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Scholars have long had a tendency to operate in silos, and those focusing on the 
Middle East have been no exception. Seldom, in fact, has there been fruitful dialogue 
between related disciplines. Area studies, including Middle Eastern studies, has 
been particularly guilty of this sin of omission, as very rarely has it engaged broader 
theoretical debates about some of the core concepts it employs in its analysis. Concepts 
such as ‘state’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘legitimacy’, ‘revolution’ and many others are often 
employed freely and with little or no attention to their genealogies, their meaning and 
use in other disciplines and some of the theoretical discussions surrounding them. 
The present volume is an exception to the rule, situating its subject of study firmly at 
the crossroads of Middle Eastern area studies and political theory, deftly also drawing 
from international relations, history and political sociology.
In the pages to come, answers to three key questions are explored: what are the roots 
of sovereign power and the supporting logic of governmentality in the Middle East; 
the timing, means and reasons why sovereign power is contested; and implications 
of the fragmentation of sovereign power for the ordering of space across the Middle 
East. This ambitious task of interrogating the centrality of sovereignty at the heart of 
the political history of contemporary Middle East is achieved through meticulous 
employment of analytical tools from several disciplines. The manuscript begins with 
an exploration of the links between domestic and regional developments, pointing 
particularly to the importance of linkages of sovereignty, agency and human action, 
and the state. Investigations of the region’s political history, the role of religion in 
shaping politics and sovereignty, and pent-up social and political pressures and their 
eruption in the 2010–11 mass uprisings follow. To bring the journey to a conclusion, 
the book ends with the responses of local states to the uprisings, and how the ensuing 
domestic repercussions continue to reverberate and to shape the region’s politics.
Trauma can be intergenerational, and from the earliest days of pan-Arabism in the 
1950s up until today, the political history of the Middle East has been marked by one 
traumatic experience after another. Structures and states are important, but so are the 
memories of the individuals who experience and respond to them. Across the Middle 
East, the states and political structures that proliferated were invariably authoritarian, 
shaping both the ways the states sought to legitimise their rule and the responses they 
elicited in their legitimation efforts. One of the most potent of the responses came from 
the domain of religion and its articulation of competing claims to authority. Agency, 
structures, states and conceptions of legitimacy at variance with each other have been 
the defining forces of Middle East politics, giving rise to geo-sectarian politics and 




These zones, and the unfolding of politics more generally, occur in urban areas. 
Urban design and architecture, intentional or accidental, and transformative processes 
such as gentrification, shape both the ways in which life can be regulated and the 
popular responses that structures and sources of authority elicit. These responses 
have led to a long history of urban political unrest across the region, culminating with 
unsurpassed contagion in what optimistically came to be called the Arab Spring. The 
Spring was not to be, however, soon reversed by the forces of violence, war and army 
coups. The outcome, ultimately, was no better than what had been replaced: houses 
built on sand, geopolitical sectarianisation, realignments and an American president 
globally plying his trade of commerce, his only trade, along with a young and ambitious 
prince determined to put his mark on Middle Eastern history. Indeed ‘end of a dream’, 
as the book soberly concludes.
What we have before us here is a rich text, informed by meticulous scholarship, 
extensive fieldwork and meaningful engagement with existing scholarship in the 
field. More importantly, the volume is theoretically informed, presenting new insights 
and interpretations, and examines, in both subtle and overt manners, the struggle 
over sovereignty, and its meaning and consequences, that has shaped so much of 
contemporary politics in the Middle East. One only hopes the present volume becomes 
a model for future generations of scholars to follow. As such, it serves as an excellent 
inaugural volume for the Identities and Geopolitics in the Middle East series.
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Crossing a street in Dahiyeh, a suburb of Beirut in the summer of 2015 should have 
been simple. It was Ramadan 1436 and the streets were adorned with colour to go with 
images of Hassan Nasrallah, Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei. Destroyed in 2006 
after the thirty- four- day war with Israel, Dahiyeh has since been rebuilt in a way that 
reflects the area’s Shi’a, Arab roots, rather than the European influences that help define 
other parts of Beirut.
Taking all of this in, I  failed to notice the SUV that had turned off Ayatollah 
Khomeini Street, but I was quickly aware of the men who jumped out of it, shouting at 
me in Arabic and Spanish, somewhat bizarrely: Who was I? What was I doing there? 
Who did I work for? Shortly thereafter, I was left to go on my way, heading back to the 
safety of my hotel. A couple of metres towards my destination, another car screeched to 
a halt and three policemen got out. Again, the questions came and the trepidation built.
Speaking with the police, it transpired that they had been asked to find out who 
I was by people who regulated life across that part of town: Hizballah. Cameras had 
been installed across Dahiyeh out of fear that there would be an attack and there was a 
liaison agreement in place between the Lebanese state police and Hizballah concerning 
security in that part of Beirut and power lay with the latter. After answering a few 
questions, I  was once again free to go. This time, I  took a taxi back to my hotel in 
Hamra, where I  remained for the afternoon. On 12 November 2015, less than four 
months after my visit, a devastating suicide attack killed 43 people and injured a 
further 200. The attack was claimed by Da’ish.
My experiences in Beirut provided a first- hand account of how sovereign power 
in Lebanon is contested. Hizballah is often referred to as a ‘state within a state’, but in 
this case the quasi state was collaborating with formal state institutions to maintain its 
security. For a state that had endured a fifteen- year long civil war in the not too distant 
past, such collaboration appeared promising. Yet the Party of God’s involvement in 
the Syrian war in support of the embattled President, Bashar Al Assad, proved deeply 
unpopular back home, increasing fears of a retreat back into sectarian violence.
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Lebanese politics has long been characterised by religious difference that is 
built into the very fabric of the state, embedded in a constitution that shares power 
along sectarian lines. This organisation of political life has left the state open to the 
geopolitical aspirations of others, leading to the penetration of Lebanese politics by 
Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel and others, resulting in the conflation of domestic and 
regional politics. Regulating life, a key part of a sovereign’s responsibilities, becomes 
increasingly difficult in such contexts, where the spread of identities and religious 
groups provides opportunities for a range of actors to wield influence and highlights 
the fragility of states across the region. It is this struggle to regulate life amid instances 
of contested sovereignty across the Middle East that is the main focus of this book.
A growing body of work quickly emerged in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, 
the spate of protests that cut across the Middle East in early 2011. The literature on 
the uprisings spans a range of different theoretical, ontological and epistemological 
positions, raising a number of important questions about the hows, whys and whens of 
the recent past. While each set of protests was driven by the theme of human dignity 
and greater political access, demands were shaped by local context. Economic concerns, 
contested ruling bargains, seemingly endemic corruption and deepening ties between 
regimes and Western states all increased anger and discontentment among peoples, 
but with particular grievances serving to mobilise people. In spite of this contextual 
difference, the target of the protesters’ ire was largely the same: the state. With this in 
mind, to understand the onset of the Arab Uprisings, we must begin by exploring ideas 
of sovereignty and political organisation in the form of the state.
While a great deal of work has focused upon questions of (in)security, a growing 
body of literature across a range of disciplines questions the centrality of the state and 
the role of religion within political life. It is here where I situate this book, albeit with 
a slightly different focus. The role of the state in the contemporary Middle East has 
long been contested, from the suggestion that its importance as a form of political 
organisation has been imposed or overstated, to the Realist position that places the 
state as central to all of political life.
A growing body of literature emerges that talks about the (re)emergence of the ‘weak’ 
Arab state amid myriad challenges to its sovereignty, from both above and below. As 
Bassel Salloukh has noted, the overlapping of domestic, transnational and geopolitical 
factors has created a scenario where as states consolidated, they not only had to 
balance against material threats but also against ideational threats. Such overlapping 
had been commonplace during the 1950s and 1960s but following the 2003 US- led 
invasion of Iraq, the regional landscape took on many of those characteristics.1 In the 
years after the Arab Uprisings, such pressures increased as states became increasingly 
unable to address – and balance – the competing pressures, fragmenting and creating 
opportunities for others to interfere within their borders.
Geopolitical struggles for Syria, Yemen and Iraq pitted regional and international 
powers against each other, with a devastating impact on local politics penetrated 
by actors and their allies. This transformation was fuelled by increasingly vitriolic 
difference that took on new meaning with the emergence of a geopolitical struggle 





It is easy to reduce the contemporary Middle East to a struggle between Sunni 
actors led by Saudi Arabia and Shi’a actors led by Iran, but the region is far more 
complex than this,3 where local identities interact with national, ethnic and religious 
denominations, while underpinned by class and ideology. Moreover, we must be 
careful not to deny local agency within the environment of this regional struggle. 
Instead, as we shall see, space is shaped by the complex interaction of regional and 
local actors, meaning that domestic political wrangling takes place within the context 
of geopolitical struggles between actors whose networks transcend state borders, 
often underpinned by shared religious values.
With this in mind, it is important to consider the role of religion within society, 
which raises a number of important philosophical and practical considerations. 
Scholars as far back as Ibn Khaldun have focused upon the social power of religion, 
which, as the twentieth century developed, became increasingly important. At the turn 
of the century, religion was largely seen as a private matter, yet in the postcolonial 
period, a number of regimes used the legitimising ideologies of religion to support 
their claims to self- determination. Religion took on an increasing political importance, 
leading to the emergence of competition between the nationalist movements of pan- 
Arabists who advocated the supremacy of the state and the Islamists who argued that 
sovereignty was found in God.
This religious revival challenged the fragile relationship between peoples and their 
nascent national projects, also serving as an outlet for political dissent. This struggle 
would be at the heart of political life in the years that followed. Yet this was not a 
singular struggle between those advocating the sovereignty of the state and those 
espousing the sovereignty of God, but complicated by a range of often competing 
interpretations about the role of Islam within political life.
Islamists, broadly speaking, believe that Islam and Islamic values should play a 
central role within public life. Although a broad phenomenon, we can view Islamists 
as those who hold that their faith provides strong political and legal guidelines beyond 
the moral code adhered to by all Muslims. Becoming an Islamist is a conscious act, 
affirming membership to a particular ideology. It is not just a response to modernity 
but it is also a product of it. The basic premise of Islamist movements is to locate Islam 
and its moral and legal codes with the fabric of the nation state. What that looks like 
in practice is a consequence of context and contingency, determined by the socio- 
economic politics of the state and the power of the group itself. As such, Islamists in 
Iran, Gaza, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia have vastly different visions of the relationship 
between Islam and the state, shaped by context and contingency. Difference is a 
consequence of the interaction of various factors that are context specific, such as class, 
nationality and ethnicity alongside the individual – and community’s – interpretation 
of Islam, and right to do so.
Some Islamists also possess cross- border networks and aspirations, challenging 
political organisation across the Middle East in the process. Although groups including 
the Muslim Brotherhood (and its affiliates) and Hizballah (and its networks) both operate 
across the region, they fall broadly within the rubric of the sovereign state’s system 
and engage in electoral politics. Other groups who also fall within broad definitions of 
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Islamism include those who conduct what they hold to be religiously sanctioned warfare 
as a consequence of their obligations. Even those who carry out such acts range from 
those with a fundamentalist Salafi vision to the Sufis, via those who lack a classical Islamic 
education.
Perhaps the most obvious point of tension, however, is the emergence of politically, 
economically and socially charged sectarian difference across and within spatial 
borders. The struggle between Sunni and Shi’a communities is politically charged, 
fusing faith with political identities and geopolitical aspirations. Competing views of 
sectarian difference exist, from the primordialist who reduces difference to faith, to the 
constructivist who views identities as constructed phenomena. Yet this is not purely an 
academic debate. Speaking in 2013, President Obama referred to ‘ancient hatreds’ in 
explaining the underlying reasons for the Syrian conflict, ignoring the lack of political 
space and the increasing barbarism of the regime.
Writing in 2015, Naser Ghobadzdeh and Shahram Akbarzadeh noted that,
Once othering becomes part of politico- religious discourse, it moves to all levels 
of society, transforming itself into as much a bottom- up as a top- down process. 
Over the course of time, othering rhetoric has expanded beyond theology to 
become a decisive part of political, social, religious and economic reality.4
Ghobadzdeh and Akbarzadeh’s point is astute. The politicisation of sectarian difference 
has given such identities almost existential importance within – and across – territorial 
borders, resulting in not only top- down but bottom- up constructions of othering, shaped 
by context- specific contingent factors. Put another way, the factors that shape sectarian 
difference are radically different in Lebanon than they are in Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan 
or Saudi Arabia. In each of these states, local historiographies give particular meaning 
to communal groups – shaped by social, political and economic contexts – which can 
result in distinct manifestations of difference when interacting with sectarian meta- 
narratives. There is, of course, a marked difference between the two sects and people 
who bear those identities, but there is nothing inherently violent about such difference. 
Instead, sectarian difference appears to be an inescapable phenomenon that ignites amid 
socio- political upheaval, uncertainty and fear, finding traction amid fragmentation.
As Fanar Haddad observes, the concept of sectarianism appears to be merely a slogan, 
deriving meaning in the eye of the beholder. In a powerful piece that documents the use 
of over a hundred scholarly sources on the subject of sectarianism, Haddad argues that 
the concept ‘lacks and eludes definition’, giving it an amorphous quality that allows it 
to be used almost indiscriminately to label anything related to sect identity.5 A great 
deal of this scholarly literature seeks to define the concept, although a large body of 
literature follows Haddad’s lead and chooses not to define a concept that has become too 
politicised and emotionally charged to possess analytic clarity. Locating myself in this 
camp, I follow Haddad by deploying the term sectarian with an adjoining word when 
necessary but aiming for the greatest level of precision and analytic clarity as possible.
A deeper problem of latent Orientalism within Western analysis of the Middle East 





serious problems. The first is a ‘flagrant tendency’ to dismiss the abiding importance 
of religion. The second is the continued desire to view the nation- state model as the 
‘proper vehicle’ of political organisation.6 Both views emerge from post- Enlightenment 
European history, ignoring the local historiographies of the region and projecting 
norms on to a region with its own unique normative and cultural history. Such issues, 
both philosophical and empirical, are prevalent across a great deal of the literature 
written in the recent past. In times of crisis and uncertainty, political landscapes and 
social contracts are redrawn. The toppling of a number of Arab leaders in the aftermath 
of the popular protests in 2011 prompted a burgeoning literature detailing the events 
and the violence that swiftly followed.7 Yet very little work has been undertaken placing 
the protests within the context of political dissent and contestation across the Middle 
East in the twentieth and twenty- first centuries.
In George Orwell’s magnum opus 1984, the Party slogan, ‘Who controls the past 
controls the future. Who controls the present controls the past’, seeks to restrict agency. 
Such comments also evoke memories of Walter Benjamin, who noted that history is 
written by the victors. History is important. History provides a narrative that justifies 
action, which supports claims to legitimacy and, ultimately, power. Often this involves 
attempts to rewrite history, such as the order given by the Egyptian President Gamal 
Abd Al Nasser to destroy all evidence of Egypt’s military activity in Yemen.
Political projects are amorphous entities, constructed and shaped through the 
interaction of countless actors and social forces. Understanding the emergence of 
political projects and the sovereign claims that underpin them requires an exploration 
of the processes of state building. Such mechanisms have rarely proved inclusive; 
instead, they have typically been inherently exclusionary, leading to people struggling 
for basic needs. Complicated by the precariousness of modernity, the struggle for 
certainty pushes people to a range of different identities and ideologies in search for 
meaning. Amid such factors, regimes seek to maintain power, using a range of logics 
of governmentality to do so. To understand such techniques, I draw on the work of a 
number of scholars including Giorgio Agamben, Hannah Arendt, Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari, Achille Mbembe, Khaldun, Robert Cover and Peter Berger, whose work 
allows for rigorous exploration of the relationship between rulers and ruled and the 
construction of political projects.8
In order to achieve this task, it is necessary, at times, to paint with a broad brush, 
meaning that a number of important incidents are either covered briefly or not at all. 
This is not a reflection of the importance of such events but rather, the need to be 
selective in the examples considered to facilitate analysis of events across the region. 
I  have deployed a broad but implicit comparative framework where I  select events 
not only based on similarity but also difference to provide a region- wide analysis of 
events. Although the Arab Uprisings were trigged by the actions of a Tunisian street 
vendor, this book does not engage with events in North Africa, for reasons of scope 
and analytical clarity.
In support of this, I draw upon fieldwork conducted across the Middle East between 
2011 and 2018, along with interviews conducted with a range of people via phone, Skype 
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political structures. All names have been removed to maintain anonymity and after a 
number of worrying events, locations have also been removed in an attempt to ensure 
safety. This empirical material is supported by tweets, diplomatic cables (released by 
WikiLeaks), speeches, constitutions and secondary literature in English, Arabic and 
Persian. I also draw upon material from my time as specialist advisor to the House 
of Lords International Relations Committee, which produced a report on the UK’s 
relationship with the Middle East entitled Time for a New Realism. In this role I was 
involved in selecting expert witnesses and writing questions for witness sessions. The 
committee drew expert testimony from ambassadors, civil society leaders, academics, 
policymakers, and a round table of ‘young people’. I have not included any confidential 
material or referred to private sessions of the committee.
At times, this book seeks to offer a historiography of claims to sovereignty, yet it 
should not be read solely as such. Nor should it be taken as purely a work of political 
theory. Instead, I  seek to combine the two to offer an approach to understanding 
the contemporary Middle East that uses political theory to deconstruct claims to 
sovereignty. In doing this, I hope to explore the claims and mechanisms through which 
life is regulated. Central to this are the following questions:
• What are the roots of sovereign power and what are the logics of governmentality 
that support it?
• When, how and why is sovereign power contested?
• What implications does the fragmentation of sovereign power have on the ordering 
of space across the Middle East?
With this in mind, the book is split across eight chapters. Chapter  1 engages with 
debates about sovereignty in the contemporary Middle East, interrogating ideas of 
space and nomos in the process of suggesting that amid shared normative environments, 
what happens within the borders of one state can have repercussions beyond the state. 
Chapter 2 offers a genealogy of states across the twentieth and twenty- first centuries, 
focusing upon the establishment of states amid competing pressures of decolonisation, 
pan- Arabism, pan- Islamism and nationalism. It then considers how political projects 
exist and operate amid regional and international pressures such as the War on Terror 
and the Arab Uprisings.
Chapter 3 explores the development of political structures and the means through 
which regimes exert sovereign power, through cultivating the ban, exclusion and 
eviscerating political meaning from life. Chapter 4 engages with the role of religion 
within political life and sovereign projects broadly. It interrogates a key source of 
sovereign tension and the space of possibility that emerges as a consequence. Chapter 5 
looks at the urban environment. With a large majority of the region’s population living 
in cities, urban landscapes become a prominent arena through which politics plays out.
Chapter 6 explores the Arab Uprisings, placing them in historical context and 
suggesting that they are the latest manifestation of long- standing grievances that have 
emerged as a fundamental consequence of building political projects. Chapter 7 looks 










meaning from political life to the emergence of war machines. Such variety reveals 
the multifarious stresses and pressures on regimes seeking to maintain power amid 
an array of societal pressures. Chapter 8 locates the domestic repercussions of the 
Arab Uprisings and their aftermath within broader Middle Eastern geopolitical and 
normative environments.
Central to all chapters is a focus upon the role of agency. The uprisings were triggered 
by the actions of a single individual whose act of resistance inspired the region- wide 
contestation of sovereign power. In the face of biopolitics and necropolitics, the 
power of agency appears limited, yet we should never underestimate the ability of one 
person or one idea to facilitate change. Fundamentally, the book argues that the Arab 
Uprisings were (the latest) manifestations of sovereign contestation that can be traced 
across state- building projects in the Middle East.
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The politics of sovereignty and space1
Politics, for the Arab philosopher Khaldun, concerns ‘the administration of home 
or city in accordance with ethical and philosophical requirements, for the purpose 
of directing the mass toward a behaviour that will result in the preservation and 
permanence of the (human) species’.2 This quest for survival, at the heart of Khaldun’s 
understanding of politics, raises a number of fundamental questions about space, law, 
security and ultimately survival, which remain pertinent today. The questions emerging 
from Khaldun’s work are certainly apt when discussing the contemporary Middle 
East, where the construction of political organisation has been directed towards the 
regulation of life. This chapter explores the way in which life has been regulated across 
the space of sovereign states, drawing on the work of Giorgio Agamben, Hannah 
Arendt, Robert Cover, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari.
Although the concept of the sovereign state is one that is traditionally associated 
with European political philosophy, states have manifested across the region as the 
contemporary form of political organisation, replacing the tribe, umma, khalifa 
and sultanate, which had regulated life prior to the demise of the Ottoman Empire. 
According to Charles Tilly, the dominance of the European view is a consequence of 
three hundred years of Europeans and their descendants imposing their system on 
the world.3 Of course, states that were imposed three hundred years ago are vastly 
different to their modern relations, stemming from developments in all forms of life; 
the modern nation state is an altogether different beast albeit one that continues to 
interact with the legacy and memory of what came before.
Debate over the imposition and the creation of artificial political projects 
by external powers  – referred to as ‘the original sin of state creation’ by Ghassan 
Salame – has been a prominent feature of discussions of state formation and state 
building in the politics of the region.4 While often viewed as artificial entities and 
condemned as impotent, states largely remain intact into the twenty- first century, 
predicated upon a range of context- specific contingent factors that shape the nature 
of social contracts and political life. Yet questions about the very nature of the state 
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A great deal of work has been undertaken on states and their claims to 
sovereign power. Focusing on the Middle East, scholars including Nazih N. Ayubi, 
Roger Owen, Lisa Anderson, Charles Tripp, Sami Zubaida, Fred Halliday, Philip 
S.  Khoury, Joseph Kostiner, Raymond Hinnebusch and Fouad Ajami (among 
others) have all engaged with such projects with a variety of different conclusions.5 
Although taking divergent theoretical, ontological and conceptual approaches, 
these works trace the development and interaction of states, peoples, bureaucracies 
and ideologies, focusing upon different loci of power and the spatial repercussions 
of such projects.
Acknowledging the important contributions made by these authors, I endorse Joel 
Migdal’s definition of the state as:
[An] organization, composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the 
state’s leadership (executive authority) that has the ability or authority to make 
and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of 
rule making for other social organizations in a given territory.6
Following Charles Tripp, I also view the state as a consequence of performability, an 
ongoing process that refutes the ‘fixed’ nature of states. In accepting this, I view states 
as political projects that are shaped and reshaped by the context and contingency of 
spatial dynamics. In times of crisis, performances draw upon a range of different forms 
of symbolic capital to maintain or re- establish the state, yet such processes often lead 
to contestation within domestic borders and across the region.
State- building processes are typically understood by considering the work 
of Charles Tilly, whose thesis ‘war made the state and the state made war’ offers a 
convincing account of the development of state institutions.7 Within debate and 
reflection on the nature of statehood, comparisons are often made with European states 
and the Weberian ‘ideal’ type, which bring together concepts of security, welfare and 
representation. Yet as Rolf Schwarz argues, perhaps this ideal type is the exception, not 
the rule; instead, regulating interactions in a number of context- specific ways.8 While 
the Middle East has been shaped, and perhaps in the middle of the twentieth century 
characterised, by violent conflict, territorial gain was not always the primary goal.9 The 
rapid militarisation of the Middle East supports this premise, increasing insecurity as 
a consequence, yet closer examination reveals that conflict has been facilitated by the 
massive extraction of rent derived from natural resources10 often viewed as ‘the gift 
from nature’ facilitating regime survival.
Within debate on political systems and state– society relations in the Middle East 
there is typically a conflation between state, sovereign, government and regime. This 
is deeply problematic and before we move forward, we must quickly distinguish 
between different typologies. Regimes are more permanent representations of political 
organisation than governments or leaders, but they are less permanent than the state. 
Regimes typically pre- date both the state and nation11 thus state- and nation- building 
projects are driven by regimes, with their own survival at the forefront of political 








The politics of sovereignty and space 11
11
of a number of competing identities and ideologies. With this in mind, the state is 
taken as a ‘more permanent structure of domination and coordination including a 
coercive apparatus and the means to administer a society and extract resources from 
it’.12 Thus, domestic sovereignty is the ability to regulate life based upon the context- 
specific relationship between ruler and ruled that is shaped by a range of contingent 
factors. Thus, to understand the emergence of states across the Middle East we must 
follow Albert Hourani’s lead and retain that which was previously discarded.13
While discussion of statehood is certainly of paramount importance, it is here 
where I  depart from other scholars, choosing instead to focus upon the concept 
of sovereignty as the lens through which interactions are regulated rather than 
discussing typologies of political organisation. As Talal Asad articulates, the state, 
‘independently of the entire population, embodies sovereignty’14 but the separation 
of sovereignty from state poses a range of challenges. As Lisa Anderson notes in 
a brief bibliography on the concept of the state in the Arab world, this approach 
of ungluing sovereignty from statehood is potentially disconcerting on normative 
grounds as sovereign power may be ‘reattached’ to monarchs, princely families or 
even firms.15 I do not go quite so far in my analysis. Instead, I  argue that such an 
approach is necessary to understand the claims to power made by regimes and from 
this, the way in which political life is contested. Ultimately, focusing on sovereignty 
allows for exploration of political communities and their relationship with both 
territory and regional dynamics.
Inherent to the parabolic pressures that forge states are innumerable forms of 
contestation. To ensure survival, rulers have imposed political, legal and economic 
structures to secure their rule, creating order within space while also cultivating 
narratives to increase legitimacy and recognition among both internal and external 
audiences. Several states have referred to pan- state ideologies  – Arabism and 
Islamism  – in an effort to unite peoples across the region, which has often been 
driven by national interest.16 More recently, ideas of sectarian unity have been used to 
construct membership of a shared community against an ‘other’ that is often perceived 
to possess nefarious intent. This reference to pan- state ideologies which transcend 
state borders and political organisation reveals the presence of a shared normative 
environment, which poses serious challenges to state sovereignty and the Westphalian 
principle of ‘non- interference’.17 Referring to leadership of the umma18 has led some to 
suggest that dawla (states) have no real power and that true authority – sovereignty – 
can only be found in God and membership of the umma.
Such challenges emerging from the relationship between religion and politics are 
not restricted to Islam and are perhaps more obvious in the complex relationship 
between the state of Israel and myriad sects of Judaism, where competing visions 
of political organisation define the spatial limits of the state. The most prominent 
example of such contestation is apparent in the building of settlement outposts in the 
West Bank. which is sometimes undertaken by the state but also undertaken by groups 
contesting the state’s authority. Organisations such a Gush Emunim and the Hilltop 
Youth have conducted ‘price tag’ attacks against the state and Palestinians while also 
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about its downfall. Recent estimates suggest that over five hundred thousand people 
live in settlements – some of which are sanctioned by the state – in the West Bank, 
with a growing number living in Area B, in breach of the Oslo Accords.19 Of course, 
questions about the territorial limits of political organisation play an increasingly 
important role in the nature of state sovereignty and the relationship between regimes 
and people, within and across space.
From the Sykes– Picot agreement until the present day, external powers have 
played a prominent role in shaping the nature of regional politics and the daily life of 
individuals, albeit with tensions emerging between states and global economic forces.20 
The legacy of colonialism is easily seen in the development of political organisation 
across the region. From the residue of the Ottomans to mandates and the role of British 
agents across the Gulf, the prominence of external actors in shaping political structures 
must not be ignored.21 For some, the very existence of the state is evidence of this 
colonial legacy, viewing the emergence of the contemporary state as the impact of 
Western forces. Yet in acknowledging such a position, one has to be careful not to deny 
native agency to those involved in political life, as local contexts feature prominently 
in the construction of political life and the regulation of space.
Penetration also takes place through the emergence of a global economy and 
actions of private companies and individuals who continue to reproduce economic, 
political and legal structures that feed into the (re)construction of the sovereign state. 
While the discovery of oil was heralded to facilitate autonomy and strength across 
the region, the patron– client relationships that emerged contributed to economic 
structures shaping dependency across the region.22 Over time these relationships have 
changed, but patron– client relations continue to penetrate – and shape – the region, 
through helping define the spatial limits of political projects but also the capacity of 
sovereign power itself.23
The history of an idea
If one is asked to trace the roots of the sovereign state, one typically begins with the 
1648 Peace of Westphalia, which established the principle of non- interference based 
upon the premise of states possessing exclusive authority within their territorial 
borders.24 The peace treaties signed at Munster and Osnabruck established the 
inviolable norm of non- interference within the domestic affairs of other states, 
enshrining borders, security and order within relations between different states 
defined by spatial boundaries. Of course, the structure of such forms of organisation 
differs, shaped by time, space and local traditions, yet the principle of non- 
interference remains central.
Over the years, scholars have sought to trace the philosophical roots of sovereignty 
and with it, constituent parts of the idea, with a recent focus on the ordering of life. 
The opening line of Political Theology, Carl Schmitt’s seminal work that would shape 
scholarly work on the concept of sovereignty in the coming years, clearly articulates his 
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state of exception as a paradigm of government that, as Agamben later suggests, ‘has 
today reached its full development’.26
Building upon Schmitt and Foucault  – along with others including Hannah 
Arendt and Walter Benjamin  – Agamben’s Homo Sacer project is grounded in 
biopolitics, concerned with the organisation and control of human life through the 
governance power of the state. Ultimately, it is an approach concerned with inclusion 
through exclusion. Fundamental to this is the sovereign decision over where the law 
applies and where it does not. For Agamben, ‘the rule, suspending itself, gives rise 
to the exception and, maintaining itself in relation to the exception, first constitutes 
itself as a rule’.27
Within this ‘paradigm of government’, Agamben suggests that the law ‘encompasses 
living beings by means of its own suspension’, controlling life through locating bare life 
at the forefront of politics, rejecting the rule of law in the process.28 Fundamental to 
this line of thought is the idea that ‘the state of exception is the preliminary condition 
for any definition of the relation that binds and at the same time abandons the living 
being to the law’,29 deciding which forms of life are worth living in the process.
As Agamben argues,
[T] he realm of bare life  – which is originally situated at the margins of the 
political order  – gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and 
exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoe, right and fact, enter 
into a zone of irreducible indistinction. At once excluding bare life from and 
capturing it within the political order, the state of exception actually constituted, 
in its very separateness, the hidden foundation on which the entire political 
system rested.30
Within the state of exception, the sovereign differentiates between the realms of bios 
and zoe, creating a binary distinction between those recognised as fully human through 
their participation in political life and those who are outside, where political life and 
meaning is stripped from them, creating a zone of indistinction and bare life. The 
marginalisation of people into the condition of bare life can occur as a consequence of 
a number of different processes, yet in attempting to escape these conditions, violent 
dislocations occur between regimes and society.
Central to Agamben’s project is the idea of the camp, the ‘hidden paradigm of 
the political space of modernity’, a site of possibility as well as a specific area within 
which life is stripped of meaning.31 The camp is a spatial- ontological arena, a space 
of possibility and the link between localisation and ordering. Fundamentally it is a 
spatial construct, existing beyond the normal juridical and governmental order, 
with implications for ordering international politics.32 The camp emerges when the 
exception becomes the rule, in specific sites but also as a broader space of metaphysical 
possibility, which creates the conditions within which human life may be reduced to 
bare life.33 Although a space of exception, the physical manifestation of the camp exists 
as a territorial area that lies beyond the juridical order, the production of a spatial 
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In The Kingdom and the Glory, Agamben builds upon these ideas, arguing that ‘the 
real problem, the central mystery of politics is not sovereignty, but government … it is 
not the law, but the police – that is to say, the governmental machine that they form and 
support’ (emphasis in original).35 In a complex yet persuasive argument, he suggests 
that politics is comprised of the constituent parts of government structures that build 
the mechanisms of the state. Identifying and engaging with these structures is then 
imperative when considering political change and its processes.36 This distinction 
between government machinery and those constrained by it provides an opportunity 
to differentiate between rulers and ruled, between regimes and society and it is here 
where we can build upon Agamben’s work to allow for greater discussion of the 
contemporary Middle East.
In such conditions, the metaphysical constitution of the state, encapsulated in the 
concept of sovereignty, ‘gives birth to law’37 and ultimately, the state of exception and 
the ban. Legal structures, institutions and the zone of indistinction do not exist in 
a vacuum; rather, they are contingent upon and shaped by conditions and cultural 
relations that are prominent features of political organisation. Efforts to understand 
such dynamics in the aftermath of state formation have been all too quick to discard 
the legacy of tradition, as Hourani argues, disregarding what was retained38 and what 
continued to shape interactions within the political and institutional fabric of the state. 
Such a position stresses the importance of considering both formal and normative 
structures in shaping the ban and the regulation of life.39
Yet in cases of severe contestation, the regulation of life is not sufficient as a means 
of articulating sovereign power. Although sovereign power exists within localised and 
ordered space, when spatial borders and the means through which space is ordered 
become contested, sovereign power too is called into question. An alternative logic 
of governmentality is posed by Achille Mbembe, who argues that in such cases, 
sovereign power is not just about the regulation of life but it is also the power over 
death, the systematic destruction of people and the subjugation of life to death, as 
‘the living dead’.40 Central to Mbembe’s theorisation is consideration of the following 
question:  ‘Under what practical conditions is the right to kill, to allow to live, or to 
expose to death exercised?’41 This approach, referred to as necropolitics, builds on 
similar foundations to Agamben, taking it a step further to exert the power to control 
those who live and die.
The increasing prominence of work by scholars such as Agamben and Mbembe 
within international relations has stimulated a vibrant debate over the application 
of such ideas to the contemporary world.42 One of the main points of tension in 
Agamben’s work is concerned with his understanding of biopolitics, which builds 
upon Foucault’s engagement with the term, seeking to ‘correct’ a number of factors, 
notably the idea that the rise of biopower heralded the emergence of modernity.43 
Instead, Agamben argues that politics is always biopolitical, as the political is shaped 
by the state of exception and its production of bare life. Another point of contention 
concerns the lack of development of this monolithic construction of bare life,44 which 
can differ depending upon context and conditions. Nor does Agamben differentiate 
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it is the division between bios and zoe that is the most important characteristic of 
political life.45
Perhaps the most damning criticism of Agamben’s work concerns the role of agency 
and scope for resistance against structural conditions.46 It is clear that structural 
factors are central to discussions of sovereignty and that agency operates within the 
confines of structural parameters. Yet Agamben’s approach is guilty of restricting 
agency, removing socio- economic contexts that are essential for understanding the 
contingency and relativity of different situations. Even within restrictive conditions, 
individuals have the capacity to exercise agency, no matter how remote the possibility; 
and as a number of scholars note, even the refugee can exercise agency.47 From this, 
amid the increasingly restrictive conditions of authoritarian rule, we can still speak of 
agency and the exception.
Agamben responds to this criticism by suggesting that agency is reasserted by 
taking ownership of the condition, as ‘putting life into play’.48 To claim ownership, one 
has to accept the conditions of ‘being thus’ and to acknowledge the conditions within 
which one exists. Even this lacks methodological development, failing to adequately 
explore the impact of agency upon structures, as agency also operates prior to being 
and both prior to and post restructuring. Returning agency to the discussion allows 
for a greater analysis of political activity and consideration of structural changes 
within society.
Agamben speaks of the destruction of identities (and agency) through 
desubjectivation and resubjectivation, the reshaping of destroyed identities. If 
individuals exercise agency then this is a resubjectivation of the self. In Agamben’s 
work, sovereignty is fully constituted as the only conceptual space within which the 
logic of sovereignty is sound but this concept merges potentiality and being, where 
potentiality can only be viewed retroactively.49 Slavoj Žižek’s response to this is to 
suggest that there must be an act prior to being, ‘overlooking the fact that the order 
of being is never simply given, but is itself grounded in some preceding Act’.50 By 
accepting Žižek’s point, we take sovereignty as a process that is ongoing in order to 
maintain logical consistency and by focusing upon the act, we are able to return agency 
to our project, albeit shaped by context and contingency.
In The Use of Bodies, Agamben engages with ontology and potentiality to suggest 
that sovereignty should be a process, an act that repeats itself, which supports both 
the need to do this and the scope for us to do so. With that in mind, the process of 
sovereignty is ongoing, continually regulating life, yet amid the fragmentation of 
political organisation, this regulation evolves into the subjugation of life to death. 
Ultimately, what remains central are regime struggles to retain power and exert 
sovereignty, using a range of different logics of governmentality. When it is contested, 
the mere regulation of life through the ban and exception suffice, yet when this 
contestation escalates, the regulation of life turns to subjugation of death. While 
sovereign projects are typically associated with territorial spaces that are central to 
the Westphalian state, amid fragmentation and contestation the parameters of space 
become disputed. As Mbembe suggests, space is ‘the raw material of sovereignty and 
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The fragmentation of sovereignty can result in existential transformation as life is 
displaced, often stripped of political meaning and reduced to bare life. It is within 
such conditions that we see the emergence of war machines, entities that challenge 
the rule- based form of political organisation. Developed by Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari, the concept of the war machine sits in opposition to the state, which exists as 
an apparatus of power distinct from societies. Seeking to reject the power of the state, 
particularly amid conditions of fragmentation, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that a 
new form of war emerges, akin to that conducted by nomads. The analogy used to 
denote this is between a game of chess and Go where the former codes and decodes 
space while the latter seeks to territorialise or deterritorialise.52
This form of war is often in tension with state apparatus but is also counter- 
hegemonic, applying as much to intellectual debate as to conflict.53 War machines exist 
as the manifestation of disruption, operating against states, but also with the possibility 
of being incorporated into state structures. Within sites and spaces of exception, power 
is ‘contracted’ out, functioning as private organisations one stage removed from the 
state. The idea of the war machine evokes memories of a Hobbesian ‘war of all against 
all’ following the descent into the state of nature, particularly amid the fragmentation 
of political organisation.
The goal of the war machine is to bring everything back to the ‘empty space’ of 
what is seen as the primordial tabula rasa. As Deleuze and Guattari suggest, the war 
machine is ‘a pure form of exteriority, whereas the State apparatus constitutes the form 
of interiority’, the means through which space is coded and decoded: ‘It is the State that 
makes possible the distinction between governors and governed’.54 Fundamentally, ‘the 
concern of the State is to conserve’55 while the war machine aims to deterritorialise, 
seen in the nomad who challenges ‘the rules and structures of the sedentarised form 
of political life, existing as a fundamental challenge to states, for whom a vital concern 
is to vanquish nomadism’ and to ‘establish a zone of rights over an entire “exterior” ’.56
Operating through interaction with the state, the war machine challenges the 
ordering of space. The unappropriated war machine
has as its object not war but the drawing of a creative line of flight, the composition 
of smooth space and of the movement of people in that space. At this other pole, 
the machine does indeed encounter war, but as its supplementary or synthetic 
object, now directed against the State and against the worldwide axiomatic 
expressed by the States.57
The manifestation of a war machine is irreducible to the state apparatus although, 
as we shall see, it may be appropriated by states, wherein previously autonomous 
social movements are harnessed by a regime, losing their deterritorialised essence in 
the process and embracing purposeless destruction.58 It is beyond the scope of our 
project to go into these concepts in more detail, but the idea of war machines offers 
a conceptual tool to discuss mobilisation against state power – as a manifestation of 
exterior against interior – which, as we shall see in later chapters, plays a prominent 
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Space and nomos
While politics is inherently about people, space is the theatre within which interactions 
take place. It is simultaneously a physical environment, a semiotic abstraction, and 
relational.59 These interactions exist within one another and coexist within power 
relations and social practices. Each society produces a space of its own nature along 
with a set of rules that regulate behaviour within space. The concept of space is deeply 
contested among scholars yet is central to understanding contemporary political 
organisation, from the camp to the city to the state. Each different definition contains 
within it sets of interactions and struggles for domination, which are context specific 
and shaped by a range of different contingent factors. Such a position bears the 
hallmarks of the work of Doreen Massey, who in For Space sets out three propositions 
that are central to our project. First, space is the product of a set of interactions and 
struggles that range from the ‘intimately tiny’ to the global. Second, space should be 
viewed as a sphere of possibility, heterogeneity and multiplicity. Third, that space is 
in a constant state of construction.60 Through these interactions, what happens in 
one space can have implications for other spaces, transcending both political and 
normative environments.
The establishment of boundaries is fundamentally an attempt to stabilise meaning 
within space and time, although such efforts are sites of contestation, ‘battles of the 
power to label space- time, to impose the meaning to be attributed to space’.61 They are 
sites of contestation, arenas within which power is exerted.62 Yet such things are not truly 
bounded, but rather in flux, ongoing processes of movement and evolution; social and 
dynamic, with scope for reproduction and transformation.63 People operate and exist 
within such spaces, regulated by power relations and given meaning amid contestation 
and the definition of community by articulating an outside against which one is closed 
off, although amid fluid boundaries this closure is increasingly problematic. Although 
regimes and states are the actors that predominantly regulate space, they are not alone. 
When meaning is rejected it becomes contested amid efforts to (re)appropriate space. 
In doing this, rights become asserted through the performance of a new spatiality by 
contesting the regulatory mechanisms – the governmentality – of such spaces.
Agamben’s Homo Sacer project is one that engages with profoundly spatial questions. 
Central to discussions of space and political life is nomos, a foundational ancient Greek 
concept used to denote ‘a range or province, within which defined powers may be 
legitimately exercised’.64 Nomos is subject of a range of (often competing) interpretations 
that facilitate the interrogation of order, life and existence.65 Agamben’s reading of nomos 
is influenced by Schmitt, whose treatise The Nomos of the Earth set out a view of world 
order that roots law to land, stressing fundamentally spatial characteristics through the 
interaction of ortung (localisation) and ordnung (ordering).66 Schmitt’s understanding 
of nomos views it as ‘the original spatial order, the source of all further concrete order 
and further law. It is the reproductive root in the normative order of history’.67
Schmitt’s ideas come out of the end of the Second World War and are underpinned 
by his views on the political and a fundamental concern with order. In his view, politics 











Houses built on sand18
18
space.68 This, for geographers such as Claudio Minca and Rory Rowan, demonstrates 
Schmitt’s spatial turn, as such events take place within space, but also shape space. In 
this view, land appropriation was the foundational act of existence, resulting in the 
belief that the nomos was a fundamentally ontological act, an original spatialisation.69 
Schmitt’s work suggests that nomos is a consequence of the interaction between 
ordnung and ortung, between space and ordering and while this interaction is 
important, it suffers through Schmitt’s failure to acknowledge both the importance 
of agency and norms. Indeed, as John Agnew argues, the very idea of the state as the 
manifestation of political organisation requires drawing upon shared histories and 
cultural legacies in an attempt to create order within space.70
In contrast, for Agamben, nomos is the localisation of the unlocalisable, the 
immediate form through which Schmitt’s axiom that ‘the political and social order of 
a people becomes spatially visible’ rings true.71 Concepts of polis and nomos are thus 
fundamentally interrelated, shaped by spatial concerns. As Deleuze and Guattari argue,
[T] he State itself has always been in a relation with an outside, and is 
inconceivable independent of that relationship. The law of the State is not the 
law of All or Nothing (State- societies or counter- State societies), but that of 
interior and exterior. The State is sovereignty. But sovereignty only reigns over 
what it is capable of internalizing, of appropriating locally.72
Building on Schmitt, Agamben adds the nation as an additional dimension of 
discussions about the nomos,73 suggesting that the global nomos is a product of neo- 
liberal modernity, the spatial manifestation of the unlocalisable exception. Yet within 
this global nomos are individual spatial orderings  – nomoi  – characterised by the 
global nomos yet given meaning by the context and contingency of space and local 
agency.74 Countless identities, ideologies and beliefs exist often with competing 
views of political organisation, emerging in the relationships that people have to the 
governance structures of the state and the way in which people live their lives. Such 
a view means that although existing within a global nomos, there are other nomoi – 
with spatial characteristics – that order communities; it is the spatial characteristic that 
differentiates nomos and nomoi from norms. The manifestation of sovereign power 
is contingent on the organisation of such spaces  – particularly in the postcolonial 
world – brought to life by Schmitt’s ideas about the interaction between ordnung and 
ortung. This position suggests that we must not only focus more on the normative 
aspect of nomos but also engage with questions about the very concept of community.
Communities are central not only to discussions of nomos but also to the very 
nature of political organisation. As Hans Lindahl argues, ‘no political community 
is imaginable … that does not close itself off as an inside over against an outside. 
Moreover, and no less importantly, by closing itself off as an inside with respect to an 
outside, a community posits a space as its own’.75 Here, not only does the closing off 
define the metaphysical aspects of a community and with it, the rules that regulate it, 
but also the space that a community resides in. Such a definition is not fixed, however, 
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institutions.76 Moreover, in closing off space against an outside, the possibility of 
citizenship is conditioned through membership of a shared community.
For Hannah Arendt, ‘all legislation creates first of all a space in which it is valid, 
and this place is the world in which can move in freedom. What lies outside this space 
is lawless and properly speaking without a world’.77 In On Revolution, the importance 
of spatially bounded territory for the establishment of a political community and the 
rules that regulate life are acknowledged.78 Here, however, we can see parallels with the 
work of Khaldun, who makes similar claims about the importance of boundaries and 
the normative ordering of space:
[1] The world is a garden the fence of which is the dynasty. [2] The dynasty is an 
authority through which life is given to proper behaviour. [3] Proper behaviour 
is a policy directed by the ruler. [4] The ruler is an institution supported by the 
soldiers. [5] The soldiers are helpers who are maintained by money. [6] Money 
is sustenance brought together by subjects. [7] The subjects are servants who are 
protected by justice. [8] Justice is something familiar, and through it the world 
persists. The world is a garden.79
This approach evokes ideas of the need for a reflexive reading of nomos of the sort 
advocated by Hans Lindahl, stressing the ongoing relationship of ordnung and ortung 
and between nomos and nomoi. This dialectic relationship has occupied a central role 
in the establishment and evolution of political projects across the past century.
Building on this and the notion that the closure of space conditions the possibility 
of citizenship, Arendt argues that the world gains meaning through the interaction of 
people, their words and deeds.80 This world building is an essential part of the closure 
of an inside against an outside, stressing the importance of the normative within 
nomos and political community. Put another way, as Robert Cover argues, ‘to inhabit 
a nomos is to know how to live in it’.81 Knowing how to live requires awareness of 
both the formal and normative structures that can regulate life: the political, legal and 
economic structures that are designed and implemented by regimes, along with the 
normative structures that can be harnessed by both regimes and communities for a 
range of ends. In harnessing the normative, myths, narratives and histories can be 
moulded and put to use in ‘meaningful patterns’ to regulate behaviour and can be 
passed across generations, learned, developed and moulded.
Yet as Cover acknowledges, the establishment of such a nomos brings with it its 
own unavoidable demise, amid debate around interpretation, creed, identity and 
practice. Thus, a fleeting instant of emergence as objective meaning creates a template 
for ‘a thousand real integrations’.82 Take, for example, faith and membership of a 
religious community. Beyond that immediate moment of shared belief, a plurality of 
interpretations exist that differ in practice, leading to contestation and a struggle to 
regulate political life and meaning. For Cover,
Legal precepts and principles are not only demands made upon us by society, 
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communicates with others. There is a difference between sleeping late on Sunday 
and refusing the sacraments, between having a snack and desecrating the fast of 
Yom Kippur, between banking a check and refusing to pay your income tax. In 
each case an act signifies something new and powerful when we understand that 
the act is in reference to a norm. It is this characteristic of certain lawbreaking 
that gives rise to special claims for civil disobedients. But the capacity of law to 
imbue action with significance is not limited to resistance or disobedience. Law 
is a resource in signification that enables us to submit, rejoice, struggle, pervert, 
mock, disgrace humiliate, or dignify.83
Similar arguments can be made about Islam and interpretations of Quran, Sunna 
and hadith. While some claims are fundamental  – such as tawahid, the oneness of 
God – transgression is also justified within the Quran, leading to numerous possible 
interpretations.84
Of course, different contexts and their socio- economic, historical, cultural 
contingencies only serve to facilitate transgression and diffusion; for example, a 
Muslim in the UK has a different set of experiences and context- specific practices to a 
Muslim in Indonesia, while a Muslim in Israel has a different way of life to a Muslim in 
Oman. At a more micro level, a Sunni Muslim in Saudi Arabia will have a different set 
of beliefs, practices and experiences to a Shi’a Muslim from the same state. The nomos 
then becomes the arena for the interaction of a set of normative structures predicated 
upon a shared belief and fleeting moment of unity, resulting in a process of tension 
and reconciliation that plays out in the community. From this we can see how ideas 
easily transcend the territorially grounded polis, leading to challenges to the sovereign 
state, the global nomos and competing interpretations of ordnung and ortung, although 
this challenges the idea of a political community as closed off as an inside against an 
outside, contesting sovereign power in the process.
Yet when considering how different communities emerge that seek to close 
themselves off as an inside against an outside, tensions arise between different visions 
of the inside and the extent to which normative ordering finds traction in space. Such 
an extension can be applied to the building of collective identities, although tensions 
can emerge when state formation clashes with tribal or religious loyalties. Here, much 
like Sophocles’ Antigone, individuals may find themselves caught between the law of 
the state and the normative values that regulate life.85 Moreover, when groups seek 
to close themselves off against an outside within the inside, political projects face 
existential challenges. Here, competing visions of the ordering of space emerge from 
within, stemming either from the transient nature of nomos or from competing efforts 
to order space. This problem was identified historically by Khaldun who stressed the 
importance of asabiyyah as a form of collective membership, transcending the loyalty 
to family and group.86 Of course, amid contestation and fragmentation, asabiyyah 
breeds asabiyyah as family, tribe and group become pitted against each other.
Yet Arendt’s words can be applied on a grander scale: ‘the organisation of the people 
as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies between people 
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proper location almost anytime and anywhere’.87 Rather than people directly living 
together, it can be applied to people living according to the same rules regardless of 
the spatial location and the contingent factors that shape those rules. The concept of 
nomos helps us to understand membership of this type of community, not necessarily 
territorially grounded, but underpinned by a set of normative beliefs that regulates 
life and shapes political behaviour, closing off a metaphysical inside against an outside 
with implications for the spatialised nomos.88
A final observation must be made about the impact of closing off an inside against 
an outside on the construction of citizenship and the ordering of space. Fundamentally, 
nomos cannot include without excluding and while this predominantly takes place 
against other communities, it can also concern individuals who are displaced from 
the inside. While citizenship is the manifestation of inclusion, statelessness is the 
dominant form of displacement, facilitated by racial undertones.89 There is no form of 
self- inclusion without a measure of self- exclusion.90 Here we see how sovereign power 
can operate and order space, giving life meaning through inclusion within the political 
life of a community, but also stripping it of this meaning through a form of exclusion.
As we shall see in the coming chapters, nomos is shaped by local context and 
contingency, which in the Middle East results in challenges to the spatial and ordering 
aspects of the regulation of life. Authority can be claimed by various individuals and 
groups, including family hierarchies, tribal leaders, religious officials, regional officers, 
employers and rulers but when applied to the sovereign state, it is assumed that these 
forms of authority have coalesced into a hierarchical structure within a particular 
territory. Across the Middle East, regime authority – and autonomy – can be challenged 
by actors operating both at a sub- state and supra- state level who are often able to lay 
more convincing claims to authority, legitimacy or power. With a rich normative 
environment serving as a means of legitimising rule that does not directly correspond 
with the geographic spaces of the sovereign state, what happens in domestic spaces 
can – and does – have regional consequences.
A further challenge emerges where regimes are unable to compete with strong 
societies in what Joel Migdal termed a struggle between strong societies and weak 
states.91 Weak states are those who are unable to enforce governance structures, to 
‘penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or 
use resources in determined ways’ (emphasis added), where social forces stymie efforts 
at exerting authority.92 It should be noted that structures that regulate authority can be 
both formal and normative – including but not limited to political, legal, economic, 
normative and religious – stemming from a range of sources. Essentially, the crux of 
Migdal’s claim is that states and societies compete for social control, practices and 
norms, influencing each other in the process.
As Marisela Montenegro and Joan Pujol suggest, contemporary manifestations 
of governmentality resort to different logics of sovereignty in an attempt to maintain 
power and order. For Montenegro and Pujol, this modern governmentality
combines biopolitical and necropolitical logics to establish social, political and 
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marks … The safeguarding of worthy populations is enacted and justified by 
pointing to potentially threatening events and declaring ‘state of exception’.93
Thus, we can see how sovereign and governmental logics set out by Agamben and 
Mbembe can be taken alongside one another, contingent on the intricacies of time and 
space. Underpinning these approaches, however, is the cultivation of an other, a racism 
that in Mbembe’s words, can ‘regulate the distribution of death and to make possible 
the murderous functions of the state’.94 A direct consequence of this is the creation of 
new forms of subjugation.
Sovereignty, space and nomos in the Middle East
The history of political organisation across the Middle East is one of contestation. 
Efforts to maintain control amid an array of competing pressures from various 
locations reveals a range of different logics of governmentality that are key to ensuring 
survival. Interrogating these techniques and strategies helps to understand the 
contemporary Middle East and, ultimately, instances of violence and revolution such 
as those seen in 2011. From the regulation of life to the subjugation of life to death, a 
range of mechanisms of governance and governmentality exist to provide regimes with 
the ability to exert power, albeit not without contestation, as competing groups seek 
influence through laying claim to social norms, practices, economies and claims to 
sovereignty, with spatial consequences.
The interaction of these factors and the closing of an inside off against an outside 
show how people can become marginalised from political communities and exist 
within bare life, reintroduced into yet excluded from politics through the declaration of 
a state of exception. Within this context, political life was stripped from large numbers 
of people across the Middle East, where lives became expendable as government 
machinery attempted to retain control. Such processes are ongoing as regimes seek 
to maintain power and people engage with the structures of politics. Following 
decades of exception and bare life, the Arab Uprisings became an outlet for much of 
the frustration people had with governance structures regulating life, resulting in a 
struggle between regimes and societies and the (further) marginalisation of particular 
identities for domestic, regional and international audiences.
Put another way, the state of exception begot the state of exception, while bare life 
begot bare life. As noted in The Kingdom and The Glory, to understand politics – and 
the Arab Uprisings – it is imperative to look at government and governance structures 
within a state that serve the biopolitical project. The need to do this is supported by 
the 2016 Arab Human Development Report, which argues that ‘the events of 2011 
and their ramifications are the outcome of public policies over many decades that 
gradually led to the exclusion of large sectors of the population from economic, 
political and social life’.95
Nomoi are not limited to the nation- state but can exist across space. The pan- Arab 
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subservient to a larger collective, to umma arabiyya wahida dhat risala khalida, the ‘one 
Arab nation with an immortal mission’.96 This vision eviscerated states and societies 
and eroded their agency, claiming to speak for the vox populus, leaving the nation 
state in its wake. Rulers aware of the power of this narrative would tap into a source of 
legitimacy that transcended domestic reserves, despite its threat to the survival of the 
sovereign state and used its symbolic power in an effort to engender popular support.97
The birth of pan- Islamism stemmed from a desire to challenge the pan- Arab 
discourse and Saudi Arabia’s attempt to counter the rising power of Nasser’s Egypt by 
stressing the importance of Islamic unity,98 along with the proselytising of a Wahhabist 
vision brought about through the development of the Islamic University of Medina 
and provision of training and funding to Imams from across the world.99 A pure pan- 
Islamist vision also held Middle East states to be transient entities working towards 
the unification of the Muslim world, yet much like Arabism before it, the ideology was 
increasingly used for political ends, leading to political rivalry between states, with 
domestic and regional repercussions.100 Ultimately, both ideological movements were 
brought down by the enduring power of the nation- state,101 yet the nature of global 
political life means that the state once more appears to be contested and the legacy of 
these movements remains.
Such movements also challenged the spatial aspects of the sovereign state that had 
come to dominate the international system, a site of contestation between regimes 
and broader populist movements that derived legitimacy from a greater, collective 
movement not confined to the borders of the sovereign state. Both pan- Arabism and 
pan- Islamism appealed to a sense of asabiyyah among the people of the region, drawing 
upon shared normative views – albeit in a number of different forms – in an attempt to 
construct a broad community of support against an outside, which were traditionally 
colonial agendas and the establishment of Israel. In recent years, this ‘outside’ has been 
constructed as Shi’a and Persian.
Yet the instrumentalised use of such narratives was not without problems, as 
Michael Barnett reveals in Dialogues in Arab Politics.102 Such ideologies also provided 
domestic support against the Communists and Leftist movements as regimes across 
the Gulf sought to empower groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood to counter the 
perceived threat posed by Communism. Longer term, regimes implemented structures 
that sought to restrict the possibility of agency, while holding together the fabric of 
political organisation. State- building processes seek to circumvent these challenges 
and establish a framework ensuring regime security and stability while the existence of 
structures to circumvent challenges results in a range of different structural pressures 
across states, which resulted in violence in times of severe contestation. Moreover, the 
location of states within shared normative environments means that events in one state 
can reverberate across the region, having an impact upon the domestic affairs of others.
Amid a range of challenges including but not limited to Western military engagement, 
global financial crises, a growing middle class103 and huge demographic changes, notably 
a youth boom and a population increase of 53% between 1991 and 2010, along with 
waves of urbanisation,104 social contracts and ruling pacts began to fragment. Before the 
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strategies, yet political marginalisation and the rising price of essentials  – especially 
bread  – altered this stability. A  Human Development Report that tracked change 
between 2009 and 2014 offers greater insight into events at this time, noting a positive 
change of +10 in Saudi Arabia, facilitated by the $96 billion package of social reform, and 
a negative change of -15 in Syria.105 With the emergence of states of exception across the 
region, perhaps best characterised in Egypt’s Emergency Laws, people were marginalised 
by legal and political structures and political meaning was stripped from life. From 
this, in order to understand the uprisings, we must identify both the conditions and the 
structures that facilitated the biopolitical project and ultimately, bare life.
As the uprisings continued across the region, revolution and counter- revolution 
vied for control. In Egypt, the end of the Mubrak era resulted in a democratically elected 
Muslim Brotherhood regime under the leadership of Mohammad Morsi, which also 
stressed the need for emergency legislation to maintain security and stability.106 The 
counter- revolution that toppled Morsi violently banned the group’s supporters from 
political life in Egypt, imprisoning thousands of Muslim Brothers and their followers, 
along with the massacre of over a thousand of the group’s supporters on 14 August 
2013 in Cairo. Those states who had supported the Morsi presidency were subjected 
to geopolitical punishment, as a Saudi- led bloc sought to regulate life not only within 
their states but also across the Middle East.
The fragmentation of states and their structures resulted in the erosion of 
sovereignty, necropolitics, war machines and conditions of bare life across 
the region. Amid such conditions, the emergence of social movements  – war 
machines – that challenged the power of the state was hardly surprising. During 
times of conflict across the region, war machines have emerged as a means of 
contesting the power of the state, albeit occasionally co- opted into those structures. 
In some cases, this resulted in the erosion of political projects driven by irredentist 
and secessionist movements. As Ariel Ahram notes, much of the focus on political 
projects in the Arab world presumes the state to be ‘immutable and fixed’, albeit 
‘fierce but weak’,107 yet amid contestation and fragmentation to hold such a position 
is infelicitous. Such a position is especially troubling when faced with secessionist 
and irredentist movements in Syria, Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Yemen. From numerous 
forms of competition to sovereign power, a plethora of possible outcomes emerge, 
contingent upon time and space, requiring analysis of the relationship between 
rulers and ruled.
Within the context of fragmenting sovereignty that left states vulnerable to the 
political ambitions of others, regimes manipulated events to ensure their own survival. 
Islamic rhetoric was increasingly used as a cloak for geopolitical agendas, best seen 
through Iranian and Saudi Arabian efforts to increase the legitimacy and vitality of 
their own rule for internal and external audiences.108 Schisms within the Muslim world 
also served as a means of undermining governmentality, authority and autonomy, as 
individuals faced often- contradictory guidance from competing sources of authority. 
Religious difference led to securitised divisions while also proving to be a useful tool in 
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Conclusions
Questions about sovereign power remain central to understanding the nature of political 
organisations. To understand political life, one must understand the manifestation and 
contestation of sovereign power. Within such projects, the role of the state occupies 
a central role, albeit one that is increasingly contested within a global nomos that is 
defined by spatial exception and underpinned by neo- liberal modernity. Within this 
nomos, the localised unlocalisable becomes contested as context and contingency 
challenge the relationship between ordnung and ortung, with serious consequences 
for sovereign projects and the organisation of communities.109 The process of defining 
an inside against an outside is central to the establishment of communities that then 
regulate life according to their normative codes. Yet competing visions of how to live 
and the values that structure such visions do not always coalesce with state sovereignty, 
resulting in challenges to the sovereign order.
Although deploying a number of theoretical positions in pursuit of answers, 
these approaches fit together neatly, sharing similar ontological foundations. 
Consideration of sovereign power allows for a greater focus on agency and human 
action. Fundamentally concerned with the regulation of life, sovereignty seeks to 
ensure regime survival through the removal of political meaning from life and creating 
conditions of bare life, or by controlling life by subjugating it to death. In opposition 
to regime power, war machines emerge that contest the organisation of political life. 
These interactions all take place within space, bringing together regional dynamics 
with intimately small local dynamics. Understanding the ordering of space goes 
some way in understanding political action and here nomos helps to understand the 
regulation of political organisation. Taken together, we have a rich tapestry that allows 
us to understand the manifestation of sovereign power, the areas in which such power 
is exerted and the means through which it is contested.
In spite of ongoing contestation, the state remains the central focus of our 
exploration, albeit in many forms. What we shall see, however, is that amid a 
fundamental struggle to exert sovereign power through the regulation of life, the 
repercussions are felt across space and time. In the contemporary world, these 
repercussions of political action are felt beyond state borders, while the harnessing 
of competing sovereignties locates political struggles within broader geopolitical 
and normative environments. While the state is often taken as a distinct unit, closer 
examination leaves it comprised of a number of different factors, existing across 
different spaces, shaped by the interactions that construct space.
The sovereign state is inherently an exclusionary concept and the need to define, 
redefine and maintain the exception exposes the power of the state. To understand 
political spaces, we must consider not only the relationship between rulers and 
ruled – and thus included and excluded – but also technologies of exclusion, which 
are (re)negotiated in response to context- specific contingent factors. Although we are 
concerned with the contestation that occurs within the state, tensions between loyalty 
to the state and to the nomos means that we have to locate our exploration within 
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spatial dynamics across the Middle East, replete with contestation. As our journey 
continues, we must locate the state – and its discontents – within broader geopolitical 
and normative environments. By doing this we are better placed to engage with the 
regulation of life and the subjugation of life to death.
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The nature of this melancholy becomes clearer, once one asks the question, with 
whom does the historical writer of historicism actually empathize. The answer 
is irrefutably with the victor. Those who currently rule are however the heirs of 
all those who have ever been victorious. Empathy with the victors thus comes to 
benefit the current rulers every time.
Walter Benjamin, Illuminations
The development of a political community is an inherently exclusionary project based 
upon a particular vision of the organisation of life. The establishment of bureaucratic 
structures that facilitate the regulation of life flows from the enactment of this idea. As 
we have seen, definitions of statehood and sovereignty differ greatly, but it is evident 
that in order for a state to be considered as such, a number of characteristics must be 
met, including the existence of a people residing within a particular territorial area 
with a shared identity and a system of governance to facilitate the survival of their 
project. Fundamentally, as Khaldun suggested, politics is the survival of the species.
This chapter engages with attempts to establish political projects, driven by 
actors both within and beyond territorial borders. In many cases, such efforts were 
revolutionary, violent dislocations between past and future that radically altered the 
ordering of space within a particular area. Yet such transformations also possessed an 
economic dimension as foreign powers sought to capitalise on opportunities provided 
by domestic upheaval, while political elites began processes of modernisation as they 
sought to forge states from the embers of uncertainty. The neo- liberal modernity that 
underpins Agamben’s spatialisation of the exception shapes the local manifestations 
of nomos and while context and contingency create unique peculiarities, there are 
underlying structural similarities that shape the exception. Although offering a 
brief genealogy of the establishment of states, this chapter should not be viewed as a 
complete history of the contemporary Middle East. Instead I seek to offer an account 
of the interaction between internal and external forces – material and ideational – that 
facilitated the establishment of states and nomoi, through the interaction of ordnung 
and ortung.
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Amid a range of parabolic pressures, the Arab state continues to face a range of 
pressures.1 From this, tensions emerge between loyalty to particular communities 
and projects. Such projects are also shaped by global and regional events; space is 
(re)constructed through the interaction of the global with the local, with implications 
for the interaction of ordnung and ortung constituting both nomos and nomoi. In a 
normative environment that draws members from different states, the interaction 
of regional, global and local issues is hardly surprising. For Paul Noble, this shared 
environment created a ‘vast sound chamber in which information, ideas, and opinions 
have resonated with little regard for state frontiers’.2
Emerging from the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the contemporary regional 
states system underwent a period of (re)construction forged by an array of domestic 
and regional struggles, amid the penetration of the Middle East by external powers. As 
Agamben suggests, all states operate within the global nomos of a spatialised exception 
that is underpinned by neo- liberal modernity, but such localised exceptions are shaped 
by local context and contingency. There is then a two- tier dimension to nomos:  the 
global ordering of spatial exceptions that is viewed as the apparently universal concept 
of the sovereign state, alongside the localised spatial exception, where nomos emerges 
through the interaction of ordnung and ortung.
Challenges facing rulers across the twentieth century were multifaceted, yet 
predominantly revolved around efforts to bring dislocated peoples together to ensure 
the survival of the collective.3 The quest for a national identity involved harnessing a 
number of historical narratives, cultural norms and tribal values in an attempt to create 
a convincing narrative of how the political vision should be expressed. Of course, by its 
very nature, such projects are exclusive and required the rejection of other narratives. 
Exclusion fed into already existing socio- economic grievances, creating fertile breeding 
ground for a range of different ideologies including Arabism, Ba’athism, Islamism, 
Communism, along with incarnations of nationalism defined within territorial borders. 
Following a spate of coups d’état across the 1960s and 1970s, new leaders put ‘coup- 
proofing’ strategies in place to ensure the survival of regimes within specific territorial 
boundaries, seeking to withstand pressures from above and below.4
These strategies established a range of different relationships including between the 
family, tribe, sect, city and ethnic group, designed to draw support from a number 
of different constituencies, with the by- product of widespread exclusion.5 Processes 
designed to include/ exclude groups from the political sphere also had serious 
repercussions across the region, as a consequence of the spread of identities across 
the Middle East, meaning that what happens within the borders of one state can have 
consequences elsewhere.
Reverberations from events such as the establishment of the state of Israel, the 
Suez Crisis, the 1967 war, the Iranian Revolution, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the 2005 
Cedar Revolution and the Arab Uprisings were felt across the Middle East, shaping 
the regional security environment. The establishment of states, either in an attempt 
to politically represent an existing nationality, or to simultaneously create a national 
identity and state, take place within the context of this broader regional environment, 
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A key part of efforts to survive was the ability to lay claim to legitimacy. Academic 
discussions about legitimacy rarely find consensus but it is generally accepted 
that in the Middle East, legitimacy deficits are responsible for malaise and political 
instability. In a groundbreaking discussion of legitimacy in the Arab world, Michael 
Hudson identified legitimacy deficits as responsible for a range of the region’s ills, 
from instability to repression, via cynicism, inefficiency and corruption.6 Legitimacy, 
for Hudson, stemmed from four main sources of authority: patriarchal, consultative, 
Islamic and feudal. Scholars of the Middle East will note that successful leaders create 
reserves of legitimacy through strategies that draw upon these different sources, 
providing leaders with the means through which to secure their rule and improve their 
standing across regional politics.7
Reserves of legitimacy are not restricted to territorial borders. In Dialogues in Arab 
Politics, Michael Barnett’s constructivist interpretation of the impact of pan- Arabism 
on regional politics, shared ideological movements provide opportunities to increase 
reserves of legitimacy. Times of crisis then serve as opportunities to reshape the 
regional order, where regimes lay claim to ideological membership as a mechanism 
of improving their legitimacy and position in the regional order. As Barnett argues,
Arab states have had strikingly different views of the desired [regional order] 
Although such differences might be attributed to principled beliefs, the more 
prominent reasons were regime interests, beginning with but not exhausted by 
survival and domestic stability. As a consequence, over the years Arab leaders 
have vied to draw a line between the regimes’ interests, the norms of Arabism, 
and the events of the day.8
For Barnett, events occur within normative environments that allow actors to derive 
meaning and interpret events in different ways. Much like our understanding of 
nomos, Barnett’s approach demonstrates that events serve as a mechanism through 
which regimes gain legitimacy but also shape their environments, providing 
transformative opportunities to reshape regional dynamics. Periods of crisis both 
national and regional thus provide opportunities for political elites to increase their 
legitimacy – beyond their capacity to govern – and strengthen their positions vis- à- 
vis the regional order.
Versailles and the League of Nations
Oh, if we can pull this thing off! Rope together the young hot- heads and the 
Shi’ah obscurantists, and the enthusiasts … if we can make them work together 
and find their own salvation for themselves, what a fine thing it will be. I see 
visions and dream dreams.9
In Arab Awakening, George Antonius’ seminal – albeit problematical – study of the 
Arab Revolt, the roots of Arab nationalism are traced back to Beirut in 1875, where 
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century were forged. Amid the strict enforcement of Ottoman law, the five engaged in 
seditious activity, placing placards around the streets of Beirut that contained ‘violent 
denunciations of the evils of Turkish rule’ and called for rebellion.10 Although initially 
unsuccessful, the events of 1875 created a movement that would have a lasting impact 
on regional politics in the following century. Over the coming decades, amid the 
turbulence of political upheaval, Arab nationalism was developed and debated, driven 
by intellectuals but played out across the streets of the region.
The most important incident in the formative years of calls for Arab nationalism 
was the demise of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the Great War in November 1918, 
following widespread unrest among Arab populations who had grown frustrated at 
long- standing persecution under the Young Turks,11 culminating in the Arab Revolt 
and the ensuing efforts of external powers to shape the actions of local agency.12 The 
Arab Revolt sought to overthrow the yoke of the Ottoman Empire, albeit supported 
by a different colonial power. Although initially confined to the Hejaz, the revolt 
spread across the region and while Sharif Hussayn was able to draw upon a relatively 
large army, they were poorly armed. The political fallout from the establishment of 
a mandate system – and location of a strong international presence in the region – 
had serious repercussions for the ordering of space, which, in turn, determined the 
capacity of indigenous Arab movements to shape their own political futures.13
During the war, British and French diplomats became involved in detailed 
discussions about the reorganisation of the Middle East following the expected demise 
of the Ottoman Empire. Diplomatic wrangling led Sir Marc Sykes and his French 
counterpart François Georges Picot to divide the region into spheres of influence, 
seemingly disregarding indigenous political organisation. Sykes expressed that to 
divide the region, he ‘should like to draw a line from the e in Acre to the last k in 
Kirkuk’.14 The agreement stated that ‘in the blue area France, and in the red area Great 
Britain, shall be allowed to establish such direct or indirect administration or control 
as they desire and as they may think fit to arrange with the Arab state or confederation 
of Arab states’.15 Although the Sykes– Picot agreement of 1916 was never directly 
implemented, it had a lasting legacy upon the region, according a great deal of power 
to the two remaining European powers and locating the idea of partition within future 
diplomatic initiatives such as the Treaty of Sèvres  and the San Remo Agreement.
With the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres, the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire 
was complete. Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant established mandates in 
the Middle East, where ‘their existence as independent nations can be provisionally 
recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a 
mandatory unit until such time as they are able to stand alone’.16 Powers responsible 
for regulating the mandates were seen to be ‘trustees’, wherein they would administer 
life ‘within such boundaries as may be fixed by them’.17
Reconstruction efforts had previously taken place between British officials and 
Arab leaders directly, where concessions over territorial control were made in 
return for political support. An earlier exchange of letters between the British High 
Commissioner to Egypt Sir Henry McMahon and Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca, 
revealed how a territory ‘in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sharif of Mecca’ 
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At the end of the war, the Ottoman Empire was divided into mandates that were 
later shared between the British and French. Once established, mandates became sites 
of contestation, with local agency posing serious challenges to colonial overlords. Iraq 
provides perhaps the most obvious example of the challenge of state building at this 
point, as newly installed political elites had to balance myriad forms of indigenous 
political organisation, religious networks, strong tribal groups and a severe disparity 
between urban and rural populations, manifesting in tensions between tradition 
and modernity. Competing narratives and efforts to facilitate inclusion emerging 
from the nomos shaped the political trajectory, resulting in cycles of marginalisation, 
persecution and violence.
Tribal, religious and class divides posed serious problems for state building 
in the formative years of Iraq. As outlined in Hanna Batatu’s magisterial study 
of twentieth- century Iraq, Iraqis were not one community but were comprised 
of members from disparate ethnic and religious nationalities. As Batatu argues, 
the Arabs of Iraq were ‘a congeries of distinct, discordant, self- involved societies’, 
dissected by serious class schisms most obviously manifesting in the distinction 
between rural and urban societies.19
Central to the political decisions taken in both Baghdad and London was a British 
archaeologist from County Durham by the name of Gertrude Bell. An intrepid 
explorer, Bell’s exploits across the Middle East rival that of T.  E. Lawrence. One of 
Churchill’s representatives at the 1921 Cairo conference, a witness to the Armenian 
genocide and officially recognised by Sir Percy Cox as ‘Oriental Secretary’, Bell played 
a prominent role in the establishment of Faisal as King and the formative years of 
the Iraqi state. In a political vacuum following the Ottoman defeat, religion played 
an important role in the formative years of the Iraqi state. Accordingly, the role of 
clerics was central to political life in southern Iraq, which worried many in the British 
administration, fearing an open door to external influence. For Bell, the proximity of 
Persia and the presence of key Shi’a shrines in Karbala and Najaf ‘brought the country 
much under Persian influences’.20
Such perceptions were central in shaping the decisions taken by the British and Faisal. 
The installation of a Sunni monarch to rule over a Shi’a majority was a consequence of the 
desire to work with the wealthy, military trained urban elites deemed more sympathetic 
to the British cause, but also to uphold Iraqi sovereignty and avoid the penetration 
of the nascent state by external powers. In the following decades, Iraqi leaders shared 
similar concerns about the loyalties of Shi’a communities and in an attempt to prevent 
unrest – and ultimately to retain power – political and legal structures were created to 
continue the process of marginalisation and remove political meaning from the lives of 
the Shi’a; at this point political institutions enshrined difference. As a general rule, no 
Shi’a was accepted into military college or bureaucracy, while accessing high school was 
problematic, creating deep grievances among Shi’a communities.21
Economic and tribal differences played a prominent role in shaping the early years 
of the state, amid competing normative agendas and visions of what such a project 
would look like.22 Difference required regulation and the co- opting of tribal groups 
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processes included the abolition of the 1933 Law Governing the Rights and Duties of 
Cultivators, allowing tribes to move to cities, although by 1965 some 50% still lived in 
rural areas.24 Unsurprisingly, oil dramatically altered the economic capability of the 
country, accounting for 60% of the budget by 1959.25 Land ownership thus became 
a key component of the social fabric of the state26 and a prominent site of political 
contestation in the coming decades.
Across the Levant, state formation was a shaped by the interaction of domestic 
social forces with the far more powerful exogenous forces, in what Nazih Ayubi referred 
to as ‘a disintegrative political process imposed “from without” ’.27 Here, states were 
established as arbiters among competing groups that sought to pacify groups through 
the instruments of central rule, notably the army and bureaucracy. Such an approach 
does little to facilitate harmony and integration but rather isolates and separates groups 
within the state. Governance was achieved through alliances between blocs that are 
community based and retain all of their characteristics as they come into power. Such 
an approach deepened political, economic, social and community divisions, facilitating 
grievance and distrust that would manifest in violence across the century.28
Perhaps the most important mandate for future stability across the Middle East was 
the League’s recognition of the British Mandate over Palestine, which used the Jordan 
river to divide the land in two, into Palestine to the West and Transjordan to the East. 
At this time, the Hashemites occupied three thrones across the region, with Faisal in 
Iraq, Abdullah in Transjordan and Hussein in the Hijaz. Yet the movements of Abdul 
Aziz Ibn Saud across Arabia put an end to broader Hashemite aspirations with the 
establishment of Saudi Arabia within the decade.
The emergence of a state under the leadership of Abdul Aziz Ibn Abd Al Rahman 
Al Saud in 1932 occurred after the unification of disparate tribal groups across the 
Arabian Peninsula into a sedentary form of political organisation over the previous 
decades. This process of sedentarisation and economic development continued over 
the coming years, but the transition from a nomadic, rural population to an urban 
dwelling population was central in securing the territorial borders of the state, a prime 
example of the relationship and interaction between ordnung and ortung, the harnessing 
of regulatory power to create spatial order. Fundamental to the state- building process 
was a centuries old alliance between the Al Saud tribe and the puritanical Wahhabi 
sect of Islam, but it was also facilitated by support from the British, although it was the 
Soviet Union that first recognised Ibn Saud as the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of the 
Nejd in 1926.29 Tribal developments aided the evolution of the political project, not 
only from rural to urban but also in providing Ibn Saud with the cultural and symbolic 
characteristics to regulate life.30
Islam played a prominent role within the nascent political project. Not only was Ibn 
Saud’s standing army the ikhwan, a group of devout Muslims, central to the expansion 
of the borders of the state, Islam was positioned centrally within the fabric of political 
organisation. The relationship with the Wahhabi ulema offered a degree of legitimacy 
for Ibn Saud’s rule. The importance of Islam was not restricted to the kingdom’s borders, 
however, as Ibn Saud offered financial support to the newly established Muslim 
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are all Muslim Brotherhood’. In the coming years Al Banna was offered protection by 
the Al Saud amid suggestions that the Egyptian regime planned to assassinate him, but 
as the century developed, the relationship became more complex as we shall see.
Although largely successful, Saudi expansion during the 1920s was not without 
resistance. Having crossed into what is now Kuwait, ikhwan fighters were met by a 
small force and in what became known as Battle of Jahra where, in 1920, the ikhwan 
were defeated.31 The battle offers important insight into the complexity of political 
dynamics at the time, as members of the Al Mutair tribe could be found on both 
sides of the conflict, revealing a burgeoning attachment to the land among those 
fighting on the Kuwaiti side.32 This burgeoning loyalty to land led to the evolution of 
political organisation, transforming the way in which life was organised and ordered, 
within clearly defined political spaces. In later years, tribes would be essential in 
the development of states across the Gulf, protecting oil installations, pipelines and 
ports, which were essential to provide the financial might to facilitate socio- political 
transformations. Of course, the tribal sheikhs were handsomely rewarded for such 
practices and were thus brought into the political and infrastructure of the new state, 
creating an interaction between ordnung and ortung.
The embers of the Ottoman Empire created opportunities for the reorganisation 
of territory across the Middle East. While the aftershocks were felt across the region, 
the epicentre was Turkey. Under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, a new republic was founded 
in ‘revolutionary style’, transforming citizens of the Ottoman Empire into Turkish 
citizens amid the widespread removal of religion from public life. The establishment 
of the Turkish state necessitated eradicating the residue of Ottoman rule and the 
creation of state apparatus and institutions.33 This project initially abolished the 
Sultanate before co- opting support from the royalists and religious clerics alike 
by appointing an Ottoman prince as caliph, albeit before abolishing the caliphate 
completely in 1924 and the azzam in the following years as part of a secularising move. 
Unlike other identity- building projects in the region that had to begin from scratch, 
Turkish nationalism had linguistic and literary roots in the middle of the nineteenth 
century34 but it was the nascent Ataturk regime that enshrined such sentiments into 
the state project.
As the historian Bernard Lewis notes, this process was not without challenges, 
demonstrated by new frontiers, the rejection of religious and dynastic royalties and 
a lack of emotional attachment.35 Over time, the Republican People’s Party worked 
towards enshrining Ataturk’s vision within new political structures. Perhaps the most 
important aspect of this was the establishment of the military, who were heavily 
involved – much as in other states across the region – within the domestic political 
climate as well as broader regional dynamics. It was not a project without difficulty, 
however, as loyalty to the former caliph and caliphate remained strong among the 
population. One of Ataturk’s closest advisors is reported to have confessed that it was 
his duty to ‘remain loyal to the sovereign: my attachment to the Caliphate is imposed 
on me by my education … To abolish this office and try to set up an entity of a different 
character in its place, would lead to failure and disaster’.36 This opened up a key source 
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In spite of such traces of loyalty to the erstwhile caliph, competing nationalist 
sentiments were rife due to the spread of different identities and political aspirations that 
had previously been co- opted by the Ottomans. One aspect of the nationalist project 
was the creation of a new system of language, which ensured that future generations 
would share the nationalist vision. The new Turkish language was prioritised over 
all other regional languages, marginalising minorities further and feeding into the 
cultivation of inclusion and exclusion. A  new national vision was put forward that 
drew upon the past to shape the future.
Similar processes occurred in Persia, where Reza Khan sought to transform 
political organisation from the Persian Empire into a new, modern Iran. Amid the 
fallout from both the Constitutional Revolution and the aftermath of the Great War, 
Reza Khan established a dominant, personality- driven form of politics that succeeded 
in pushing both ethnic minorities and the Shi’a clerics to the margins of society. The 
political turmoil that followed reflected the struggle to shape the nature of the state 
in the move from empire to nation state, perhaps best seen in the reframing of Persia 
as Iran.
The speed of transformation across the Middle East was astounding. For George 
Antonius, these transformative processes created ‘new forces and tendencies which 
were not inherent in the trends of the national movements’.37 Antonius is correct in this 
observation, particularly when considering that transformation and dislocation would 
also result in pushback against these movements, but also in inertia and competition 
among existing institutions designed to implement such strategies. Perhaps the most 
severe of all points of dislocation from the fall out of the Great War was found in the 
establishment of the state of Israel.
The Palestinian mandate and the state of Israel
While European powers were operating across the Middle East, populations of these – 
and indeed other states – had become increasingly restless. Widespread anti- Semitism, 
reflected in incidents such as the Dreyfus affair, cultivated political support for what 
became known as the Zionist project that would eventually call for a return to the 
ancient land of Israel. The emergence of the Zionist movement in the late nineteenth 
century was itself a consequence of particular socio- political experiences. Central to 
the burgeoning movement was The Jewish State, written by Theodore Herzl, whose 
words called for ‘sovereignty [to] be granted us over a portion of the globe large enough 
to satisfy the rightful requirements of a nation’.38
In spite of the growing popularity of the Zionist movement, it took a 67- word 
declaration of support from the British Foreign Secretary published on 2 September 
1917 to firmly locate the matter within the realm of international politics.
His Majesty’s government view[s] with favour the establishment in Palestine of 
a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to 
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shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non- 
Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by 
Jews in any other country.39
While the Balfour Declaration expressed support for creating a ‘national home’ for 
Jewish people in Palestine, the wording of the declaration was deliberately ambiguous. 
For many at the time, the concept of a national home was coterminous to a state, 
although some such as Winston Churchill and Neville Chamberlain were largely of 
the opinion that a Jewish state would occur in due course; such a view helped generate 
a sense that the declaration was in British interests to curry favour with Jewry across 
the world during the war.40 At the same time, many Arabs were of the view that the 
British had also promised them a state, as a reward for their involvement in defeating 
the Ottoman Empire.41 British policy was convoluted, seeking to support both Arabs 
and Jews, leaving both firmly of the opinion that they had London’s support.
Before the Second World War, five distinct waves of aliyah (the immigration of 
Jews from across the diaspora to the land of Israel) had brought almost four hundred 
thousand Jews to Palestine. Once settled, institutions were formed – in parallel with 
mandatory governance structures  – to provide support to Jewish settlers in what 
Mehran Kamrava has referred to as a ‘state within a state’, a common theme that 
emerges amid contestation.42 After aliyah came the process of transforming land 
into a state for the incoming settlers, at the expense of the indigenous Palestinian 
communities. Such processes occurred physically and intellectually, transforming 
the soil in accordance with particular political visions, along with creating a new 
ordering of space.
The need for expropriation and removal was quickly acknowledged, first by Theodor 
Herzl, albeit ‘discreetly and circumspectly’.43 In contrast, the first Prime Minister of 
Israel, David Ben Gurion, argued that ‘there were no others’44 and ultimately that 
Palestine was the ideal choice for settlement.45 Yet it was the transformation of life on 
the ground that would have the most lasting impact, as land was bought by Zionists 
while more directly, groups such as the Haganah, Irgun and Stern Gang engaged in 
violence against Palestinian Arabs.
After the establishment of the United Nations (UN), a partition plan for Palestine 
was approved by UN General Assembly Council Resolution 181 on 29 November 
1947, which called for the partition of Palestine into eight parts: three to the Arab state; 
three to the Jewish state; one, the town of Jaffa, was to be an Arab enclave in the Jewish 
territory; and Jerusalem was to remain under international control, administered by 
the UN.46 This plan was accepted, pragmatically, by the Jewish leaders, but rejected by 
Arab leaders who were loath to cede such an amount of territory and argued that it was 
in violation of their right to self- determination.47
The Declaration of the State of Israel on 14 May 1948 was the culmination of Herzl’s 
vision. In the years that followed, erstwhile Mandatory Palestine was existentially 
transformed as indigenous communities were ‘systematically extinguished’ to allow 
for the establishment of the state of Israel.48 After the declaration of statehood, armies 











Letters and declarations 41
41
troops, the newly established Israeli Defence Force (IDF) ultimately proved victorious, 
feeding into an environment where seven hundred thousand Palestinians were expelled 
from their homes on 15 May 1948 in what would become known in Palestinian history 
as the nakba, the catastrophe.
Efforts to establish the state of Israel required engagement with a number of 
competing historiographies, each laying claim to land and its history. Such contestation 
has routinely been acknowledged by Israeli leaders along with the construction of a 
historiography of Jewish claims to the land, which was later powerfully destroyed by 
Shlomo Sand, an Israeli academic working at Tel Aviv University.49
Nasser, pan- Arabism and Ba’athism
The failure of Arab armies to defeat Israel on the battlefield and the continued 
presence of colonial powers helped ferment widespread nationalist support for a 
pan- Arab movement that challenged the ordering of the states system. This was both 
physical and intellectual, as a large number of people found solace in the ideological 
movement. In such conditions, radical ideas quickly began to spread.50 Long- standing 
tensions within the mandate programme erupted as burgeoning movements for self- 
determination clashed with colonial overlords amid the fallout from the declaration 
of the State of Israel. Political institutions established as part of mandatory control fed 
into the cultivation of nationalist programmes. Questions about the regulation of life 
and its spatial ordering became prominent within political discourse, often facilitated 
through colonial structures. This was a time of serious turmoil where local populations 
began to ‘awaken to their full potential’.51
Although Egypt had been under occupation since before the establishment of 
the mandate system, an increasingly turbulent period would lead to a form of quasi 
independence, albeit on the condition that Britain retained control of the canal zone, 
foreign policy and security.52 It was within this context that a school teacher from 
Cairo named Hassan Al Banna formed the Muslim Brotherhood. Al Banna’s vision 
for the Brotherhood included the provision of social goods and services that the state 
failed to provide, resulting in a deeply fractious relationship between the regime and 
the ikhwan.
For many scholars, with the toppling of King Farouk in 1952 and the birth of the 
Egyptian Republic, the modern Middle Eastern state was born. In previous decades, 
tensions between political elites and burgeoning nationalist movements began to 
manifest in countless forms but it was the alliance of the nationalist movement with 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood that was fundamental to the establishment of the 
new Egyptian Republic. This alliance proved to be short- lived amid serious personal, 
political and ideological tensions between the nationalists and the Islamists. The 
fallout established two populist strands in the Arab world and pitted them against each 
other over the regulation of life and ultimately, the roots of sovereign power. In doing 
so it resulted in the establishment of authoritarian structures and the deep state that 
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The roots of Arab nationalism were found within colonial residue across the Middle 
East and efforts to facilitate political development amid a fragmenting post- Ottoman 
landscape.54 Ideas of this shared vision reveal serious tensions between conceptions of 
the state and the broader Arab nation, based initially upon a shared linguistic vision, 
but also upon a mercantile integration of the region.55 For some like Nazih Ayubi, the 
decline in this trade prevented the emergence of a strong class dimension to drive the 
movement, furthered by regional disintegration as a consequence of assimilation into 
capitalist systems by colonial actors.56
Of course, the very concept of Arab nationalism is contested both philosophically 
and politically as a consequence of context and contingency.57 Political manifestations 
of the concept varied from efforts to create a shared territorial entity such as the short- 
lived United Arab Republic (UAR) and the broader goal of unity between all Arab 
states, or the much less ambitious aspiration of collectivity and coordination. Seen 
in a range of different ways, there is little doubt that Arab nationalism was a radically 
new way of doing politics, which resulted in a populist movement that threatened the 
conservative status quo of ‘old style notables, large merchants and landowners’.58 The 
emergence of the Arab nationalist movement provoked questions about the ordering 
of space and the means through which life was regulated, creating friction between 
ordnung and ortung once again.
This new way of doing politics led to the emergence of different forms of political 
organisation, perhaps most notably in Syria under the leadership of Hafez Al Assad 
in 1971; the ensuing transformation of the Syrian state was described by one scholar 
as a process of turning the state’s social and political structures ‘upside down’.59 The 
Ba’ath ideology played a key role in the development of the state and Assad occupied 
a prominent role in ‘defending its cause on the streets’, which nearly cost him his life 
when he was stabbed by a member of the Muslim Brotherhood.60
The early years of Assad’s rule sought to ensure the survival of the Ba’ath regime amid 
a range of coups – and counter coups – d’état, resulting in the widespread restriction 
of opposition and dissent. As part of this process, former members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood were asked to provide documentary evidence of their withdrawal from 
the organisation within a month; according to Law 49, anyone unable to provide it 
would be sentenced to death. Such measures had a dramatic impact upon political 
opposition across Syria. The years after the writing of the 1973 constitution were 
plagued by protest and violence, but the Hama massacre of February 1982 which 
killed an estimated thirty thousand people removed all space for public and private 
dissent, revealing the ferocity of the Assad regime and hinting at the characteristics of 
necropolitics to come.61
Yet this was just one strand of Arab nationalism. Jalal Al Sayyid, one of the 
prominent Arab nationalist  figures – and later a founding member of the Ba’ath party – 
distinguished between these different strands:
Arab nationalism is the sum total of characteristics, qualities and hallmarks 
which are exclusive to the collectivity called the Arab nation, Arab unity is a 
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formed into one single political system under one single state … the Arab nation 
is that human collectivity which speaks the Arabic language, inhabits a territory 
called the Arab lands and has a voluntary and spontaneous felling of belonging 
to that nation.62
These views have their roots in the late nineteenth century, where education played a 
prominent role through both the establishment of institutions and the historiographies 
taught.63 Such views are supported by Youssef Choueiri who argues that a number 
of local histories provided by the likes of Muhammad Izzat Darawazh, Darwish Al 
Miqdadi and Shafiq Ghurbal can be seen as part of broader pan- Arab trends, albeit 
shaped by local context.64 Fundamentally, for Choueiri, nationalism is a process that 
is a consequence of modernity, stemming from the interaction of global and regional 
factors and the institutionalisation of Arab culture and language within the fabric of 
states, leading to a range of different interpretations.
A shared language was key to establishing unity amid such difference and Arabic 
was the vehicle through which culture and history could be developed, distinct from 
their Ottoman and Persian neighbours. Yet questions about the role of religion within 
the movement offered an area of dissent, where prominent thinkers wavered in the 
loyalty afforded to Islam or nationalist goals. Intellectuals such as Rashid Rida, – who 
we shall return to in Chapter 4 – Amir Shakib Arslan, Ma’ruf Al Arnawut and Darwish 
Al Miqdadi differed over the role of Islam in Arab nationalism. Ultimately, it was down 
to a Christian, Qustantin Zurayq, to argue that religion provided a source of ethics 
and culture that were integral to the nationalist cause. Yet with economic malaise and 
the burgeoning influence of socialism from interaction with European powers, a more 
secular form of nationalism began to dominate Arab political discourse.65
In spite of a plurality of views, the movement gained a great deal of traction as ideas 
spread across the Middle East. Yet unlike the Zionist movement that was immediately 
concerned with the establishment of a state project, pan- Arabism was characterised 
by a range of philosophical questions about its nature.66 Different visions of the Arab 
project emerged across the region, shaped by context- specific contingent factors and 
the lack of intellectual and political coherence ultimately prevented its development. 
Regime interests routinely trumped commitment to this shared ideological vision, 
resulting in competition between the members and a process of one- upmanship in a 
struggle over spatial ordering.67
In spite of these tensions, nationalist movements possessed a strong social core. 
While in power, Nasser sought to bring about social justice and the development of the 
Egyptian economy, albeit largely unsuccessfully as a consequence of tensions between 
political and economic capabilities.68 Similar tensions were found across the Middle 
East at this time as states sought to regulate all aspects of life, albeit to the detriment 
of their economies, eroding their ideological visions in the process. The dominance of 
private interests over public to the benefit of particular groups at this point served to 
further embed patrimonial networks into the fabric of the developing states.
Central to the political and economic development of states at this time was their 
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such calculations was the emergence of a Middle Eastern ‘front’ in the Cold War, 
as concern about the spread of Communism and the location of vast reserves of oil 
and gas focused the attention of the super powers on the region.69 A raft of policies 
were drafted in Washington, DC designed to curtail the Communist influence, most 
obviously seen in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshal Plan, while the UK and France 
sought to retain their role on the world stage amid burgeoning nationalist movements 
and decolonisation.
Containment policies resulted in the establishment of the Baghdad Pact and later the 
Eisenhower Doctrine, which attempted to secure pro- Western regimes and maintain 
their anti- Communist stance. Later, these efforts would result in direct interference 
in the domestic affairs of states across the region. A British and US sponsored coup 
d’état removed the first democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammed 
Mossadegh, and returned Reza Shah to power.70 The perceived success of the coup 
prompted the CIA to attempt to overthrow the Syrian government in 1957, but the plan 
was discovered before it could be enacted.71 In neighbouring Iraq, a 1958 coup d’état 
removed the Hashemite dynasty, creating a period of instability and fertile ground for 
the Ba’ath party, particularly amid the widespread dissatisfaction with Nouri Al Said, 
the Prime Minister at the time, and his apparent pro-Western leanings.72
Perhaps the most important incident during the Cold War in the Middle East was 
the Suez Crisis of 1956, which not only signalled the end of British influence across the 
world but also demonstrated the vitality of the Arab nationalist movement.73 Britain’s 
presence in Egypt in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had a key role 
to play in shaping the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood and the emergence of 
the Arab nationalist beacon, Gamal Abd Al Nasser. In addition to their involvement in 
Palestine and Iraq, Egypt was of paramount importance to the British, where the Suez 
Canal was described by Anthony Eden as the ‘back door to the East and swing door of 
the British Empire’.74 The need to defeat Nasser related not only to British goals in the 
Middle East but also to its position in the world. As one minister suggested, ‘If we lose 
the [Middle East] we are finished’.75
After the successful handling of the Suez Crisis, Nasser’s popularity was at an 
all time high, but this would be eroded by military defeat to Israel amid an array 
of domestic and regional mistakes in the years leading up to his death in 1970. The 
starting point of this decline was the short- lived UAR, a union between the pan- Arab 
visions of Nasser’s Egypt and the Syrian Ba’ath regime. The Ba’ath party was inspired 
by the metaphysical vision of the Syrian Zaki Al Arsuzi, but its main ideologue was 
the Arab nationalist Michel Aflaq, who formed the party in 1943 along with Salah Al 
Bittar and members of the local intelligentsia. Aflaq’s vision was based upon a shared 
language that would eventually forge a stronger bond over time, underpinned by love, 
thought and sentiment.76
This vision was grounded in socio- economic concerns and rapidly became fused 
with socialism, which helped stress the importance of both the broader collective and 
territorial state. Although he acknowledged the role of the state in the shared Arab 
vision, Aflaq stressed the importance of the party that represented ‘the whole of the 
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own identity’.77 At a time of bickering among Arab states, the Ba’ath slogan of ‘common 
Arab destiny’ began to resonate among the peoples of the region.78
Yet in spite of a shared commitment to Arab unity, the UAR was undermined 
and ultimately decimated by political wrangling and competing political visions; 
Nasser later expressed that the union was against his better judgement, revealing the 
amorphous character of Arab nationalism.79 Local contexts also differed greatly. In 
Syria, anti- Egyptian sentiment was rife – some referred to ‘Egyptian colonialism’ – and 
the commercial bourgeoisie remained active unlike in Egypt, where state control of 
both the economy and political sphere were rapidly increasing.80
Political instability was not limited to the UAR but was rife amid the penetration 
of the region by global forces, perhaps best seen in North Yemen as civil war pitted 
royalists against republicans, triggered by a series of coups d’état that drew in states 
from across the region into what Malcolm Kerr later termed the Arab Cold War.81 
While Egypt supported the republicans, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Jordan and others offered 
military aid to the royalists out of fear at the potential revolutionary repercussions 
along with the nationalist aspirations of Nasser.82 A  porous border between Saudi 
Arabia and Yemen helped Saudi forces cross into the country which increased the 
severity of the task facing the Egyptians in the process. What initially began as an 
opportunity for Nasser to regain credibility across the Arab world proved, as Anthony 
Nutting suggests to be his Vietnam.83
Beyond Egypt, the case of Jordan reveals the precarious challenge of balancing 
domestic and regional pressures. Political wrangling in the country pitted the 
Hashemites against the vociferous Ba’athists and Nasserists, leading to the formation 
of an anti- Western government led by Suleiman Nabulsi, which left the kingdom 
occupying a contradictory position on the world stage. This situation was ultimately 
resolved by Hussein dissolving parliament and restricting political space across the 
kingdom, allowing only the Muslim Brotherhood to operate, given their strong anti- 
Nasser sentiment; such a move later helped assuage concerns that the Hashemite 
monarchy was merely a Western pawn.84 Yet Jordan remained trapped by regional 
forces. Although the Hashemite kingdom decided against joining the Baghdad Pact, 
it felt compelled to participate in the 1967 war with Israel, alongside a number of 
republics who had conspired against it. Such a position appears counter intuitive, but 
as Michael Barnett persuasively argues, King Hussein was trapped in the parabolic 
pressures of the Arab sound chamber:  ‘[I] f he went to war with Israel, the most he 
would lose would be the West Bank and Jerusalem, but if he stayed on the sideline he 
would probably lose his crown and country.’85
The death knell of Arab nationalism rang in the summer of 1967 when Israeli forces 
decimated the combined armed forces of Egypt, Jordan and Syria, resulting in the 
deaths of twenty thousand Arabs and the creation of a further five hundred thousand 
refugees. Perhaps most significantly  – and indeed symbolically  – however, the war 
resulted in the Israeli capture of Jerusalem along with the West Bank, Sinai Peninsula 
and the Golan Heights.
Prior to the war, an air of confidence breezed across the Arab world. Newspapers 
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Hassanein Heikal who argued that ‘Whatever happens, and without trying to anticipate 
events, Israel is drawing near almost certain defeat … whether from the inside or the 
outside.’ Others claimed that Israel could be crushed ‘in a matter of hours’. Reporting 
on the battle, the BBC proclaimed Israeli successes as ‘the swiftest victory the modern 
world has known’.86 The defeat ushered in widespread recrimination and criticism of 
political elites through with a wave of literary works across the Middle East that framed 
regimes as anzimat al- hazima, or ‘regimes of defeat’.87 This was a seismic reframing of 
political leadership across the Middle East. In a damning critique of Arab states, Fouad 
Ajami argued that the defeat revealed that ‘the Arab revolution was neither socialist 
nor revolutionary: The Arab world had merely mimicked the noise of revolutionary 
change and adopted the outside trappings of socialism; deep down, under the skin, 
it had not changed’.88 Fundamentally, for Ajami, the defeat showed the bankruptcy of 
Arab unity.89
Even the establishment of the Arab League was wracked by competing visions 
and political difference. Although the League was able to draw upon states from 
across the Middle East and North Africa and also oversaw inter- governmental 
organisations, it was largely the victim of regional rivalries. Perhaps the League’s 
biggest success was at the 1967 summit in Khartoum, which ended Saudi and 
Egyptian proxy involvement in the Yemen civil war amid shared animosity towards 
Israel. The Yemen war was emblematic of issues that had created schisms across 
the Arab world, stemming from competing visions of Arab nationalism and its 
relationship with the sovereign state.90 Yet the Khartoum Summit did not end the 
fighting in Yemen, nor did it lead to the establishment of a unified Yemeni state. 
While the Republic of North Yemen was established in 1962, the People’s Republic 
of South Yemen was established in 1967, supported by the Soviet Union, while full 
unity was only achieved in 1990.91
A second feature of the summit was debate about how to engage with Israel. Defeat in 
the 1967 war had escalated divisions across the Arab world while stressing the importance 
of a shared position on Israel. The Khartoum summit emphasised the importance of the 
sovereign state across the region, while also acknowledging the need for unity. Yet such 
unity was constrained by the personalities of rulers from states across the region, albeit 
alongside a pragmatic agreement not to undermine the regional order.92 The summit 
also established the principle of ‘three nos’ in dealing with Israel: no negotiation, no 
recognition and no peace, which was seen by some to be a diplomatic success.
Others were less convinced, believing that the summit signalled the victory 
of conservative politics over radical. This conservativism was coupled with the 
vulnerability of the Arab order, which meant that the revolutionary philosophies of the 
likes of George Habash and Nayef Hawatmeh were largely ignored. Such a conclusion 
helped empower a range of other actors and, ultimately, created fertile ground for the 
emergence of Islamist movements in the coming decade.
While Ajami’s words reflect the perceptions in the Middle East towards their 
leaders, the geographic landscape of the region had dramatically shifted. One response 
to this was UN Security Council Resolution 242 passed in November 1967, which 
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political independence of every state in the area to live in peace within secure and 
recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of force’.93 The resolution brought with 
it tacit acceptance of the state of Israel’s existence and established the idea of ‘Land for 
Peace’, which became implicit within all future peace processes.94
The response from Palestinian resistance organisations was to increase the ferocity 
of their campaign against the Israeli state with high- profile attacks including those at 
the Munich Olympics. By now the world was aware of the plight of the Palestinians 
and the UN invited the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Yasser 
Arafat, to speak to the General Assembly in 1974. Arafat appealed to the delegates to 
‘enable our people to establish national independent sovereignty over its own land’.95 
With the failure of the Arab states to address the Palestinian question, it became the 
cause célèbre of liberation movements across the world.
In spite of the increasing popularity of their cause, Palestinians struggled to 
integrate into Jordanian society forcing them to move to Lebanon. Once again 
they would struggle to assimilate, particularly with the outbreak of civil war during 
which massacres took place at the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps, committed by 
the Lebanese Phalanges Party, but according to recently released documents with the 
support of the IDF.96 Beyond this, a number of Arab leaders sensed an opportunity to 
capitalise upon Nasser’s weakness while also addressing serious domestic problems 
through the instrumentalised use of Islam. The (re)birth of the pan- Islamic movement 
provided another means through which political elites could increase their legitimacy 
and speak to populations at home and abroad.
Six years after the 1967 war during the Jewish festival of Yom Kippur, Egyptian 
forces and their Syrian counterparts launched a strike against Israeli targets, quickly 
regaining control of the Golan Heights and Sinai. After this initial period of Arab success, 
Israeli forces turned the tide of the war, albeit with help from the United States, and 
regained control of both the Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula. It is widely accepted 
that Egyptian President Anwar Sadat began the war to try and strengthen his hand in 
negotiations with Israel and following a ceasefire on 22 October, he was heralded as the 
batal al ubur, the Hero of the Crossing, the one responsible for healing the wounds of 
Egyptian nationalism. A year later Egypt and Israel signed a disengagement agreement 
and, six years after the war, the Camp David Accords resulted in a peace deal between 
Israel and Egypt. As a consequence of the deal – and the rejection of the three nos – 
Egypt was isolated from the Arab world and faced sanctions from the Arab League.97
In Egypt the years after the war were characterised by increasing repression and 
authoritarianism, resulting in serious economic challenges and widespread vitriol 
directed against Sadat. The peace deal was viewed as a betrayal of Arab, Palestinian 
and Muslim causes and for Egypt to be the first Arab state to make peace was an 
affront to many across the state. At this time the Muslim Brotherhood began to play 
a more prominent role in Egyptian life and amid rising violence emerging during 
criticism of Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel – signed under US auspices after Sadat 
visited Jerusalem – debate about the nature of Egyptian society and celebrations of 
the 1973 war, Sadat was assassinated. The failure of the Arab nationalist dream – in 
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repression and rising authoritarianism – meant that political forms of Islam became 
increasingly popular as a way of ordering regional politics.98
Islamic revivalism
The repercussions of the demise of the pan- Arab movement were felt far beyond the 
borders of Egypt. Tensions over the construction of identity amid changing regional 
dynamics helped create the space and context for the emergence of an increasingly 
politicised form of Islam. After the failure of the pan- Arab project, Islam offered the 
most potent form of resistance, opening up schisms in the relationship between rulers 
and ruled as messages were spread through mosques, largely circumventing state 
censorship. Religious identity had long been a key component of Arab nationalism, 
with the perception that to be an Arab meant that one should also be Muslim.99 
Shared cultural aspects underpin both identities that are formed within the context of 
particular histories and following the fragmentation of the Arab nationalist vision, an 
Islamic revival was hardly surprising.
It is within this context that the British government made the decision to withdraw 
from ‘East of Suez’ and by 1971, all British forces had been removed from the Gulf. 
This withdrawal created space for independence movements to find traction, 
ultimately resulting in the establishment of Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE). Yet British involvement in the Gulf continued. In Bahrain, Ian 
Henderson, a colonial policeman awarded the George Medal for his role in quashing 
the Mau Mau rebellion, was installed as the head of security in 1966. Henderson 
retained his position for thirty years amid wide- ranging allegations of torture during 
his tenure.100 Even after formal withdrawal, British involvement in Bahrain remained 
strong, continuing to head up key security portfolios and using an array of strategies 
perfected amid counter- insurgency campaigns.101 Although British involvement 
remained, political tensions were exacerbated by increased Iranian activity on the 
archipelago, reviving historical Persian claims to sovereignty over Bahrain that were 
later rejected in a UN- supported plebiscite.102
The following years were shaped by global concerns about oil, resulting in the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crisis of 1973. At this 
time, the power of ideology had given way to the economic might of states across the 
Gulf who, other than Saudi Arabia, were little more than city states at this time and 
thus were sarcastically referred to as al- dawla al- bi’r, the oil- field/ well states.103 Yet such 
states would exercise a great deal of power and influence in the coming years, as events 
across the Gulf began to be felt across the Middle East.
Revolution in Iran resulted in a serious dislocation of the regional order.104 While 
under the Shah Iran worked closely with Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf states on 
regional security, the revolution and ensuing establishment of the Islamic Republic 
put an end to this cooperation. It also added an explicitly sectarian dimension to the 
foreign policies of the Persian Gulf states,105 alongside a strong Iranian desire to provide 
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The aftershocks were felt across the region as revolution left ‘a trail of devastation in 
regional relations, littered with spontaneous utterances and unfettered intervention in 
neighbouring states’.106
A great deal has been written about the revolution in Iran, but a few points are 
worth repeating. Widespread unrest stemming from a history of persecution and 
draconian policies had ostracised large aspects of society who took to the streets after 
protest groups were brutally repressed. Ruhollah Khomeini had been viewed by many 
as the figurehead of opposition to the Pahlavi regime, returning from exile shortly after 
the Shah had abdicated. The system of veleyat- e faqih was quickly established, creating 
an Islamic system of government ruled, in the absence of the missing twelfth Imam, 
by Khomeini.
At this point, ideas once again took on a central role in the organisation of regional 
politics in the guise of pan- Islamism. Much like Arab nationalism before it, visions 
of pan- Islamism required demonstrations of adherence to – and purity of – Islamic 
messages in an attempt to speak to members of the global umma. Once again, regime 
interest began to manifest in such claims, as Saudi Arabia sought to frame Iran as 
a Shi’a state, reducing its appeal to Sunni Muslims, while also stressing the Persian 
nature of the revolution. In contrast, Tehran sought to portray the Al Saud as unpious 
and not worthy of being the guardians of the two holy places.107
Domestic unrest also began to increase amid the rising prominence of Islam within 
politics. The same year, on the eastern and western coasts of the kingdom, unrest was 
brewing. On the western coast in the largely Shi’a areas, political unrest among the 
marginalised Shi’a groups, long persecuted by the state on the grounds of their sect 
had been empowered by events in Iran. On the opposite coast, during the pilgrimage 
season, a descendent of the Saudi ikhwan, Juhayman Al Utaybi, seized the Grand 
Mosque of Mecca in protest at what was seen to be the ‘moral laxity and degeneration of 
the Saudi rulers’.108 While ended by military force, the symbolic ramifications of events 
demonstrate different interpretations of Wahhabist doctrine within Saudi Arabia.
The events of 1979 demonstrate the symbolic importance of religion within 
regional  – and global  – politics, particularly in light of the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and ensuing flow of Muslims to the country to fight for the Western- 
backed mujahedin. While some scholars reduce the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran to a sectarian schism,109 a more nuanced reading of events suggests that religion 
has taken on additional political meaning within the context of increasingly vocal 
sectarian divisions.110 In a reading of events similar to that put forward by Barnett to 
describe the regional influence of Arabism, Islam thus took on a symbolic role, serving 
as a source of legitimacy for audiences across the region. From this, religion also 
became a source and arena of competition and rivalry, resulting in the politicisation of 
religion and the conflation of politics with religion.
In Lebanon, the collision of religion, politics and geopolitics resulted in the 
establishment of Hizballah, the Party of God, which was formed with Iranian support, 
both financial and ideological, for Shi’a communities across the south of the state. In the 
following decades Hizballah would go on to become a prominent Iranian ally, but as we 
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new Islamic Republic was central to the emergence of the Party of God, we must also 
recall the importance of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 in response to continued 
attacks from the PLO. The importance of the Israeli invasion in creating Hizballah 
was acknowledged – and perhaps overstated – by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud 
Barak, who argued that ‘it was our presence there that created Hezbollah’.112
It was hardly surprising that war quickly followed the declaration of the Islamic 
Republic. Iraqi armed forces invaded Iran on 22 September 1980 and began an eight- 
year conflict that resulted in a catastrophic loss of life and drew in other Gulf states, 
demonstrating the regional importance of the war amid widespread fear of Iranian 
intentions.113 Khomeini’s rhetoric only served to fuel such concerns by stressing a 
desire to export the revolution and to provide support for oppressed Muslims across the 
world. The use of religious rhetoric threatened to open up the regional order, leading 
to the fear that minority Shi’a groups – many of whom had experienced discrimination 
throughout state- building processes – would side with Iran.
Shared religious and ethnic ties across the border between the two states meant 
that in both Tehran and Baghdad, ethno- religious minorities were perceived as fifth 
columns and subject to discrimination and marginalisation from state projects. In 
Iraq, Saddam Hussein had risen to power in 1979 after a bloodless coup toppled 
Ahmed Hassan Al Bakr. At this point tensions between ruler and ruled resulted in 
a violent society and the widespread repression  – and murder  – of Shi’a political 
and religious figures. Minority groups were violently repressed, most notably in the 
al- Anfal genocide and the Halabja massacre which resulted in the deaths of over a 
hundred thousand Kurds.114
Following the end of the war, circumstances facilitated moves towards 
rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia following a catastrophic earthquake 
in Iran and continued fear about the aspirations of Saddam Hussein. The annexation 
of Kuwait as the nineteenth province of Iraq in 1991 was the manifestation of such 
fears, exacerbated by Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme. 
The invasion quickly topped the regime of Sheikh Jaber Al Sabah, who fled to Saudi 
Arabia, but a week after Operation Desert Storm was launched, the Iraqi military was 
decimated but the Ba’ath party rule continued.
Political turmoil was not restricted to the Gulf. The struggle between Israelis and 
Palestinians erupted once again in 1987 with the first intifada (uprising) comprised of 
widespread acts of civil disobedience and resistance across the West Bank and Gaza. 
The events lasted until 1991 with the Oslo Accords but marked a significant turning 
point in the Palestinian cause as local agency began to act independently of regional 
Arab states. The Oslo Accords sought to restart the peace process and move toward 
a two- state solution, based on the 1978 Camp David Accords but predicated upon 
mutual recognition and the right of Palestinians to self- determination as documented 
in UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Signed on the White House lawn on 
13 September 1993, the accords put a road map towards a two- state solution in place, 
which was halted in 1995 with the assassination of Yitzak Rabin by Yigal Amir, an 
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and ideology and their interaction with political projects, at his trial, Amir claimed 
that he was acting in accordance with Jewish Law, which was rejected by the judges.115
The War on Terror
The events of 11 September 2001 dramatically altered the nature of international 
politics, creating more conducive conditions to spatialise the exception. The declaration 
of War on Terror called for the eradication of violent Islamic fundamentalism and the 
safe havens that allowed such groups to flourish. Across the region, the narrative of 
the War on Terror provided scope for leaders to frame dissent as terrorism and draw 
upon US support in the process. In framing political struggles as part of this broader 
struggle, regimes were able to conduct military campaigns that involved emergency 
powers, derogation from legal structures and, also, to transgress humanitarian 
concerns.116
In the State of the Union speech that followed the 9/11 attacks in early 2002, 
President Bush positioned Iran and Iraq as part of an ‘axis of evil’ that would shape 
the contemporary world order. Although eleven of the nineteen hijackers were Saudi 
citizens, the alliance between Saudi Arabia and the United States remained positive 
amid strong personal relations between kings and presidents.117 Regional security 
calculations were a central part of tensions across the Persian Gulf, with Saudi Arabia 
reliant upon the United States for security while Iran deemed itself uniquely qualified 
to preserve the regional status quo.118
A year later, a US- led military force invaded Iraq, albeit with limited international 
support and without a UN Security Council Resolution. There is little doubt that the 
invasion and its aftermath had a catastrophic impact upon Iraq as it quickly became 
the site of a struggle for political power and a broader conflict that drew in a range of 
regional actors not only in response to the invasion, but also in an attempt to shape 
the post- war landscape of the country. Abu Al Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qa’ida in Iraq, 
suggested that the fight against coalition forces in Iraq would play an important role in 
the group’s larger struggle: ‘the spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue 
to intensify – by Allah’s permission – until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq’.119
Post Saddam, politics in Iraq became shaped by a range of parabolic pressures 
that thrust the indigenous alongside the regional and the international, with Iran 
in a position of influence.120 For many Arab leaders, the idea that Iran would gain a 
foothold in the Arab world was a source of great concern. Saudi Arabia was especially 
worried, urging US officials not to ‘leave Iraq until its sovereignty has been restored, 
otherwise it will be vulnerable to the Iranians’.121
Iraq quickly become the main arena of the rivalry between Saudi Arabia – along 
with other Sunni Arab states  – and Iran, although the struggle was not limited to 
Iraq’s territorial borders, opening up space for a regional competition. The rivalry was 
escalated by King Abdullah of Jordan’s claims about a ‘Shi’a Crescent’ that framed Shi’a 
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Efforts to frame regional politics along sectarian lines began in earnest after the 2003 
war, yet these narratives struggled to find traction across the region, where President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran had become one of the most popular figures through 
his anti- imperialist stance.
Ahmadinejad’s popularity was matched by that of Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of 
Hizballah, whose actions in the 2006 war with Israel were well received by populations 
across the Middle East. Only a year before conflict, Hizballah’s power in Lebanon 
appeared to be in jeopardy following the assassination of Rafik Hariri, the Lebanese 
Prime Minister – allegedly by Hizballah and Syrian actors122 – which resulted in the 
withdrawal of Syrian troops from the state who had been in Lebanon since the start of 
the civil war.123 Yet within the space of a year, the Party of God fought a thirty- four- day 
war with Israel in south Lebanon, which resulted in the punitive destruction of the 
Beirut suburb of Dahiyeh but was framed as a success for Hizballah and, by extension, 
Iran.124 As a consequence, Hizballah’s popularity increased dramatically across the 
region, laying bare a dilemma in Arab leadership:  to support groups that opposed 
Israel, or to oppose Shi’a groups across the region and, by extension, Iran.
Post 2003, scholars began to view a new form of regional organisation through the 
lens of a ‘normal’ Westphalian system, where states were driven by raisons d’état.125 
With the increased prominence of non- Arab players within regional politics the move 
to a ‘post- Arab system’ appeared in motion. At this point, as scholars such as Vali 
Nasr suggested, sectarian identities began to shape the region, not Arabism.126 Yet 
as Morten Valbjørn and André Bank stress stress, Arab politics became shaped by a 
‘new’ form of competition over the meaning of Arab nationalism. Evoking Malcolm 
Kerr’s work on the Arab Cold War and Jerrold Green’s assertion that ‘Arab politics is 
still Arab’,127 Valbjørn and Bank argued that this new form of Arab nationalism played 
out over Arab symbols, allowing for analysis of the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran.128 Yet with the Arab Uprisings of less than a decade later, the ordering of space 
took on a different form, shaped by the interaction of Arabism with Islamism, taking 
place within arenas that were not traditionally associated with the Arab cause129 and 
cultivating sect- based cleavages.
In December 2010, the actions of a Tunisian street vendor triggered a tidal wave 
of protests across the region that toppled long- standing authoritarian regimes in 
Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya. The Arab Uprisings eviscerated regime– society 
relations, opening up deep schisms within the fabric of political projects and revealing 
traumatic memories across the region’s history. The spread of protests across the region 
driven by a dissatisfaction with the economic climate and frustration at the nature of 
regime– society relations is the focus of later chapters, but it is important to note that 
the spread of these grievances from Tunisia to Bahrain shows the capacity of ideas 
and movements to transcend state borders. The emergence of regional grievances 
created conditions of uncertainty that placed serious pressure on regimes across the 
region, resulting in fragmentation and reframing the relationship between ordnung 
and ortung, with broader regional consequences.
The uprisings also impacted upon relations between states as a number became 
embroiled in proxy conflicts in pursuit of their foreign policy goals.130 Other states 
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sovereignty and legitimacy had been damaged by the unrest. This unrest put serious 
pressure on regime– society relations and the ability of a state to withstand this reveals 
a great deal about the state- building process. It also opened up schisms within these 
processes, particularly over the role of religion within political life. While suspicion 
at Iranian involvement had escalated into proxy conflicts across the region, it later 
transpired that groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood had received support for 
Qatar, leading to a Saudi- led land and sea blockade.
The blockade shortly followed the withdrawal of Saudi, Bahraini, Emirati and 
Sudanese ambassadors, posing a serious challenge to the very survival of the Gulf 
Co- Operation Council (GCC).131 The GCC had been formed in the midst of the 
Iran– Iraq War to maintain security and stability across the Persian Gulf, but was 
predominantly formed to counter threats from across the Gulf. Yet Qatar’s apparent 
counter- hegemonic behaviour across the post- Arab Uprisings region including the 
funding of violent groups, support for Islamist movements and Al Jazeera’s anti- 
status quo coverage of the uprisings created serious schisms within the organisation. 
The blockade continued over the summer of 2018, echoing a similar withdrawal of 
ambassadors in 2014 and resulting in tenders being placed to create a canal zone 
between Qatar and the mainland.
Perhaps the biggest impact on the territorial construction of the Middle East, 
however, was the emergence of Da’ish in the summer of 2014. The declaration of 
the caliphate spanning territory in both Iraq and Syria was heralded by a video 
posted on YouTube by Bastian Vasquez, a Chilean- Norwegian man, stood on the 
border between Iraq and Syria. The video, entitled ‘The End of Sykes– Picot’ shed 
light upon the intentions of the group, rejecting the ‘so- called border of Sykes– 
Picot’ and articulating widespread anger and frustration at the legacy of state 
formation across the region.132 Despite the inaccuracy of the claims, the Sykes– 
Picot narrative proved to be a powerful vehicle for demonstrating the legacy of 
external interference across the region. Although defeated through a loose alliance 
of forces from Iraq, Popular Mobilisation Units (PMUs), Iran, Hizballah, Syria, 
the United States, Russian, UK and Turkey, the legacy of the caliphate remains, 
as post- conflict reconstruction efforts play out across Iraq and conflict continues 
in Syria.
Conclusions
Results from a 2015 study undertaken by a research team at Mount Sinai hospital 
in New  York found that trauma from the Holocaust with epigenetic alterations 
can be seen in both parents and offspring. The conclusions of the study suggest 
that trauma can be intergenerational and similar conclusions can be derived about 
how memory can be shared across communities.133 From this, historical experience 
has an undeniable role in shaping the present. Thus, the establishment of political 
organisation across the region should not be viewed in isolation. Rather, we should 
place the emergence of states and groups within context, through which rules and 
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result in the cultivation of particular forms of identities and political organisation, 
shaped by the residue of history.
Tensions over memories and the political actions that they provoke can cause 
rifts within and between states, leaving regimes open to criticism, which itself creates 
space for new arrangements of political life, as we see in the cases of Arabism and 
pan- Islamism. Thus, events occur within the context of history and memory and how 
people act at such points is a consequence of their engagement with both the nomos 
and the political structures of the state, which may not be aligned.
Structures also exist between states, as collective memory and experience operates 
within ethnic groups, sects, religions or broad ideological positions, setting rules on 
how to live and defining spatial borders. Ultimately, a dialectic relationship between 
agency and nomos means that political actions have metaphysical consequences with 
longer- term repercussions. Such structures impact on the ability to act in particular 
ways, creating, replicating or moulding grievances across time. Structures can exist 
within states, for instance across history, reflecting the challenges that the state has 
gone through, along with the type of nation building and the assimilation of others 
into national projects.
A central tension emerges from the interaction of nomos and nomoi that exist 
within powerful currents, driven by nationalist, tribal and religious sentiments. While 
the global nomos offers a form of political ordering, the interaction of ordnung and 
ortung that defines nomoi can create myriad forms of political life amid parabolic 
pressures and currents. Such currents posed challenges for the development of 
political organisation, seen in Migdal’s ideas about the role of the state in society and 
the inability to penetrate and regulate social relationships.
The presence of ‘weak states’ and a shared normative environment means that 
regional security machinations have domestic repercussions. Fearing increased Iranian 
involvement, regimes typically respond with restrictive strategies and securitisation, 
resulting in conditions of bare life and necropolitics as a consequence of regional events. 
Of course, this is not a region- wide strategy, as we shall see in Kuwait, but it is common 
in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and 
Israel. Opposition is often framed within the context of an existential struggle for 
survival in an attempt to justify recourse to emergency legislation. For many states, this 
transcends conflict and also exists within the context of a process of securitisation, often 
along sectarian lines and thus, occurring across borders. Framing political tensions in 
such a way removes agency from domestic groups while also consolidating the support 
base of a ruling elite and eroding the traction of socio- economic protest movements. 
Within this process, regimes create the conditions of bare life and necropolitics in an 
effort to ensure their own survival, while securing regional alliances in the process. Yet 
the onset of the uprisings suggests that it is not enough to focus solely upon structure; 
we must also consider the role of agency in political activity.
As we move forward, it is important to remember the legacy of this experience 
as residue feeds into quasi- normative structures such as memory, trauma and 
empowerment, shaping the behaviour of actors. Indeed, the interaction of material and 
ideological structures shapes the capacity and desire of actors to behave in particular 
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ways. Yet we must also note that state experience  – and from this, the experience 
of individuals and groups within the state – differ, shaped by contingent facts. Such 
experiences create normative environments that regulate life, but also provide 
opportunities for regimes to derive legitimacy from times of contestation.
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[T] he real problem, the central mystery of politics is not sovereignty, but 
government … it is not the law, but the police – that is to say, the governmental 
machine that they form and support.
Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory
The reign of an absolute monarch is something of a rarity in the modern world. Amid 
the pressures of modernity, the ability to lay claim to absolute power is limited to a 
small number of states, a number of whom are in the Middle East. Yet such absolute 
power is not limited to monarchies. The prevalence of authoritarian rule across the 
Middle East has led to the establishment of what Nazih Ayubi has termed ‘fierce states’, 
echoing Friedrich Nietzsche’s definition of the state as ‘the coldest monster’.
This chapter looks at the way in which a range of political structures  – formal 
and informal  – have been created in pursuit of regime survival. Although typically 
viewed as the security mechanisms of a state, coercive capabilities are also embedded 
within the regulatory mechanisms of political systems and the ability to create bare 
life, underpinned by claims to legitimacy. In pursuit of this, regimes embed themselves 
within local contexts of tribalism, history, religion and civic myths that shape politics 
in an attempt to survive.
The development of political communities and the systems that regulate and 
order them are an essential part of closing off a community against an outside. The 
development of political structures is an essential part of this process, restricting 
the capacity of action but also giving meaning. As we have seen, amid a regional 
environment underpinned by shared memories and norms, the spatial exception 
is not restricted to one territorial area; what happens in one state can have regional 
implications and vice versa. The residue of history, ideology and the spread of identities 
across the region creates conditions that facilitate mobilisation around cross- border 
issues, posing serious challenges to states and structures designed to regulate life. 
Central to our exploration of the regulation of life and of the ban that underpins such 
regulation is the contingency that shapes political systems.
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Acknowledgement of this position demonstrates that rulers have carefully crafted 
both a narrative and political infrastructure that draws upon an array of different 
mechanisms of control to regulate life. While religion, ideology and tribal loyalties 
have been moulded to meet domestic and regional needs, ruling elites have also created 
formal structures with the aim of ensuring the survival of the regime. Constitutions 
have been designed to draw upon cultural reserves to ensure that regimes are often 
taken to be representative of states, while opponents are often marginalised. They are 
imbued with a range of mechanisms to help maintain control through the capacity 
to strip political meaning from life, in a manifestation of the ban, and the capacity 
to derogate from the rule of law. Ultimately, regime survival and sovereign rule is 
dependent upon the combination of legitimacy, coercive capabilities, and the extent to 
which these aspects are embedded within territoriality.
Authoritarianism and political structures
Across the Middle East, newly established states were populated by nascent 
bureaucracies, with homogeneity and equality claimed to be at the heart of new 
political projects.1 Security (and stability) was the primary concern of colonial 
overlords, yet politics was seen as a prominent mechanism of divide and rule 
strategies, manifesting in political structures such as in Lebanon, in tribal courts of 
Transjordan, or administrative separation and de facto Alawi and Druze states in 
Syria.2 Within this, a number of forms of political systems have been employed with 
various social implications, from the Lebanese consociational model to the theocratic 
Islamic Republic of Iran. Each form of political organisation is unique and predicated 
upon context- specific contingent factors found in demographics, history, ideology and 
intended outcome, creating unique nomoi that operate within a global nomos.
While a cursory glance at the region sees elections in a number of states, amid 
various different contexts and to varying degrees of success, it is difficult to conclude 
that these projects meet the criteria to be considered democratic. Although elections 
for political positions have been an integral part of political life  – understood in 
different ways with different restrictions  – in Lebanon, Bahrain, Turkey, Israel, 
Iran and Kuwait, others had different experiences with democratic processes, amid 
allegations of corruption and malpractice. Elections have also taken place within 
more contested arenas such as the Kurds in Northern Iraq in 1992, Yemen in 1993, 
Iraq in 2005 and subsequent years and Egypt in 2012. Yet these electoral experiences 
do not prove the successful application of democracy, nor do they demonstrate its 
failure. While a number of democratic characteristics may be present, such as the 
shura meetings and tribal audiences, these have not always been replicated into the 
formal political structures of states, meaning authoritarian politics has dominated 
the region.3 With this in mind, a number of scholars have undertaken taxonomies 
to articulate difference within authoritarian rule, to include strength, reformist, 
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The dominance of authoritarianism stems from a number of reasons: first, weak 
civil society prohibits the emergence of a strong democratic culture, while the legacy 
of unions and associations have fuelled the strength of networks of patronage that cut 
across the region. Second, economies have historically been state run. Although in 
recent years a number of states have embraced liberalisation and market forces (such 
as Israel and the Gulf states), the legacy of statist ideologies and the power of rentierism 
has placed regimes centrally within the state and once again, constrained the power 
of society. Moreover, it has facilitated the spread of corruption through networks of 
patronage, where the ultimate goal was mobilising popular support, retaining authority 
and autonomy, but to prevent the emergence of the organised masses.5 The potential 
implications of such issues are explored in depth by Hannah Arendt in The Origins 
of Totalitarianism, where she argues that the power of the mob has the capacity to 
dramatically reorder political characteristics of society, demonstrating the power of 
normative structures to reshape political life.6
Third, levels of education have historically been low, amid large- scale inequality. 
Although a recent youth bulge has co-incided with improved literacy rates and 
the number of people graduating with degrees, many find that there are few 
employment opportunities. Fourth, the region was largely absent from the third 
wave of democratisation that spread across the world, which Eva Bellin suggests is 
a consequence of geographic remoteness from the epicentre of democratisation.7 Of 
course, the distinctive experiences of states across the region have created unique 
forms of authoritarian rule and, in the cases of Israel, Kuwait, Turkey and Lebanon, 
some form of democratic politics. Ultimately, difference shapes the nature of local 
nomoi, along with the intricacies of the ban.
In a number of cases, emergency powers have transitioned from exception to norm, 
often becoming ‘coded’ within legal structures of states. In Egypt, a paradigmatic 
example of the seemingly permanent use of emergency laws to regulate life, consecutive 
regimes used the law as a means of controlling populations. For the thirty years prior to 
the uprisings of 2011, the state existed under a de facto and de jure state of emergency, 
restricting civil liberties and political participation through the expansion of security 
organs of the state and blurring the legal and illegal.8 The roots of such a strategy are 
found in the British military presence in the country, where Martial Law 15/ 1922 was 
used in 1914 as a mechanism of control but it was under Nasser when the blurring of 
law and politics, legal and illegal, became the norm. After Nasser, consecutive Egyptian 
presidents used emergency powers to maintain sovereign rule, embedding the exception 
within the fabric of the Egyptian state.9 Similar experiences are found in Syria and Israel, 
where the perennial use of emergency powers creates the possibility to create bare life.
Beyond emergency powers, political systems can serve as a mechanism of 
overcoming societal differences through the cultivation of consociational systems of 
government, power- sharing agreements that give a political voice to elite representatives 
from societies beset by communal divisions. In Lebanon, the Taif Accords that ended 
a fifteen- year long civil war established a power- sharing system of government that 
embedded communal identities within the fabric of the political system. As Arend 
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bringing elites from key segments of society together to build coalitions, transforming a 
zero- sum game into a spirit of cooperation and compromise and softening communal 
differences.10 Embedding communal difference into the political system provoked a great 
deal of criticism, but in recent years a number of scholars and analysts have softened 
their stance, suggesting that the power- sharing agreement has maintained peace, albeit 
within the context of a stagnating political climate and ongoing structural violence.11
We must also consider how structures have been used to integrate citizenship strip 
political meaning from life within the context of the camp. The reform of political 
structures and institutions plays a prominent role within the (re)development of 
the ban. The development or reform of institutions allows for the cultivation of new 
rules, structures and procedures, including constitutional reform, decentralisation, 
supervision of elections and abolition of particular ministries.12 Of course, reform 
can also move away from liberalisation, as domestic challenges have often resulted 
in deliberalising moves. A  cursory glance at political systems across the Middle 
East reveals that reform has been a regular characteristic of political life in the 
previous four decades: new constitutions, reform of existing constitutions, electoral 
experiments and a range of other reforms have been made in an effort to ensure 
regime survival.
One such example is the political liberalisation that took place in Egypt under 
Sadat’s process of infitah (openness in terms of economic liberalisation). In Jordan, 
the first parliamentary elections were held in 1989, while in Syria, parliament was 
expanded to allow independents to stand in 1990. In 1992, Saudi Arabia established 
its Basic Law, al hukm al- asi, to legislate for fundamental civic rights, also adding a 
consultative majlis ash- shura the same year. Across the Gulf, new constitutions were 
created in 2000, which gave women the vote in Qatar, while reform in Bahrain was part 
of a political package to ease transition to the rule of King Hamad in 1999.
Constitutions, citizenship and ‘the ban’
Political systems and their constitutions are manifestations of the formal regulation of 
life, adding stability and permanence to political communities. Although executives 
have played a dominant role within the context of Middle Eastern politics, constitutions 
underpin their activity and capacity to operate in a particular way. Such manifestations 
occur in a range of different guises and with different priorities, from monarchies to 
republics. Essential to our exploration is an understanding of the issue that arises when 
considering the interaction of ordnung and ortung and the ensuing implications for 
law, politics and ultimately, sovereignty.
Territorial dimensions of legal structures are often run in contradiction with 
broader commitments to a non- territorial community, a theme that is covered in 
more detail in the following chapter. This creates a dichotomy between territorial 
and personal laws (and obligations), both constitutionally and in customary practice. 
Reference to the personal does not just evoke a sense of individualism, but also to 
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tension is between communitarian and territorial federalism, wherein legal structures 
shape the life of community groups.
The struggle to resolve this tension while retaining legitimacy manifests in 
institutional building and transnational integration, impacting upon individual 
loyalties.13 Along with regional experiences, Islamic tradition contains within it rich 
sources of democracy and civil society. Fundamental to this is the idea that the Quran 
contains verses stressing that affairs must be resolved through shura or a process of 
consultation.14 Ideas of civil society are also found within classical Islam, understood 
as those activities taking place beyond state control including a merchant bourgeoisie, 
an active judiciary and the presence of scholars all acting independently of state 
structures.15 Islamist movements have traditionally capitalised upon access to such 
civil society, where groups have typically been able to exert influence. Ensuring that 
societies are run in accordance with norms is a concern for those seeking to derive 
legitimacy for their rule and to regulate life, from which the nomos offers a set of 
guidelines to regulate political activity; as such, a number of states have established 
constitutional offices to protect such norms.
It is hardly surprising that religion occupies a central role in political structures. 
Islam is the state religion in all but four of our states of inquiry (Israel, Turkey, Lebanon 
and Syria), while Islamic teachings serve as a source of law or legislation in all but three 
(Israel, Turkey and Lebanon). Constitutions reflect the prevalence of Islam both in 
the religion of the state but also through the construction of laws. In contrast, Turkey 
explicitly stresses its secular character. For instance, Article 2 states that, ‘The Republic 
of Turkey is a democratic, laic and social state governed by the rule of law’, while Article 
174 aims to ‘safeguard the laic character of the Republic’. Israel is careful to stress its 
democratic character, although it is also explicitly Jewish.16 In Saudi Arabia the Basic 
Law of Governance of 1992 provides regulatory oversight, which is underpinned by 
‘the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet’.17 Within such a context, elections 
were deemed inappropriate by King Fahd, the kingdom’s fifth ruler.18 In addition to 
such laws, norms serve as a mechanism to regulate life, seen most visibly through the 
importance of tribalism across the kingdom.19
Political projects are comprised of peoples, both citizens and non- citizens alike. 
An integrated notion of citizenship is created through recourse to political and legal 
structures, which, in turn, are shaped by culture and the interaction of identities 
and ideology. For Agamben, ‘ “the people” represents a fundamental “biopolitical 
fracture” ’,20 the totality of those integrated and sovereign citizens. This too is an 
exclusionary concept, referring to ‘a fragmentary multiplicity of needful and excluded 
bodies’,21 or who were never included within the political project. As Michael Shapiro 
suggests, we should view citizenship in such a way, while also adding a temporal 
element into the discussion, which helps with the consistent process of ‘renegotiation’.22
Citizenship occupies a central role within political projects, serving as the way in 
which a community closes itself off against an outside. By enshrining this difference in 
law, a community gains security and a temporal permanence. Yet the establishment of 
a number of nation states appeared at odds with traditional visions of identity, many 
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an outside that engenders loyalty among many of the inside appears increasingly 
difficult. Fundamentally a normative project that enshrines legal rights to people in 
their relationship with their polities, citizenship is seen by many to be an act that seeks 
to impose control on sovereign power.23 Conversely, as Arendt argued, citizenship 
rights may be revoked as a mechanism of exclusion and control.24 Historically used 
to regulate the bidoon25 in Kuwait and Palestinians, the denial of citizenship rights 
continues to be powerful tool in the arsenal of regimes.26
Establishing states requires the closing off of an inside against an outside but even 
this does not necessarily entail citizenship but membership, which can be revoked 
through recourse to bare life. The process of state building posed a number of serious 
challenges to the creation of a citizenship body, requiring the delineation of territory, 
control of borders and identification of people to populate the new project. To identify 
with the nation, loyalty had to transcend traditional forms of identification that were 
based on looser affiliations to create loyalty to the state and, perhaps more importantly, 
to the interests of regimes.27 Traditionally, those who can claim citizenship are able 
to trace their family lineage and territorial linkages through male parentage to the 
pre- independence eras.
Such concerns are particularly prominent in those states where the establishment 
of national projects challenged the pre- existing organisation of political life. Debate 
about the nature of citizenship has taken on political meaning, shaped by the context 
and contingency within which such considerations take place, and underpinned by 
nationality laws that establish stringent criteria defining who can – and cannot – be 
considered as belonging to the community and should be a citizen.28 While naturalisation 
clauses have been added, these are underpinned by security concerns and fears about 
the regime survival.29 Citizenship comes with a number of benefits. It is a mechanism 
to ensure loyalty amid stronger pulls towards Arab nationalism, pan- Islamism or 
indeed stronger nationalisms across the Gulf, facilitated by the rentier bargains that are 
prominent throughout the Gulf.30 Access to such resources helped to cultivate loyalty 
and legitimacy among peoples, increasing regime authority in the process.31
The formation of states and their citizenry has been underpinned by concerns 
about sedition and fear about the potential to manipulate domestic events for 
nefarious reasons. The process of establishing control and delineating populations 
was shaped by the need to not only maintain security but to carve out individual 
identities that differentiate new political projects from what came before and from 
their neighbours.32 The establishment of the United Arab Emirates out of seven 
distinct emirates, each with their own local identity, provides an example of such an 
issue. This process of establishing a federal entity posed questions about the eligibility 
of citizenship and passports, particularly amid the presence of a large percentage of 
Dubai’s population who were of Persian origin.33 Perhaps the most obvious example 
of this  – discussed in more detail below  – concerns the Kuwaiti bidoon, who were 
marginalised as a consequence of an exclusionary vision of nationality law, but one that 
remains pertinent today.
One response to such concerns is the revocation of citizenship – creating conditions of 
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the very heart of ideas of belonging – inclusion – within political projects but also reveals 
the importance of context and contingency in decisions of revocation. The removal of 
citizenship serves as a means of excluding people from political projects, revoking their 
access to the benefits of citizenship with implications for their families, particularly as 
most of those whose citizenship has been revoked are men and nationality is traditionally 
passed through the father. Ultimately, it serves as a deterrent against political protest. 
The nature of citizenship reveals a great deal about the process through which the ban 
is applied and, conversely, through which life can be stripped of its political meaning. 
Recourse to the ban facilitates the creation of bare life, allowing for the marginalisation 
of peoples through the potentiality of the exception. The revocation of citizenship 
serves as one of the more prominent manifestations of sovereign power in operation yet 
potentiality means that all people can be reduced to the figure of homo sacer.
A more obvious means of understanding exclusion is revealed through consideration 
of the citizen– non- citizen binary. Such an approach locates citizenship both within a 
clearly delineated territorial space and shared cultural community, typically associated 
with traditional ideas about sovereignty. This vision of citizenship suggests that in 
search of national identities, people buy into the production of particular narratives 
and historiographies which supersede other identities. This position involves the 
development of a national myth that seeks to create a homogenous identity, derived 
from shared culture and tradition. Ideas that underpin such national myths and 
belonging require education to evoke ideas of the ‘imagined community’.34 In many 
cases, this has taken place within communal identities rather than at the national level, 
although in recent years, Gulf states have developed educational curricula that stress 
the importance of nationalist narratives.35
Amid loyalty to a range of different identities and ideologies, the construction 
of identity becomes incredibly complex. While the previous chapter outlined the 
importance of the pan ideologies of Arabism and Islamism which leave a strong 
residue of community spirit and belonging within contemporary political life,36 the 
construction of citizenship within states often runs contrary to such sentiments. 
People thus retain a semblance of loyalty to both domestic and regional identities. 
Moreover, the formal and normative structures that emerge from history and cultural 
legacies typically manifest in a range of demotic experiences that are contingent upon 
socio- economic, cultural contexts.
Constitutions are central to these structures, which in many cases stress the 
importance of equality and inclusion, yet the reality of political life is somewhat 
different. While Article 17 of the Omani Constitution articulates that, ‘All citizens 
are equal before the Law and share the same public rights and duties. There is no 
discrimination between them on the ground of gender, origin, colour, language, 
religion, sect, domicile, or social status’, consideration of relations between indigenous 
Omanis and migrant workers reveals such clauses to be hollow. For those marginalised 
from political life, equality and inclusion are words not deeds or, as a Yemeni aphorism 
goes, ‘ink on the paper’, meaningless as few across the state care about what is written, 
while the central government struggles to regulate life.37 Demands for equality and 
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the region, yet such calls have often been ignored.38 For others, although important, 
citizenship and equality mean very little when people are not treated as such, reflecting 
deeper existential concerns about the nature of political life.39
Political systems serve as mechanisms of control and population management, 
facilitating the regulation of life while also aspiring to bring people together as an 
inside. In Lebanon, the Taif Accords provided major sects with permanent access 
to decision- making, as the key portfolios of the state are distributed between 
Sunni, Shi’i and Maronite. Although important in creating peace, the power- 
sharing system entrenched difference along communitarian lines,40 feeding into 
political stagnation and exacerbating corruption along communal lines. In spite of 
this criticism some acknowledged that the agreement had prevented the descent 
into war.41
In Iraq, an informal system of consociational governance, the Muhasasa 
Ta’ifa (sectarian apportionment) was established in 2003, designed to empower 
representatives from Sunni, Shi’a and Kurdish communities. The implementation of 
this system drew upon plans made by Iraqi opposition groups at a conference in 1992 
which was then imported into the country along with the exiles who became the state’s 
new ‘elite’. The Muhasasa system allocated positions according to the ‘Salah al- Din 
principles’, dividing jobs along the percentage estimates of Shi’a Sunni and Kurdish 
groups. These identities were placed at the heart of the agreement, which brought 
together a range of political parties from different communities.42 As Toby Dodge 
has pertinently acknowledged, the Muhasasa Ta’ifa system has ‘greatly weakened 
the Iraqi state’, resulting in endemic corruption and widespread inefficiency. It also 
created conditions where the United States, Saudi Arabia and Iran could exploit Iraqi 
politics in pursuit of their own interests, seen in the role of Major General Qassem 
Soleimani playing a prominent role in government formation in 2006, 2010, 2014 
and 2018.43
In what followed, a form of federal system was established in Iraq, creating an 
autonomous Kurdish zone, largely distinct from the administrative power of Baghdad, 
the first instance of autonomous Kurdish rule since the short lived Mahabad Republic. 
Of course, the implications of such structures are strongly felt in the construction 
of identity that replicates the community rather than the territorial. The creation of 
divisions – in spite of constitutional nods to inclusion – strengthen loyalty to particular 
identities, while conversely increasing the power of narratives of victimhood.44 
Recounting the dominance of religious identities, one senior Kurdish policy advisor 
suggested that ‘we don’t have Iraqis in Iraq’.45
Tribes, culture and tradition
At the heart of mass mobilisation is the power of identity and ideology. We should 
not view agents as the passive carriers of identity but rather as the bearers of 
identities, performing their roles in accordance with generally accepted practice along 
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it is (re)constructed and negotiated across time and space, shaped by context and the 
contingency of daily life. Identity is performed, where actors behave in accordance with 
normative structures that clearly delineate the boundaries of acceptable action and the 
state. Such performances feed into the construction of the nomos, as each actor brings 
with them their own experiences and agendas that shape the regulation of political life. 
Within this, regimes seek to exert regulatory power and to penetrate society, but their 
ability to do so reveals a great deal about their own power.
The modern process of state formation was an effort to penetrate and regulate 
a society that was itself already regulated in accordance with previously accepted 
norms. New forms of political organisation contested the already existing relationship 
between ordnung and ortung. Different processes of tribal assimilation and 
contestation are seen across political projects, at various speeds and characterised by 
distinctive rhythms. Moreover, this did not result in the end of tribes but rather the 
beginning of a new set of relationships between power brokers across time and space, 
creating new forms and performances of regulatory power, drawing upon history, 
identity, solidarity and norm.46
Scholars including Albert Hourani, Philip S.  Khoury and Joseph Kostiner have 
different understandings of the characteristics of a tribe, while the assimilation of tribal 
groups into political structures has itself become a site of contestation.47 Efforts to 
assimilate tribal structures into political organisation are shaped by local and regional 
context, along with the particular rhythms of tribal groups, which may fall in- between 
different nomoi. The process of assimilation is a central part of state- building projects.
Khaldun’s work on tribes reveals a great deal about the factors that bind such 
groups together, based on a shared asabiyyah, the principles of military- administrative 
slavery and religion. While these characteristics have evolved from Khaldun’s initial 
reflections we continue to see the importance of such ideas in the contemporary state, 
offering a way of regulating life within contested political organisations.48 Tribal values 
go alongside religion in providing a pool of reserves to legitimise political action and 
to help penetrate and regulate life across the modern state.
Tribal groups are malleable entities, with religious and political loyalties often 
transcending those of the family or the tribe. As we saw in the Battle of Jahra, members 
of the Al Ajmi tribe fought one another as a consequence of different political loyalties. 
In Jordan, much like in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the key to domestic stability was to 
facilitate networks of patronage through tribal links, attracting tribal chiefs, co- opting 
their interests and consolidating influence.49
Amid this contestation and a struggle for legitimacy, regimes lay claim to whatever 
forms of legitimacy it may draw upon, often embodied in the ritualistic performances 
of tradition.50 With such normative structures embedded within institutions and civil 
society, neopatrimonialism finds traction across society. As Rabi suggests, cultural 
heritage (turath) is a ‘means to self- recognition’, an expression of a fixed community in 
spite of diverse manifestations at an individual and collective level.51 Put another way, 
turath is a means of expressing solidarity with another through the acknowledgement 
of a shared tradition that can be expressed and performed as law, albeit perhaps also 
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found at different groups, allowing for the cultivation of asabiyyah among different 
communities, including tribe, ethnicity and religion.
The importance of turath is also seen as a mechanism to construct legitimacy. 
Typically, this has been viewed through an analysis of the performance of 
institutions, but within the context of rentier politics, predicated upon a particular 
form of social contract that requires no taxation but provides little in the way of 
formal political expression, justice and turath play an important role.53 With this 
in mind, Rabi speaks of the revival of turath in pursuit of a particular political 
function (wazifa siyasiyya). Islam serves as a cultural bond to tie people together 
within the context of political organisation, yet this was also shaped by the colonial 
experience, shared linguistics and culture. Although often at odds with the state, 
these movements are driven by leaders seeking to improve their legitimacy reserves 
and ensure regime survival.
Across a range of different contexts, regimes have used networks of patronage as a 
means of ensuring regime survival, which have, in recent years, begun to transcend state 
borders. This strategy of (neo)patrimonialism builds upon – and cultivates – new links 
across state structures, capitalising upon shared religious, tribal or ethnic identities 
that can be harnessed to regulate life, but conversely as a means of challenging political 
order. Within this melange of identities and norms, stability is achieved if its authority 
pattern is congruent with other authority patterns at play in society.54
Colonial legacies and regional forces
Further stressing contingency, global context has long provided justification and 
support for authoritarian regimes, first in the struggle against Communism, in some 
instances Arab nationalism, and more recently within the context of the War on 
Terror. This has provided embattled regimes with valuable international support or 
revenue, which can prove invaluable. As Luciani suggests, even ‘limited revenue from 
abroad dramatically improves the state’s ability to buy legitimacy through allocation 
and increases regime stability’.55 One way in which this was achieved was through the 
tribe, which also serves as a means of demonstrating turath and maintaining control 
over space. This complex web of interrelations has embedded tribal groups within the 
socio- economic activities of the state, as we shall see, most notably the commercial and 
military arms of the state.56
The establishment of the territorially grounded nation state is a consequence of 
the collapse of imperial states that had far looser governance structures in peripheral 
areas, allowing tribal leaders greater autonomy. The assimilation process thus requires 
bringing such groups under the control of the sovereign, along with transforming 
tribes into citizens while retaining their tribal history. Yet in many cases, tribes retained 
a prominent role within state structures through their regulatory and distribution 
prowess. Harnessing the power of tribal norms and culture arms regimes with 
legitimacy and a strong regulatory arsenal, yet the inability to do so creates uncertainty 
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institutions that can curtail the capacity of powerful tribal groups and lineages that 
offer a different way of doing politics and ordering space.57
Establishing a state over lands populated by a multitude of tribes is a difficult task. 
After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the failure to address the challenges of the socio- 
economic landscape and the inability to assimilate rural tribal groups into the body 
politic of the new nation state left urban elites at the whim of powerful rural currents 
who were able to ‘capture the state’, framing its own interests and asabiyyah as the 
national interest.58 Of course, fundamental tensions exist between states and tribes and 
the process of state formation sought to reconcile such differences through developing 
asabiyyah and coercion.
While the colonial era helped to establish political structures and institutions, it was 
most instrumental in defining the territorial aspects at play, as ‘distinct states’.59 Perhaps 
though, as Lisa Blaydes suggests, we should pay greater attention to earlier periods 
in Middle Eastern history, which help to explain the establishment of indigenous 
examples of civil society. For Blaydes, it was the emergence from Late Antiquity that 
developed  – and indeed institutionalised  – fiscal and bureaucratic capacities that 
shaped pre- Islamic societies.60 This legacy helped the establishment of mechanisms of 
governance that facilitated economic life.61
With this in mind, a number of historians have demonstrated that the Muslim state 
was shaped through the interaction of the political and religious dynamics of the Middle 
East,62 a position endorsed by Blaydes.63 This argument shows how a range of factors 
and time periods, including the pre- Islamic, Islamic, colonial and postcolonial, shaped 
contemporary forms of political organisation.64 Moreover, norms may be comprised 
of the residue of previous experience that remains in the historical narratives of the 
state or the public consciousness. Of course, some incidents had more impact than 
others. Indeed, the fall of the Ottoman Empire and other colonial experiences had an 
existential impact upon urban life across the region.65
Within this process of (re)construction, reform plays a prominent role in 
(re)shaping identity. Perhaps the most obvious example of symbolic reform is the 
treatment of women, wherein both legal and normative structures shape the capacity 
of women to act in particular ways. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, historically the role 
of women in the kingdom has been referred to as ‘a benign apartheid’ and a ‘gender 
apartheid’, reflecting the severity of legal, political and religious restrictions placed on 
women.66 The severity of such expectations was felt by all living in the kingdom. One 
couple who worked in Saudi Arabia during the 1980s told me of a time when they had 
been at a party in the desert and as the man was inebriated, his female partner had 
driven them back to the outskirts of Riyadh. Fearing the implications of being caught 
driving  – among a number of other convention- breaking activities  – they took the 
decision for her inebriated partner to drive them home; the risk to their lives was seen 
as far less than what would happen if she had been caught driving.67
Of course, this has broader consequences for both the nature of society but also the 
construction of identity, as women are often seen as the bearers of particular identities; 
accepting this premise means that women can also be viewed as responsible for the 
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foreign workers led to the systematic exclusion and expulsion of people who were 
perceived of eroding such values, a practice that continues to this day.69
The military and mukhabarat
In addition to developing (neo)patrimonial systems and reserves of legitimacy, regimes 
also developed coercive mechanisms to retain power. A prominent part of maintaining 
power was the cultivation of strong  – and often parallel or competing  – military 
and security institutions. Created more for political and symbolic purposes than in 
response to particular threats, they were designed to maintain power amid widespread 
uncertainty. In an effort to exert control, security apparatuses facilitate the destruction 
and reconstruction of social dynamics in support of a regime. With a focus upon both 
foreign and domestic threats, the establishment of institutions such as the mukhabarat 
were designed to both facilitate the regulation of life across a state but perhaps more 
importantly to ensure regime survival. With this in mind, the mukhabarat should be 
seen as a partisan mechanism of control, designed to regulate life.
Amid a climate of coup proofing during the 1960s and 1970s, security institutions 
were typically woven into the fabric of the state to facilitate regime survival. Thus, 
ensuring the loyalty of the security apparatus was a prominent aspect of regime 
survival strategies. As Eva Bellin astutely suggests, the security establishment is most 
likely to abandon its project amid serious financial uncertainty. When the military 
apparatus lacks the ability to maintain the coercive apparatus, it is compromised and 
disintegrates.70 Ensuring the loyalty of military and security institutions was thus of 
paramount importance. Locating these institutions within (neo)patrimonial structures 
served two goals:  providing the opportunity to reward family members, while also 
ensuring the loyalty of key institutions of state.
Beyond this, militaries play a prominent role within the cultivation of legitimacy 
and pride in nationalist projects. From vast military spending to military service, the 
military as an institution is central within political projects. The relationship between 
military and state structures has typically been close, with former military leaders 
becoming political leaders, while politicians across the region have served time in the 
armed forces as a means of improving their standing and cultivating relations with the 
institutional power of the state.
Militaries have also played an important role in determining political structures. 
In Turkey, for example, military figures have served as the self- styled protectors of 
democracy by maintaining the secular characteristics of the constitution. Of course, 
the context- specific strength of security apparatus and the prestige with which the 
military are held can also pose a serious threat to domestic stability, through a capacity 
to topple regimes. The greater that the security services are institutionalised within the 
state bureaucracy, the more willing it will be to disengage from politics.
Put another way, if institutionalised, an identity is developed that is separate from 
the state and a clear career path is opened for officers who, as Eva Bellin suggests, may 
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as a prominent facilitator of the neopatrimonial structures that have characterised 
regional politics. Institutions are then organised along patrimonial lines, linking 
members through blood, sect or patronage, blurring the distinction between public 
and private and linking the interests of military leadership and regime.72
Hafez Al Assad’s rule in Syria between 1970 and 2000 was one characterised by 
repression and strong neopatrimonial networks, which built upon both a carefully 
cultivated cult of personality and a strong Ba’ath ideology.73 The military also built 
upon tribal and familial networks to ensure that people loyal to both regime and 
leader fill key positions. These employment decisions give key security portfolios to 
loyal allies, feeding the construction of ‘deep states’, where security apparatus interests 
coalesce with both regime and economic interests. As such, portfolios under security 
apparatus control accrued vast wealth and created a vested interested in maintaining 
the status quo.74
As was common across the region at this time, the upper echelons of military and 
state bureaucracies were populated by close family members and other groups that 
benefitted strongly from patronage networks, such as the Alawi community in Syria, 
who comprised 11% of the population.75 The economic interests of the Alawi community 
quickly became intertwined with the survival of the Assad regime.76 This power was 
underpinned by a strong coercive infrastructure and an ‘absolute presidency’, and 
although elections occurred, these were largely symbolic.77 Opposition groups such 
as the Muslim Brotherhood and other civil society actors were emphatically crushed 
to solidify such moves, resulting in the deaths of an estimated twenty- five thousand 
civilians.78
Similar experiences were found in Ba’ath Iraq, where Saddam Hussein cultivated 
a similar cult of personality.79 His sons Udai and Ousai controlled key security and 
economic portfolios, but while Assad relied upon the Alawi community for support, 
Saddam drew upon the tribes and Tikritis.80 The military played an integral role in 
ensuring this support, yet a sense of paranoia emerging from the spate of regional 
coups d’état prompted Saddam to create five overlapping intelligence agencies to watch 
the military, militias and each other.81
One of the most prominent examples of such an institution is the National 
Guard, a mechanism through which ruling elites historically distributed funds across 
neopatrimonial networks of tribal and Bedouin leaders. It is an institution of social 
control through the cultivation of strong alliances but is typically not a force to help 
deal with internal strife, such as urban disorder, border security or other military 
missions. In the Jordanian case, the interaction of such factors within the military 
creates a range of processes that transcend the military, carrying their production ‘to 
the realm of national culture’.82 In Saudi Arabia, the National Guard – established as 
successor to Ibn Saud’s ikhwan – remain independent of the national military, tasked 
predominantly with ensuring the survival of the ruling family.
As a consequence of possessing a great deal of political influence and having accrued 
vast financial resources in the process, it is hardly surprising that militaries have 
typically been against reform that would reduce their power. Often playing the ‘long 
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political and economic interests and the continuation of (neo)patrimonial structures. 
Where military and security institutions were negatively affected, much like in Iraq 
and Yemen, the consequences have been dire as the marginalisation of individuals with 
military training and access to high- tech weaponry can have negative implications for 
regime stability.
Legitimacy and neopatrimonialism
Once constitutions and political structures have been established, political life is 
regulated in accordance with turath, which serves as a means of excluding individuals 
from political life. Such structures also facilitate and entrench neopatrimonialism as 
a tool of regime survival, through the positioning of family and tribal figures in key 
institutional positions, along with economic incentives. This ensures that a number 
of authoritarian regimes – those with strong neopatrimonial systems – were able to 
withstand domestic and regional pressures.83 Neopatrimonialism not only involves the 
distribution of resources as a means of maintaining support, but also the allocation of 
prominent political positions and portfolios, serving as a means of cultivating loyalty 
and of circumventing political unrest.
Legitimacy plays an important role, providing some semblance of cover for the lack 
of democratic input, widening the support base and restricting populist movements. 
Such strategies are wide- ranging, employing religious, cultural, historical and 
economic factors. In addition to this, the importance of external influences provides 
support for regimes through the provision of aid or speeches supporting the regimes in 
international forums. When exploring neopatrimonialism, a distinction must be made 
as to the desired reach of such acts: Is the intention to secure the loyalty of prominent 
figures in key institutional positions, or is it to engender backing from across a larger 
support base? How one answers this question determines the strategies and narratives 
involved in political and security responses.
In considering the importance of bureaucratic institutions we must remember the 
impact of competing visions of nomoi that shape the construction of such institutions. 
While the importance of religion and Islamic law in shaping institutional development 
cannot be ignored,84 we must also note that the importance of tribal values, which go 
some way to regulating contemporary life albeit requiring regulation within the context 
of the contemporary state.85 This position is also held by Wael Hallaq, who stresses how 
political leaders are required to operate within the context that they inherited, which 
demonstrates a ‘cumulative history of past action and specific manners of conduct’.86
The nature of political organisation prior to the establishment of contemporary 
states gave prominence to tribal leaders. As such, the need to assimilate tribes into 
political projects and networks of patronage was of paramount importance. The 
successful implementation of institutionalised coercive networks creates a particular 
form of political and economic life that can ensure loyalty to new regimes. Yet the 
need to restrict the power of the tribe necessitated a delicate balancing act, requiring 
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normative aspects that facilitate the construction of legitimacy particularly through 
tribal dress and customs.87 The tribe serves as a means of legitimising rule through the 
provision of normative support for ruling elites while also eroding the coherence of 
the sovereign state.
The evolution of political life
Let us now consider the interaction of nomos and nomoi, formal and norm in shaping 
political life. The following section considers Turkey, Iran and Israel as states where 
the formal and normative clash to regulate life. These examples provide rich material 
to consider how religion shapes the interaction of ordnung and ortung and, from it, the 
construction of citizenship and political structures in contrasting ways. These cases 
although on the periphery of the region, all hold elections and explicitly articulate the 
role of religion within the fabric of the state.
In Turkey, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, political life in the crumbling 
empire’s heartland had collapsed. Under Mustafa Kemal Attatürk, a new state was 
established at the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, from the embers of empire, with an 
explicitly secular vision at its core.88 This almost militant form of secularism pushed 
religious practice to the margins of society, changing the official language from Arabic 
to Turkish and sought to curtail the public influence of the ulema. This move sought to 
facilitate rule ‘by positivism not superstition’,89 yet in later years Ottoman traditions and 
cultures are said to play a more prominent role – albeit in an elusive way – ultimately 
leading to the emergence of the Justice and Development Party (commonly known as 
the AK Parti or AKP).90
The ‘Six Arrows’ of Kemalism facilitated widespread transformations across the 
new state, eroding the legacy of Ottoman rule.91 It was this secularist agenda that 
had the most substantial impact upon Turkish public life and while religion retained 
influence within the private sphere, it would be removed from the public sphere.92 In 
the following decades, Islamist groups gained influence, yet the secular identity of the 
Turkish Republic was maintained – and indeed enforced – on a number of occasions 
by the Turkish military in the face of rising Islamist agendas.
Following the ratification of the 1924 constitution, Article 88 stated that ‘the 
people of Turkey regardless of their religion and race were, in terms of citizenship, 
to be Turkish’. A number of problems emerge from this definition, concerning belief, 
language, national belonging and ideology, although state practice has been different, 
which had a ‘racist- ethnic visage’ and a focus upon language.93 The Sheikh Said 
rebellion of 1925 brought such issues to the fore, notably questions about Kurdish 
integration into the new state. State policies to such questions involved relocation and 
ethnic redistribution and were supported by grassroots movements such as the Citizen 
Speak Turkish campaign, resulting in political exclusion.94
Turkey provides an obvious example of how normative practices of citizenship, 
manifesting in exclusion, discrimination, relocation and marginalisation can 
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positions. The combination of formal and normative structures helps to solidify 
regime and broader manifestations of hegemonic identities at the state level, 
resulting in deeper structural tensions within society. Such tensions then become 
embedded within the fabric of the state, reproducing themselves over time and 
manifesting in periods of intermittent violence that, in turn, have implications for 
the ordering of space.
In contrast to Turkey, religion occupies a more central role in post- revolutionary 
Iran, as state structures  – both formal and normative  – shaped life. The revolution 
in 1979 toppled the authoritarian regime of the Shah, Reza Pahlavi and imposed a 
new theocratic system of government, veleyat- e faqih, the Regency of the Jurist. This 
system, a theocracy with democratic traits, locates power in the hands of a supreme 
leader (Articles 5 and 107), whose position is given as a consequence of their Shi’i 
credentials.95 Political order is conflated with theological aspects to create a system 
of checks and balances where democratic elements are supervised by the Guardians 
Council to ensure that everything is run in accordance with Khomeini’s ideas.96
Khomeini rejected the need for government to create laws, believing that, ‘If laws 
are needed, Islam has established them all’.97 The Iranian constitution supports this 
thesis, articulating that Islamic principles and norms exemplified in the revolution 
‘represent an honest aspiration of the Islamic Umma’.98 The revolution transformed 
all aspects of life in Iran. Women’s dress also became a site of contestation, as state 
forces enforced the ‘correct’ wearing of hijabs.99 Although a theocracy, elections are 
held for the majlis, the office of the president and a number of other bodies within state 
machinery; presidential candidates are, however, vetted by the Guardians Council.
Iranian identity is certainly not without problems. Although the state draws heavily 
upon a fusion of Persian nationalism and Shi’a thought, such identities are exclusionary 
to both ethnic and religious minorities, where around 50% of the population belong 
to minority groups.100 Iran’s nationality law was ratified by the majlis in 1929, where 
citizenship is ‘the indisputable right of every Iranian’,101 defined initially as someone 
born to an Iranian father.102 From this definition, a number of issues emerge around 
gender, religion, ethnicity and social origin. A  direct consequence of problems 
with nationality has reduced both Faili Kurds and Khavari Afghans to the status of 
stateless peoples – essentially homo sacer – many of whom are living in camps and 
local communities, facing discrimination and restrictions to education, healthcare 
and employment.103 Such tensions also manifest in structural violence over issues of 
language and cultural practice.104
Formal structures within the Iranian political system are designed to protect the 
vision of veleyat- e faqih but central to the construction of the contemporary Iranian 
identity is the fusion with Persian nationalism, driven by a history of conquest, 
expansion and a strong cultural legacy. This combination of formal with normative 
shapes political action and behaviour, formalising marginalisation and discrimination 
within the political system and the broader fabric of the state. The combination of 
state security mechanisms with the basij, the quasi- informal militia responsible for 
regulating opposition behaviour across the state, demonstrates the all- encompassing 
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In contrast to both Turkey and Iran, Israel offers a much more conceptually 
complex discussion of citizenship, with an array of different identity groups 
operating across the state. The Israeli notion of citizenship is derived from an ethno- 
nationalist discourse, based upon Jewish descent (from the mother) and a fusion of 
both collectivist republicanism and individualist liberalism.105 Amid a number of 
domestic challenges, particularly related to a relatively small population size, the 
Law of Return (1950) gives automatic citizenship to any individual with a Jewish 
grandparent who migrates to Israel, rather than the religious definition of a Jew. 
As Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled argue, this law ‘became the most important legal 
expression of Israel’s self- definition as a Jewish state. It established ethno- nationalist 
citizenship that, in principle, encompassed all Jews, and only Jews, by virtue of their 
ethnic descent’.106 This discourse of citizenship was fused with interpretations of the 
Zionist ideology – itself contested as to its vision of the state and the construction of 
society – and as a consequence, privileged Orthodox Jews as the ‘true keepers’ of the 
faith within Israeli society.107
Amid this array of identities Zionist bodies sought to homogenise Israeli society 
both ethnically and in terms of the urban landscape, as we shall see in Chapter 5. Even 
with such efforts, divisions within Jewish communities can be identified, creating 
classes of Jews according to diasporic roots, dividing society into Ashkenazi (European) 
and Mizrahi (Middle Eastern and North African) who were historically pushed to the 
periphery of society, although in recent years this marginalisation has been directed 
against Russian and Ethiopian Jews. The ensuing kulturkampf is predominantly found 
politically, ethnically and in the religious– secular struggle over political life and the 
character of the hegemonic narrative within the Israeli state.108 Legal structures regulate 
daily life according to the Torah through observing the Sabbath, the prioritising of 
religious law over civil courts, state support for religious educational institutions and 
widespread military exemption for members from the Orthodox communities.109 
Amid concern at the perceived secularisation of Israeli society and increased prejudice 
towards Orthodox Jews, a number of Jewish political parties emerged that put faith at 
the centre of their political agendas.
After the Declaration of the State of Israel in 1948, political culture was built upon 
a synthesis of religious and secular ideas that were supplemented by Ben Gurion’s 
concept of mamlachtiyut, understood as acting in a sovereign- like manner, concerned 
with the distribution of power. Supporting this project were the colonial laws of the 
British mandate that provided legal ground for emergency laws. The new state behaved 
in a pioneering manner, responding to the ideals of Zionism and expected citizens 
to contribute towards this broader Zionist project.110 Somewhat counter- intuitively, 
this also applied to those Palestinian- Israelis who became a minority in Israel after 
the 1948 war and were granted citizenship, albeit with minority status. Through this 
combination, the nascent Israeli state took shape, yet it retained a fundamental tension 
between its ethnic and democratic characteristics that can be revealed in a hierarchy of 
citizenship, which simultaneously differentiates and incorporates. Ideas of citizenship 
make a distinction between those non- citizens, living under occupation in the West 
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Such Palestinians thus remain distinct from Palestinian- Israelis living within Israel 
who are considered to be citizens, albeit with fewer rights.
When one looks at Israeli society, the ethno- nationalist discourse separates Jews from 
Palestinians, while the republican discourse legitimises and differentiates between the 
Ashkenazi, Mizrahi and other subjugated groups in Israel.111 Such differences became 
embedded within political institutions and society. Along with this, the dominance of 
Judaism, as both formal and normative structure, plays a prominent role in the regulation 
of life across the state, politically and culturally. Formal and normative structures have 
collapsed into one another, changing the characteristics of the Israeli state, where 
structural violence along Jewish lines becomes a defining part of relations between Jews 
and non- Jewish identity groups across both Israel and the Palestinian territories.
From the cradle to the grave and everything in- between
Such issues are not limited to states with elections. The presence of vast amounts 
of natural resources facilitated political development in the postcolonial period, 
resulting in the establishment of ‘rentier states’, where the extraction of natural 
resources provides the financial resources to facilitate development, albeit not without 
democratic repercussions. For Rolf Schwarz, rentier states are understood as those that
derive most or a substantial part of their revenues from the outside world and 
the functioning of their political system depend to a large degree on accruing 
external revenues that can be classified as rents. Rentier states rely on allocation 
and redistribution (allocation states) and hence show a remarkable different 
political dynamic than other states.112
These different dynamics reflect political, cultural, economic and religious values and 
regime projects are aided by vast financial resources.
Regimes in rentier states enjoy a degree of autonomy from society. The use of natural 
resources by regimes across the Gulf allowed leaders to create a form of social contract, 
where citizens paid little or no taxation but have a limited formal political voice. 
Rentier projects have economies that are typically state driven, with institutions that 
are designed to reflect local customs113 and distributed across networks of patronage. 
The accumulation of finance through the sale of natural resources to external actors 
is central to the rentier state, which then allocates and redistributes finances across 
society. This reduction – or removal – of taxation within political life poses a number 
of challenges to those wishing to offer a taxonomy of states across the Middle East, 
while also resulting in a range of serious political consequences.
Vast financial resources create a workforce driven by a set of assumptions about 
desired job type rather than responding to demand. As a consequence, rentier states 
are typically home to huge numbers of migrant workers who are often caught within a 
zone of indistinction and the ban. In many cases, migrant workers are the most visible 
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migrant workers, whose rights and legal status are often restricted without recourse to 
legal and political protection.114
Kuwait is typically held to be one of the more democratic states within the Middle 
East, with a spirit of compromise at the heart of political life. Ruling elites in Kuwait have 
exploited vast financial resources brought about by rent from oil and gas to reorganise 
state institutions, maximising symbolism and loyalty, while also providing limited political 
space for an elected parliament and civil liberties. At this point, loyalty to the land was 
central to the development in Kuwait although there were no clear borders and territory 
was contested. Devotion to the land superseded allegiance to the tribe, seen in the battle of 
Al Jahra, where members of the Al Mutairi tribe were pitted against each other as Saudi- 
led forces went into battle against their neighbours to the east. Defence of the country was 
seen as tantamount to defence of the ruler and, by extension, protection of the Al Sabah 
meant the protection of Kuwait. Those who fought in the battle were offered citizenship, 
while many of those who did not became bidoon, those without the state.115
To understand how such conditions have emerged, we must consider political life 
before the oil boom which reveals a strategy of inclusion, designed to ensure regime 
survival amid tribal and geopolitical pressures. The severity of such pressures forced 
the dynastic Al Sabah regime to compromise instead of coercing, unlike most of 
its neighbours. The Al Sabah brought a range of different groups into the political 
realm, sacrificing resources to maintain networks of patronage and continue welfare 
projects116 with tribes – who were typically attracted to the military and police117 – 
merchant classes, urban workers and even Shi’a groups. In doing this, the Al Sabah 
embedded its legitimacy  – and survival  – in the stability of its society, resulting in 
some viewing the Al Sabah more positively than a number of the other regimes across 
the region. Another manifestation of such views was seen in the enfranchisement of 
Kuwaiti women during the 1990s, in spite of resistance from more conservative parts of 
society and broader regional voices.118 Such moves were not purely altruistic, however, 
as the Al Sabah concentrated key ministerial portfolios in the hands of a small number 
of families and maintained a stronghold on the most important six ministries.119
Part of this process of inclusion involves engaging with Islamist parties, such as 
the Muslim Brotherhood, who have fed into constructions of legitimacy. Typically, the 
socially active side of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood develops legitimacy, but the 
distribution of oil wealth and provision of welfare – referred to by one US diplomat 
as ‘cradle to the grave and everything in- between’120 – restricted space for groups like 
the ikhwan, pushing them towards the political sphere.121 The constitution protects the 
freedom of association, although the political climate has restricted the establishment 
of certain groups at precarious times. Such space allowed for the establishment of a 
local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1963, which then proved useful to the 
Kuwaiti state in their effort to balance against the rise of Arab nationalism. Over 
the coming decades, the Muslim Brotherhood continued to play a prominent role 
in Kuwaiti politics, facilitating political reform of twenty- five districts to ten, while 
allying themselves with secular parties as a means to avoid discreditation.122
A positive form of political regulation occurs through the distribution of land in 
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access to the business sector. Allocation of land would embed mercantile classes into 
the burgeoning bureaucratic structures, while instilling Kuwaiti citizens with the belief 
that one day they too may own land in their country. Similar practices occurred in the 
UAE, where it was alleged that each citizen would be allocated three plots of land.123 
Moreover, this also serves to depoliticise domestic communities, leaving the political 
arena to ruling families as other actors are moved into the economic sector, albeit with 
loyalty to the state.124
A more negative case is found when considering the bidoon jinsiya  – stateless 
people – who have long been marginalised from official state structures.125 Kuwait’s 
national identity law defines citizens as those who had settled in the country before 
1920, or who had been naturalised at a later date. Bidoon are those who either refused 
or were unable to gain Kuwaiti citizenship during the formative years of the state, 
many of whom are descendants of Bedouin tribes such as the Shammar and ‘Aneza.126 
Fearing instability from the movement of people, the Kuwaiti government sought to 
strip political life from bidoon and to restrict access to public goods. Marginalised from 
state structures, they are unable to register for citizenship, access free education in 
state- run schools, register vehicles or purchase telephone lines and SIM cards. On their 
driving licences, bidoon are registered as ‘illegal residents’.127 In this case, they are not 
covered by international law as Kuwait is neither a signatory to the 1954 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, nor the 1961 Convention on the Prevention 
of Statelessness. From this, it appears that the bidoon exist as a prime example of 
hominus sacri, existing in bare life, without recourse to political and legal structures yet 
bound by the very structures that abandon them. An Amnesty International report in 
2016 estimated that one hundred and twenty thousand people are bidoon in Kuwait.128
In neighbouring Bahrain, a system of minority rule  – of Sunni over Shi’i  – 
historically established a form of sectarian difference into political life, stemming 
from long- standing fears about the other.129 Across the history of twentieth- century 
Bahrain, Shi’a Bahrainis were relegated to second- class status on the island, along with 
urban labourers from the Asian subcontinent, as the Sunni regime sought to maintain 
political control by empowering the Sunni minority. Tracing relations between Shi’a 
groups and the regime reveals a number of crisis points: after the Iranian revolution, in 
the mid- 1990s and more recently after the Arab Uprisings.130 A number of political and 
legal structures were established that sought to regulate political life, such as the Law 
of Political Association Article 4 which prevents the establishment of an organisation 
based on sectarian, religious or ideological grounds.
In the decades after the British withdrawal, a climate of political dissatisfaction 
consumed the island where sectarian identity was seen as a threat to political stability.131 
Although political life is far more complex than the binary delineation of sectarian 
difference, Shi’a groups have historically been viewed as a source of opposition.132 One 
report for a Bahraini ministry noted:
[T] here is a dangerous challenge facing Bahraini society in the increased role 
of the Shīʿa [and] the retreat of the role of the Sunna in the Bahraini political 
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and the likelihood of political regime change in the long term by means of the 
current relationships between Bahrain’s Shīʿa and all the Shīʿa in Iran, Iraq, 
Saudi Arabia’s eastern region, and Kuwait.133
Much like the history of Iraq, perception of perfidious interference dominated relations 
between the Al Khalifa regime and its Shi’a population, coloured by beliefs about Iranian 
interference in domestic affairs.134 Such perceptions have had a detrimental impact 
upon Shi’a politics across the island, as parties such as Al Wefaq have experienced 
widespread discrimination and their leaders have been jailed. Moreover, a number of 
Al Wefaq MPs have been arrested and stripped of their nationalities with devastating 
consequences for themselves and their families. In some cases, family members were 
detained and tortured, cast into bare life as regimes exert sovereign power in a flagrant 
attempt to survive whatever the cost.135
Creating the ban
Within the spatialised exception, different manifestations of localised nomos are 
shaped by particular contingency and subjectivity, restricting political activity and 
perceived challenges to regime authority and legitimacy in accordance with context- 
specific dynamics. In response to such challenges, regimes seek to create exclusion 
and legitimacy to facilitate, justify and normalise mechanisms of control. One such 
mechanism is to cultivate a sense of belonging to normative and ideational communities 
that can then be strengthened and mobilised over time,136 fed into neopatrimonial 
structures and preserved through the distribution of wealth and cultural capital.137 
Supporting these approaches is the declaration of a state of exception.
For Agamben, the ban emerges as derogation from constitutional clauses is 
undertaken in order to protect the political project. The onset of much emergency 
legislation has its roots in colonial times, where the British sought to regulate life and 
establish order in tumultuous times. Across Israel and Palestine, recourse to British 
Mandate Law has provided scope for the use of emergency powers, regulating the Arab 
citizens of Israel between 1948 and 1966, while also regulating life in the West Bank.138 
Moving responsibility for peace and order from the police to the military was a key 
strategy and an indispensible means of defending imperial interests. With roots in the 
1883 Act for the More Effective Suppression of Local Disturbances and Dangerous 
Associations, the move allowed for the use of extraordinary powers that had previously 
been restricted under common law. Further exploration of emergency legislation sees 
almost routine suspension of the law in times of crisis, reflecting a broad desire to stay 
in power, albeit facilitated by local context and history. Such laws are primarily used 
as mechanisms of control, in defiance of Article 4 of the International Bill of Human 
Rights’ prohibition of discrimination.
We should not view political structures as neutral. As we have seen, the interaction 
of formal and normative structures has an undeniable impact upon the regulation of 
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the ban a key part of this regulation. The ban emerges not only through potentiality 
found in democratic systems but also as a consequence of the development of political 
structures that are inherently exclusionary. Moreover, as Wael Hallaq argues, we 
can identify five metaphysical ‘form properties’ that constitute states, which reveal 
abstract similarities in political organisation that allow us to apply Agamben’s case to 
the Middle East. These include a constitution from historical experience, sovereignty 
and ensuing metaphysics, legislative monopoly, bureaucratic machinery and a cultural 
hegemonic engagement with the social order.139 Of course, such comments are deeply 
contested but provide an entry point into discussions of sovereignty and the ban in 
non- democratic states.
The application of states of emergency varies across the region, from royal decree 
to two- thirds majority of parliament. In Qatar, Article 69 of Chapter IV states that the 
Prince [sic] declares emergency law. The article then gives the Prince the power to take
all the prompt measures needed to confront any danger threatening the State’s 
safety, or the integrity of its territory, or its People’s security and interests, or 
obstruct the State’s institutions from performing their functions, on condition 
that the decree must include the nature of the exceptional circumstance for which 
the Martial Law was declared, and prescribe the measures taken to confront it.
In Jordan, the application of a Defence Law by Royal Decree can establish conditions of 
martial law, which may also ‘impose a limited censorship on newspapers, publications, 
books and information and communication media in matters related to public safety 
and national defence purposes’. In Saudi Arabia, the responsibility lies with the King, 
as enshrined in Article 61 of the Basic Law. Article 62 states that, ‘If the King feels 
that these measures may better be permanent, he then shall take whatever legal action 
he deems necessary in this regard’. As we shall see in the next chapter, this ability to 
define the exception – an expression of sovereign power – ultimately raises a number 
of questions about the source of that power.
Across the region we can group the reasons for derogation from the rule of law 
and declarations of states of emergency into three areas: war, coups d’état and general 
unrest. The establishment of the state of Israel was coeval with declaration of emergency 
legislation in Israel, along with martial law in Iraq in 1948, but the 1967 war created 
states of emergency in Egypt, Jordan and Syria. It also resulted in similar conditions 
in Lebanon only five years later. Amid concerns about their role in domestic politics 
and Israeli activity, Hizballah declared a state of emergency in 2018, asking myriad 
questions about sovereign power in the process. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
in 1991, the later also declared martial law.
In the decades after the establishment of Israel, the interaction of parabolic pressures 
created a climate of uncertainty and unrest, resulting in a series of coups d’état across 
the region. Within this climate, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria, Yemen, Jordan, 
Lebanon and Iraq all derogated from the rule of law to maintain power. Additionally, 
amid conditions of domestic unrest, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Iraq and Egypt all declared 
emergency laws. Central to such moves were desires to maintain power, regulate space 
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and retain territorial integrity amid fear about efforts to alter spatial borders and the 
regulation of life. In these cases, the state of exception has become the norm, where 
emergency legislation is taken to be a necessary part of normal politics and individuals 
reside in camps, both physical and metaphysical. Such a move changes the nature of 
political life in the region, making the exception the rule and creating the conditions 
wherein individuals become hominus sacri.
Conclusions
The space within which ordnung and ortung interact defines both nomos and sovereign 
power. Understanding the political structures that order space requires consideration 
of the specific context and contingency. In many cases, this is shaped by both colonial 
experience and broader understandings of turath and belonging. A range of different 
identities thus emerge and clash within nomos. Political structures try to regulate the 
manifestation of such identities and tensions through constitutions, institutions and 
regulating civil society. Returning to Migdal, regimes seek to regulate and penetrate 
society, while others seek to stymie such intentions.
While it is clear that biopolitical projects aim to regulate life, this chapter has shown 
that a spatial dimension surrounds such efforts, wherein norms and multi- layered 
concepts of identity clash with more formal political structures creating a zone of 
indistinction between ordnung and ortung. By exploring the political realm we have 
come to see that it serves as an arena through which layered and complex understandings 
of identity and citizenship merge and are regulated by norms – often in tension with 
formal structures – to create a particular type of spatial ordering. Here, much like the 
tale of Antigone, competing visions of political ordering often clash with one another.
There is little doubt that normative structures play a strong regulatory role, which 
goes some way to explaining the survival of the Gulf monarchies who are able to draw 
upon a strong sense of asabiyyah, which creates deep schisms in times of uncertainty. 
Norms and personal relationships reflect both the importance of tradition but also the 
instability of formal institutions, serving as a source of opposition.140
As Nicolas Gavrielides argues,
What makes tribal ideology even more powerful and pervasive besides being 
truly Arab, is the fact that it is never formally articulated, stated, written down 
or even openly criticized. It is just there, permeating every action, thought or 
process which is of socio- political significance.141
Although somewhat hyperbolic and quick to ignore the importance of vast financial 
might, Gavrielides makes an interesting point about the power of norms in regulating 
life, particularly when embedded within neopatrimonial structures that facilitate the 
distribution of wealth in accordance with such values.
In doing this, regimes risk creating political projects that are increasingly organised 
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also deepening divisions between particular groups in a negative consequence of 
Khaldun’s asabiyyah. The spatial repercussions of such a move risk opening up fissures 
within the relationship between ordnung and ortung, the spatialised nomos, along with 
the broader organisation of regional politics along the lines of a spatialised exception. 
While Gulf states offer perhaps the most obvious example of such practices, we should 
not ignore other political projects, for whom defining the spatialised exception is 
equally challenging, albeit in a range of different ways.
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The dawla and the umma
lIlmw i adwa (sa sbt eiinadstate).
[Mankind was but one nation, then it fell into variance.]
Quran 10:19
As muezzins recite calls to prayer from the minarets of mosques across the region, 
Muslims are reminded of the obligations of their faith. Fajr marks a universal start 
to the day before the complexities of contemporary life create countless trajectories 
of possibility, as life becomes shaped by the contingency of the political. Beyond this 
universal call, muezzins are divided by subjectivity, space, time and the complexity 
of everyday life. Unlike other religions, Islam is seen to be well equipped to provide 
guidance to its followers on circumventing the seductive trappings of this life, offering 
explicitly political instructions on how best to live life through adherence to the Quran 
and Sunna  – seen to be Divine Law  – yet the very interpretation of such texts by 
infallible human agency brings in subjectivity, couched in contingency, which leads to 
division, difference and ultimately, the erosion of God’s sovereignty.
This chapter focuses on competing claims of authority found within religion and 
their political repercussions. To do this, it uses the concept of the state of exception 
to identify a zone of indistinction that is inherent within a number of political 
projects deriving legitimacy from religion. Much like the discussion of turath in 
the previous chapter, it is concerned with how the collapse of religion into politics 
and politics into religion creates a zone of indistinction, along with contesting 
the relationship between ordnung and ortung that transcends the traditional 
understanding of political organisation. In this zone, regimes are able to circumvent 
domestic – and regional – contestation but are simultaneously contested through 
recourse to such systems of belief, with serious repercussions for political life across 
the Middle East.
In a book entitled Islamic Exceptionalism: How the Struggle Over Islam Is Reshaping 
The World, Shadi Hamid argues that because of its inherently political nature, Islam 
is fundamentally different to other religions, albeit with different visions of political 
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meaning shaping contemporary political life.1 This identification of the political nature 
of Islam is not new, with a range of scholars suggesting that the religion was established 
alongside a political community led by the Prophet, which was inherently concerned 
with the ordering of people, not space. Moreover, such scholars also argue that the 
Quran offers guidance on all facets of life, which makes it political. Of course, these 
views are contested. Nazih Ayubi argues that this approach is Orientalist and that the 
Quran offers no explicit guidance on political life and community, albeit using a narrow 
definition of politics.2 This view supports the position of Sheikh Ali Abd Al Raziq, an 
Egyptian jurist whose framing of Islam as apolitical helped support the development 
of sovereign entities after the First World War, while also permitting Muslim heads of 
state to have relations with non- Muslim states.3
Yet this too is not without problems. One approach is to reject Abd Al Raziq’s 
thesis that political authority is not part of Islam, suggesting that Sharia can be applied 
to the contemporary world.4 A second approach stems from a discussion of Islamic 
conceptions of society initially identified by Khaldun but developed by other Muslim 
thinkers who stressed the importance of adding the seemingly coeval conception of 
the state to society as a means of safeguarding the latter.5
Fundamental to discussion about the relationship between religion and politics is the 
source of sovereignty. For Muslims, God is the source of sovereignty and as the Quran 
proclaims, ‘It is God unto whom belongeth the sovereignty of the heavens and earth’.6 
But while sovereignty is found in God, questions arise as to who should rule on earth 
after the death of the Prophet. Andrew F. March suggests that different interpretations 
of authority offer a range of ways to resolve such questions. First, political authority is 
seen as a form of contract between rulers and ruled, when a council of representatives 
selected a leader to guide the community in accordance with his message. A second 
view is that God’s will is embodied in the corpus of the divine law itself and so divine 
sovereignty is derived from the extent to which God’s law is applied, albeit opening up 
a raft of new questions in the process.7
Religion and politics
On 1 April 1979, less than three months after the abdication of the Shah of Shahs, 
Iranians voted to establish an Islamic Republic on the basis of principles espoused 
by Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini who was later installed as Supreme Leader 
of the new state. Khomeini had returned to Iran on 1 February where he was greeted 
by an estimated crowd of five million who had grown angry at the Shah’s regime. 
Over the course of the protests, political opposition to the Shah coalesced around 
Khomeini’s vision, some more willing than others amid allegations that the revolution 
was hijacked by Khomenei, but in the months that followed, Islam played a prominent 
role in regulating life across the new republic.8
The new republic placed Shi’a values at the centre of its approach to politics, both 
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politics. Values of resistance and counter- hegemony became integral to understanding 
Tehran’s foreign policy, extrapolating from the Karbala Narrative in Shi’a history.9 
Revolutionary fervour dramatically altered the regional order, fusing geopolitical 
concerns with sectarian schisms seen in the establishment of Hizballah10 and provision 
of support for other Shi’a groups across the region. Following such support, in the 
years that followed, the blame for domestic unrest in states with sectarian tensions was 
firmly placed on Iran.
Later the same year, a group of Saudi tribesmen led by Juhayman Al Utaybi entered 
the Grand Mosque in Mecca and seized control of it by force. The group held the belief 
that modernisation strategies deployed by the Al Saud – coupled with their ‘un- Islamic’ 
behaviour  – were contrary to Islam. Al Utaybi garnered support from disaffected 
groups across the kingdom and gained credibility through his family lineage; his 
ancestors had been part of the ikhwan rebellion of the 1920s, which rose up against Ibn 
Saud’s state- building project for its departure from the rightful path of Islam. Events 
in Mecca shook the kingdom, revealing the fragility of the Al Saud’s relationship with 
their Islamic backers and stressing the complexity of the dual path of political rule and 
adherence to Wahhabist doctrine.
Amid the rapid transformations of the previous decades across the region, such unrest 
was hardly surprising. Transformation from empire to colonial rule fashioned a range 
of different experiences and interpretations of Islam, demonstrating the contingency 
of relationship between state, regime and society. Within anti- colonial and nationalist 
movements, religion took on an important role beyond faith as a means through which 
collective identities could be mobilised and alternative visions of political organisation 
could be established. Islam also initially served as a source of culture and tradition for 
the nascent Arab nationalist movement, along with providing the means through which 
the movement could spread, but while it initially lost ground to projects espousing Arab 
unity, the importance of Islam as a means of ordering politics and space remained.
There is little doubt that Islam has had a dramatic impact on the political arena, 
existing in numerous forms:  from the puritanical Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia to 
the quietist Ibadism in Oman, via competing visions of the role of clerics in Shi’a 
thought. This plurality of interpretations has implications for the ordering of life for 
individual believers, communities and states even before they are placed in the context 
of political life and parabolic regional currents. Yet much like nomos, Islamic unity 
proved to be an illusion. Instead, competing interpretations of faith and the ordering 
of life in accordance with Islamic traditions quickly emerged, in some cases, operating 
in tension with state projects. One of the most devastating points of tension concerns 
sectarian difference.
Few terms possess such vitriolic connotations as sectarianism which, in recent 
years, has become imbued with all manner of issues pertaining to identity politics and 
violence. Although there is a complex history of relations between the different sects 
of Islam, there is nothing inherently violent about this difference. In recent times it has 
become imbued with negative connotations, amid the perception of deviating from 
the norm, while also being extended to include political and ethnic minorities.11 As a 
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almost meaningless. Deeply politicised and emotionally charged, the concept has 
become a ‘catch- all’ term, an elastic concept applied to a range of issues that can often 
be understood as everything from the perfectly legitimate expressions of sect- centric 
behaviour to inter- sect violence.12 Consideration of the concept reveals tensions about 
the construction of identity and debate between primordialists and constructivists.13 
Putting this debate aside, we can identify three distinct periods where inter- sect 
violence escalated to play a prominent role in regional politics in 1979, 2003 and 2011; 
unsurprisingly, regional politics also shape the relationship between sects and broader 
political communities. These periods correspond with crises in regional politics: the 
Iranian Revolution, the Iraq War and the Arab Uprisings.
The mobilisation and manipulation of sect- based identities for political reasons has 
been a common feature of political life. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, sect- 
based identities were mobilised for political purposes, both domestic and regional, 
as regimes attempt to exert control and influence and, ultimately seek to ensure their 
survival. Speaking to constituents is one means through which this can be achieved, 
while also strengthening claims to unity through fear of the other. Efforts to regulate 
the territorially bounded polis often involve recourse to religion, which transcends 
territoriality. As such, given recourse to a shared normative environment we can see 
how internal actions can have regional repercussions.
Contemporary debates on the role of religion across the Middle East are 
characterised by tension over the extent to which religion shapes politics or politics 
shapes religion. Yet the role of religion is far more complex that being reduced to 
two opposing positions. Indeed, a religious community should not be viewed as a 
monolithic, homogenous bloc; instead, in addition to doctrinal differences, we must 
also consider movements on the left and right, economical disparities, the conservative, 
the peaceful and violent, allowing for context- specific contingencies to shape analysis. 
Religion is also a site of tension between tradition and modernity, best seen in the 
anachronistic demands of fundamentalist movements to return to the golden ages of 
their faith. At its heart is a desire to ensure that religion retains a ‘authoritative’ position 
within contemporary life; although what this authoritative position looks like is open 
to interpretation.
The emergence of an ‘Islamist revival’ during the 1970s sought to challenge the 
status quo across the region, arguing that political trajectories had failed and that 
only Islam could correct this failure. Across the region, Islam occupied a seemingly 
contradictory place within states, acting as a legitimising tool yet also posing a serious 
threat to regime stability and sovereign power.14 As a result, regimes faced a delicate 
balancing act to ensure that Islamic legitimacy was maintained while also restricting 
the capacity for groups to charge regimes with impropriety or to use the mosque as a 
means through which to challenge political elites and also regulate life; religion itself 
became a zone of indistinction and a site of possibility for political empowerment, 
repression and everything in- between. A range of methods were used to regulate and 
control the role of Islam within state structures including constitutional reform and the 
marginalisation of particular individuals and groups. Ultimately, however, religious 
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‘the failure of political Islam’15 and, later, a move towards post- Islamism amid debate 
about the role of religion in society, politics and the public sphere.
The importance of contingent factors that shape the place of religion in society 
means that we cannot understand such groups and their place within societies – or 
across the region more broadly  – without putting them into political, social and 
legal contexts. In support of this, Asef Bayat stresses the importance of social agents 
and the context in which they operate in order to understand group behaviour 
and the characteristics of faith.16 As Shahab Ahmed suggests, current ‘analytical 
conceptualisations’ of Islam fall short of ‘identifying the coherent dynamic of internal 
contradiction which lies at the crux of any successful conceptualisation of Islam as a 
human and historical phenomenon’.17 From this position we can see the emergence of a 
number of ‘Islams’ contingent upon context. This leads to inherent diversity, difference 
and disagreement, a point stressed by Ahmed who argues that ‘Muslims have long 
been well aware that they are not all the same … that their identity as components of 
universal Islam includes diverse experiences, agreement, disagreement … that they 
mostly agree to disagree and be different.’18
The logical conclusion of such an argument is the idea that each Muslim is 
simultaneously an instance of ‘local imam’ and a member of the universal community 
of Muslims.19 This distance in positions is also populated by membership of different 
communities, from family, tribe, sect or state. Running Ahmed’s argument to its 
conclusion, with competition over symbolic forms and manifestations of Islam, ‘there 
can be only one true Islam, and that is usually the believer’s own’.20 Such a position 
leads to serious tensions between competing visions of unity, from local community 
to broader claims to the umma, along with disparate views of the ordering of life. 
Moreover, it also opens up debate about the relationship of religion and territory with 
discussions about dar al Islam, the land of Islam and dar al harb, literally the ‘land of war’ 
but better understood as any contested territory not under Islamic rule.21 Parallels also 
emerge with the concept of the nomos, which draws people together amid shared belief 
in a particular vision but implodes after a fleeting instance of unity. Managing such 
difference is fundamentally a political task, albeit couched in theological dissonance.
From this, faith serves simultaneously as a source of legitimacy and an existential 
threat to political stability and the future of the territorially grounded sovereign state. 
Religion is a means through which opposition can emerge through the existence of 
competing sovereignties, yet it retains an integral position within mechanisms of 
control. One of the mechanisms through which regimes create bare life is through 
the manipulation of religious structures and the cultivation of sectarian difference. 
To understand such processes we must explore the means through which regimes 
have ‘played’ with both religion and the law, co- opting both formal and normative 
structures within the framework of political organisation.22
Although Islam is seen to be all encompassing with God the source of all laws, we 
cannot isolate it from context and socio- economic facts, for it is through engagement 
with such a reality that region exists and evolves. As James Piscatori suggests, ‘even a 
religious code such as Islam must be accepted as variable and evolving with changing 
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social, economic and historical context, religion has a prominent role in ordering 
and regulating life. Joseph Schacht, one of the foremost scholars on Islam notes how 
Islam is biopolitical in nature: ‘[T] he central feature that makes Islamic religious law 
what it is, that guarantees its unity in all its diversity, is the assessing of all human acts 
and relationship, including those which we call legal, from the point of view of the 
concepts.’24 At the heart of the biopolitical project is the regulation of life, which serves 
as a means of exerting control across populations and defining the spatial borders of 
political organisation in the process.
As Dale Eikelman and James Piscatori suggest, politics takes on an Islamic dimension 
through ‘the invocation of ideas and symbols, which Muslims in different contexts 
identify as “Islamic”, in support of … organized claims and counterclaims’. Given that a 
plurality of ideas and symbols can be used amid a range of different interpretations of 
such symbols, it appears obvious that there can then be myriad definitions of political 
Islam.25 It is generally accepted that most Muslims hold the law to be ‘divine and sacred’, 
revealed through the Quran and the Sunna. Yet in application and interpretation, law 
is not monolithic or without critical reflection as it is interpreted by ‘infallible’ actors 
who are products of the contingency of time and space. Comprised of both formal 
and normative aspects  – where rules and rituals merge  – the establishment of the 
rule of law and its meaning within Islam is contingent upon the relationship between 
religion, law and the nature of political organisation. Thus, local histories and cultural 
narratives shape such contingency, feeding into the construction of what a person is 
refrained from doing and with it, spatial boundaries.26
Put another way by Joseph Schacht:
The central feature that makes Islamic religious law what it is, that guarantees 
its unity in all its diversity, is the assessing of all human acts and relationship, 
including those which we call legal, from the point of view of the concepts 
‘obligatory/ recommended/ indifferent/ reprehensible/ forbidden’.27
Yet with the societal, political and technological developments since the establishment 
of Sharia, the regulation of conduct is ‘unsettled’28 leading to different interpretations 
shaped by local contingency. This, in itself, is a source of consternation for many such 
as Mawdudi, who hold that God’s law must govern over the infallible contingency of 
human- made laws.29
Debate over ideas and their application in political contexts has long been a source 
of contention. Efforts to circumvent such issues and to appease disparate groups of 
people have required developing reserves of legitimacy. Demonstrating the importance 
of retaining Islamic legitimacy, a number of states sought to demonstrate legitimacy 
and compliance with Sharia by establishing Sharia guarantee clauses, designed to 
offer guidance on ‘what Islamic states were permitted to do’.30 Such clauses have to be 
applied constitutionally, requiring a particular set of clauses to ensure compliance and 
ratification of theological requirements in both public and private realms. Of course, 
the development of these clauses led to doubt concerning elements of historical Islamic 
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Amid efforts to create unity among such difference, there is often recourse to an 
‘ideal’ time of Islam. Although the ‘golden age’ of Islam is often heralded as the most 
ideal period, leading many Salafists to desire the somewhat anachronistic return 
to such a time, this was a highly idealised period that bore little resemblance to 
contemporary narratives of the time.32 With this in mind, it is important to remember 
that religion exists within contingent factors in order to provide a more holistic picture 
of events. Moreover, we must also recognise the tension between public and private, 
which becomes particularly important during the apparent rise of post- Islamism and 
the move away from formal structures of Islamic teaching.
Such issues are not limited to Islam but emerge when considering the relationship 
between other faiths and politics. In Israel, the complex relationship between state 
and synagogue has been equally contested. The interaction of faith with different 
interpretations of Zionist ideology – themselves shaped by different socio- economic, 
cultural and historical experiences  – has resulted in a melange of different groups 
operating both inside and outside the recognised borders of the state of Israel. 
Moreover, in the case of groups such as the Hilltop Youth and Gush Emunim (along 
with a number of others) there is a rejection of the legitimacy of the state and its 
borders, with the groups’ members seeking to alter the geographical parameters of 
the state.
Religion, authority and interpretive dissonance
Facing challenges to their sovereignty, Middle Eastern rulers have long sought to 
circumvent contestation through the construction of exclusionary projects that fuse 
faith, tradition and culture.33 Yet recourse to religion or culture does not necessarily 
preclude others from subscribing to particular communities and, perhaps, such 
constructions create scope for further contestation across state boundaries. The 
establishment of mandate- era territorially grounded forms of political organisation 
created colonial forms of statehood, clashing with the prominence of Islam in 
political structures.34 Although not theological concepts, dar al Islam and dar al harb 
are classical legal doctrines treated in the Sharia that help to regulate interactions 
between Muslims and non- Muslims that are not necessarily separated territorially. The 
establishment of territorially defined forms of political organisation in the mandate 
period were thus directly at odds with a religion that recognised ‘no boundaries for 
its kingdom’.35
In addition to this clash of territorial principles, the evolution of political 
organisation during the state- building process required the transition of social 
dynamics from largely rural, tribal and Bedouin communities to more sedentarised 
and urban communities. Regulating life in these new communities was of paramount 
importance and constitutions provided scope through which to achieve this goal, 
yet most of the newly urban population were not familiar with the workings of 
constitutional documents and, amid the uncertainty of their new life, found certainty 
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serving as a source of laws within constitutions, yet religion also plays an important 
role in regulating behaviour through the establishment of a normative code that 
believers subscribe to.
To understand how religion is used within contemporary politics we must begin 
by engaging with a dichotomy that shaped interactions between Islam and politics in 
the formative stages of state- building processes. Islam as a religion occupies a space 
within both theological and political realms as the Prophet Mohammad served both 
as a head of faith and also as the leader of a political community and this tension 
remains. The Madinah Constitution that governed political life under Mohammad is 
widely believed to be the first written constitution. Theories of politics and the state 
within Islam and Islamic law are shaped by the interaction of these two difference 
concepts but it is debate about the ultimate source of sovereignty that are of paramount 
importance. Within Islam, God is sovereign, the ultimate source of law and authority. 
The Quran supports such a position: ‘Allah is the One who has sent the Messenger with 
guidance and the religion of truth to prevail over all religions.’36
It also provides guidance as to how to live:  ‘verily those decrees guide you to my 
straight path, so follow the way and do not follow other paths’.37 Given its holistic 
nature, Islam is a public faith, seeking to regulate political activity to maintain well- 
being and as such, it provides guidance on all facets of life. It follows that the Sharia is 
the basic constitution for Muslims and written political constitutions across the region 
pay heed to this, acknowledging the Quran and Sharia as providing guidance in how to 
live. From such a position it is easy to see how Islam can be seen as a political religion, 
although issues of interpretation arise amid efforts to regulate the complexities of 
modern life.
The history of Islam is one replete with difference, from the Khawarij to the Shi’a 
manifesting not only in theological and political schisms, but also within sects.38 The 
spread of Islam across the Middle East means that different sects and interpretations 
within sects have created allegiances within and across states and challenged the spatial 
regulation of life in the process.
In engaging in debate about sovereignty, one must consider its roots, limitations and 
the right of rebellion, representation and relationship between Sharia, democracy and 
policy enactments.39 How one answers such questions is contingent upon context, both 
within and between states, where history and interpretation are important in shaping 
the relationship between Islam and political structures and ultimately, political life. 
With its focus on the regulation of life, Islam has long possessed a political dimension. 
As we have seen, however, with the plurality of views and interpretations, political 
decisions require legitimisation – often by the ulema – who justify rule by stressing that 
their authority is a consequence of either the sovereignty of Divine Law, or the contract 
between ruler and ruled.40 The relationship between ruling elites and prominent clerics 
is then of paramount importance when considering stability within a territory, where 
human order is to conform to ‘the Divine norm’.41
Here lies a fundamental tension within debate about religious sovereignty. While 
some argue that Divine Law is the source of sovereignty, others suggest that the very 
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theological realm, diluting God’s message. Such a conclusion results in numerous 
challenges to the sovereign order, particularly among efforts to derive legitimacy and 
authority from theological sources.
During the fragmentation of empire, political figures sought to codify aspects of 
Islamic law within constitutions as a means of ensuring regime survival in the face of 
burgeoning nationalist movements. Around this time, Egyptian scholars at Al Azhar 
sought to repudiate claims made by Alī ʿAbd Al Rāziq that the Prophet Mohammad 
was a religious messenger, without political doctrine.42 In response, Muḥammad 
Rashīd Riḍā argued that justice, equality and accountability are found within Islam 
and are regulated by following the correct path:
As far as civil and social governance is concerned, Islam laid down its foundation 
and principles, and prescribed for the umma that it employ judgment and 
discretion in this area, because it changes along with time and place and it 
advances along with civilization and knowledge. Among its basic principles is 
that authority over and command of the umma belongs to it itself [sulṭat al- 
umma laha] and that its affairs are a matter of consultation within it.43
Rida’s views were influential on the ideas of Hassan Al Banna, the founder of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, for whom Islam served as a political response to colonial 
projects, bringing the political into the theological and the theological into the political. 
The colonial legacy, Al Banna suggests, can be found in the very establishment of 
nations and nationalities across the Arab world.44 Yet all too aware of the need to tailor 
comments to particular audiences, prima facie consideration of Al Banna’s speeches 
suggest that they are rife with contradiction, particularly over the idea of a nation. 
In a letter to Egypt’s King Faruq in 1948, Al Banna wrote that ‘Islam is guaranteed to 
supply the renascent nation with its needs’.45 For Al Banna, one of the main objectives 
of the Brotherhood was to ‘establish Allah’s sovereignty over the world. To guide all of 
humanity to the precepts of Islam and its teachings (without which mankind cannot 
attain happiness)’.46
The formation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a political movement marks the 
establishment of an Islamist group, an organised collective believing that Islam should 
play a prominent role in the organisation of public life. The creation of the group 
was a conscious act of political agency, simultaneously a response to modernity and 
a product of it.47 Yet the group was not homogenous, reflecting the importance of 
contingency and interpretation. As the Brotherhood’s ideological canon developed, it 
also began to fragment.
In contrast to Al Banna, Sayyid Qutb argued that the world is steeped in jāhiliyya, 
stemming from ‘rebellion against the sovereignty of God on earth’. Supporting this, 
Qutb argued that rebellion emerged from
attempts to transfer to man one of the greatest attributes of God, namely 
sovereignty, by making some men lords over others … in the more subtle form of 
claiming that the right to create values, to legislate rules of collective behavior, and 








The dawla and the umma 101
101
Intellectual tensions between Qutb and Al Banna reflect fissures within Islamist 
movements themselves, concerning activity and spatial arena, but shaped by different 
contexts that give old ideas new meanings. Since the 1970s, a more nuanced form of 
engagement with debates about their role in politics has emerged, which sees some 
Islamist groups taking a more active role in civil society, in addition to those more 
radical groups for whom violence is viewed as the means to achieve their goals. This 
view reflects the contingency of modernity and local factors in shaping the relationship 
between religion, law and politics. A secondary dimension emerges, concerning the 
relationship between Islamist groups across state borders and the extent to which 
groups should operate at a transnational or national level.49
How one understands Islam and the contingent factors that determine its position 
in – and beyond – the state defines the relationship between religious and political 
realms. In accordance with the emergence of the modern state, religious belief and 
practice is subordinate to state structures. Yet for most Muslims, the law is divine and 
sacred and for many, legal doctrine – as revealed in the Quran and Sunna – must be 
immune from critical discourse. God is seen to be the ultimate sovereign, the final 
arbiter of power and the source of all laws. Yet questions still remain over territorial 
control. Following this, for Michelle Burgis, authority is derived from God’s authority – 
from application of Sharia to umma – and not through the regulation of territory.50
Religious revivalism: engagement, opposition and failure?
Today the Jurists of Islam are proofs (of God) to the people, proofs of the Imam. 
Total obedience is owed to them, since they are specially appointed by the 
Prophet to be his successors and to rule. The Jurists’ authority in government 
affairs is equal to that of the Prophet and of the Imams, since they all share in 
common the burden of executive power to apply the divine law.51
As we saw in the previous chapter, the prevalence of authoritarianism stems from 
regime efforts to ensure the survival of their rule. Supporting this, Mounia Bennani- 
Chraibi suggests that the main reason for authoritarian persistence was ‘to remain 
in power and protect their personal interests … [and as a result they often have] to 
defend themselves against their own people’.52 Within this context, access to political 
space became restricted. One way in which groups could gain access was through 
religion, as a consequence of state reliance upon religious views to maintain legitimacy 
and authority. As we shall see, the notion of political community is a source of much 
contestation within Islamic thought, with the repercussions of such debates having 
serious implications for state sovereignty and security. This type of debate raises a 
number of questions about the spatial ordering of society and the means through 
which society is regulated. The resolution of debates over the role of Islam within 
political community can provide the means through which ruling elites can strengthen 
their claims over political leadership, both ideologically and materially.
When state structures begin to fragment, people are forced to find alternative 
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emerged for groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizballah and Badr Brigades 
to gain prominence through the provision of social goods and services. A number of 
these groups desired a political role, yet beyond Iran, they were largely unsuccessful, 
prompting a move towards ‘post- Islamism’, which saw the relocation of religion from 
public to private realms. Before we reach this point, however, let us briefly trace the 
role of religion within political life.
After the fall of the Ottoman Empire and establishment of the mandate system, 
questions about the role of religion within the fabric of newly established states were 
central to the construction of political organisation. The struggle over the place of 
religion in the public realm is perhaps best seen across twentieth- century Turkey, as 
the struggle to locate religion was integral in shaping the political nature of the state. 
In Iraq, mandate forces sought to restrict the influence of the clerics of the south by 
allying with the Sunni minority and establishing a monarchical system that restricted 
the political influence of the Shi’a clerics. In Mandatory Palestine, Jews continued to 
make aliyah, establishing settlements and kibbutzim as a mechanism of transforming 
land, coordinated by the Jewish Agency and, while religion was important, Marxist- 
inspired material factors played a prominent role in activity at this time.
From the 1940s to the 1960s regimes and religious groups typically worked in 
unison, in battle against secular, leftist and pan- Arab ideologies that threatened the 
political status quo.54 Nowhere was this more apparent than in Jordan, where the influx 
of Palestinian refugees after the nakba created fertile ground for populist ideologies 
to spread. In this context, the Muslim Brotherhood established a political wing, the 
Islamic Action Front. Of course, relations between the Brotherhood and the regime 
would fluctuate, based upon the interaction of domestic and regional dynamics. While 
religion operates as a means of legitimising political rule, it also serves as a double- 
edged sword, providing scope for groups to challenge the status quo within this zone 
of indistinction.55 A number of groups have challenged regimes in this zone, accusing 
them of not upholding religious values, doing so from both inside and outside political 
systems; both legally and illegally.
With the discovery of oil, the role of religion within society became more prominent 
as regimes sought to ensure their legitimacy amid widespread economic and social 
development. With the rapid and in many cases existential transformation of societies 
that took people from rural to urban settings and challenged their traditions, faith 
provided a sense of certainty. While some rulers such as Faisal Al Saud were able – and 
willing – to demonstrate their piety, others such as Anwar Sadat, the ‘Believer President’, 
sought to position themselves in a way to harness the power of religion.56 This revivalism 
has resulted in even greater diversity within the concept of political Islam, between and 
within sects, over the use of violence and, once again, as to the final vision.
The discovery of oil also shaped the trajectory of a state’s foreign policy, as the 
proliferation of Islamist narratives and visions began to be used as a mechanism to 
challenge the pan- Arab vision. The financing of a range of different actors in several 
contexts was fuelled by the exponentially increasing Saudi petro- dollars during the 
1970s. This financial clout allowed Wahhabist thought to attain a ‘preeminent position 
of strength’ across global manifestations and expressions of Islam, achieved in no small 
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The ‘crisis of Arab nationalism’ in the aftermath of the 1967 war provided the 
kingdom with the opportunity to challenge Egypt as the dominant regional actor 
through the mobilisation of pan- Islamist narratives. Poor socio- economic conditions 
left the region ripe for Islamic narratives to challenge the bulbous Arab nationalist 
regimes, and these Islamic narratives spread across increasingly disaffected urban 
populations, along with those marginalised from elite politics. The flows of workers, 
ideas and capital that began in the 1970s only served to facilitate the dawa (call to 
Islam) through the spread of Wahhabist ideas,58 supported by seemingly inexhaustible 
financial resources, much like in Qatar that also follows Wahhabi thought. While Saudi 
funding for groups across the world began in earnest in the 1970s, Qatari support 
became more prominent in the years after the Arab Uprisings as the state embarked 
on a more proactive foreign policy. Yet Wahhabism would not be accepted by all, given 
their fundamentalist approach to faith and association with the Al Saud dynasty,59 
whose behaviour was viewed by some as incompatible with strict Islamic doctrine.60
Islamist parties often referred to religion as a means of eroding the political 
credentials of ruling elites, seeking to demonstrate the impropriety of rulers, ultimately 
arguing that they were unfit to rule. All too aware of the challenges posed by mosques 
and their capacity for mobilisation, regime observation and restriction of Friday 
prayers was hardly surprising. In spite of this, those leading the prayers were able 
to frame sermons within the word of God, leaving criticism implicit and avoiding 
direct incitement. Yet by not performing within the accepted limits of Islam, one is 
then trapped by the mobilisation of such narratives, wherein the double- edged sword 
served simultaneously as a means to legitimise and criticise.
The prominence of Islam within state building is perhaps best seen in the 
establishment of Saudi Arabia and the ongoing efforts to ensure the legitimacy of the 
Al Saud. With less than favorable tribal and nationalist credentials, the alliance with 
Wahhabist ulema was essential in the establishment of the state. Due to a centuries- 
old alliance between the Al Saud and Wahhabi clerics, religion has served a dual role 
in the kingdom, providing the means for the Al Saud to gain legitimacy and also to 
develop a national identity. Contingent factors of time, place and economic context 
stress the importance of a strong communal identity, amid disparate historical, tribal 
and religious experiences, which mean that identity has been built around the power 
of the Al Saud family and its Islamic values. Nationalist narratives evoke collective 
memory of history, territory and societal love; the Saudi nationalism revolves around 
faith and loyalty to the Al Saud, the Protectors of the Two Holy Places of Islam. The 
need to maintain this social contract in spite of evolving socio- economic conditions 
has thus proved central in the very survival of the Saudi state.
Islam occupies a central role within the Saudi legal system, with the Sharia as the 
source of its laws  – underpinning the Basic Law of 1992  – while concepts such as 
qanun (law) and musharr’i (legislator) were peripheral in political discourse to prevent 
the emergence of challenges to Sharia.61 The prominence of Islam in legal and political 
structures is not without issues, however, as it raises questions as to the source of 
sovereign power. As we have seen, sovereignty is exercised through the declaration 
of an emergency and the sovereign decision, yet a zone of indistinction emerges here 
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Article 61 states that, ‘The King declares a state of emergency, general mobilisation 
and war, and the law defines the rules for this’, while Article 62 offers more guidance 
on this. From our earlier discussion about the sovereign decision this is hardly 
surprising. However, consideration of earlier articles and principles appears to 
challenge this. Article 1, for example, states that: ‘The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a 
sovereign Arab Islamic state with Islam as its religion; God’s Book and the Sunnah of 
His Prophet, God’s prayers and peace be upon him, are its constitution, Arabic is its 
language and Riyadh is its capital.’ Building on this, Article 7 states that, ‘Government 
in Saudi Arabi derives power from the Holy Quran and the Prophet’s tradition’, while 
Article 11 begins, ‘Saudi society will be based on the principle of adherence to God’s 
command’. It is quickly apparent that a fundamental tension emerges as to the source 
of sovereignty; while the monarch takes the decision, the roots of sovereignty appear 
to lie elsewhere.62
The alliance between Wahhabism and Al Saud is mutually beneficial, ensuring the 
survival – and ultimately predominance – of both clerics and statesmen. The coercive 
apparatus of the state protects religion while the Sharia legitimises the state, preventing 
it from descent into tyranny.63 It is, of course, a relationship not without tension, as 
seen with the ikhwan rebellion against Ibn Saud’s forces in the 1920s out of concern 
at modernisation processes going against Islamic values and the seizure of the Grand 
Mosque in 1979.64 In response to criticism about Islamic practice, the state supported 
ulema issued fatwas legitimising regime actions when necessary65 and in the years after 
the seizure of the Grand Mosque, the importance of the ulema for political survival 
was increasingly apparent.66
In addition to the fatwa justifying action in the Grand Mosque, a similar fatwa was 
issued to restrict Shi’a political activity:
The Rafidah of the Hasa [al- Ahsa’] be obliged to surrender to true Islam and 
should abandon all their defective religious rites. We asked the Imam, Ibn Saud, 
to order his viceroy in al- Hasa, Ibn Jiluwi, to summon the Shi’is to Shaikh ibn 
Bishr, before whom they should undertake to follow the religion of God and his 
Prophet and to cease the invocation of the saintly members of Ahl al- Bayt, and 
to abandon other innovations in their public assemblies, and to conform to the 
rule of prayer five times daily in the mosque. Prayer callers (muaddhin) are to 
be sent. The people are also to study the three principles of the Wahhabi tenets; 
their houses of worship are to be destroyed and those that object to this will be 
exiled.
With regard to the Shi’is of Qatif, we have advised the Imam to send 
missionaries and preachers to certain districts and villagers, which have come 
under the control of the true Muslims and in which Shari’ah laws should be put 
in effect.67
The fatwa reveals the Wahhabi suspicion and rejection of Shi’a beliefs and, given the 
prominence of the ulema within the fabric of the Saudi state, the kingdom’s Shi’a 








The dawla and the umma 105
105
Much like in Saudi Arabia, consecutive regimes in Egypt sought to facilitate the 
bureaucratic co- option of the ulema of Al Azhar. Having witnessed the influence 
of the clerics of the ulema across the previous decades,69 Nasser sought to solidify 
his rule by bringing the clerics ‘to heel’, in what was described as the ‘capitulation 
of the ulema to the state’.70 Yet the clerics quickly ascertained their importance and 
sought to improve their position within bureaucratic structures as they recognised 
their value in countering challenges posed by the Muslim Brotherhood and their 
Saudi neighbours. The reforms also had the unintended by- product of political 
empowerment as expansion created new forms of expertise, negatively seen by some 
as bricolage – the fragmented intellectual constructions of Islamist protest71 – but later 
serving as a means of political empowerment.72
The struggle to regulate society was far greater than the struggle to regulate the 
ulema, as the Brotherhood occupied a prominent role within civil society, providing 
much needed social goods and services. The Brotherhood itself had spent a great 
deal of time reflecting on the desired place of the organisation within Egyptian 
society, as a public, political actor, noted by its founder Hassan Al Banna, who 
recounted that ‘No one but God knows how many nights we spent reviewing the 
state of the nation … analysing the sickness, and thinking of the possible remedies. 
So disturbed were we, that we reached the point of tears.’
Under Anwar Sadat, the ‘Believer President’, the political constraints placed on Al 
Azhar were loosened as he sought to use religion as a mechanism of legitimacy and 
to achieve political goals just as his predecessor had done. While Nasser had used 
the clerics of Al Azhar to legitimise arrests of the Muslim Brothers, Sadat provided 
greater space for Islamic expression as he sought to limit the power of the Nasserist 
cabal although it was here that prominent members of the ulema demanded greater 
influence. The rise of jamaa Takfir wa Hijra, a group that capitalised on tensions 
between regime and ulema, led to the clerics taking a stronger line against more 
militant forms of Islamist action and moving towards the centre of the political arena. 
Following the assassination of Sadat, his successor Hosni Mubarak sought to crush 
the threat posed by radical Islam while also co- opting the ulema and increasing the 
regime’s Islamic legitimacy by giving them administrative responsibility and control 
over a number of areas.73
In Jordan, Islamist movements provided the means to challenge the burgeoning 
Arabist, leftist and Palestinian movements. These opportunities secured the Hashemite 
monarchy in the face of a number of threats, while also building upon one pillar of 
their domestic legitimacy, namely descent from the Prophet. In the first fifty years of 
the state, an implicit alliance between the Hashemites and the Muslim Brotherhood 
increased monarchical claims to legitimacy by using the Brotherhood’s networks to 
speak to populations through informal channels. At this time, the ikhwan in Jordan was 
dominated by Palestinians and thus working with the Muslim Brotherhood provided 
another means for the Hashemite regime to secure its rule. Much like in Saudi Arabia 
and Egypt, over time Islamist groups would utilise their role in society to challenge the 
regime, resulting in a clamp down on Islamist groups between 1989 and 1993. It also 
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mosques under the control of the Ministry of Awqaf Islamic Affairs and Holy Places. 
Constitutional placed religious institutions – including mosques – under supervision 
and provided training to those wishing to preach or offer Islamic guidance.74 Later 
reforms would also require written ministerial approval in order to give sermons and 
offer Islamic guidance, punished by a ban, jail sentence or fine.
As we have seen, Kuwait’s political history of compromise created space for groups 
such as the Muslim Brotherhood to operate, yet unlike their counterparts in Egypt 
and Jordan, this action was driven by the harakat (movement) rather than the hizb 
(party). As one prominent Islamic figure noted, the Kuwaiti branch of the Muslim 
Brotherhood was formed in 1951 in response to burgeoning Western influence and 
amid the secular movements of Arab nationalism:
Our Islamic movement started in the early fifties, during the period in which 
Kuwait was under the fierce assault from Western concepts and values of 
secularism and nationalism, the most noticeable of which were the pan- Arab 
Nationalism, Ba’athism, and Socialism. Such an assault was meant to distract the 
Kuwaiti Muslims from their faith. That was the main reason for the establishment 
of political Islamic activities.75
Members of the newly formed ikhwan ran in local elections but as individuals rather 
than as members of the political party.76 Across Kuwaiti politics, the Constitutional 
Court occupies a central role, serving an intermediary role between different groups 
across the state and on some occasions ruling against the Al Sabah.77 Although often 
viewed with a sense of pride because of its spirit of dialogue and compromise, there 
are growing demands for reform of the social contract, which was initially due to be 
reformed in 1966 to reflect changing social and religious dynamics.78
In Lebanon, political parties have been mapped on to the sectarian construction of 
the state.79 After the civil war, the establishment of the consociational power- sharing 
system of government gave each sect a share in the running of the country as a means 
of providing each group with access to political space. While serving as a means of 
ensuring that all groups can express their views and grievances amid historical 
conditions of extreme poverty, marginalisation and violence,80 the system is flawed in 
the sense that it constitutionalises and enshrines sectarian difference in the political 
realm, creating a system that is easily deadlocked by veto powers.81
Although religious values have provided some actors with the ability to shape 
regional affairs, context remains central to such capacity. Some Shi’a Muslims in 
Lebanon, aware of the need to operate within a confessional system and fearing a 
return to the darker days of the civil war, express solidarity with their Christian kin 
by putting up Christmas decorations in a visible manifestation of the negotiation 
between the transnational – Twelver Shi’ism – and the national – Lebanese identity.82 
For others, their faith shapes political behaviour in different ways. While faith may be 
abstract, we must not remove it from the context within which it operates, for it is the 
political, social and economic contexts that are given direction by religious beliefs and 
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In Iraq, from the establishment of the state until 2003, sectarian difference was 
propagated as a mechanism of survival, seeking to limit the power of the Shi’a clerics – 
and by (perceived) extension, Iran – and ensuring the survival of successive regimes.83 
In response to historical discrimination, a number of Islamic parties – predominantly 
Shi’a – provided a political voice for those marginalised by the erstwhile regime.84 The 
most prominent of these parties, Al Da’awa Islamiyah, emerged in the late 1950s as a 
consequence of the impact of modernisation and marginalisation on communities.85 Al 
Da’wa drew support from clerics across the south and was inspired by the theological 
ideas of the Iraqi Shi’a cleric Muhammad Baqir Al Sadr. Although most of its members 
were exiled to Iran, the party retained influence as a prominent opposition movement 
and played an important role in the post- 2003 landscape. While based in Iran, Da’awa 
was supported by the creation of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Republic in Iraq, 
which was more vocal in its support of veleyat- e faqih. Despite possessing a sectarian 
dimension, Al Da’awa initially found support from a number of Sunni Muslims as a 
consequence of drawing on the writing of Sayyid Qutb. Some Shi’a clerics stressed 
unity, in spite of the conditions inside Iraq, perhaps most notably Al Sadr.86
In spite of such sentiments, when political contexts changed post 2003, relations 
between Sunni and Shi’a took on increasingly violent dimensions in their relations. 
While countless factors had shaped political life in the previous eighty years, the new 
political climate brought sectarian tensions to the fore, albeit shaped by a range of 
social, economic and tribal contingent factors.
Religion also found space in political structures in Bahrain. While also historically 
populated by secular, leftist and Arab nationalist parties, Shi’a opposition groups 
gained a great deal of support in Bahraini politics following the Iranian revolution. 
Relations between regime and opposition groups ebbed and flowed in the subsequent 
years, culminating in a ‘decade of discontent’ in the 1990s.87 Amid socio- economic 
difference, religious symbolism played a prominent role in the construction of political 
opposition, drawing people together under a shared banner of Shi’a Islam. This 
symbolism played an important role in constructing unity and a Shi’a identity, within 
which religious figures such as Sheikh Isa Qassim serve as the spiritual leadership 
of parties like Al Wefaq.88 Religious denomination resulted in political, social and 
economic discrimination but grievances stemmed from such discrimination, where 
unemployment has disproportionately impacted upon Shi’a communities.89 Ultimately, 
the relationship between Shi’a parties and the regime is shaped by security calculations, 
which determines the nature of interactions.
The inability of groups across the region to capture and consolidate political 
power after the Iranian revolution led Olivier Roy to argue that political Islam 
‘failed’.90 Following the work of scholars such as Asef Bayat, in later works, Roy 
suggested that after its failure, Islam took on a more private dimension in what 
became known as post- Islamism. In this sense, Islamic commitment moves from 
the public realm into the private. The argument suggests that Muslims lost interest 
in transforming faith into a political ideology and social movement. Instead, moving 
away from state- led efforts to transform society, post- Islamism is a search for a 
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forms of religious authority and their relationships with state structures. To this 
end, ‘contemporary re- Islamisation is a cluster of individual practices that are used 
as a means of finding jobs, money, respect and self- esteem, and bargaining with a 
marginalised state that has played on conservative re- Islamisation but been unable 
to control it’.91
Amid the uncertainty of the modern world, faith provides a degree of certainty.92 
In this case, the move to a more private Islam occurs with a new form of knowledge 
production and new application of Islam to the modern world. This also results in 
the emergence of a new type of preacher, able to speak to the urban youth while also 
demonstrating Quranic excellence in a single thought.93 Although suggesting a move 
towards the individualisation of religion, some such as Bayat demonstrate that in spite 
of such individualistic practice, Muslims also embody forms of the good life.94 Here 
we see the fusion of modernity with tradition and public with private in numerous 
discourses about human dignity and the good life. Such a move becomes increasingly 
important in the years leading up to the Arab Uprisings as previous failures of political 
aspirations created different forms of political expression and belonging, within both 
national and discursive collectives.
Dar al Islam, dawla and umma
Central to discussions about the relationship between Islam and sovereignty are 
questions about territory and jurisdiction, the ordering of life and the spatial limitations 
that emerge from such ordering.95 For some such as Majid Khadduri, Muslims are 
bound by the ‘law’ of their faith regardless of territory or place of residence. Yet such 
a position fails to accommodate the realities and contexts of individual Muslims and 
their communities, which shape their action and identity.
As Khadduri notes,
A distinction … must be made between an authority which is directly derived 
from and exercised by God, and an authority which is derived from a divine 
code endowed by God but enforced by His viceregent (or by a secular ruler) 
which is equally binding upon the latter and the people.96
Tension over sources of authority is a prominent feature of debate over the role of 
religion in political organisation. The dawla and umma are fundamentally two 
discordant bedrocks for the contemporary state, revealing tensions between and 
within theological circles about the nature and trajectory of political organisation.97 
Historical understandings are associated with the efforts of Jamal Al  Din Al  Afghani 
whose writings sought to mobilise Muslims across the world around the concept of 
Islamic unity. Afghani’s work framed Islamic unity as a response to colonial oppression, 
where injustice provoked the need for collective response. Yet this was not a call for 
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The inability of Muslims across the world to identify with this ‘imagined 
community’ meant that Afghani’s project ultimately failed in practice, but the 
legacy of his work continued. Rashid Rida’s work in the aftermath of fall of the 
Ottoman Empire called for states to adopt the normative values of Islam – as found 
in the Sharia  – which resulted in the establishment of groups such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood, working within the confines of territorial borders.99 In the following 
years, the concept of a broader pan- Islamic movement became associated with a more 
militant form of violent extremism who espoused membership of an umma as an 
imagined community akin to dar al Islam.100
The concepts of dar al Islam and dar al harb provide insight into the relationship 
between faith, law and territory. Dar al Islam is generally understood as ‘the whole 
territory in which the law of Islam prevails’, while dar al harb refers to land not 
encompassed by dar al Islam.101 Although Ibn Al  Arabi depicted Islam as a single 
person, the concept of dar al Islam was binding to communities that, by their very 
nature had become territorial.102 For Parvin and Sommer, dar al Islam is ‘a legal 
construct that has a territorial dimension:  a territorial expression of the umma … 
which itself has a political component’.103
It is helpful at this point to return to the concept of the nomos to consider the roots 
of political organisation across the Islamic world. The concept provides insight into the 
relationship between law and territory, along with interpretations of ‘how to live’. While 
early understandings of the nomos suggest an attachment to soil, consideration of pre- 
Islamic history across the Arabian Peninsula, reveals how the nomadic way of life left 
little attachment to land. The words of incitement used by Umar to aid the conquest of 
Iraq reveal a great deal in this regard: ‘The Hijaz is your home only in as far as it is a 
pasturage. Those who dwell there have no power over it except in this respect. Where do 
newcomers who emigrated stand with regard to God’s promise, “Roam the earth?” ’104
Similar views are also found in the work of Khaldun, whose reflections of the 
nature of tribal life we have encountered previously. Speaking about the nomadic 
characteristics of the tribe, Khaldun notes that such groups
have no homelands they might use as a fertile (pasture), and no fixed place to 
which they might repair. All regions and places are the same to them. Therefore, 
they do not restrict themselves to possession of their own and neighboring 
regions. They do not stop at the borders of their horizon. They swarm across 
distant zones to achieve superiority over faraway nations.105
These remarks share similarities with Parvin and Sommer, who suggest that 
territoriality at this point was ‘a function of time more than space’, as territorial 
boundaries were defined through a tribe’s movements.106 Such movements were later 
harnessed in an effort to facilitate the expansion of Islam, which became fixed with 
the development of communities. As the expansion of sovereignty began to wane, a 
more static, permanent sense of politics began to emerge, supplanting the personal, 
sociological character of Islamic sovereignty with an identity that was shaped by 
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The emergence of divisions within the community was hardly surprising, in spite of 
widespread criticism from jurists at the time, who suggested that Islamic law ‘recognises 
neither division in Moslem authority nor differentiation among Moslems on racial or 
cultural background’.108 Amid these internal visions, the idea of the universal form of 
dar al Islam began to wane, ceasing to be able to shape the reality of its members. In 
spite of such concerns, the appearance of different groups was acknowledged in the 
Quran: ‘We made you into nations and tribes so that you may know each other.’109
The emergence of divisions began to be categorised by cultural and political 
differences, while affinity with soil developed over time grounding communities in 
space. With the spread of Western ideas, first through the crusades and much later, 
the mandate system, territorial segregation became the primary form of political 
definition.110 Although some have suggested that Islam is incompatible with the 
concept of the territorially grounded nation state,111 Piscatori suggests that there is 
nothing about Islam that makes it incongruent with such ideas.112 While this position 
is certainly more accurate than others, there are tensions that emerge when we look at 
the political manifestations of Islam and its relationship with territory.
The German historian Reinhard Schulz argued that the umma served to reinforce 
the territorially grounded national state,113 as a range of different definitions of umma 
are given in the Quran. As a consequence, this plurality of meanings provides scope 
for actors to use it in particular contexts and for political reasons, creating a form of 
contingency. Of course, context is key in understanding the concept, as it is shaped by 
nationalism, states, movements and socio-economic forces.
As Fred Halliday suggests, the term umma
was available, in a range of meanings … It is not surprising, therefore, that, 
on the one hand, the term, umma, should have become a common one in the 
political discourses of the Arab world in the twentieth century and that it should 
have a variety of distinct, equally licensed, meanings within both the discursive 
legacy of the substratum and the contemporary, world- historical, context of the 
Arab world.114
Halliday notes how the concept is contingent upon the complexities of contemporary 
political life. Supporting this thesis, Schulze argues that local and national interest far 
outweighed broader Islamic sentiments, particularly within moments of crisis, even in 
the burgeoning moments of the sovereign state.115
Discourses that mobilise the concept of the umma are based on such contingency; 
after all, ideas and discourse alone cannot transcend difference or indeed shape political 
activity. Instead, they rely on actors who are themselves shaped by context.116 As a 
consequence, we must consider the broader context that shapes contingency, as social, 
cultural, economic and historical factors shape group intentions, capabilities and the 
type of relationships that they have with society. Put another way, we must locate groups 
not only within ideological streams and socio- economic factors, but also geopolitical 
conditions.117 It is through this that we are able to understand the emergence of ideas 
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Geo-sectarian politics
In addition to different spatial and temporal differences, faith is also characterised by 
distinct theological interpretations, resulting in the emergence of different sects.119 The 
roots of sectarian difference are initially political, stemming from dispute over who was 
to lead the caliphate after the death of Muhammad. This dispute reached its zenith on 
10 October 680 AD where Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet, and his followers were 
ambushed by a larger Ummayad force. In the ensuing battle at Karbala, Hussein and 
his young son were killed, along with all of his male companions. The Battle of Karbala 
is a central point within the history of Shi’a Islam, routinely marked in the festival of 
Ashura. Hussein had spent a great deal of his life challenging the perceived corruption 
of the Ummayad court, ultimately leading to his death at Karbala. The narrative of the 
battle creates ideas of guilt and martyrdom among Shi’a Muslims, as a consequence of 
ancestral failures to help Hussein and his followers.120
Historical developments at this time also document the emergence of the Kharijite 
movement – taken literally to mean those who rebel against religion – who rejected 
submission to human authority. After the Battle of Siffin ended in a truce, the 
Kharijites criticised Ali for ending the battle, rejecting his position as leader and the 
role of arbitrators in ending the war. The Kharijites took a literal reading of the Quran 
and the phrase la hukma ila lillah – there is no rule but God’s – as a literal manifesto, 
rejecting all forms of human authority, even if this was God’s representative on earth.121 
The challenge of this idea also raised fundamental questions over authority, such as 
who determined the law and, in keeping with our discussion of sovereignty, who 
determines the exception?
While all Muslim states in the region refer to the Sharia within either constitutions 
or Basic Laws, the Islamic Republic of Iran explicitly uses it as the source of all of its 
laws. In the aftermath of revolution, the system of veleyat- e faqih enshrined the values of 
Twelver Shi’a thought within the fabric of the newly established Islamic Republic, which 
provided the state with much needed legitimacy. Moreover, the structure of veleyat- e 
faqih facilitated the regulation of both formal and informal space, thus harnessing the 
power of religion, something that the Shah had previously been unable to do.
While Khomeini’s vision established the Islamic Republic, earlier in his life he had 
followed a more quietist trend within Shi’a thought, arguing that clerics should remain 
removed from politics. This view, as currently espoused by the likes of Grand Ayatollah 
Ali Sistani remains the predominant difference between the two great schools of 
Shi’a thought, in Qom and Najaf. In spite of such tensions, Khomeini articulated the 
compliance of veleyat- e faqih with Islam in a constitution that
advances the cultural, social, political, and economic institutions of Iranian 
society based on Islamic principles and norms, which represent an honest 
aspiration of the Islamic Ummah. This aspiration was exemplified by the nature 
of the great Islamic Revolution of Iran, and by the course of the Muslim people’s 
struggle, from its beginning until victory, as reflected in the decisive and forceful 
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Amid such comments, in its aftermath, the revolution was greeted with superficial 
optimism by some in Riyadh. Shortly after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, 
King Khalid proclaimed:
It gives me great pleasure that the new republic is based on Islamic principles 
which are a powerful bulwark for Islam and Muslim peoples who aspire to 
prosperity, dignity, and well- being. I  pray the Almighty to guide you to the 
forefront of those who strive for the upholding of Islam and Muslims, and I wish 
the Iranian people progress, prosperity, and stability.123
Yet relations between the two quickly soured, as geopolitical and political concerns 
began to play an important role. It was here that sectarian difference also took on 
a security dimension, as the two sides expressed their intent and concerns. For 
Khomeini, Iran sought to ‘export our experiences to the whole world and present the 
outcome of our struggles against tyrants to those who are struggling along the path 
of God’.124 Khomeini’s comments were a source of great consternation for Sunni Arab 
states, not only through an apparent desire to spread the revolutionary goals of Shi’a 
Islam, but also to challenge the regional status quo.125
In response, a cycle of rhetoric emerged between the leaders of Saudi Arabia and 
Iran in an effort to demonstrate Islamic legitimacy.126 In pursuit of this, Khomeini 
sought to stress unity across the Muslim world:
There is no difference between Muslims who speak different languages, for 
instance the Arabs and the Persians. It is very probable that such problems have 
been created by those who do not wish the Muslim countries to be united … 
They create the issues of nationalism, of pan- Iranianism, pan- Turkism, and such 
isms, which are contrary to Islamic doctrines.127
In spite of his efforts to foster unity, Khomeini was vociferously critical of the Al Saud 
who were seen as ‘corrupt and unworthy to be the guardians of Mecca and Medina’128 
and later referred to as ‘traitors to the two holy shrines’.129 In a damning indictment, 
Khomeini claimed that:
If we wanted to prove to the world that the Saudi Government, these vile and 
ungodly Saudis, are like daggers that have always pierced the heart of the 
Moslems from the back, we would not have been able to do it as well as has been 
demonstrated by these inept and spineless leaders of the Saudi Government.130
In response, King Fahd condemned the ‘hypocrites and pretenders who are using 
Islam to undermine and destabilise other countries’.131 Tensions erupted in violence 
on the 1987 hajj where an estimated 450 pilgrims died, of whom 275 were Iranian,132 
which later resulted in the politicisation of hajj licenses and the Iranian boycott of 
the hajj. There was also an explicit attempt by Saudi leaders to frame the revolution 
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Although Khomeini spoke of providing support to the mustazefin (downtrodden), 
this was then to be placed within the context of long- standing Sunni– Shi’a tensions 
alongside suspicions about Persian expansionism. In the following years, the two states 
began to engage in ideological and political competition to increase their influence 
across the Middle East and wider Islamic community.
Perhaps the most visible manifestation of this was in the Organisation of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC), the forum to resolve issues across the Islamic world.133 As Jeffrey 
Haynes notes, the OIC was plagued by contending visions of an ‘appropriate’ Islamic 
society, politicising belief and challenging the spirit of the organisation.134 Saudi 
dominance of the organisation is hardly surprising. The headquarters of the OIC are in 
Jedda, while the kingdom has donated large sums of money to the organisation and its 
various institutions. In return, Saudi Arabia possesses de facto veto power, while also 
seemingly uses the organisation as a platform to support its political agenda. In 2012, 
Saudi Arabia called for the suspension of Syria’s membership of the OIC as a consequence 
of the Assad regime’s violence against citizens. As tensions between the two major Gulf 
powers escalated, it was hardly surprising that the OIC became an arena for tensions 
to play out, resulting in the vocal condemnation of Iran for ‘its continued support for 
terrorism’ and for interfering in the domestic affairs of states across the Middle East.135
Beyond the OIC, both Saudi Arabia and Iran have capitalised on shared religious 
networks to exert influence across the Middle East, attempting to reduce the political 
influence of the other by funding religious groups. While Iraq offers an obvious 
example of such mobilisation, similar links can be drawn in Lebanon, Bahrain, Syria, 
Yemen, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and the Horn of Africa. It is widely acknowledged 
that Saudi Arabia has provided vast sums of money to clerics for spreading the 
Wahhabi message.136 One Shi’a cleric recounted a flight from Medinah that he shared 
with Imams returning home from receiving religious schooling in Saudi Arabia. In 
return for undertaking this training, the clerics received a monthly stipend along with 
support for their families.137 Yet in spite of this funding, their actions were shaped 
by local context. While Salafis have gained prominence in Lebanon, this is not the 
strict Wahhabist form of Salafism. A Lebanese journalist recalled visiting the home of a 
Salafi cleric, where he met the cleric’s daughter who, much to his surprise, was ‘wearing 
jeans and a T- shirt’.138 Such a story demonstrates how transnational forces interact with 
local contexts to shape space in a particular way.
In times of uncertainty, shared religious values – transcending territorial borders – 
provide the capacity to shape relations with groups beyond state borders. In post- 
invasion Iraq, US diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks document the perceived 
role of Shi’a actors and, by extension, Iranian influence, including the funding of 
groups such as the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and Badr, 
in the region of $100  million and $45  million respectively.139 This campaign also 
involved engagement with Iraqi politics, where Iran was accused of pushing Maliki 
into a confrontation with the Sadrist movement to ensure the political dominance of 
its Iraqi allies and the spiritual dominance of the Persian marja’iyya.140
The implications of this for the ordering of space – and the territorial borders of 









Houses built on sand114
14
regional currents interact with the intricacies of life, across southern Iraq and also in 
Yemen where conflict took on an increasingly sectarian nature amid the conflation of 
domestic politics into geopolitical currents shaping the Middle East.141
A zone of indistinction
As we have seen, religion exists simultaneously as a zone of possibility and restriction. 
Within this zone, believers find guidance on how to live, regimes find the means to 
legitimise their rule, and dissidents find the tools through which to challenge political 
order. Interpretation of text and tradition thus serves as a source of possibility, shaped 
by the interaction of context- specific contingency. Ultimately, what we have seen 
across the Middle East is that religion has become the arena through which states and 
their opponents can play out their political struggles amid competing visions of how 
to live. With its role in public life, religion becomes the means through which dissent – 
in a range of different guises – can emerge. Even when religious space is restricted, 
narratives and norms can be used as a means to challenge the status quo and to shape 
life both formally and informally.
Moreover, Islam serves as a means through which ruling elites can increase legitimacy 
by stressing conformity with Islamic norms and practices. This then opens up scope 
for criticism as regimes may not be seen as Islamic enough, leading to challenges from 
opposition movements on religious grounds. Thus, religion exists as a double- edged 
sword, simultaneously serving to legitimise and delegitimise, depending upon the 
particular contexts in operation. If this is so, there is more to religion than faith and 
a discussion about the organisation of society. Instead, there appears to be a greater 
existential dimension to the role played by religion within political community: as a zone 
of indistinction, contingent upon interpretation that shapes the spatial ordering of life.
We can see how Islam becomes the vehicle through which opposition emerges, 
requiring regulation from regimes in an attempt to maintain control. Such regulation 
ranges from fatwas justifying behaviour, to the banning of groups from particular 
backgrounds. Historically, political opposition has also been marginalised by regimes 
that have cultivated sectarian master narratives, wherein the grievances of political 
agents have been subsumed by broader debate around legitimacy of belief. Yet within 
conditions of regulation and control, religion also serves as an ideological framework 
to challenge the status quo and to mobilise networks against state structures, opening 
tension between ordnung and ortung. Inherent within Islam are structures that help 
spread ideas and mobilise people, which has long been a source of concern, leading 
to the regulation and monitoring of Friday prayers. Here, the mosque becomes a 
battleground of ideas to shape the attitudes of the public.
Such issues are not unique to Islam; instead, they can be found whenever there is 
certainty of belief.142 For example, Israel is often referred to as a ‘Jewish and democratic’ 
state yet as a number of Israeli scholars have acknowledged, this political system is 
better suited by the concept of ‘ethnocracy’.143 As Oren Yiftachel argues, ethnocratic 
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domination of power structures while maintaining a democratic façade’. In the Israeli 
case, this form of ethnocracy reflects the broader Zionist strategy of ‘Judaizing the 
homeland’144 and the physical transformation of the land.145
In the Israeli case, the expansion of the dominant group is at the cost of Palestinians 
in the West Bank and Gaza, along with other ethnic groups in Israel proper. Essentially, 
Yiftachel suggests that the process of Judaising the ‘Land of Israel’ creates a set of power 
relations that shape interactions between Israelis and Palestinians, between Ashkenazi 
and Mizrahi Jews, Orthodox and secular Jews and many other groups. It is a holistic 
approach that facilitates existential transformation of life across Israel and Palestine 
in the quest to Judaise territory, as a form of ‘creeping apartheid’.146 Moreover, it is an 
attempt to order space, defining spatial borders in the process, albeit with competing 
visions of how to live. Here, nomos is itself a zone of indistinction, serving to legitimise 
a range of different positions.
Although there is little doubting the impact of Judaism upon life across Israel, 
symbolically, politically and socially, an important impact concerns settlement policies. 
Religious views of the so- called ‘Land of Israel’ vary depending upon interpretation 
and the fusion of Torah and political factors on the ground. Beyond Israel proper, 
ideological views found in the religious Zionism trend  – itself not a homogenous 
bloc – have shaped political action across the West Bank. Such action has taken place 
by both state and non- state actors, using land transformation as a mechanism for 
political expansion.147 Settler movements have long been used as a means to define the 
nation and its citizens, but across the West Bank this has an impact on both Israel and 
Palestine. As we shall see in the next chapter, the transformation of urban landscapes 
plays a prominent role in the regulation of political life but before reaching this point 
we must consider the religious views that have shaped settlement behaviour beyond 
the formal practices of the state.
Although initially resistant to the civilian presence in the West Bank, which 
had previously been designated as a military zone to abide by international law, 
resettlement efforts driven by civilians  – led by the group Gush Emunim  – were 
given approval by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol who famously pronounced, ‘Well kids, 
if you want to – ascend’. Demonstrating the importance of territory, an alternative 
transliteration of this quote reads, ‘Children, you may return home’.148 In the aftermath 
of this proclamation, the ascent into the hills of the West Bank was undertaken by 
some 20 trucks and cars carrying around 100 settlers along with Rabbi Zvi Yehuda 
Kook, the settlers’ spiritual guide.149
Following this effort, the settlers published a pamphlet detailing the importance 
of civilian settlement. In it, the pamphlet proclaimed that the group ‘set out today 
to found a city in the heart of Eretz- Israel near Nablus’.150 The settlers and military 
apparatus of the state agreed upon the terms of the civilian presence in the West Bank, 
building settlement housing and services. The Secretary of Gush Emuni, Zvi Slonim, 
later reported that
in ‘basement’ conditions yet ‘penthouse’ morale … the settlement gradually 
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making of a new form of pioneer life … [and] were sparked with the seed that 
fruited with more and more Elon Moreh [settlements] in Judea and Samaria.151
Such efforts sought to transform the West Bank from ‘enemy territory’ to Jewish 
homeland.
Later plans outlined far more ambitious projects seeking to transform life in the 
West Bank and Gaza. Negotiating a difficult relationship with political elites in Israel, 
large aspects of the settlement project were consumed by state apparatus wherein the 
transformative aspect was used for political and security purposes. The success of such 
transformative processes is revealed when we consider that Avigdor Lieberman, the 
Israeli Defence Minister (who made aliyah from the former Soviet Union) is a West 
Bank settler, embodying the breach of international law and conventions while serving 
as a high- ranking official in the Israeli government.152
Political disengagement from the West Bank and Gaza proved incendiary, moving 
away from a theological imaginary and a political vision. This goes some way to 
explaining the violence that erupted amid the disengagement from Gaza and the 
destruction of ‘illegal’ settlements.153 Such illegal settlements push the sovereignty of 
the Israeli state beyond the territorial borders in search of a broader vision of Eretz 
Israel. A secondary point of tension stemming from the relationship between Judaism 
and the state concerns the role of the ultra- Orthodox in the military. Competing views 
on the source of sovereignty emerge when considering military action in the West 
Bank and Gaza. Disengagement policies were deeply contested by a range of religious 
sources who rejected the political decision to withdraw, leading to widespread protests.
Although previously exempt from the military service that is compulsory for all 
other Israelis, a long- running legal battle was ended when the Supreme Court declared 
the exemption to be ‘discriminatory’ and ‘unconstitutional’.154 With concerns that the 
IDF was becoming more religious, fears about disobeying military orders increased 
amid calls for disobedience from individuals such as Rabbi Avraham Shapira, a 
former Chief Rabbi of Israel, and leader of Merkaz HaRav Kook.155 Following acts of 
disobedience, Ha’aretz, a leading Israeli newspaper, published an opinion piece entitled 
‘Drafting Ultra- Orthodox Jews into the Israeli Army Is Dangerous’.156 When faced with 
such decisions, soldiers face a test of their loyalty: to their state or their Rabbi. As the 
political situation becomes increasingly complex, such tensions will strike at the very 
heart of the Israeli state amid efforts to exert sovereign power.
Conclusions
When placed in political and economic context, religion is a means through which 
individuals can be included/ excluded from state structures, while also serving to shape 
political activity through intellectual curiosity, ethical values and normative behaviour. 
Amid the uncertainty of modernity and a fragmenting regional system, the certainty 
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of groups who run welfare programmes and offer moral certainty prove attractive 
and those who are able to offer protection amid uncertainty can develop widespread 
support.
Although often overlooked by scholars of politics and other disciplines, we should 
remember to acknowledge that faith is a means for action in and of itself. While 
scholars are quick to consider how faith is populated with political meaning, we should 
not disregard belief. That being said, we can also explore the political dimensions 
that are taken alongside belief as a consequence of tensions between different ideas 
about the role of religion within society that are ultimately grounded in contingency. 
Discussion about membership of communities of faith leads to division, contingent 
on a range of factors. Much like the nomos, unity is a fleeting instance that fragments 
into countless different visions with their own regulatory capacity. As a consequence, 
we should not seek to reify religion as a homogenous force; rather, we must remember 
that it is shaped by particular experiences of economic, social, ideological, historical 
and geopolitical interactions.
While simultaneously creating a nomos by seeking to regulate behaviour, it is shaped 
by particular contexts. Historically, debate about the relationship between religion and 
politics shaped society, whereas at present, the debate serves as a means of ensuring 
control and regulation over society. Within this position, the range of normative, 
structural, cultural and multifarious positions within religion broadly serves as a 
mechanism through which governance  – and biopolitical control  – can be exerted. 
Religion is then central to political struggles but also broader efforts to regulate life 
and define spatial borders.
Within political projects are countless interpretations and narratives that reflect 
regime, opposition and populist views that quickly spread within and between states. 
With the spread of TV, radio, print media and the Internet, individuals are also able to 
access the views of figures in neighbouring states, speaking to local populations, but 
also across a region as a whole. Complicating matters is the fact that each position is 
then interpreted by individuals who are shaped by history, culture, society, economic 
and political factors, leading to a plurality of views before ascertaining the nature 
of one’s faith. Fundamentally, this discussion relates to the regulation of life within 
particular territories, shaped and defined by both time and space. But it also provides 
scope for challenges to the manner in which life is regulated, a means through which 
legitimate challenge to the status quo can emerge. As such, Islam simultaneously serves 
as a source of authority and of opposition, a zone of indistinction that is necessarily – 
and simultaneously – a zone of possibility and repression.
Within these conditions, regimes often constructed and referred to sectarian 
master narratives in an attempt to ensure their survival, deepening divisions within 
already fractious societies. Sectarian difference served as a mechanism of control, 
with explicit support for particular sects over others who were often then politicised 
and securitised, showing the power of norms to shape formal structures. The 
construction of narratives of belonging can transcend state borders to easily result in 
theological debate possessing both political and geopolitical ramifications. This also 
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provides the mechanisms through which foreign policy goals can be reached, when 
theological narratives cross borders and become shaped by the contingency of local 
context.
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Building Beirut, transforming Jerusalem  
and breaking Basra
Empires collapse. Gang leaders
are strutting about like statesmen. The peoples
Can no longer be seen under all those armaments.
So the future lies in darkness and the forces of right
Are weak. All this was plain to you.
Walter Benjamin, On the Suicide of the Refugee
Cities of Salt, a novel by Abdelrahman Munif set in an unnamed Gulf kingdom tells 
the story of the transformation of Wadi Al Uyan by Americans after the discovery 
of oil.1 The wadi, initially described as a ‘salvation from death’ amid the treacherous 
desert heat, played an important role in the lives of the Bedouin community of 
the unnamed kingdom  – although the reader quickly draws parallels with Saudi 
Arabia  – and its ensuing destruction has a devastating impact upon the people 
who lived there. The novel explores tensions between tradition and modernity that 
became increasingly pertinent after the discovery of oil, outlining the transformation 
of local society amid the socio- economic development of the state. The narrative 
reveals how these developments ride roughshod over tribal norms that had long 
regulated life, transforming the regulation and ordering of space, grounding the 
exception within a territorially bounded area. It was later banned by a number of 
Gulf states.
Although fictional, the novel offers a fascinating account of the evolution of life 
across the Gulf. World Bank data suggests that 65% of the Middle East’s population 
live in cities, although in Kuwait this is 98%, in Qatar it is 99%, but in Yemen it is 
only 35%.2 Legislation designed to regulate life finds most traction within urban areas, 
where jobs and welfare projects offer a degree of protection. The city is a fluid entity, 
often viewed through the lens of networks that go some way into ordering life.3 Beyond 
this, the aesthetics of a city can be used to develop a national identity, which also brings 
about exclusion. Decisions over infrastructural and development projects are taken for 
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of citizens and non- citizens within states and across space. This chapter explores the 
role of urban environments as sites of sovereign power and contestation. It considers 
the way in which urban environments simultaneously shape – and are shaped by – 
political projects across the twentieth and twenty- first centuries.
Understanding the concept of sovereignty entails exploration of relations between 
peoples and their leaders within space. A range of factors shape the essence of these 
interactions, from identity and ideology to the nature of the political system. The 
environment within which interactions occur can also shape relations between 
rulers and ruled. As Henri Lefebvre argues, space is ‘a social project … the space 
thus produced also serves as a tool of thought and action … in addition to being 
a means of production it is also a means of control, and hence of domination, of 
power’.4
Urban space is the physical representation of aspects of the nomos, as an arena 
through which life clashes with an array of identities and values that may impact upon 
the capacity of the life to live. A range of factors shape the (re)construction of space – 
both urban and rural – and the movement of people within and across spatial borders. 
Existential challenges emerging from environmental issues coupled with the nature 
of state building has left a large percentage of the region’s population living in urban 
environments. This relocation positions the city as the main arena of contemporary 
politics, the dominant space where life is regulated.
Migration from rural to urban environments was an integral part of the 
transformation of political organisation. A range of strategies were then deployed in an 
effort to regulate this space, but amid contestation, alternative sources of governance 
have emerged, providing legitimacy to those groups well placed to develop social 
welfare programmes. Reflecting the growing penetration of neoliberal ideas, as the 
century progressed state institutions took less of a role in urban planning, creating 
space for private entrepreneurs to act. This type of strategy serves to reinforce 
neopatrimonial networks that support sovereign power and often occur along sectarian 
lines, regulating life in the process.
Within the urban environment, identities, groups and networks interact and 
collide, simultaneously reinforcing and challenging national projects. Amid an array 
of tribal, ethnic, religious, political and ideological loyalties, regulating life within the 
city is of paramount importance for regime survival. As such, the city is the arena 
through which networks of patronage  – family, tribal, religious or bureaucratic  – 
can be mobilised to retain power. While legal structures go some way to restricting 
agency, norms have also been used to reduce the capacity of civil society to challenge 
regime stability.
The governance of a city goes beyond enforcing the laws of a state as it also 
aims at letting life live. But the city is also a site and perpetrator of urban violence, 
encapsulating both direct and indirect forms of violence and repression, regulating 
life in the process. This violence takes a range of different forms, from that enforced by 
security personnel, to imagery and structural violence, while also possessing a spatial 
aspect. Thus we should not view the city as a neutral zone; in turn, the city plays both 
a regulatory role and also a performative role, wherein the buildings and streets take 




are cities solely the zones of performance, stages wherein political dynamics are played 
out; they are also landscapes of the mundane, where the routine of daily life is a product 
of regulatory structures.
A great deal of work has been written on spaces of exclusion within and beyond the 
contemporary city that are typically populated by refugees and displaced peoples5 and 
also the militarisation of the city,6 but very little has explored broader understandings 
of violence and its impact upon agency. It is through this that we can see how daily 
life is regulated across the Middle East, combining both the laws of a state and the 
normative structures of ideology, imagery, rhetoric and narratives in the manifestation 
of a clash between ordnung and ortung, the regulatory aspects of sovereign power 
interacting with the spatial characteristics.
The evolution of the urban
Territory is no doubt a geographical notion, but it’s first of all a jurido- political 
one: the area controlled by a certain type of power.7
Urban planning and development are not a neutral process; development will, 
almost certainly, have implications for people affected areas. The city is the space in 
which contemporary politics occurs, with the interaction of people with institutions, 
infrastructure, ideas, capital and the regulatory mechanisms of a state.8 The city 
landscape is routinely structurally – and symbolically – violent. With this in mind, the 
urban landscape becomes a canvas for regime and nationalist narratives. Amid times 
of crisis, where the legitimacy of regimes is challenged, the canvas of the cityscape 
evolves to take on additional forms of representative violence.
Given the rapid urbanisation across the twentieth century, the city quickly 
became the arena within which life is regulated and contested.9 Population density 
meant that politics was increasingly played out within urban environments, bringing 
together laws, religion, ethnicity, sex and class into a melting pot of identities, issues 
and agendas. Development projects transform the social dynamics of a city, not only 
through the need to house workers responsible for undertaking the changes – often in 
deplorable conditions – but also through the changing social fabric of the state, wherein 
indigenous populations within a number of Gulf states are often in the minority.
Urban violence can be seen in two ways: the first is the structural violence of the 
architecture and depiction of civic loyalty within the city, which supports regime 
interest and nationalist projects. This may occur in the guise of latent structural and 
symbolic violence along political, ethnic, sectarian, tribal or national lines. The second 
is the regulation of life within the city, or the means through which security is enforced 
and regime stability is maintained, often through the guise of direct violence. These 
two concepts of violence often intertwine, feeding into one another and contributing 
to marginalisation and discrimination. Of course, this landscape reflects broader 
political trends within and between states. Moreover, the means through which life is 
regulated within the city can also be used as a mechanism of political control. Enforced 
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political space can be restricted in times of crisis. The interaction of these instances of 
violence can result in the emergence of a transformative space, a site of becoming or, 
put another way, a zone of indistinction, both possibility and repression.
An additional point of tension that manifests in the urban environment is the 
clash between the public and the private. Understanding the interaction between such 
concepts within particular contexts is at the heart of exploring the role of the city in 
shaping political life. Ultimately, as Mark Wigley explains,
What binds violence and space together is not the discrete events which appear 
to disturb the spaces we occupy but the more subterranean rhythms that already 
organize those very spaces … In the end there is no space without violence, 
and no violence that is not spatial. Violence is the very structure of space. Each 
discourse maintains a strategic silence about the particular forms of violence 
which makes both it and what it appears to address possible.10
As such, to understand urban violence we must combine the analysis of terrain with 
both legal and pragmatic structures that regulate life and those contextual ‘rhythms’, 
currents or norms that shape political action. This interaction helps to reveal the nature 
of sovereignty and the extent to which rulers can regulate life or strip it of political 
meaning. Ultimately, the interactions of such structures and rhythms feed back into 
ordering of space and the demarcation of borders.
Transformations occurred as local actors sought to secure their rule and to engage 
with processes of globalisation. The transformation of society exposed a tension 
between old and new, traditional and modern forms of public space. The evolution 
from mandate to independence fuelled such dichotomies. Those able to facilitate 
urban development projects were immediately positioned as those with power and 
influence and, as a consequence, the transformation of urban landscapes secured 
political power. Gaps in marginal regions result in a vacuum, filled by a range of 
documentary practices, including the face of martyrs on billboards, lamp posts, walls, 
commemorative structures and across public spaces.11 Such zones of indistinction thus 
become zones of possibility wherein agency can be exerted amid efforts to regulate life.
Urban development and the transformation of life from rural to urban brought 
with it serious changes to the organisation of life, a great deal of which went against 
indigenous values. Ensuring that such networks and traditions continued albeit within 
a territorially defined space was a key part of the state- building process.12 Maintaining 
control over fluid networks was an essential feature of laying claim to power but with 
the onset of urbanisation, which dramatically altered the organisation of life, bringing 
in territorial rights and with it, private property, this became increasingly difficult.
The legacy of empire and mandate rule played a prominent role in the 
transformation of Middle Eastern cities. Those cities that had played important roles 
during the Ottoman Empire, facilitating trade links with Europe such as Beirut, 
Alexandria and Izmir, experienced rapid transformation,13 while new mandate capitals 
also experienced rapid developments as they took on burgeoning importance. The 







transformation of both formal and normative structures, as people moved from the 
countryside to the cities in search of work.
As Charles Tripp suggests,
For those who inherited the colonial state and then proceeded to claim the 
exclusive right to rule it, the very languages and practices of power that gave 
them dominion were eventually turned against them. Idioms that had been used 
to buttress the power of a restrictive elite were taken up by their opponents and 
given a very different significance, while retaining their potency.14
Idioms, language and practices differ within and between states and, as a consequence, 
the nature of political life within cities differs, once again shaped by contingent factors. 
For instance, the cities of the Persian Gulf range from company towns, secondary port 
cities and aspiring global metropolises,15 which differ from the more historic seats of 
regional power in Baghdad, Beirut and Cairo. It is then important to make distinctions 
between cities across the region, not only by considering their expressions of political 
power, but also by considering their engagement with the global nomos. The discovery 
of oil in the 1920s and 1930s facilitated the development of so- called ‘company towns’, 
where the city dominated all forms of life, political, cultural and social, creating 
hierarchical structures of control.16 Dammam, Al Khobar, Dharan, Abadan, Ahmadi 
and Awali were all formed as company towns by the activity of external oil companies, 
who brought with them Western architects and ideas, seemingly with little regard 
for the impact on people who had been living there, for whom this was yet another 
damning criticism of modernity.17
This transformation of life across the Gulf states required large- scale investment 
and with it a workforce that had its own impact upon life in the Gulf; an influx of non- 
indigenous workers meant that by the 1950s around 40% of employees in the oil and gas 
sector were from abroad.18 Even states without oil reserves profited as they sent off workers 
to oil states and received vast remittances in return, facilitating the transformation of the 
homeland, enabling the purchase of land and rapid commercial ventures.19 Some, such 
as the Lebanese businessman Rafik Hariri, earned a great deal in the Gulf, which funded 
his involvement in political life before his assassination in 2005.20 The legacy of such 
transformations remains evident in the commercial districts of cities and the high- rise 
structures that dominate skylines. To their critics, such structures ‘often ignore the living 
tissue of their surroundings in their physical outlook and in catering to new, exclusive 
sections of the local economy. High- rise dwellings, often located in the midst of less- 
affluent city spaces, further exemplify this novel, decontextualised urban reality’.21
Of course, this position within the networks of a global economy came at a social – 
and indeed political  – cost. As Fuad Malkawi suggests, traditional forms of urban 
organisation, cityscape and construction have been transformed in the quest for new 
spaces of global consumption, materialism and communication.22 These new urban 
spaces were carefully planned to restrict and monitor life, tailoring it to the needs of the 
company and contemporary visions of the state.23 In Turkey, Ottoman architecture was 
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as Kaveh Ehsani articulates, an increased obsession with the idea of using the urban 
environment as an instrument of coercion over the population.25 Such processes were 
driven by Western experience, where once again, architecture, necessity and political 
calculations trumped local contexts and values and were designed in accordance with 
an imaginary construction of ‘Arabia’.26
In the first half of the twentieth century, a burgeoning scholarship on cities in 
the region  – underpinned by Orientalist tropes  – was concerned with the defining 
characteristics of an ‘Islamic city’. From this scholarship, a mosque, suq and public 
bathhouse were deemed necessary criteria to become a city in the Middle East in spite 
conclusions being derived from North Africa alone.27 While cities undoubtedly share 
similar characteristics, contingent factors create difference as a consequence of climate, 
technologies of production and distribution, social dynamics and political systems. 
The interaction of these factors produced urban forms of organisation that differed 
across the region amid competing visions of political organisation. Cities became 
spaces of contestation as tradition and modernity collapse into zones of indistinction 
and possibility, simultaneously drawing on the past and future, underpinned by 
Orientalist interpretations of the ‘Islamic city’ in the process.28 Yet one Emirati woman 
told me that Emirati traditions such as pearl diving had largely been discarded unlike 
in neighbouring Qatar, where the dhows (boats commonly found in the Persian Gulf, 
Indian Ocean and East Africa) were turned into tourist attractions.29
This contemporary construction of an imaginary ‘Arabia’ is perhaps best seen amid 
recent developments in Kuwait, where an architectural firm involved in designing 
Madinat Al- Hareer, the City of Silk, plays upon such concepts while also serving as a 
beacon of Kuwaiti power. The new city will be home to the ‘Tower of a Thousand and 
One Nights’, and upon completion, it will be the largest tower in the world, dwarfing 
both the Freedom Tower in Saudi Arabia and the Burj Khalifa in Dubai. For Kuwait, the 
Madinat Al- Hareer is supposed to represent life on the Arabian Peninsula inspired by 
‘the defiant flora of the desert as much as the rich folklore of Arabic heritage described 
in Kitab’Alf Layla wa- Layla’.30
The means and extent to which urban landscapes have transformed has serious 
implications for the political environment of a state. In Abu Dhabi, after Sheikh 
Zayed’s decision to embark on an ambitious development programme, 40% of the 
workforce was dedicated to construction projects.31 Similar stories are found across 
the Gulf. Doha’s journey from Bedouin rule to global hub occurred at vast speed amid 
independence movements and the British withdrawal.32 In Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, 
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, the speed of transformation created contradictions within 
society between traditional values and modernity, many of which were reflected within 
architecture and the incongruence of suq and skyscraper.
Urban landscapes, public space and symbolic architecture
Attempts to rewrite the social contract impact on cities first. Furthermore, when 












challenges, citizens are forced to find other sources of employment, welfare and 
support. Inhabitants of the major cities of the developing world live in challenging 
conditions, where many survive on the few resources they can access. The move 
to informal networks of support creates space for groups such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood, Hizballah, Hamas and Fatah to gain large- scale support. Open space 
within urban environments provided scope for contestation, transformation and 
expressions of political dissent, where urban landscapes become canvases for counter- 
hegemonic narratives of martyrdom and resistance. Of course, this resulted in the 
increased policing and regulation of urban space through coercion and violence.
Religion, tradition and culture provide guidance for the structuring of space 
in accordance with regulatory goals. The type of mosque  – or temple or church  – 
helps to shape the identity of the area yet this must also be placed within economic 
contexts.33 Although people are seen to reside within homogenous areas, such a 
reductive argument serves to reify sectarian identities, at the expense of class and 
economic factors.34
Endogenous and exogenous forces – both with and without consent – shape the 
spatial dimensions of the urban space, with implications for the capacity of people to 
live their lives.35 Cities themselves are exclusionary projects in their governance and 
their architecture, which has violent spatial properties. Within cities, political, social, 
ethnic or religious differences can have spatial implications, which are then amplified 
by national and regional aspirations. One such way in which power and aspiration 
can be demonstrated is through architecture and imagery. In addition to security 
mechanisms such as armed police, barbed wire and security cameras, violence also 
possesses a symbolic side, playing a political role and bearing an identity.
Urban environments provide an array of opportunities for such domination and 
violence to be displayed and for latent structures to manifest. The rising importance of 
urban environments also provides scope for authority to be challenged, often in visual 
form using the urban landscape as a canvas. The power of the image across the Middle 
East should not be ignored. From the martyrdom posters in Lebanon and Palestine, to 
the posters of Khomeini and Khamenei in Iran and Iraq, taking in the images of Gulf 
leaders, it is hard to ignore the presence of political narratives that remind people of 
their nomos, of the context and contingency that regulates their life.
Regulating and transforming life in rural and urban contexts is thus a demonstration 
of sovereign power:
The reorganisation of towns and the laying out of new colonial quarters, every 
regulation of economic or social practice, the construction of the country’s 
new system of irrigation canals … the building of barracks, police stations 
and classrooms, the completion of a system of railways  – this pervasive 
process of ‘order’ must be understood as more than mere improvement or 
‘reform’. Such projects were all undertaken as enframing, and hence had the 
effect of representing a realm of the conceptual, conjuring up for the first time 
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Transformation also occurs through expropriation, gentrification, occupation 
and ethnic redistribution as a range of strategies facilitate demonstrations of 
sovereign power, brought about by formal and normative structures but contingent 
upon context- specific factors.37 Such actions shape political landscapes, creating 
a metaphysical environment wherein people resort to extralegal strategies as 
mechanisms of exerting agency.38
Amid such challenges, public space became monopolised by regimes. For many 
Egyptians, public space was synonymous with space that is ‘owned by the government’.39 
In spite of this, Tahrir Square had long been a place in which dissent was expressed, such 
as Evacuation Day in 1946, which called for the British withdrawal from Egypt. This 
was later followed by an occupation by a student movement in 1972; sympathisers of 
the second intifada in 2001; people protesting against Hosni Mubarak’s support for the 
US- led Iraq War; and political reform movements in 2005 and 2006.40 In the following 
years, the area around Tahrir Square underwent what was ostensibly the development 
of the Cairo metro and a parking garage, but as crowds entered the square in early 
2011, it became evident that the work had instead been a move to prevent symbolic 
protest, albeit unsuccessfully.
Myriad efforts were undertaken to regulate life across cities in the region. As Stephen 
Graham notes, the city is the arena within which tracking, surveillance and targeting 
have all begun to play an integral role in daily life.41 Of course, this demonstrates the 
power of formal security structures – supported by security agencies, the police and 
military – along with the speed at which such techniques can evolve. Yet we must also 
consider the architecture and the symbolism deployed across the city, which acts as a 
daily reminder of sovereign power.
While state mechanisms routinely used violence as a mechanism of control, urban 
violence occurs in a number of other guises. The careful development of nationalist 
iconography was a prominent part of the urban environment in the formative stages 
of nationalist projects, which often revolved around a leader’s cult of personality and 
benevolence. In a nod towards aspects of totalitarianism, roads and buildings were 
often adorned with images of rulers and their families, in explicit displays of power. This 
imagery is representative of the social contract in operation across many Gulf societies 
where ruling families have become almost synonymous with political projects in states.
Gentrification and transformative violence
The evolution of the city, much like the city itself, should not be viewed as a neutral 
process. Investment, change and urban planning all reflect political decisions and 
aspirations with regard to regulating political life and the urban environment. 
While this contains aspects of improving life for people living within the city, such 
decisions are loaded with political meaning. Transformation is often a violent process, 
uprooting people from homes and radically altering daily life. In addition, the ongoing 
gentrification of a number of areas simultaneously erases history and creates a more 









renovated. In a number of contexts, these areas are also home to dissident groups and 
thus, while there is an economic dimension at play, there is a clear political dimension 
to processes of gentrification.
Gentrification serves both to facilitate further transformation away from prior 
incarnations of the urban environment and to reinforce new identities. With the 
increased ease of access to knowledge and imagery, this has taken on paramount 
importance, particularly in areas that have large numbers of tourists. With lower 
land prices on the peripheries of cities, the desire for property is higher than in 
the historic centres. This is exacerbated by economic developments within the 
global economy that have had an impact in local areas. Take the suq in Manama, 
previously occupying a central role in daily life, it has now become almost peripheral 
to economic developments such as the Financial Harbour, built upon land reclaimed 
from the sea. Moreover, the historic suq has begun to play a lesser role to the malls 
that have emerged across the island and even to the shops close to the nearby Bab 
al Bahrain, which was itself part of a land reclamation process. Within the suq, 
traditional shops have been occupied by migrants from the Asian subcontinent, 
reflecting both the changes in identity and urban life across Bahrain, along with the 
emergence of new hierarchies.
The city of Jaffa, once an Arab city overlooking the Mediterranean Sea, is another 
example of the extent to which cities can play a transformative role. In the British 
mandate era, Jaffa became a site of protest between Arabs and Jews, which resulted 
in the establishment of Tel Aviv to the north. During the struggle to establish the 
state of Israel, Jaffa was defended by a group identified as the Muslim Brotherhood 
who surrendered to the Zionist forces after five months of intense fighting.42 The 
regulation of life in Jaffa under the British was done in accordance with martial 
law established by mandatory rule. Under martial law, house demolitions were a 
common part of daily life along with the militarisation of the city. Such experiences 
were later adopted by the Israeli security services as a means of maintaining control 
of life in the West Bank and Gaza. In recent years, the gentrification of Jaffa has 
seen the restoration of traditional Arab monuments, such as the Mosque of the 
Sea and the Hassan Bek Mosque, turning the Old City of Jaffa into a tourist area.43 
Additionally, other reports have noted efforts to ‘Judaise’ the area by building 
Jewish only complexes.44 As a consequence, retail and rent prices have been driven 
up, disproportionately affecting Palestinian- Israelis, referred to by a legal defence 
coordinator as ‘ethnic cleansing’.45
Efforts to improve the infrastructure of cities can also have negative social 
implications. Across Beirut, urban planning has detrimentally impacted upon local 
communities46 and their engagement with life across the city. Massive investment from 
Saudi nationals transformed the area between Ras Beirut and Ain al Mraiseh, which is 
now largely empty. The construction of bridges and highways such as the Yerevan Bridge 
in Bourj Hammoud, the Hawd Al Wilaya Bridge in Basta and the Charles Helou Avenue 
have all divided neighbourhoods, resulting in economic and social repercussions.47 After 
all, the fundamental point of a city is to provide a home and welfare to people and as an 
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While urban planning is undertaken by regimes and actors empowered by regimes 
through networks of patronage or cronyism, there are a number of examples of societal 
actors driving the transformation of political terrain. Perhaps the most obvious example 
of this is found in the settler movements in the West Bank who seek to use architecture 
and building projects as a means through which the borders of the state of Israel can be 
pushed. The establishment of such settlements, deemed illegal under international law 
yet both legal and illegal under Israeli law, brings with it infrastructural programmes 
that facilitate such transformations, including the development of roads and water 
supplies. Such projects have symbolic importance, along with a transformative sense 
of permanence, impacting on facts on the ground.
In addition to transformation of land for settlement, land has also been renovated 
for tourist purposes. Much like in Jaffa, the process of gentrification was designed to 
increase the flow of tourists to the Old City and the development of the old harbour 
and transformation into a market area with bars and restaurants was a prominent part 
of this goal. Yet perhaps the best example of such forced exclusion is the case of the 
Jordanian Bedouin living in Petra, who were evicted to provide the Jordanian state 
with access to a vast revenue stream from tourism.
Of course, other cities have experienced similar transformations, as the rhythms 
of state politics clash with hegemonic globalising forces. In Mecca, the need to 
accommodate large numbers of pilgrims resulted in dramatic change to the city.48 
In the Grand Mosque, a seventeenth- century portico was removed, meaning that 
around 95% of Mecca’s old buildings had been destroyed in the past two decades, 
later described as ‘cultural vandalism’ by the head of the Islamic Heritage Research 
Foundation, Irfan Al Alawi.49 The development of the Mecca Royal Clock Tower 
was erected on the graves of around four hundred culturally significant sites, while 
the house of Khadijah, the Prophet’s first wife, has been transformed into a block of 
toilets.50 Earlier renovations at the Grand Mosque resulted in the destruction of the 
Ottoman Al Ajyad Fortress and claims from Ankara that such developments were an 
‘act of barbarism’ and the destruction of shared Islamic heritage.51 The politicisation 
of Mecca continued as developments cost the lives of thousands of pilgrims, when 
in 2006 the Al Ghaza hotel collapsed and in 2015, a crane collapsed into the Grand 
Mosque, killing 118 people. The same year, between 2,000 and 4,000 pilgrims were 
crushed close to the Jamaraat Bridge.
As a number of scholars have shown, violence maintains a regulatory capability, in 
some cases restricting the capacity of people to travel within certain areas. The case of 
Palestine provides a harrowing example of how the Israeli state has used architecture 
as a means of exerting control.52 In Khuzestan, the south- western province of Iran, 
political aspirations of Arabs residing in towns such as Abadan were a source of 
existential concern to the Iranian regime. In addition to concerns about the territorial 
integrity of the state,53 the province was home to around 80% of Iran’s oil reserves yet 
lacked substantial economic investment and infrastructural development, resulting in 
large- scale political and social grievances including suggestions of widespread drug 
addiction.54 In response to perceived irredentist agendas, Tehran embarked on a process 










to erode unrest and ensure stability.55 This strategy would later be used by Bashar Al 
Assad in an attempt to create order and maintain power in post- uprisings Syria.56
Existential transformation and becoming
The transformation of Jerusalem provides scope to explore how urban landscapes 
take on political meaning, while the regulation of the urban environment feeds into 
broader, existential political projects. Jerusalem offers an example of how cities serve 
both as a means through which life is regulated but also how identity and ideology is 
performed. Jerusalem has long occupied a central role in the conflict between Israelis 
and Palestinians, with both claiming the city as capital of their states. Consideration of 
architecture and symbolism across the city reveal mechanisms of control and the way 
in which life has been regulated reveals a great deal about the nature of sovereignty 
within Jerusalem and Israel more broadly.
In the summer of 1943, the Zionist Planning Committee was established to develop 
a plan to transform the urban landscape of Jerusalem, five years before the formal 
establishment of the state of Israel. The aim of the group was ‘the economic recovery 
of Jerusalem to enable the city to attract large numbers of residents’, which was central 
to the broader Zionist project.57 In support of this, a subcommittee was established, 
focusing entirely upon industry in Jerusalem to facilitate its rebirth. For David Ben 
Gurion, the subcommittee was to facilitate a rise in ‘Jewish settlement in Jerusalem and 
its environs, to rehabilitate and strengthen its economic basis, and to ensure that the 
capital of our country will have a Jewish majority in population and building’.58
In spite of such demands, before the establishment of Israel in 1948 Jerusalem 
became peripheral to the transformation of other areas of Palestine, notably Jaffa and 
Tel Aviv, amid concerns that mistakes in Jerusalem could prevent the establishment of 
the state. It was only by 30 July 1980 that the Jerusalem Law was passed by the Israeli 
Knesset, which formalised the regulation of eastern parts of Jerusalem. Facts on the 
ground, however, reflected de facto control of Jerusalem, which had been declared as 
the capital of the Israeli state on 13 December 1949.59
In the aftermath of the seizure of East Jerusalem in 1967 with the historic Old City 
as its symbolic prize, Israeli strategists sought to solidify their state- building efforts. 
Ensuring the retention of a unified Jerusalem under Israeli control was the main goal.60 
The importance of this was stressed by Moshe Dayan, who on entering the city stated 
that ‘we have reunited divided Jerusalem, the dismembered capital of Israel. We have 
returned to our most holy places; we have returned and we shall never leave them’.61 
In his memoirs, Abba Eban, the Israeli Foreign Minister, wrote how ‘we had come 
back to the cradle of our nationhood to stay there forever’.62 Reflecting this existential 
transformation, shortly after the capture of East Jerusalem and the West Bank, Israeli 
maps were ordered to stop using to the 1947 ‘Green Line’ as the border of Israel.63
In a speech at the UN headquarters in New York, Abba Eban described Israel’s 
emergence ‘from grave danger to successful resistance’, attempting to shape public 
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speeches of modern times’.64 Yet the aftermath of the 1967 war would have serious 
territorial repercussions for both Israel and Palestine. On 22 September 1967, Israeli 
newspapers published a 160- word statement by a group calling itself the Movement 
for a Greater Israel:
The victory of the Israeli defense forces in the Six Day War has brought the 
nation and the state into a new and fateful era. Undivided Israel is now in the 
hands of the Jewish people, and just as we had no right to renounce the State 
of Israel, so are we commanded gratefully to receive what this era has granted 
us: namely, the entire Land of Israel.
We owe allegiance to the integrity of our land; to its past and its future. And 
no government in Israel has the right to give up this wholeness.65
With this statement, the political landscape of Israel was dramatically transformed, 
resulting in Palestinian territory becoming the site of decades- long contestation 
between Israelis, Palestinians and settler movements.
Within this context, the regulation and retention of land took on existential 
importance. Urban planning became a central aspect of an existential strategy 
designed to normalise the occupation and create cohesion among territories held by 
the Israeli state. In doing so, the city became a site of contestation deployed by the 
Israeli state against Palestinians in the name of sovereignty. A ring of settlements was 
built around East Jerusalem, cutting off the city’s Palestinian population from other 
Palestinians in the West Bank. In the city itself, the Maghriba Quarter located in front 
of the Western Wall was destroyed immediately after military victory to facilitate 
access to the wall. Further architectural moves were undertaken, demonstrating the 
power of the new Israeli state. Architectural and archeological efforts were reflective 
of the broader Zionist project, which David Ben Gurion suggested required ‘digging 
the soil with our own hands’66 as a necessary part of transformation. This process 
of transubstantiation serves as a form of creative destruction, an opportunity for 
becoming, where destruction is a form of regulation, an attempt to shape the future by 
destroying the past.
The transformation of the city of Jerusalem quickly took shape, combining old 
British colonial laws with the establishment of new urban planning institutions. Policy 
briefings such as Israel Builds became a prominent feature of Israeli political and 
security discourse. In this volume, Ram Karmi, wrote that, ‘Home means more than 
just the narrow confines of one’s apartment; it also implies a sense of belonging to 
the immediate surroundings.’67 Transformation took on both personal and nationalist 
characteristics where the two feed into one another and, as a first order of business, the 
barriers separating the two sides of the city were removed. Of course, sovereign power 
also regulates space through placing restrictions on land ownership. In accordance 
with Israeli law, 80% of the land comprising the territorial area of Israel can only be 
purchased by Jews.68 Such regulation has changed the demographic status of the Old 
City, as previous Arab inhabitants have given way to Jewish owners, many of whom are 








Such symbolic violence is also seen in rural areas of the West Bank under military 
control. When travelling towards Nablus from the south of Israel at night, one is struck 
by the bright lights of a Star of David on the Palestinian hills, while Stars of David are 
also found within the Old City of Jerusalem, in the Christian and Muslim Quarters, once 
again demonstrating the extent of structural violence within the urban environment. 
Life for Palestinians living in Jerusalem is increasingly difficult, regulated by police and 
security apparatus and subjected to structural violence across the city. Checkpoints are 
routinely used across the Old City to regulate movement, most recently seen in the 
installation of metal detectors at the entrance of the Al Aqsa mosque, which resulted 
in widespread demonstrations in the summer of 2017.
Since 1967, East Jerusalem and the West Bank have themselves undergone 
existential transformation, not only in the structure of urban life but also in the 
capacity of agency to live within these structures. The development of infrastructure 
within territorial borders was politically contested but integral to the development of 
Israel. In ensuring that Jerusalem remained united, successive governments supported 
settlement building in the east of the city in predominantly Arab neighbourhoods. 
Such moves were not without consequence and seemingly little thought was given to 
the implications for Palestinians. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol reflected, ‘What are we 
going to do with a million Arabs?’ Eshkol paused for a moment and then responded, 
‘I get it. You want the dowry, but you don’t like the bride!’69 Addressing this question 
brought security officials and urban planners together to develop an urban landscape 
that served as a symbol of a sovereign Jewish state while also protecting its territorial 
borders, citizens and identity.
Gentrification and urban development processes have facilitated the transformation 
of East Jerusalem from Arab to Jewish, as part of broader political projects. Speaking 
on a tour of East Jerusalem in September 2017, Israeli Public Security Minister Gilad 
Erdan articulated his excitement to see Jewish families in East Jerusalem, along with 
the claim that, ‘Our sovereignty in the State of Israel and the Land of Israel begins 
here’.70 Governance of East Jerusalem reveals a great deal about political dynamics. 
Since 1967 one can see power disparities between Arab and Israeli communities, 
reflected in access to land, education, electricity and mobility.
Amid rising violence stemming from two intifadas, a separation wall 422 miles long 
was built east of the so- called Green Line71 with the declared objective of ‘regulating the 
entry of Palestinians from the West Bank into Israel’.72 Regulating access are twenty- 
seven permanently manned checkpoints that punctuate the wall while access into and 
out of Gaza is subject to approval from Israeli security officials. Within the West Bank 
itself, Palestinian life is also restricted, as the development of settlements means that 
there are around forty roads in the West Bank that Palestinians are not able to use.
Since then, those on the east of the wall have restricted access to Jerusalem. 
Although initially designed as a mechanism to reduce the threat of terrorism, what has 
developed is a formal security structure that also serves to regulate life and embed the 
occupation within the fabric of Palestinian daily life, referred to by many as apartheid.73 
Checkpoints are spaces of exception where life is be reduced to its barest form as people 
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harassment.74 While checkpoints restrict access from the West Bank into Israel, they 
also have a broader impact in terms of Palestinian efforts to situate any future capital in 
Jerusalem, restricting connectivity – emotional and logistical – through limiting access 
to and communication with Palestinian East Jerusalemites. Similar restrictions are also 
found across the West Bank. Checkpoints in Hebron regulate movement across the city 
as a consequence of the presence of a large number of Palestinians and a small settler 
population that is protected by soldiers from the IDF. The Abed checkpoint, which is 
permanently staffed, is situated fifty metres away from the Ibrahimi Mosque, requires 
passage through cages and under the watchful eye of heavily armed soldiers.
Transformation of the urban architecture can also be used in a punitive manner: Those 
deemed guilty of violence against the Israeli state may have their houses demolished, 
creating more space for future settlement building, while such measures are justified by 
emergency legislation from the British mandate that legalised the transformation and 
militarisation of Jaffa. Such moves show the transformative power of the city, while also 
demonstrating how urban environments can themselves be violent towards inhabitants. 
While initially latent, this structural violence often manifests in direct acts of violence 
against individuals or representatives of the state as marginalised individuals seek to 
assert their agency. As we shall see, similar practices took place across the region, as 
space and architecture took on political meaning.
Camps and enclaves
The ‘national state’, having lost its very foundations, leads a life of a walking 
corpse, whose spurious existence is artificially prolonged by repeated injections 
of imperialist expansion.75
The urban environment possesses a strong, restrictive element that is inherently 
violent. The sovereign order has restricted political life across the Middle East, 
resulting in all people having the potential to become homo sacer. For Agamben, the 
camp is the hidden paradigm of modernity, the means through which all of life is 
captured, comprised of particular zones where life is stripped of meaning and also a 
broader site of potentiality. Urban environments contain both of these aspects, but the 
centrality of the city within daily life means that governance of urban environments is 
an attempt to regulate this potential. Urban planning requires taking decisions about 
the manner in which life is regulated, through the design of the city, the installation of 
fences, traffic management, surveillance and access to welfare systems. Yet it can also 
contribute to marginalisation and political evisceration through structural violence 
and the perpetuation of normative structures of control.
Exclusionary narratives in support of regime and nationalist interest manifest in the 
architecture of the city and the imagery that adorns it, creating norms that are violent 
towards those not included within such projects. Of course, amid urban transformation 
and the ensuing repercussions, such moves may, in turn, provoke people to resort to 







emergence of a logic of necropolitics but also the emergence of war machines as groups 
seek to contest sovereign power.
Although Agamben argues that in bare life one has to accept this position of ‘being 
thus’, the denial of agency is not reflected in events on the ground.77 Amid challenges 
to regime monopolies on violence, the urban environment becomes an arena for actors 
from a range of backgrounds to exert agency. While urban landscapes impact upon 
people in different ways, it is obvious that life in a camp has similar consequences 
for people, albeit shaped by the intricacies of local context and contingency. The 
widespread reduction of political agency, restrictions on movement and labour and 
general structural violence serves to reinforce the idea of life being stripped of political 
meaning, abandoned by the law yet bound by it. In some cases, camps themselves 
are subjected to raids from security forces as a means of preventing the emergence of 
agency, yet in others, camps are left to self- regulate.78
Widespread restrictions have eviscerated political life, creating zones where 
individuals and communities are cast aside by legal and normative structures, receiving 
no protection yet bound by law. Within this zone, individuals seek to assert agency, 
adorning the streets with new meaning through graffiti, martyrdom posters and other 
ideological motifs.79 Yet in some cases, the city serves as a zone of possibility. The power 
of imagery, narratives and community gains traction in urban environments, as such 
factors can transcend economic, class, gender and political divides, serving to empower 
groups. In Lebanon, Palestinian groups such as Fatah al Islam and Shi’a groups such 
as Amal and Hizballah all sought to improve their socio- economic positions through 
engaging with the urban environment. In Iraq, parts of Baghdad took on new meaning 
amid the empowerment of Shi’a groups, with repercussions for Sunni minorities and 
the stability of the city. Spaces with sectarian divisions became zones of indistinction, 
brought about by suspension of the rule of law. Underpinning this was the political 
climate of the state, which revealed the influence of formal and normative structures 
and the power of a range of groups to capitalise on urban disenfranchisement.80
While the city is a space of exception where formal structures operate to remove 
political meaning from life and create bare life, it is also the space where norms are 
(re)created and facilitate the process of stripping meaning from life. The camp is the 
example of bare life par excellence, seen in both forms routinely across the Middle East. 
As a consequence of exclusionary policies across the region, large- scale displacement of 
peoples has resulted in the establishment of physical camps to provide refuge to those 
affected. Although initially deemed temporary, the Belata camp outside Nablus has 
existed since 1948. Following large- scale displacement of peoples as a consequence of 
conflict, organisations such as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) 
have taken on responsibility for refugees. In Lebanon, UNRWA has been tasked with 
protecting around four hundred and fifty thousand Palestinian refugees.81 As crises 
across the region continue, this number increases; estimates put the number of Syrian 
refugees living in Lebanon at around 1.5 million.82
Across the first decade of Palestinian camps in Lebanon, the Lebanese security 
forces remained outside of the refugee camps, resulting in the creation of internal 
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Bureau  – maintained a presence in the camps and the state began to play a more 
repressive role in both political life and the architecture of the camps, where roofs 
were banned, cement was prohibited and cartographical boundaries were stringently 
enforced.83 Life in the camps became increasingly violent, particularly during the PLO 
clashes with Israel and the civil war, as Palestinians sought to assert a form of political 
agency, yet urban planning meant that access to the camps was restricted, subject to 
checkpoints and monitoring.84
The case of Nahr el- Bared is one that provides an example of clashes between 
competing forces within the spatial borders of the camp. In the summer of 2007 the 
camp was the site of a fierce battle between the Lebanese military and Fateh al Islam, 
a militant Islamist group. Over the course of the summer, large swathes of the camp 
were destroyed and Palestinian residents were forced out. This is, as Adam Ramadan 
suggests, a case of urbicide within a spatialised exception85 as violence transcended 
necessity and became
the deliberate and systematic erasure of the camp … made more possible by the 
very nature of the political spaces of the camp, which are in Lebanon but not 
of Lebanon, in which Lebanese sovereignty and law are not fully enforced, in 
which a whole range of non- Lebanese actors exercise political power outside the 
control of the Lebanese state.86
Here, the rule of law was suspended allowing for the Lebanese armed forces to 
undertake vandalism, looting and destruction without sanction as a consequence of 
the declaration of the exception. The fighting resulted in a large number of deaths and 
worsened the conditions facing Palestinians in the camps. Across present- day Beirut, 
Syrians fleeing conflict endure similar challenges. Similar experiences and stories can 
be told of camps across the Middle East, in Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, 
Iran and Syria, where processes of self- regulation emerge amid the suspension of the 
rule of law.
Historical examples of Palestinian resistance show how agency can be expressed 
within the context of bare life. Both Jordanian and Lebanese camps for Palestinians 
were sites of resistance  – in Al- Wihdat and Shatila respectively  – and symbolic of 
the burgeoning Palestinian nationalism. The failure of assimilation and legacy of 
both nakba and naksa (the day of the setback, commemorating the displacement 
of Palestinians after the 1967 Six Day War) facilitated this mass mobilisation of 
Palestinians in refugee camps  – known as al thawra (the revolution)  – across the 
region, creating narratives of heroism and resilience. Camps were seen to be liberated 
areas, furnaces in which Fedayeen (guerilla fighters) were forged, while Palestinian 
symbolism fuelled this nationalist sentiment.87 Such symbolism remains an integral 
part of the Palestinian camps, resulting in the perception that such spaces remain 
militant zones. These tensions have longer- term ramifications for assimilation within 
host countries and their own state- building projects, yet their expression demonstrates 








Amid the fragmentation of urban environments, typically along communitarian 
lines, there has typically been an increase in the development of infrastructure and 
welfare programmes by non- state actors as a means of expressing agency and rejecting 
being thus. When state sovereignty fragments and regimes either choose not to – or 
are unable to – provide welfare and governance strategies that help people meet basic 
needs then other actors are required to care for peoples, reinforcing socio- political 
divisions. Filling this space provides opportunities for other actors to gain legitimacy 
by playing the role of a state and fulfilling its responsibilities under a social contract.
The nature of political life across the region has meant that such conditions are 
rife. From the Muslim Brotherhood to Hizballah, a range of groups have gained 
prominence through offering social care and physical protection to those in urban 
environments who have been excluded or marginalised by state structures. In Lebanon, 
Shi’a Muslims have long been marginalised, while poverty, disenfranchisement and 
marginalisation has been a prominent part of daily life dating back to the nineteenth 
century.88 A  century later, similar conditions remained. By 1974, Shi’a Muslims 
comprised somewhere in the region of 30% of the Lebanese population but received 
less than 1% of the state budget.89
The combination of these factors contributed to creating conditions of bare life 
in Lebanon.90 Furthermore, election laws required those wishing to vote to return to 
the villages of their birth in an attempt to provide an accurate demographic snapshot 
of life across Lebanon.91 Such a law failed to recognise the large- scale migration to 
urban centres, further adding to the disenfranchisement facing Shi’a groups. Within 
this context, it is hardly surprising that a group such as Hizballah, supported by the 
financial and logistical might of Iran, would garner support through the provision of 
welfare services.
In contemporary Beirut, the situation is much improved, but Hizballah remains 
the most influential actor in the city, if not the whole of Lebanon. The Party of 
God regulates life across Shi’a areas such as Dahiyya, where the group’s ideology is 
visible across the fabric of the streets as flags, images of Nasrallah and Khomeini and 
martyrdom posters adorn buildings around the area. Even the road names reveal key 
figures and ideologues. The governance of Dahiyya, with its own particular security 
concerns, combines the old and the new; with video cameras on every corner and 
armed guards on prominent crossroads, relying on a delicate relationship with the 
formal mechanisms of power in the Lebanese to retain control, evoking questions 
about the ordering of space within Beirut, a veritable state within a state.
In post- 2003 Iraq, which experienced an Al Qa’ida insurgency, increasingly sectarian 
violence taking place between a range of militias, a counter- insurgency campaign and 
serious economic challenges, US forces established the so- called Green Zone to facilitate 
governance efforts. The influx of political figures who had been ostracised by the Ba’ath 
regime, along with Iranian officials such as the senior Revolutionary Guards General 
Qassem Soleimani created a new form of political life in Baghdad. The Green Zone is 
secured by a range of different security structures, including military, police, members of 
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is heavily securitised and regulated, wherein individuals are unable to walk around the 
streets without the correct credentials.92 Yet it is situated in an area that is socially and 
economically impoverished. If one walks out of the Green Zone and crosses the road, 
there is a dramatically different form of life. Post 2003, the influx of Iraqis from the 
diaspora has established a new, hierarchical form of Iraqi politics – and disenchantment – 
and additionally, a form of class politics that is tangible at the very heart of governance.93
In the south of the country, a range of obstacles challenge both state sovereignty 
and the capacity of people to live their lives. The city of Basra has long been a source of 
political unrest, from the establishment of the state to the present day. In the aftermath 
of the Gulf War, dissent against Saddam’s rule began in Basra before spreading across 
the south, revealing the failure to assimilate into political projects. Post 2003, sectarian 
divisions were exacerbated by financial support for groups such as Thra’rallah, who 
were implicated in efforts to incite sectarian tensions and to penetrate the local police 
force amid support from Iran.94 This Iranian support is perhaps best acknowledged in 
a comment from a senior advisor to the Ministry of Interior, who referred to the city 
as ‘the Iranian city of Basra’.95
Although shared religious ties helped facilitate an Iranian presence, revealed 
through posters and banners of Khomeini and Khamenei, such a presence was not 
always popular, particularly in light of excessive violence against protesters.96 More 
important are socio- economic challenges that often escalate amid tensions between 
tribes and Shi’a militias such as the Asaib al- Haq.97 Tribal tensions manifest in 
regulatory struggles, creating conditions of uncertainty for people who are trapped 
in an increasingly precarious position. Amid a range of economic challenges, drug 
dealing is prevalent as a means of raising money, with crystal meth a popular choice. 
One Iraqi analyst referred to the problem as Breaking Basra after the popular TV series 
Breaking Bad.98 Such problems are not limited to Iraq, as people in Syria, Lebanon and 
Yemen will attest. As conditions deteriorate, black economies emerge as actors seek to 
fund their actions. In spite of proclamations of Islamic purity, drug dealing is rife as a 
means of raising funds quickly and easily.
Conclusions
As the majority of the region live in urban environments, cities are the arenas within 
which politics occurs. They are camps in both forms, the space in which ordnung 
and ortung clash, with devastating consequences. The structure and organisation of 
cities and their architecture and symbolism all serve as a means of doing politics. The 
symbolism found within cities across the Middle East displays a legacy of political 
activity and with it makes visible the colonial legacy of external penetration. The 
evolution of political organisation is a direct consequence of securing territory and the 
evolution of a state- building project. The delineation of territorial borders and efforts 
to exert sovereignty over this territory results in the establishment of governance 











There remains little doubt that cities in the Middle East have been simultaneously 
the arenas and perpetrators of violence. The urban landscape provides a means 
through which life can be regulated but also the mechanism to demonstrate power and 
structural violence through the use of force, governance and architecture itself. For 
scholars of urban geopolitics, the city is increasingly the site of political violence: of 
terrorism, war and protest; direct and indirect; latent and manifest. Planners and 
strategists seek to design cities that can respond to such challenges, yet the design 
of cities also serves to reflect both formal and normative structures within political 
environments. In spite of the literature focusing upon the militarisation of urban 
landscapes, we must not solely consider cities as battlegrounds of insurgent struggles; 
they are much more.
While the camp can be both the physical and metaphysical sites of exception, 
the suspension of the rule of law creates zones of indistinction and conditions of 
potentiality where individuals can easily be reduced to bare life.99 Beyond this, life 
is all too often subjugated to death, seen in the manifestation of urbicide across the 
region. Beyond these examples, we can also see the emergence of migrant compounds 
across the Gulf, where workers reside in squalor, abandoned by the law yet bound by 
it. Within such spaces, they are reduced to bare life.
Sovereign structures are imposed on to pre- existing socio- economic experiences, 
on communities that have a history of political interaction and organisation. With 
this in mind, we should not ignore the role of norms within the development of the 
sovereign state. Other scholars have argued for the existence of ‘informal sovereignty’ 
within political projects, but this approach is problematic when considering the 
already contested – and from this, hierarchical – nature of sovereignty. Instead, history, 
norms and cultural practices all shape the capacity of people to act, with groups often 
filling the role of the state when regimes are either unwilling or unable to regulate 
activity within a particular area. This type of regulation ranges from security, as seen 
in Hizballah- controlled southern Beirut, to the provision of hospitals by the Muslim 
Brotherhood across Cairo. As suggested in Chapter 3, Islam provides space through 
which civil society actors can engage in informal politics and, in doing so, providing 
much needed infrastructural support to those within society who did not have access 
to state- run institutions.
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The people want the fall of the regime
Al- shaʿb yurıđ isqāṭ al- nizạ ̄m
[The people want the fall of the regime]
I see a decaying temple, almost collapsing … it will fall sooner than later.
Mohammed ElBaradei
In the opening chapter of The Wretched of the Earth, Franz Fanon suggests that 
decolonisation, with its world changing aspirations, is
a program of complete disorder. But it cannot come as a result of magical 
practices, nor of a natural shock, nor of a friendly understanding. Decolonization, 
as we know, is a historical process: that is to say that it cannot be understood, 
it cannot become intelligible nor clear to itself except in the exact measure 
that we can discern the movements which give it historical form and content. 
Decolonization is the meeting of two forces, opposed to each other by their very 
nature, which in fact owe their originality to that sort of substantification which 
results from and is nourished by the situation in the colonies.1
Much like decolonising movements, those who engaged in political protest, taking 
to the streets across the recent past, also seek to change the order of their world. 
Such change is a historical process, shaped and given meaning by context and the 
specificity of contingency. With this in mind, we must not view the uprisings that 
broke out across the region in late 2010 as independent phenomena. Instead, we must 
locate the protests within the context of state- building processes – where regimes have 
sought to maintain sovereign control amid an array of challenges – but also within 
the history of political protest across the Middle East. Ultimately, the uprisings are the 
latest manifestation of the long- running politics of resistance. This chapter traces this 
history of protest and resistance, locating the uprisings within a broader narrative of 
the contestation of sovereign power, arguing that protest movements which emerged 
in 2011 should not be viewed as isolated incidents. To do this I  look at historical 
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examples of unrest, before turning to a consideration of socio- economic factors and 
finally, exploration of the impact of environmental degradation that brought about 
rapid transformations of social and political landscapes in the years leading up to the 
uprisings.
The emergence of uprisings across the region demonstrates the widespread rejection 
of political, social and economic conditions that people had faced. The conditions 
prior to the uprisings should not be viewed solely as a by- product of political life, 
an accident or the unavoidable consequence of the interaction between nationalist 
and globalising forces. Instead, as previous chapters have argued, political, social and 
economic situations were carefully designed as mechanisms of control, resulting in 
the cultivation of a form of bare life. Although not necessarily the literal manifestation 
of Agamben’s bare life, political meaning had been stripped from groups across the 
region, wherein individuals are bound by the laws of the state yet not protected by such 
laws. For Agamben, once in this position, there is no escape and one should accept the 
position of ‘being thus’.2 Yet looking across the region in the early months of 2011, it 
was difficult to view events as the acceptance of the status quo. Instead, what quickly 
became known as the Arab Uprisings was seen as the rejection of being thus and the 
demonstration of agency – seen to be possible even within bare life3 – amid efforts to 
improve political life.
After decades of political marginalisation where ruling elites had created political 
and social conditions tantamount to bare life, there was little hope of lasting change. 
Although the decade prior to the uprisings had been punctured by political protest, 
these efforts were largely unsuccessful as instruments of state security pervading 
all aspects of society were able to crush the protesters. At this point, grievances and 
resentment continued to fester, as regimes used all manner of mechanisms of control 
and techniques of government to prevent the emergence of protest movements. Yet by 
2011, protesters in a number of states were successful in their demands for political 
transformation, albeit in a range of different forms, escaping bare life and rejecting 
‘being thus’ in the process.
This rejection was driven by expressions of agency and resistance, which required 
huge courage and a desire to transform all aspects of political life. As Charles Tripp 
notes, this was not an immediate phenomenon, but one that emerged over time and 
space. Much like historical accounts of protest, latent structural grievances began 
to manifest, resulting in challenges to mechanisms of control. For Tripp, ‘the public 
had been brought into resistance and this had been made possible not only by the 
immediate performances of resistance, but by the underlying, gradual reversal of the 
flow of capillary power itself that had been going on for years’.4
As we shall see, the rejection of ‘being thus’ served as a source of possibility:  a 
disjunctive moment where people across the region could either continue with their 
existence in bare life or to challenge the status quo. In many cases, the latter was chosen 
as a moment of possibility served to inspire expressions of political agency. This hope 
was combined with an increased awareness of the latent socio- political- economic 
structures that had facilitated oppression, while allowing those who benefitted from 
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the Middle East in 2010 was one such means through which knowledge of events was 
distributed and while the cables did not reveal anything that the people of the region 
didn’t know, they added to the psychological damage, impacting on national pride. 
Although it was generally accepted that corruption played a prominent role in accruing 
wealth, when documented by WikiLeaks, this placed an additional psychological 
burden on individuals, prompting many to exert agency through resistance.5
In Arabic, the closest transliteration to the concept of resistance is, for many, 
muqawamah, literally understood as ‘to stand up’. For Larbi Sadiki, the concept of 
muqawamah is comprised of a broad range of norms and values, driven by agency and 
shaped by an Islamic and communal ethos. Moreover, although it is context specific, 
reflecting language and idioms, it also transgresses spatial and temporal dynamics.6 
Ultimately, muqawamah is
a way of thinking, being, and acting, and an ever- widening site of holistic struggle 
in which the AK- 47 is not, in the scheme of resistance, more important than 
piety, charity, schooling, propaganda or music. It simultaneously constitutes and 
embodies a normative imaginary for enacting emancipation at various levels, 
beginning with inner self- transformation through resistance against religious, 
moral, and intellectual laxity, and ending with creative protest.7
To understand why such events took place we must not only look at the uprisings 
themselves but also place them within broader contexts of resistance and political 
opposition.
A history of unrest
Protest movements rarely occur as independent phenomena; they are typically 
shaped by events that have come before. The political history of the twentieth- century 
Middle East is one of contestation, driven by efforts to exert power and manifestations 
of resistance. With this in mind, to understand the uprisings that broke out in late 
2010, we must consider the residue of historical unrest that shaped performances of 
resistance. Such reflections allow us to identify broad structural factors that cultivate 
latent grievances, along with the evolution of state security apparatus that continued to 
serve within mechanisms of control.
Our exploration of state building began prior to the Treaty of Versailles with acts 
of resistance and the Arab Revolt, wherein people sought to challenge the power of 
the Ottoman Empire. Egyptian history across the twentieth century has been shaped 
by the interaction of political movements, seeking to exercise power and engage in 
acts of resistance. Driven by decolonisation efforts, the struggle for Egypt is central 
in understanding political life across the Middle East and shaped by the Egyptian 
Revolution of 1919, unrest in the 1930s, the 1952 Young Officers Coup and unrest in 
the late 1970s. In all, mass movements took to the streets, rallying against structural 
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by anti- imperialist sentiment and economic concerns, wherein thirteen thousand 
landowners owned 40% of cultivated land, while the poorest 80% held less than 20% 
of privately owned land.8 Egyptian intellectuals sought to capitalise on British inertia 
after the First World War, at a time when key staff and goods were being transferred to 
Palestine. The revolution began the processes of gaining independence, during which 
thousands of Egyptians were killed, injured and arrested.9
The establishment of the modern Egyptian Republic in 1952 occurred amid 
decolonisation movements, alongside widespread anti- British sentiment and 
capitalising on increasingly prominent class tensions. Anti- imperial attacks took 
place across Cairo, while the Muslim Brotherhood gained prominence. Mass protests 
stemmed from the expression of multifaceted grievances that spread across the region 
with the development of Arabism. Political transition from Sadat to Mubarak was 
triggered by an act of violence, when a member of Islamic Jihad – who also served in 
the army – assassinated Sadat as a consequence of the peace treaty with Israel. After his 
death, Sadat was succeeded by his Vice President, Hosni Mubarak.
Life under Mubarak was aptly described by the economist Samer Suleiman ‘of 
regime success and state failure’.10 In spite of early nods towards democratisation, 
Mubarak quickly fell into line with regional practices. Having come to power after 
the assassination of his predecessor Anwar Sadat, early signs of reform and apparent 
rapprochement with the Muslim Brotherhood quickly dissipated amid perceived 
threats to his rule. In 1992, Mubarak responded with force writ large across Islamic 
groups in Egypt as a consequence of the emergence of a violent Islamist insurgency 
that had committed terrorist attacks in Cairo.
Domestic events continued to be shaped by regional factors and the Palestinian 
cause, although once described to me as a ‘political football’, was one such issue. 
Beginning with the Arab– Israeli wars, the cause continued with the intifada of 1987, 
which much like other incidents, had broader regional ramifications. Across the 
1990s, following the fall of the Berlin Wall and end of the Cold War, many states across 
the Middle East experienced the growth of civil society organisations, yet in several 
instances, these reforms were restricted by authoritarian tendencies, such as in Jordan 
where reform was a strategy to maintain control amid economic crisis.11
In Syria, Hafez Assad violently suppressed an Islamist uprising across the state 
(1976– 82), resulting in the deaths of around thirty thousand people and widespread 
repression of Islamist movements12 in what Patrick Seale referred to as a ‘long campaign 
of terror’.13 Moreover, in an attempt to maintain order, it was forbidden to discuss events 
in Hama. As one Syrian recounted, when she asked her father about what happened in 
Hama, he threatened her with violence if she ever asked again, out of a fear of potential 
repercussions. Similar incidents were recounted when talking to others about Syria.14
A British man travelling to Damascus in the 1980s was asked by his Arabic teacher 
to take a pair of shoes to a local man in the suburbs. Although no house number was 
given, this was hardly surprising and, assuming that he would be able to find someone 
who knew the old man, he went to the area with confidence. After an afternoon of 
searching, resulting in countless claims not to know the man and an increased sense 
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he was looking for no longer lived there; in fact, ‘he no longer lived at all’.15 All that 
remained of him was a pair of shoes. While Robin Yassin Kassab and Leila Al Shami 
suggest that Hama was ‘traumatised for a generation’, the Syrian psyche more broadly 
was devastatingly damaged.16
In Iraq, to quash domestic unrest, Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against 
the state’s Kurdish population17 and also committed ‘atrocities on a predictably massive 
scale’ against both Kurdish and Shi’a dissidents.18 The most prominent of the Shi’a 
opposition parties, Al Dawla, fled to Iran after the execution of their spiritual guide, 
Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir Al  Sadr. Disaffection among the Shi’a community was seen 
by many in Iran as a means of increasing their influence, resulting in the establishment 
of the SCIRI out of members of Al Da’wa to export Khomeini’s revolutionary goals.19
Following unification in 1989, Yemen experienced a period of political crisis 
that continues to shape its future. The struggle to meet basic needs was a prominent 
characteristic of daily life, exacerbated by the absence of national security infrastructure, 
health care and limited local governance across the state’s 333 districts. Although living 
within the Yemeni state, individuals in rural areas may have little sense of the state as 
a political entity beyond the presence of political posters. Across peripheral districts, 
life is regulated by tribal sheikhs – often competing with one another – where state 
mechanisms have little influence amid the power of turath and normative structures 
of tribal and religious life.20 Within such conditions, protests, strikes, riots and bombs 
were a routine part of life across the state. Dire economic conditions were aggravated 
by the return of migrant workers expelled from Kuwait.21
A history of civic activism within the fabric of the Kuwaiti state has created the 
most vibrant political sphere in the Gulf, albeit resulting in a number of instances of 
unrest. The importance of politics within Kuwait should not be understated. As Kristin 
Diwan suggests, the National Assembly is central to Kuwait’s national identity.22 Since 
the 2006 succession, the assembly has been characterised by political unrest as groups 
vie for influence within the political realm. Yet the nature of political life in Kuwait 
means that a struggle for influence in the National Assembly also results in ‘extra- 
parliamentary’ strategies and mobilisation, feeding into a climate of unrest.23
Similar events occurred in Bahrain, as decades of political unrest prompted the 
abolishment of emergency laws and the establishment of a new national charter to 
replace the country’s democratic constitution suspended in 1975. The State Security 
Law was enacted in 1975 and helped enforce the Al Khalifa’s rule across the archipelago, 
while the State Security Court – established in 1995 – was responsible for sentencing 
hundreds of activists. The abolition of emergency laws was a key part of reconciliation 
efforts between the regime and Shi’a opposition groups.24
Even the conservative Saudi kingdom was not immune from such pressures as 
a number of groups challenged the Islamic credentials of the Al Saud. Al Sahwa al 
Islamiyya Sahwa, an influential group of Muslim Brotherhood activists was joined by 
the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights, who both criticised the Al Saud’s 
domestic and foreign policies.25 In the following years, the sahwa, perhaps the best 
organised political group in the kingdom, offered the most likely political challenge 
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Islam to offer resistance to the Al Saud. Yet even this was largely superficial, curtailed 
by the co- option of the group into the institutional structures of the state.26
Beyond isolated incidents, a number of issues occurred in the decade prior to the 
uprisings that had an incendiary impact regional politics, with repercussions felt across 
the domestic realm. The first was the US actions in the aftermath of Saddam’s invasion 
of Kuwait, which opened up schisms between regimes and their societies as people 
were largely opposed to government support for US military action against Iraq. 
A second issue was the War on Terror, which possessed a degree of Arab complicity, 
while the third was the onset of the second intifada, which was quickly framed as part 
of the War on Terror. A fourth was the 2005 Cedar Revolution in Lebanon, which was 
the catalyst for the Syrian withdrawal, while the fifth was the Green Revolution in Iran, 
which demonstrated the capacity of people to challenge their regimes. Such factors fed 
into a region- wide mass mobilisation, facilitated by technological developments and 
the emergence of Al Jazeera. Regional events shaped domestic contexts and vice versa. 
In this context, local movements had to capitalise on local conditions and regional 
factors27 as efforts to create order had implications for spatial borders, as domestic and 
regional challenges collided.
At this time regional forces exerted a great deal of influence on localised nomoi. 
Both Yemen and Jordan had spoken out against the US military action, responding to 
public demands, but not without cost, as both were hit economically by the loss of US 
and Saudi financial support. Jordan at this time had begun a move towards political 
liberation, seemingly in a pre- emptive move by King Hussein to retain power. In doing 
this, the country underwent the most competitive parliamentary elections in over forty 
years.
In the mid 2000s, many believed that reform was likely in the Hashemite kingdom 
facilitated by the Jordanian National Agenda, cutting across political, economic, social 
and administrative lines, seeking to restructure parliamentary elections and essentially, 
offering a radical redistribution of power across Jordanian society. The stated aim of 
the agenda was
to achieve sustainable development through a transformative program that 
puts Jordan on a trajectory path towards fast economic growth and greater 
social inclusion, resulting in comprehensive strategies and initiatives developed 
to realise social, economic and political development, evaluate and monitor 
progress of its implementation according to detailed performance indicators.28
Yet amid increasing pressure from conservative aspects of society who feared the 
erosion of tradition and turath amid the trappings of modernity, the Jordanian National 
Agenda was withdrawn, replaced by the far less progressive ‘All for Jordan’ initiative.
This example demonstrates the importance of balancing different pressures and 
agendas both within society and among supporters. Those regimes that had survived 
the tumultuous 1970s, a period beset by parabolic ideological forces and a spate of 
coups d’état had developed a strong ability to balance competing pressures while 
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This was perhaps, as Marc Lynch argues, because the Jordanian state had ‘perfected 
the art of pervasive social and political surveillance and control’.29 The biopolitical state 
machinery was fully operational, monitoring all aspects of society and preventing the 
creation of organised opposition movements. Those opposition parties that did emerge 
typically did so from within the context of the current political system, resulting in 
a complicit form of dissent. As governmental penetration of society increased, mass 
urban protests during the 1990s decreased, ultimately feeding into the cultivation 
of structural grievances.30 Yet this did not put an end to resistance, nor to the brutal 
methods of control used by rulers that were argued to be necessary to prevent a spiral 
into chaos similar to the Lebanese civil war.
There is little doubt that political life in Lebanon was shaped by the fifteen- year long 
civil war that drew in all aspects of society. During the civil war, Shi’a groups gained 
greater representation as seen in the establishment of Hizballah in 1982, reflecting 
both the socio- economic conditions facing Shi’a Muslims in the country but also the 
failings of Amal who, at that time, dominated political representation of the Shi’a.31
As we have seen, although initially an armed militia with an explicit resistance 
agenda shaped by Shi’a history, the group evolved into a political entity, becoming one 
of the most influential parties in Lebanon.32 For the group’s leader Hassan Nasrallah, 
resistance is holistical, involving force and politics. It is ‘a complete organism with 
a thinking brain, eyes, veins, ears that listen, a tongue that utters, and a heart filled 
with affection or full of anger’.33 This point is echoed by Hizballah’s Deputy Secretary 
General, Shaykh Na’im Qasim who suggests that resistance is ‘military, cultural, 
political and informational resistance. It is resistance by the people as well as by the 
mujahidin; it is resistance by the ruler and by the ummah’.34 In spite of such remarks, 
the Cedar Revolution served as a spectacle of possibility, resulting in the withdrawal 
of Syrian troops but also demonstrating the capacity to bring about political change 
without requiring a descent into civil war.35
A year later, war with Israel secured the group’s popularity across the region. At 
the time, Nasrallah and Ahmadinejad were the most popular leaders in the Middle 
East due to their anti- Israeli stance. This popularity created serious challenges for 
Sunni Arab rulers who had long viewed the Party of God with suspicion, but after the 
destruction of Dahiyeh in 2006 they were forced to provide support to the group out of 
fear that they would lose credibility domestically.
As political space was restricted and groups failed to find traction within electoral 
processes, the political and social fabric holding the nature of the social contract 
became increasingly frayed, creating conditions of uncertainty and fitna (civil strife). 
At this point, old divisions within society became increasingly prominent, as economic 
hardship worsened, while latent tensions across society began to manifest in protest.
Wealth and poverty
The idea that the Arab world is ‘richer than it is developed’ is one that resonates with 
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the IMF, noted that while top- line numbers often looked good, ‘too many people 
were being left out’.37 Development is inherently liked with empowerment and 
to understand the roots of the uprisings, we must consider not just economic or 
political factors, but the relationship between wealth and power.38 This relationship 
manifests in the establishment of (neo)patrimonial systems of governance and the 
cultivation of so- called ‘deep states’ across the region, which prevent moves towards 
regime accountability.39
To understand this, we must consider the impact that governance structures have had 
on people across the region. Although bare life is typically considered as the restriction 
of human agency through recourse to political and legal structures, normative and 
economic structures also have a restrictive capacity. As we have seen in earlier chapters, 
the nature of social contracts – particularly those underpinned by rentier bargains – 
and the emergence of (neo)patrimonial mechanisms of control have created societies 
underpinned by marginalisation. As Gilbert Archar suggests, all Arab monarchies 
are patrimonial regimes, along with Ba’ath regimes in Syria and formerly Iraq. Both 
Egypt and Yemen are neopatrimonial, where regimes possess autonomy from rulers, 
who can later be replaced. Thus, neopatrimonial societies possess strong organisational 
structures that can survive the removal of rulers where particular economic interests 
and power are more important than governing.40 Put another way, in a neopatrimonial 
system there is no distinction between the public and private as states are run in a form 
of feudal enterprise. Reflecting this, when protesters took to the streets, the term izba 
(fiefdom) was levied at ruling elites and as the uprisings took place, the emergence of 
gangs and militias along economic lines would become commonplace.41
As a consequence, political regimes not only occupied a central role within the 
economy at the cost of the private sector, but also subsumed the state itself in its quest 
for survival. States such as Lebanon and Bahrain began to rely on external funds to 
prop up regimes and national economies. In 2006, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia donated 
$1.5 billion to the Lebanese Central Bank to support the bank’s currency chest, while 
two years later the bank received a further $1 billion from Saudi Arabia, helping 
maintain the Lebanese pound’s peg to the dollar which had become increasingly 
precarious.42 In Bahrain, the Al Khalifa family’s personal fortune was supported by 
finances from Saudi Arabia. In both cases, economic interest was tied to broader 
political and geopolitical concerns.
As regimes found themselves unable to regulate political life, society became 
increasingly polarised, leading to the politicisation of the allocation and distribution 
of resources, while states also became extractors, predatory and clannish.43 At this 
point, the security sector received disproportionately large amounts of financial 
support compared to other aspects of society, along with greater political influence 
and ability to act without regulation.44 Arab Human Development Reports in the 
years leading up to the uprisings paint a gloomy picture of unbalanced development, 
systematic exclusion and structural neglect.45 Reports routinely detailed governance 
failures and the absence of mechanisms to effectively hold political elites to account. 
Institutional weakness was routinely identified as ‘one of the most important causes of 
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that this exclusion resonated across the region because it was ‘inclusive’, in so much as 
it affected people across different classes, in both rural and urban areas, and the poor.47
In 2004, the authors of Towards Freedom in the Arab World referred to the state as 
a ‘black hole’, where the centrality of power in the hands of a few results in a situation 
where ‘nothing moves and from which nothing escapes’.48 The report suggested that 
the key issue behind political failings ‘lies in the convergence of political, social and 
economic structures that have suppressed or eliminated organised social and political 
actors capable of turning the crisis of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes to their 
advantage’.49
While it is correct not to reduce the democratic deficit to purely cultural factors, we 
should not dismiss the importance of history and values in defining contingency and 
shaping the decisions taken by those in power.50 Indeed, as the Executive Summary 
suggests – acknowledging the power of the nomos, nomoi and norms – ‘freedoms in 
Arab countries are threatened by two kinds of power: that of undemocratic regimes, 
and that of tradition and tribalism, sometimes under the cover of religion’.51 The 
interaction of the two  – a form of ordnung and ortung  – facilitated the creation of 
systems of governance, both formal and normative, which restrict the capacity of 
agency. As Amartya Sen argues, cultural factors have a hugely important impact on 
political and economic behaviour, shaping participation in activities and civil society, 
mutual support and solidarity.52
Socio- economic differences had a detrimental impact on the democratic tradition.53 
In the 2008 State of Reform in the Arab World report, Jordan was ranked as the highest 
performing Arab state in terms of democratic practice and the rule of law, while, 
Saudi Arabia had the lowest general index and Yemen the lowest rank in terms of 
application of the rule of law. Palestine had the highest rank of equality and social 
justice, while Lebanon had the highest rank for respect for rights and freedoms.54 Yet 
in a positive analysis of regional dynamics at the time, Bassma Kodami suggested that 
the region was experiencing a ‘constitutional moment’, noting the opening of a space 
of expression, albeit not participation.55 As the following years would prove, such 
optimism was ultimately misplaced.
Although the discovery and extraction of oil pumped money into domestic 
economies there was widespread stagnation in per capita GDP between the 1970s and 
the 1990s. At the same time the region experienced the world’s highest population 
growth, placing additional pressure on society. This increased growth rate was a 
consequence of infitah policies that led to social reforms and improvements across 
the health care sector, yet as we have previously seen, the private sector lagged behind, 
lacking development amid state dominance of economies. At this point, it was 
estimated that while the private sector accounted for less than half of the GDP across 
the region, corruption was rife.56
Adding to such challenges were enormous levels of capital flight. At the height of 
the 2008 economic crisis, contracts worth $958 billion and $354 billion were cancelled 
in the UAE and Saudi Arabia respectively,57 while an estimated $247.5 billion was 
removed from the Middle East.58 Although many analysts reduced the uprisings to a 
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should be viewed as a form of private capitalism that operates independent of the state 
but dependent on wider socio-economic forces, helping to understand the inclusivity 
of the exclusion.59 In addition, tensions between public and private sector workers have 
long been rife, manifesting in the emergence of class struggles.60 Such factors have 
been escalated by the relatively high population growth rates, while both standards of 
living and per capita income have stagnated since the 1980s.61
Underpinning all of this, and indeed political life more broadly, were gender 
issues and questions about the role of women in society. High levels of female 
underemployment fed into such economic situations, shaped by interpretations of 
culture, tradition and nomos. As a World Bank report on gender and development notes, 
although there are achievements in a number of areas of well- being, key challenges 
emerge in economic participation and political empowerment.62 Moreover, women 
face widespread discrimination across the private sector, once again stemming from 
cultural prejudice and bias, resulting in many working for lower wages. The 2009 Arab 
Human Development Report documents how the interaction of a range of different 
factors has established structural ‘social biases against women’,63 perhaps most obviously 
seen in the recently lifted ban on women driving in Saudi Arabia. Discrimination has 
been a direct consequence of the reduction of the number of women in the workforce, 
leading to higher fertility rates, lower levels of education and less influence in the family. 
Furthermore, this restricts the type of interactions that occur, limiting the exchange of 
information and lowering the desire for political agency.64
We should not view economic structures independently from political contexts. 
In the case of the Trucial States, it is easy to see how British colonial policies were 
essential in establishing political structures that were later necessary for their economic 
development.65 Such an approach resulted in the immediate penetration of domestic 
politics by external actors, but over time, a more centralised economic system was 
developed, facilitating nationalist projects and the perpetuation of exclusionary forms 
of social contract. One of the reasons for this identified by the UNDP was the
inability of the state to co- opt the educated youth into what used to be a relatively 
well- paid civil service that acted as a mechanism for upward social mobility. In 
country after country since 1980, the public sector was no longer able to absorb 
ever- increasing numbers of graduates produced by the educational system.66
The failure to provide jobs or to stimulate a vibrant private sector meant that by 2011 
41% of people across the Middle East were living ‘in need’ and in 2015 53% required 
financial assistance from non- state actors as informal networks began to play a more 
important role within the state. This was exacerbated by endemic corruption, which 
is estimated to have amounted to around $1 trillion in the past fifty years.67 As a 
consequence of the need to look for alternative sources of economic support, 56% of 
people viewed the economy of their home country as overly negative.
The cultivation of particular forms of political life and social contract between 
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prior to the uprisings, voter turnout in elections across the region was low. In Saudi 
Arabia, for example,
[p] eople were reluctant to register and vote, as was clear in Riyadh (the Saudi 
capital and home to 2,692,780 citizens), where the number of registered voters 
did not exceed 18% of those eligible to vote, i.e., 86,462 voters out of a potential 
electorate of approximately 470,000 persons – representing just two percent of 
the total population of the city.
The small number of registered voters was expected to lead a relatively 
high rate of participation on election day (February 10, 2005). The rate of 
participation in the capital, however, barely reached 65 percent (i.e. a little bit 
more than 1 percent of the total population of Riyadh).68
Even in elections deemed ‘free and fair’, low turnout provided scope for regime 
candidates to win easily.
History and culture must not be ignored when considering the means through which 
economic allocation facilitate (neo)patrimonialism. Such values played an important role 
in the establishment of the very structures at the heart of political projects.69 Although 
a number of rights were secured by constitutions, there were regular instances of states 
not fulfilling obligations to international conventions or indeed, not being signatories 
of such conventions.70 This feeds into the perception of a gap between the law in theory 
and the law in practice, with people trapped in a zone of indistinction between the two. 
The weakness of civil society organisations and widespread restrictions in application 
of justice only served to fuel a loss of confidence in the state and its institutions. Faith 
in electoral processes and turnout in elections both rapidly diminished across the years 
preceding the uprisings.71 In the 2010 elections in both Egypt and Jordan, the main 
opposition group, the Islamic Action Front, boycotted the elections, resulting in a 
climate of despair.72 It is within this context that people across the Middle East took to 
the streets in what became known as the Arab Uprisings.
The stories of Khaled and Mohammed
The emergence of protests in late 2010 should not be seen as independent phenomena, 
but rather the most recent manifestation of long- running politics of resistance from the 
formal and subaltern. The power of the Arab Uprisings can be traced to the influence 
of ideas, narratives, sacrifice and human actions against repressive regimes. The stories 
of two individuals in particular are worth noting, as their behaviour had a dramatic 
impact upon regional politics. For many, there had been little hope of political or 
economic reform, as the imposition of emergency laws in the previous decades had 
prevented any serious reform beyond token nods to elections or economic handouts 
facilitated by (neo)patrimonial systems inherent within political projects. The process 
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a form of bare life, lacking recourse to legal protection yet bound by the laws of the 
land. The construction of particular forms of political and legal structures prevented 
expressions of agency, establishing authoritarian structures that were regulated by (neo)
patrimonial systems as a mechanism of retaining power. Here governance strategies 
include economic disenfranchisement and the closure of economic systems, removing 
channels through which political and legal disenfranchisement and marginalisation 
could be escaped.
The uprisings must then be seen as the response to existential crises, the visible 
contestation of sovereign power. Following the self-immolation of Mohammad Bouazizi, 
Arab populations faced a disjunctive moment wherein they could accept their position 
within political communities or they could reject being thus. Within this moment, one 
of the most enduring aspects of the uprisings emerged. Ordinary people who had not 
been politically active challenged decades of repression, marginalisation and structural 
violence, emerging from years of bureaucratic inertia with a new form of political agency. 
From their unique – yet remarkably similar – experiences, a form of collective agency 
was developed and a shared hope and responsibility was created across the region.
In 2010, an Arab Human Development Report outlined the obstacles to political 
participation in Egypt. Central to the increasing disillusionment was a perceived 
political apathy among the Egyptian youth. After noting issues with political 
structures, the report suggested that an additional factor is ‘the apathy among youth 
towards political participation, borne of the conviction that that their voice will 
largely remain ignored’.73 Only months later, people took to the street as the uprisings 
spread across Egypt. While apathy was certainly a factor, this was a regime construct, 
stemming from political fatigue and the belief that political change could not happen, 
all underpinned by fear.
For Wael Ghonim, a prominent opposition figure but at this time a Google 
employee, the regime lived in fear of opposition, projecting a façade of democracy 
while vanquishing dissidents.74 While a number of opposition groups operated across 
the decade prior to the uprisings, few had a lasting impact, restricted by the power of 
the emergency laws. Other civil society actors fared little better, leaving the Muslim 
Brotherhood as the main source of organised opposition to the Mubarak regime, albeit 
facing widespread discrimination and a ban from electoral politics. In spite of this, the 
Brotherhood had firmly established themselves as a force across Egypt, wielding vast 
power and influence across society.75
Beyond the ikhwan, optimism about opposition parties was placed in the likes 
of Mohamed ElBaradei who was viewed by many as a means through which lasting 
change could be engendered. Upon returning to the country in February 2010, his 
Facebook page documented seven demands:
 1. Terminate the state of emergency.
 2. Grant complete supervision of elections to the judiciary.
 3. Grant domestic and international civil society the right to monitor the elections.
 4. Grant equal time in the media for all candidates running for office.
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 6.  Guarantee the right to run for president without arbitrary restrictions, and set a 
two- term limit.
 7. Vote with the national identity card.76
These demands required dramatic structural changes across Egyptian society. It also 
marked the point at which social media began to play a prominent role in political life 
across Egypt and the wider Middle East. At this point, Ghonim took on responsibility 
for running both the ElBaradei and Kullena Khaled Said (We Are All Khaled Said) 
Facebook pages. His account of events in Revolution 2.0 reveals how such platforms 
were used as a means of spreading information and government fears at their perceived 
‘revolutionary power’.
Posting anonymously on Kullena Khaled Said, Ghonim provided followers 
with contemporary updates from the case and other acts of state repression across 
Egypt. Followers of the Facebook page organised a ‘silent stand’ protest to take the 
disenchantment to the street and express anger at the Ministry of Interior, in a non- 
violent way. Despite regime attempts to prevent it, protests took place across a number 
of Egyptian cities, while dissent also spread across the ‘echo chamber’ resulting in 
protests on the corniche in Doha; this was 18 June 2010.
In the months that followed, a set of organic, grassroots movements using the 
Internet gained momentum across Egypt. It was a time in which political agency began 
to manifest across the country, in spite of the perceived apathy of the Egyptian youth. 
Independently of Ghonim, a Facebook page was established calling for the monitoring 
of the 2010 elections, which were later argued to be fraudulent, suggesting that the 
ensuing parliament was illegitimate.77 On 30 December 2010, Ghonim posted: ‘January 
25th is Police Day and it’s a national holiday … I think the police have done enough 
this year to deserve a special celebration … What do you think?’
After the toppling of Ben Ali in Tunisia, Egyptians were hopeful about what could 
happen next. While contexts were different, there were a number of similarities between 
the two cases; it was hoped that just as Tunisians had rejected their positions within 
bare life, so too might others. On 25 January, Egyptians took to the streets, occupying 
Tahrir Square in a collective demonstration of political agency and frustration at the 
Mubarak regime and his intention to transfer power to his son, Gamal. Although the 
Brotherhood was the leading opposition party, their view of events across the country 
was mixed, with the older generation taking a watching brief, while younger Brothers 
and Sisters took to the streets.
Somewhat counter- intuitively, the support of the Egyptian army was integral for 
the success of the revolution, facilitating the transition away from Mubarak. In the 
coming years, the army took on an increasingly prominent role in political life, but in 
an attempt to retain influence across the country’s future, military personnel supported 
the protesters in Tahrir against their former sponsor, Hosni Mubarak. On 10 February, 
Mubarak transferred power to the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), a 
standing military committee with its roots in the Free Officers’ Movement, which ruled 
in Egypt during times of severe crisis. A day later, Mubarak fled to the Red Sea resort 
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increasingly influential role in Egyptian politics, as befitted the unofficial opposition 
party that had strong networks of influence across the state. This culminated in the 
election of the Mohammed Morsi  – the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party 
candidate – as the first democratically elected President of Egypt, albeit not without 
serious schisms within the ikhwan about how to rule.
Across the region, a number of common factors were found in protest movements. 
Fridays became days of protest, requiring little or no communication through 
channels that had routinely been monitored or regulated by the state, while the 
mosque served as a focal point. Protest movements used the cityscape around them 
as an integral part of their political action, seizing public spaces and transforming 
them into spaces of possibility. Online spaces were used as a means of spreading 
images and messages across the region. Central to the movements were slogans such 
as irhal (leave) or al- shaab yureed isqat al- nizam (the people want the fall of the 
regime) and events across the region were eagerly watched by those protesting in 
different countries across the region.
Collective empowerment and realisation of possibility born out of the toppling of Ben 
Ali and Mubarak facilitated widespread mobilisation across the region. Ideas quickly 
spread across space, resonating with local grievances and a spirit of empowerment and 
hope emerged. People who had long been pushed to the margins of political life began 
to believe in the possibility of change and took to the streets to express their political 
will.79 Across the region, people watched, encouraged and emulated each other, from 
the squares of Cairo to Sana, from Manama to Damascus. Ideas spread across state 
borders, aided by technological developments and the establishment of hashtags across 
social media that facilitated investment in shared projects and bound people together 
across a region in turmoil, supported with a clear narrative of struggle, replete with 
expectations, heroes and villains.
Although often ignored, protests in Jordan began on 14 January, with a day of rage 
that focused upon the Prime Minister Samir Al  Rifai. At this point, the protesters were 
predominantly the traditional opposition parties, who had experienced two decades of 
repression and negotiation with the regime over their place within the political system. 
As a consequence, the regime had become well versed in counter- revolutionary tactics, 
designing an urban architecture that prevented large- scale mobilisation, along with the 
widespread penetration of opposition groups. In spite of this, the protesters’ demands 
were met and the Prime Minister was dismissed.80
Protests in Yemen began in early February inspired by events in Tunisia and Egypt, 
but once again drew upon a long history of local discontent. A day of rage was called 
for on 3 February, which drew a crowd of thousands in protest against Ali Abdullah 
Saleh’s rule. In the early stages, the protesters were a combination of civil society actors 
who had long been critical of the regime and youth activists. Networks were informal, 
grassroots movements that largely bypassed formal opposition groups. In Sanaa, irhal 
was baked into bread while in Taiz, it was painted on banners. For one observer, ‘That 
single Arabic word has united Yemen’s fractured political opposition, turning old 
enemies into temporary allies and pushing President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime to 
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On 25 February pro- regime supporters clashed with protesters and on 19 March 
regime snipers opened fire, leading to an escalation of violence and a rapidly increasing 
death count as Saleh struggled to retain control. After efforts to reshuffle his cabinet, 
implement a new constitution and a number of announcements about transition to 
his Vice President, on 3 June Saleh was injured in a bomb blast at the presidential 
compound and taken to Saudi Arabia to be treated. On 4 June, Abdrabbuh Mansour 
Hadi was appointed as Acting President, but amid a range of competing tribal, religious 
and political factions, a Houthi insurgency and active Al Qa’ida franchise, along with a 
range of regional actors, Yemen was drawn into a seemingly intractable war, shaped by 
geopolitical considerations with devastating humanitarian consequences.
In Bahrain, protesters designated 14 February as a day of rage. Much like protesters 
elsewhere, activists moved into Pearl Roundabout and transformed the space into a 
site of possibility. Two days later, regime forces cleared the square and destroyed the 
site, in doing so removing one of the prominent symbols of Bahrain history; a six- 
hundred- fils coin that also depicted the roundabout was removed from circulation. 
Protesters differed greatly in their approaches, which ultimately proved detrimental 
to their cause. Chants referring to not being Sunni or Shi’a ‘just Bahraini’82 evoked 
memories of political protests from the 1990s yet played a prominent role in the 
uprisings. Some called for peaceful protest, requesting political reform while others 
demanded the end of Al Khalifa rule. The regime’s response across Manama was 
swift following clashes between protesters and security forces. The restriction of 
political space that followed later was hardly surprising but was the beginning of the 
counter- revolution.
On 14 March, after the Crown Prince’s failed efforts to facilitate dialogue with 
the protesters, Saudi- led GCC forces under the guise of the Peninsular Shield Force 
entered Bahrain, leading to a widespread crackdown on civil society, political space 
and opposition groups. Across the island, the Al Khalifa rule had become increasingly 
challenged by long- standing political grievances, predominantly from Shi’a parties 
such as Al Haq and Al Wefaq. A public sphere that facilitated dialogue about political 
reform had emerged in the late 1990s, but efforts to regulate political debate in the 
kingdom had resulted in arrests of prominent human rights and political activists. As 
we shall see in the following chapter, regime figures quickly framed the 2011 uprisings 
along sectarian lines, adding in an existential dimension by playing into fears about 
Iranian expansionism and of the ‘Persian other’. Fundamentally, the protests became 
the site of contestation between ortung and ordnung.
In Oman, protests began in earnest on 18 February, taking on a vastly different 
character to that in other states. For many, the uprisings in the sultanate came as 
a surprise as it had long been isolated from broader regional currents and possessed 
a well- respected leader, a long and proud history and financial resources to provide a 
comfortable life. In spite of this, a spate of protests occurred across February, spread by 
text message and the Internet, resulting in the closure of schools across the country.83 
Initially small, the protests gained traction when they reached the city of Sohar where 
they escalated, resulting in regime forces using tear gas, rubber bullets and suggestions 
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place, stimulating further protests throughout the month along with military aggression 
against those politically active.
Grievances were similar to other states, as protesters sought to eradicate corruption 
and called for the removal of a number of prominent ministers, yet protesters expressed 
‘confidence in the sultan that he will respond to our demands’.85 On 21 March, a crowd 
of around seven thousand in Muscat handed a letter to the public prosecutor calling 
for the immediate investigation into ministerial finances. Recognising the severity of 
the protests, the sultan acquiesced and later in the year held parliamentary elections 
for the first time. Although the sultan’s rule was never in serious danger, the protests 
exposed underlying structural tensions within the state. Unlike other instances of 
unrest across the region, protesters issued a public apology to the sultan for damaging 
the state.86 While concerns were assuaged, questions about succession in the sultanate 
post-Qaboos continue to plague political life.87
On 25 February, demonstrations took place across Iraq as activists sought to use 
the popular momentum as a means through which to stimulate political progress and 
end the deadlock that had frozen political life. As violence broke out, six protesters 
were killed. Protests became a weekly occurrence but, unlike other states across the 
region, the uprisings failed to find the popular support to affect political change. This 
lack of support is predominantly seen as a consequence of two reasons. First, divisions 
within Iraqi society and all- too recent memories of war and violence meant that there 
was a distinct lack of popular will to take to the streets.88 Second, a number of Iraqis 
felt that they had democracy and as a consequence many believed that ‘we’re ok’.89 
A more convincing argument, however, suggests that although disenfranchised and 
marginalised, Sunnis lacked representation and popular leadership, preventing wide- 
scale mobilisation.90
The biggest prize for the revolutionaries was Saudi Arabia. As we have seen, the 
very fabric of the Saudi state is bound up with the Al Saud tribe, whose conservative 
alliance with Wahhabi clerics and rentier bargain meant that political participation 
was limited. In spite of this, the kingdom faced a number of serious pressures in the 
years prior to the uprisings, leading to Madawi Al Rasheed, a prominent Saudi scholar 
to suggest that Saudi Arabia was ‘ripe for change’.91
Despite deep structural grievances, few turned up to a day of rage in Riyadh, with 
the majority of those who attended from news outlets. One of those who did was 
Khaled Al Johani, a Saudi teacher who spoke to the BBC before being arrested. His 
words reflect much of what was happening across the Arab world at this time: ‘I am 
here to say we need democracy. We need freedom. We need to speak freely. We need 
no one to stop us from expressing our opinions … Freedom … there is no freedom. 
Dignity … there is no dignity. Justice … there is no justice.’92 The Saudi response to Al 
Johani’s words would serve as a premonition of what was to follow across the region.
Both Syria and Palestine set 15 March as their day of rage. While some Palestinians 
called for expressions of frustration and non- violent resistance against both the Israelis 
and Palestinian Authority, divisions between West Bank and Gaza, and Hamas and Fatah 
meant that no serious opposition could be organised. In contrast to the burgeoning 
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could be seriously affected as a consequence of decades of repression and restrictions 
of political space. The strength of the Syria state and its repressive apparatus seemed 
impregnable, but regime violence inspired protests and mobilised the body politic.93
The tragedy of events across Syria is widely documented in a number of prescient 
accounts. Perhaps the most powerful is by Yassin Al Haj Saleh, whose account of the 
fragmentation of Syria documents the rise of war machines that were supported by 
the Assad regime in a move that helped regulate all aspects of the Syrian population.94 
Protests broke out across the state where they were met with disproportionate force. In 
Deraa, regime forces opened fire on protesters and the ensuing brutality created a cycle 
of escalation that drew in more and more people as family and friends were killed or 
injured. Grievances grew rapidly, as tales of the horrors of the regime’s brutality spread. 
Events escalated following the arrest of fifteen schoolboys in Deraa who had sprayed 
walls with revolutionary slogans picked up on TV. While in detention the children 
were tortured as their fingernails were ripped out. The parents of the children went 
to plead for their release from the local branch of political security, led by a cousin of 
the President, where they were told, ‘Forget your children. Go sleep with your wives 
and make new ones or send them to me and I’ll do it.’ It was hardly surprising that in 
response, thousands of people gathered in front of the Omari Mosque and demanded 
their release.95
The escalation and emerging intractability of the conflict was in part a consequence 
of the burgeoning regional importance of events in Syria. The geopolitical aspirations 
of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Russia, the United States and groups such as Hizballah 
coalesced in Syria, aligning themselves with either regime or opposition groups. As 
a consequence, each side became emboldened, provided with weapons, finances and 
international political support in international forums such as the UN, leaving the 
people of Syria paying a truly abhorrent price.96
In Kuwait, the government marked the fiftieth anniversary of independence and 
the twentieth anniversary of the liberation of the country from Iraqi forces with large 
handouts given to all except bidoon. On 18 January, protests broke out in the country 
and although events would not dramatically escalate until June, where thousands 
took to the streets of Kuwait City, discontent began to spread. Amid growing political 
turmoil, a number of MPs refused to sit on committees with colleagues who were 
perceived to be corrupt and following the defection of a number of government MPs, 
the opposition was able to win a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister. One of the 
main goals of the opposition MPs was to gain the opportunity to question the Prime 
Minister about political activity and perceived corruption in the country. Allegations 
of corruption included the suggestion that sixteen MPs had received bribes of around 
$350  million to support government policies and that the Prime Minister was also 
involved, having diverted public funds to personal accounts abroad.
Shortly after, the Constitutional Court decreed that the Prime Minister could not 
be held to account for violations committed by his ministers, only those violations 
under his direct authority. Amid widespread allegations of corruption, this was seen 
by opposition figures as ‘a clear attempt to prevent the lawmakers from exercising 
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Despite this setback, protest groups were not deterred. One opposition group, the 
Popular Action Bloc, stressed that ‘no medium of escalation would be spared’, while 
another opposition figure tweeted that ‘no solution will come from within the 
parliamentary halls of Abdullah Al  Salem, but instead must come to it’.98 In response 
to such inertia, protesters stormed the parliament on 16 November. There, in a nod to 
democracy, Musallam Al Barrack – a prominent opposition leader – proclaimed that 
protesters have ‘entered the house of the people’.99 In response, the National Action 
Bloc stated that ‘the storming of the parliament is no less dangerous than what the 
government is doing’100 and revealing the surprise at the turn of events, one interviewee 
referred to them as a ‘rare incident’.101
Protesters were careful to frame the uprisings as a defence of the constitution. In 
doing this, protest movements were able to draw support from a range of disparate 
groups including Islamists, Shi’a and bidoon, along with those who had expressed 
desires for greater democratic accountability. Galvanised by successfully storming the 
parliament, red lines imposed by the Al Sabah were breached, notably insulting and 
taunting the Emir and ruling family. One protester proclaimed:  ‘In the name of the 
nation, in the name of the people, we will not let you, your Highness, practice autocratic 
rule.’102 Such comments were not beyond reproach and a number of opposition figures 
were arrested, including Al Barrack.103
Much like other states across the region, protests began within the fabric of current 
political structures. Aware of the potential repercussions of expressing dissent against 
the ruling family, but also with the idea that change could only be brought about from 
within the system, political anger was expressed carefully. As Al Barrack suggested, 
‘People do not dispute the Al  Sabah family’s right to the presidency, but the Al  Sabah 
family is disputing the people’s right to manage the state and its wealth.’104 Instead, ire 
was directed towards the government, as it was felt that Kuwaitis have ‘a government 
that doesn’t listen, doesn’t see and all it does is deceiving the people’.105 Yet as a caveat 
to such incendiary comments, Al Barrack was careful to express support for the Al 
Sabah family.
The Prime Minister resigned on 28 November 2011 and a new Prime Minister, Jaber 
Al  Mubarak Al  Sabah, was appointed amid serious political challenges. Legislative 
elections in February 2012 returned thirty- five of fifty seats in the National Assembly 
to opposition candidates, the largest grouping of which was the Shi’a National Islamic 
Alliance movement. Parliamentarians elected in February, led by Musallam Al  Barak, 
advocated the idea of a parliamentary government for Kuwait and widespread political 
reform, including a law guaranteeing the independence of the courts. Eight days 
before a vote on this law, the Constitutional Court – appointed by the Emir – dissolved 
parliament.106 Protesters stressed that they would continue ‘under the umbrella of the 
constitution’ using ‘all peaceful and constitutional tools’.107 In a nod to the power of 
the exception, Sheikh Salman Al  Humoud, the Information Minister, proclaimed that 
the ruling enhanced the ‘durability of the democratic system’ and ‘demonstrates the 
strength our democratic institutions and our judicial system’.108
While the uprisings spread across the Arab world, on its periphery, Iran, Turkey and 
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7.7 million took to the streets to express solidarity with Tahrir Square. In the summer 
of 2011 outrage at the rising cost of living resulted in protests, demonstrating the move 
from a quietist social welfare Zionism of the formative stages of the state to the more 
hawkish but economically liberal interpretations of Zionism. In response, a tent was 
pitched in Habima Square on Rothschild Boulevard in Tel Aviv, triggering a mass 
protest. Facebook once again proved a platform to spread ideas, helping to develop 
a tent city that straddled differences across Israeli society as people were ultimately 
united in search of social justice. In spite of the scale of the protests, as 2011 ended, 
so too did the movement, amid reform of aspects of society including restrictions on 
benefits given to the Haredi community.109
In Turkey, the ruling AKP discourse stressed ‘historical responsibilities’ to the 
region, stemming from deep collaboration and personal relationships with political 
leaders. Prominent figures in the party, including President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, 
viewed the AKP model as one that could be applicable across the Arab world. Indeed, 
Turkish historical experience and record of parliamentary democracy offered a vision 
of political and democratic stability for the region, driven by Ataturk’s secular vision, 
albeit eroded by Erdogan’s Islamic party.110 In spite of this, over the coming years 
Turkey was not immune from protests.
Protests in Turkey erupted in Istanbul’s Taksim Gezi Park, stemming from the 
violent eviction of protesters who were demonstrating against the planned destruction 
of the park.111 The protests rapidly escalated, bringing together broader concerns over 
the political vision of the Turkish state, environmental challenges, the erosion of secular 
ideals, the freedom of the press and freedom of expression.112 Rising authoritarianism 
was perhaps the main driving force, triggering protests across the state after the 
occupation of the park. The park was later cleared using tear gas and rubber bullets 
amid claims from the Prime Minister that ‘Taksim is not Turkey’.113
For many in Iran, events across the Arab world were framed as a continuation of 
one of two possible narratives. Regime figures viewed the uprisings as a continuation 
of the 1979 revolution, while opposition figures framed the protests movements as a 
continuation of the 2009 Green Movement. As we shall see in the following chapter, 
the Islamic Republic’s response to the uprisings was rife with contradiction and shaped 
by geopolitical calculations. In 2009, Iranian citizens demanded political change 
in the aftermath of a contested presidential election that returned the incumbent 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to office. In the so- called Green Movement, protestors used 
social media as a tool to mobilise people across the state, facilitating demonstrations 
and getting information about events outside of Iran. While triggered by the electoral 
crisis, the protests must also be placed into historical context.114 Images of Iranian men 
and women in squares, on university campuses and major roads were transmitted 
internationally, as protesters began to support reformist candidates Mir Hossein 
Mousavi and Mehdi Karoubi.115
While the protest movements spread across the region, a number of states were 
largely able to avoid unrest, as will be discussed in the following chapter, with a number 
of Gulf states using patrimonial networks and rentier economies to placate protest 
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largely free from protests. In part this was a consequence of such societal schisms, 
preventing the emergence of a coherent protest movement under strong leadership, 
but the memory of the civil war remained central in the minds of many.116 Yet only a 
few years later, protests erupted across Beirut as people from a range of sects expressed 
frustration at governance failures and bureaucratic inertia that prevented collection of 
rubbish across the city in what became known as the #YOUSTINK movement.
While Gulf states were largely unaffected by events in 2011, their rulers faced a serious 
challenge only three years later with a dramatic fall oil prices. Uncertainty following the 
Arab Uprisings had driven the price of oil up from just over $60 in 2010 to a peak of 
$115 in 2014 but this was not sustainable, driven down by increased supply facilitated by 
the rapid expansion of North American crude oil. This fall in in oil prices had a serious 
impact on those states that exported oil. In 2013, oil rents amounted to 53.8% of GDP in 
Kuwait117 along with 90% of government income and 88% of exports in Saudi Arabia.118
Vast reserves of natural resources allowed Gulf regimes to placate populations 
through rentier social contracts, along with the welfare benefits and subsidies that 
come with such a social contract.119 Although difficult to estimate, break- even oil 
prices differed greatly across the Gulf, from $52 in Kuwait to $126.9 in Bahrain,120 while 
Saudi Arabia required the price of oil to be above $84.3 to break even. Maintaining 
social cohesion amid serious economic pressure placed additional pressure on regimes 
across the Gulf, already wary after the events of 2011.
Demands for an improved quality of life were at the heart of protest movements, as 
chants such as ‘ish, huriya, karama insaniya’ (bread, liberty and human dignity) were 
heard from Cairo to Manama, revealing seismic schisms within political structures.121 
The rapid emergence of protest movements revealed a great deal about the political 
nature of contemporary societies and also the strength of belief and agency, as people 
took to the streets in defiance of emergency laws that had previously been tools of 
restriction and repression. The overwhelming images of the first part of the uprisings 
were the scenes of hope and possibility that political change could be achieved. For 
the first time in political protests, there was no reference to slogan such as ‘Islam 
is the solution’, or ‘Arab unity is the solution’. The protesters truly were grassroots 
organisations, driven by a desire to change the order of their worlds but in the months 
and years to come, such movements would be hijacked by a range of different actors.
Spaces and performances of resistance
As Frantz Fanon argued, changing one’s world is a violent process that leads to disorder. 
This violence need not necessarily be direct but can take place in a range of different 
forms, through a range of different objects and subjects. One such transformative aspect 
occurred in public spaces, where expressions of agency facilitated the metamorphosis 
of space that had previously been a mechanism of sovereign power into a site of 
possibility. As we have seen, space is simultaneously the arena and the canvas, the 
area in which politics was played out and the means through which political agendas 
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political power but also mechanisms of control, drip- feeding civilian populations with 
a sense of sovereign control and ultimate authority.
The fabric of space, as we saw earlier, both demonstrates and enacts power. Such 
visible  – yet unseen  – techniques of power fed into the construction of myths and 
narratives that were used as mechanisms of control. These mechanisms helped 
normative structures to be accepted by those who are subjugated. The uprisings 
demonstrated a widespread rejection of the ordering of space. Essentially, as Hamid 
Dabashi argued, protesters were ‘creating a new geography of liberation, which is no 
longer mapped on colonial or cast upon postcolonial structures of domination … a 
restructuring [that] points to a far more radical emancipation’.122
As a consequence, a range of tactics were employed and graffiti became both voice 
and action of dissent against ruling elites. It became a medium of communication 
when the mainstream media ‘ignored the dissenters’ and exploded across urban 
environments in response to Orwellian surveillance of creative figures.123 Acts of graffiti 
helped facilitate the reappropriation of public space, serving as ‘unsanctioned aesthetic 
modes of self- expression in dialogue with the urban environment’, transforming space 
from sites of neutrality to those demonstrating potential and revolutionary change.124 
Graffiti as art became resistance in and of itself, reflecting protest narratives but also 
interjecting, reframing the urban environment according to the creativity of the 
protesters. Squares became sites of possibility, gymnasiums of civic activism, as new 
meaning was given to all manner of arenas.125 Transformative processes fed into and 
developed anti- systemic protests and the appetite for democratic process, as Larbi 
Sakiki suggests, through ‘sustained and creative mass protest’.126
After seizing public space, protest movements sought to reclaim it, transforming 
meaning beyond its previous message of repression. This transformative process went 
some way to dismantling authoritarian regimes, rejecting the visibility of power and in 
doing so, creating space and possibility for the new. In dismantling the physical world, 
protesters created space to be shaped into something new. Space thus became a zone of 
indistinction where the remnants and residue of the ancien régime remained, but were 
subsumed by transformative possibility.
In rejecting authoritarianism, citizens regained control of territory, purging regime 
forces and symbols from space and time, transforming the geographical area into a 
site of possibility. The presence of crowds in Tahrir was symbolic not only in their 
defiance of state legislation, but also in their presence in the square itself, wherein 
previous relations between regime and square – or urban architecture broadly – that 
had previously served to reinforce power were severed.127 In a more powerful move, it 
was the scene of a new becoming, as an opportunity emerged to reframe the nature of 
Egyptian politics. It also fuelled protests across the region, demonstrating the power 
and possibility of collective action.
The transformation of space in an existentially liberating way was characteristic 
of the uprisings. In such a climate, artists became the targets of persecution. One 
particular instance of regime brutality that became a prominent work of art saw an 
Egyptian woman wearing an abaya being dragged through the street, revealing a blue 
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image took on symbolic importance, becoming a symbol of the struggle for freedom 
against oppression, viewed through the lens of gender- related issues.128 The image of 
the blue bra was later banned by the UAE.
In Bahrain, public spaces that were in tourist areas became canvasses to disseminate 
political messages. Competing narratives played out on the streets, with black paint 
used to cover up earlier messages. The images of martyrs and political prisoners 
adorned the walls, annotated with comments written in both Arabic and English to 
get coverage from the international press visiting to cover the Formula 1 race. Amid an 
increasingly violent conflict, space became contested as protesters were met by counter- 
demonstrations and security forces, as the Al Khalifa regime sought to prevent further 
escalation. Protests quickly moved across space, from the urban environments of the 
suq in Manama to rural villages across the island and as a consequence, highways took 
on a security dimension with military and police personnel stationed at intersections. 
Similar scenes were found in Yemen, Syria and Egypt.
Authoritarian regimes were not only draconian but also resilient. Their penetration 
of all aspects of society, domination or destruction of opposition movements and 
regulation of public space made few optimistic about lasting change. Decades of 
authoritarian rule, facilitated by (neo)patrimonial structures and underpinned by 
normative structures limited political space and civil society, restricting the capacity of 
people to express grievances, yet making the expression of a political voice all the more 
powerful.
The words used by protesters were imbued with meaning:  hope, possibility and 
a desire to challenge seemingly endemic despotism.129 Words became tools of 
empowerment rather than repression and songs took on political importance.130 In one 
of the more powerful Egyptian protest songs, engineering student Ramy Essam wrote 
the song ‘Irhal’, a call and response song in Tahrir Square, featuring the lyrics: ‘We are 
not leaving; He will leave; As one; We demand one thing; Leave, leave, leave’. Nationalist 
songs historically used by regimes were transformed as lyrics were rewritten to express 
loyalty to protest movements and people, rather than regimes. In addition to the 
tangible fabric of the state, protesters also sought to alter the metaphysical construction 
of the state. As one Syrian woman observed, songs that had been symbols of nationalist 
pride were rewritten to express possibility, solidarity and hope.131
Virtual space also became a site of contention as technological developments 
allowed anyone with a smartphone to become a journalist. This rise of the citizen 
journalist allowed events to be documented, stories to be verified and hegemonic 
narratives to be challenged. Moreover, amid widespread restrictions on the freedom 
of press, the Internet provided a means to circumvent regulation but also created a 
new space for divisions and dissent to emerge as friends and families became bitterly 
divided.132 In Egypt, token nods to reform meant little, leaving the press under regime 
control in what one analyst called a ‘truly Orwellian nightmare for reformists’.133
Emergency laws gave Mubarak licence to cut off the Internet which, counter 
intuitively for the regime, pushed more people out on to the street. Yet the Internet 
made awareness of the uprisings immediate and grounded it in the present. Ultimately, 
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individuals engaged in collective action. As Judith Butler argues, these actions ‘collect 
the space itself, gather the pavement, and animate and organize the architecture’.134
Ultimately, the transformation of public space into sites of possibility was an essential 
aspect of the uprisings. The prominent rejection of previously embedded authoritarian 
regimes offered an alternative vision to people who had been trapped in bare life. 
Moreover, graffiti and street art served as a non- violent method of transformation, 
dramatically altering and reclaiming space while also having the capacity to speak 
to a range of audiences regardless of language. Fundamentally, graffiti was a way of 
‘defending and occupying the street’.135 Over time, this transformative process took on 
a holistic nature as both the formal power of regimes and normative practices were 
identified and transformed.
Degradation and transformation
While a great deal of this chapter has discussed transformation in the run up to 
the uprisings, perhaps the most important form of change was demographic. 
Transformation from rural to urban has been a prominent feature of political 
development across the history of the Middle East, changing the nature of urban 
environments and placing additional pressures on political elites to both meet basic 
needs and to regulate life. In the years leading up to the uprisings, the most important 
transformative movement from rural to urban was a consequence of environmental 
degradation, stemming from the inability of farmers to tend to land and produce food.
In the Levant, environmental change enforced by anthropogenic developments 
increased the likelihood and occurrence of droughts and in Syria, the length and 
intensity of droughts as experienced between 2006 and 2011 was two to three times as 
likely.136 Such changes had a dramatic impact upon migration in Syria and across the 
Levant broadly, as individuals sought water and sustenance, while arable land became 
increasingly rare. In the run up to the uprisings in Syria, 75% of farmers suffered total crop 
failure and in the north east, 85% experienced loss of livestock. Ultimately, the drought 
affected 1.3 million people, bringing the number of Syrians in poverty over the 2 million 
mark, also resulting in 800,000 Syrians losing their livelihoods and migration to cities.137 
The price of bread rose 87% in public bakeries while families had to spend between 50% 
and 80% of income on basic food.138 Of course, the impact on state infrastructure was 
undeniable, with a generation of Syrians existing without schooling and institutional 
support. Such conditions remain, exacerbated by conflict, leaving 9.8 million Syrians as 
food insecure while 6.8 million of those are severely food insecure.139 Making matters 
worse, recent estimates suggest that one in three houses in Syria have been destroyed, 
while the country lost 80% of its GDP between 2010 and 2016.140
Environmental degradation should not be seen as a neutral phenomenon. As 
Francesca de Châtel argues, such events must be placed in the context of Syrian 
mismanagement of moves towards a market economy and the failure of the Assad 
regime to respond appropriately to drought. As de Châtel asserts, drought is a structural 
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We should then place it in a broader context of events at the time. While some argue 
that drought should be viewed through the lens of a ‘threat multiplier’,142 it is perhaps 
the inadequate regulation of such issues and the failure of the move from centrally 
planned economy to market liberalisation143 that meant that serious humanitarian 
issues emerging from the drought were mismanaged. Some estimates suggest that 
around 50% of the Syrian workforce was involved in agriculture at this time.144 As a 
consequence, an estimated three hundred thousand people migrated from the north- 
east of the country145 and by 2009 an estimated 60– 70% of villages in the governorates 
of Deir ez- Zor and Hassakeh had been deserted.146 Drought appeals failed to meet 
targets and the government sought to downplay the severity of the crisis, fearing the 
potential consequences of decades of economic and resource mismanagement.147
As a 2016 Arab Human Development Report noted, ‘the events of 2011 and their 
ramifications are the outcome of public policies over many decades that gradually 
led to the exclusion of large sectors of the population from economic, political and 
social life’.148 At this time there was a low level of support for formal institutions and 
a widespread lack of confidence in legislatures, particularly in its ability to hold the 
executive to account, to protect liberties and to treat all societal groups equally. Indeed, 
by 2014 only 21% viewed the rule of law to be applied universally and a year later this 
figure rose to 25%. As a consequence, over 50% of people had a negative view of the 
political situation along with their economic circumstances.149
In 2011, 41% of people in the region were living ‘in need’ and although this number 
dropped by 2015, 53% of people required financial assistance from other actors such 
as families, friends and other groups, as informal networks took on an increasingly 
important role and the need for support remains.150 Indeed, 56% of people asked had an 
overly negative view of the economy of their home country, with Lebanon worst at 71%. 
These sentiments were exacerbated by endemic corruption, estimated to be in the region 
of $1 trillion in the past fifty years.151 Ultimately, in such conditions of uncertainty and 
instability, those able to provide support were seen in a positive way, giving them a great 
deal of influence across the region, which helps to explain the popularity of groups such 
as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Hizballah and even Da’ish.152
Conclusions
Placing the Arab Uprisings in the context of political, economic and social unrest 
across the Middle East provides valuable insight in understanding why, when and 
how the protests took place. The proliferation of ideas, grievances and ultimately 
protest across time and space reveals two important aspects. First, that state- building 
processes have created structures that have a detrimental impact on life, manifesting 
in tensions between rulers and ruled, along with existential and often competing 
visions of political organisation. Second, amid a shared normative environment what 
happens in one state can have regional repercussions. Protest movements have always 
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often intertwined, with serious consequences for the ordering of space. From Nasser’s 
manipulation of the pan- Arab cause to the multifarious agendas and groups involved in 
the Arab Uprisings, political agendas have served to undermine real political progress 
across the region. The complexity of such factors and inter- relation of themes and 
issues has created a new political dynamic, wherein space became a site of possibility 
and in the months that followed, the region was characterised by a struggle to shape 
this possibility in a range of different ways.
The uprisings of 2011 should not be viewed as qualitatively new phenomena 
but instead, the continuation and manifestation of revolt and resistance against 
embedded authoritarian movements. With this in mind, we see that although the 
protest movements demonstrated the ability to reject being thus, seeking to move 
away from the creation of bare life in political, legal and socio- economic forms, 
similar expressions of agency had been occurring over time, albeit without the 
success of the Arab Uprisings. Although Agamben argues that escaping bare life 
is impossible, across the region, expressions of agency and resistance served as 
a mechanism of rejecting being thus. This is, however, part of a bigger narrative 
account of the Arab Uprisings, which should be split into two. The first part, as 
documented above, is a story of hope and resistance, where autocratic, authoritarian 
regimes were deposed in Egypt and Yemen (and Tunisia and Libya, although these 
are beyond the scope of our analysis) but regimes in Bahrain and Syria were seriously 
challenged. The second part of the broader narrative considers the response of the 
state, to see how regimes fought back against the protesters.
The uprisings reveal the depth of political dissatisfaction and the fissures that were 
inherent within political projects. These divisions were also prevalent in opposition groups 
whose views on how best to respond to regimes vastly differed even within sites of protest. 
From calling for peaceful pro- democracy marches to the violent toppling of regimes, 
the range of competing visions of protest ultimately restricted their capacity for change. 
Although people took to the street to express this displeasure, little changed. Structural 
grievances remained and although token reform would take place, the underlying factors 
that caused the uprisings endure, leaving a very real possibility of future unrest.
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The regime fights back
The regime in Egypt is waging war against the young who dare to dream of a 
bright future for themselves and their country. Somewhere there are still peoples 
and herds, but not with us, my brothers: here there are states. A  state? What 
is that? Well! Open now your ears to me, for now will I  say to you my word 
concerning the death of peoples. State is the name of the coldest of all cold 
monsters. Coldly lies it also; and this lie creeps from its mouth: ‘I, the state, am 
the people’.
Family of Alaa Abd el- Fattah, detained in June 2015
On 3 July 2013, the Egyptian army engineered a coup d’état against Mohammad 
Morsi, the region’s first democratically elected Islamist President.1 Following a spate 
of protests that culminated in an estimated twenty million people taking to the streets 
of Egypt to voice their displeasure at Morsi’s ‘ordinary’ transition,2 the army forced the 
Freedom and Justice Party from power. On 14 August, some four weeks after Morsi’s 
government was toppled, over eight hundred supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood 
were killed near the Rabaa al- Adawiya mosque in Cairo in what Human Rights Watch 
called a likely ‘crime against humanity’.3 It was in Rabaa where Egypt’s revolutionary 
dream died.
Over the course of twelve hours, Egyptian security personnel used a range of tactics 
and weapons including bulldozers and supported by snipers, security personnel entered 
the square to disperse protesters to devastating effect. Yet the Rabaa massacre was not 
an isolated incident. Shortly afterwards, protesters were dispersed from al- Nahda in 
a similar manner, while further Brotherhood protests were also ended with violence.
The Human Rights Watch investigation into events in Rabaa documents a 
systematic attack against ‘unarmed persons on political grounds’, where lethal force 
was used indiscriminately.4 Kenneth Roth, the executive director of Human Rights 
Watch, referred to it as one of the world’s largest killings of demonstrators in a single 
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government’.5 The report names Abdul Fatal Al Sisi, the Egyptian President, as one of 
the individuals complicit in events.
In the weeks that followed, some of the remaining members of the Brotherhood fled 
to London, Doha and Istanbul, while others were imprisoned or killed; over the course of 
the following year, over 2,500 civilians were killed and 17,000 injured,6 while 40,000 were 
arrested.7 The following year, an Egyptian court sentenced 529 Muslim Brothers to death 
and, a year later, Mohammad Morsi also received a death sentence in a systematic repression 
of the ikhwan – both party and ideology – driven by domestic and regional concerns, driven 
by the concerns of Saudi Arabia and the UAE.8 Morsi later died in an Egyptian court.
In Bahrain, where regional concerns were equally prevalent, the regime’s response 
framed protestors as fifth columnists doing the nefarious bidding of Iran, resulting 
in the widespread restriction of political space across the island. In this climate, 
opposition groups and a number of journalists were imprisoned and in a number 
of instances, killed. The case of Eman Salehi, a Bahraini sports journalist who was 
killed by a member of the royal family reveals a great deal about the political climate 
in Bahrain.9 The Salehi case also evokes memories of Agamben’s homo sacer, the 
individual who can be killed with impunity, revealing the potentiality at the heart of 
political projects; at the time of writing, her killer remains free.
In contrast to Egypt and Bahrain, events in Syria and Yemen erupted in violent 
conflict, pitting protest movements against regimes in ferocious fighting that rapidly 
consumed political dynamics across each state. Following the fragmentation of 
political organisation, ferocious hostilities began to shape life across the two states as 
local grievances interacted with national events, which all took place within a struggle 
for supremacy across the Middle East. As existential fear began to take hold, politics 
began to play out in what the Syrian intellectual Yassin Al Haj Saleh has termed a ‘state 
of nature’. Evoking the work of Thomas Hobbes, Al Haj Saleh’s description of events in 
Syria bear a number of hallmarks with those in Yemen as politics became characterised 
by ‘social dispersion, direct reactive responses, violence – all characteristics of a society 
losing its self- control and its ability to act uniformly’.10
Al Haj Saleh’s portrayal of the state of nature is perhaps bleaker than Hobbes’, 
suggesting that there is a ‘natural’ transformation into this state of nature as a 
consequence of the increasingly repressive and sect- based politics of survival that 
challenge the very existence of the Syrian people. This approach stems from regimes 
following their instincts, their neuroses and ‘their madness’. In such conditions, groups 
develop narratives of superiority and victimhood as a means of ensuring their survival. 
As a consequence, politics is reduced to a ‘sectarian war, in which murder leads to 
murder, asabiyyah activates asabiyyah, and hatred animates hatred’.11
The events of early 2011 that eviscerated regime– society relations across the Middle 
East were a widespread rejection of the political, economic, social and legal status quo, 
pushing people into localised forms of asabiyyah and challenging the relationship 
between ordnung and ortung in the process. Having had political meaning stripped 
from their lives and the regulation of this limited form of existence embedded within 
the fabric of the state, protests were an expression of agency in the face of seemingly 
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governance structures of the state as regimes attempted to regain control over the 
situation, using a range of draconian strategies. The rejection of ‘being thus’, in turn, 
created a situation wherein both regime and peoples sought to define the ordering of 
political life and, as a consequence, the very limits of political space. This process of 
contestation resulted in the emergence of war machines and a struggle to exert control 
over them.
Regime responses to the protests emerged from state- building processes, which 
facilitated the widespread repression that followed the uprisings. Although a number 
of regimes created bare life in an attempt to end the protest movements, this was 
not always successful. Instead, because of the existence of strong normative currents 
across the region, further mechanisms of control were deemed necessary. This chapter 
traces regime responses in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, beginning with the 
declaration of emergency powers before moving to consideration of securitising 
moves  – the linguistic framing of particular issues as threats  – which once again 
demonstrates the conflation of domestic and regional factors. It argues that regional 
affairs had a profound impact on regime responses to protest movements, while in 
turn, regime responses had regional repercussions.
States (and spaces) of emergency and exception
As protesters took to the streets in early 2011, political organisation was renegotiated 
amid the reconceptualisation of protest and resistance. This biopolitical machinery 
helped regimes control life, stripping it of political meaning but when this was deemed 
insufficient, sovereign power was exerted by controlling life through death. Regimes 
quickly declared states of emergency, suspending political structures and the rule of 
law as a consequence of perceived existential threats to their rule. Recourse to such 
methods was hardly surprising, yet as the repeal of emergency legislation was a 
prominent feature of protestor’s demands, such action only served to escalate tensions. 
Once again, the state of exception had become the paradigm of government, the 
new norm.
The historical use of emergency legislation across the Middle East set a precedent for 
constitutional powers to be used in times of domestic unrest, embedding potentiality 
within the fabric of political organisation. Yet with the onset of the uprisings, regimes 
derogated from legal responsibilities to ensure their survival. The uprisings had a 
seismic impact upon regional dynamics as millions of people were displaced from 
their homes amid widespread instability and violence across the region. Widespread 
migration both within and between states impacted not only on state infrastructures 
but also their economies, as refugee populations were comprised of large numbers 
of professionals and highly qualified workers. The flow of people across state borders 
placed huge strains upon host countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, while 
also having a serious impact upon the construction of societies and their very survival.
These actions occurred in space that quickly took on new political meaning, 
opening up new sites for regulation.12 While sites of opportunity, they were also sites 
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of the mundane, where the theatre of the spectacle was also the everyday landscape of 
life’s routines, making the evolution of space more powerful. Amid contested societies 
and environments, public spaces became the battleground. Across the region, people 
articulating political messages occupied public spaces where they were quickly met 
with counter- narratives, protests and often, the security mechanisms of the state. 
As Mona El- Ghobashy suggests, ‘the streets had become parliaments, negotiating 
tables and battlegrounds rolled into one’.13 Public space quickly became a zone of 
indistinction:  a site of contestation and exception, where regime and opposition 
discourses clashed, while repressive force was a mechanism of control.
The uprisings triggered a fundamental shift in the way of doing politics. Beyond the 
mobilisation and direct action seen in the squares of the region, politics became a topic 
that was readily discussed as the shackles of authoritarian restrictions were thrown 
off. Debate about political life was everywhere but with such debate came divisions. 
As securitising moves took place, political divisions both online and in person 
between family and friends became increasingly heated, resulting in ostracisation and 
separation.14 It was a time of uncertainty for regimes and peoples, but it was a time 
when regimes fought back.
Derogation from constitutional clauses and establishment of emergency powers 
gave regimes seemingly unlimited power to respond to protest movements in whatever 
way was deemed necessary. Although a number of constitutions possessed clauses that 
limited the time under which emergency legislation could be imposed without review, 
such powers were rarely challenged.15 Through derogating from legal obligations, 
regimes were given power to respond to protests with violence, both direct and 
structural, destroying political space and reshaping the nature of societal dynamics. 
Such moves allowed for the repression of a range of different political and religious 
groups across the Middle East with regional repercussions.
Emergency laws were deeply unpopular and often cited by protestors as one of 
their main grievances. Perhaps the most prominent example of the draconian use 
of such laws was in Egypt. Although emergency laws in Egypt were lifted in the 
final days of the Mubarak regime – for the first time since 1980 – they were quickly 
reinstalled by the SCAF amid the uncertainty of post- revolutionary life. In response, 
rights organisations were vocal in their condemnation of the move. In response 
to Decree 193/ 2011, which not only revived the powers but also expanded their 
scope, an open letter was written that noted how the legislation highlighted the gulf 
between aspirations for democracy and the legacy of the old regime that continued to 
administer Egyptian affairs.16
Although Mohammad Morsi had promised to remove emergency laws, when faced 
with serious threats to his regime he derogated from the rule of law, returning to a 
paradigm of government that had become the all too common norm. In support of the 
sovereign decision, Morsi stated: ‘I am against any emergency measures, but I have said 
that if I must stop bloodshed and protect the people then I will act.’17
After the coup d’état that deposed Morsi in the summer of 2013, Decree 136 
permitted military personnel to stand by police forces to protect buildings.18 Such a 
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more depriving people of political rights.19 Two years on from the uprisings, concern 
at the behaviour of the security services remained, amid widespread corruption and 
endemic violence, with policemen remaining ‘above the law and immunized from 
criminal accountability’.20
In conditions of increasing uncertainty, it was argued that ‘police continue to 
deploy excessive violence and torture systematically as it was during the Mubarak 
regime’.21 In the following years, the human rights situation worsened, amid ‘massive 
and systematic violations of basic rights and freedoms despite starting the year with 
a promising new constitution’.22 The spectre of a terrorist threat in Sinai from a group 
that had declared allegiance to Da’ish only served to strengthen the Sisi regime’s 
proclamations of the necessity of such legislation. This move also located Egypt within 
a Saudi- led coalition of Sunni states in the fight against terrorism, which had broader 
geopolitical repercussions beyond the fight against Da’ish, drawing on a burgeoning 
anti- Iranian sentiment along with cultivation about the Shi’a – and Persian – other.
In the early days of the uprisings in Syria, emergency laws were repealed in a token 
nod towards the protest movements. Imposed in 1963 to legislate for the prolix war 
with Israel the laws were used to support efforts to counter internal dissent, feeding 
into narratives that dissent was an attempt to emasculate the nation or collude with the 
enemy.23 On 20 April 2011, Decree 161 lifted the emergency legislation, but the state of 
emergency was later replaced with Decree 54. Upon its implementation Mohammed 
Al Shaar, the Interior Minister, was explicit in his warnings to protestors stressing that 
they must ‘refrain from taking part in all marches, demonstrations or sit- ins under any 
banner whatsoever’.24
Amid unrest across the Bahrain, on 15 March 2011, the Al Khalifa declared a state 
of emergency in accordance with Article 36(b) of the Bahraini Constitution. Coming 
a day after GCC troops crossed the King Fahd causeway, emergency legislation 
was imposed to restrict political activity and support counter- revolutionary efforts, 
coupled with the use of military courts to try protestors. Three days later, Yemen’s 
President Ali Abdullah Saleh declared a thirty- day state of emergency, suspending the 
constitution. In Kuwait, regime efforts to regulate political life involved handing out 
prison sentences to those who stormed the parliament along with those who insulted 
the Emir.25
In a similar move, Saudi Arabia sought to regulate political activity through 
recourse to counter- terror laws that restricted access to the Internet and freedom of 
speech.26 Such efforts resulted in the establishment of new anti- terror legislation, which 
meant that acts of peaceful dissent could be defined as terrorist crimes. In addition to 
such manoeuvring, Riyadh employed other strategies to regulate political dissent and 
opposition. The Ministry for Culture and Information placed legal requirements on 
anyone wishing to blog to have a licence; those wishing to apply for a licence had to be 
in possession of a college degree and be over the age of twenty.27
Another mechanism of control that became increasingly prominent at this time 
was the regulation of citizenship, where the politics of identity and ensuing revocation 
of citizenship rights from individuals became increasingly important in times of 
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philosophical questions about the nature of citizenship, but also exploration of the 
legal mechanisms through which such strategies can be undertaken. As Zahra Bashar 
notes, the importance of historical and cultural dynamics has created a particular form 
of citizenship and stringent restrictions upon those who can claim nationality. With 
this in mind, after the uprisings, states across the Gulf amended legislation to allow 
for the removal of citizenship through recourse to either anti- terrorism legislation 
or nationality laws29and between 2011 and 2018, 738 Bahrainis had their citizenship 
revoked.30 One former MP told me that he found out that he had lost his nationality 
while in London, via Al Jazeera.31
In such conditions, lives are deemed ‘expendable’ through the cultivation of 
bare life, through recourse to Law Number 58 of 2006 for Protecting Society from 
terrorism Acts and the Citizenship Law of 1963. In Bahrain it is illegal to be a stateless 
individual, a crime routinely punished under the Asylum and Immigration Law. As 
a consequence of their position in society, the stateless are unable to appeal against 
the charges as they possess no legal protection or ability to give lawyers power of 
attorney. The law denies individuals access to employment, marking them as migrant 
workers requiring sponsorship, along with the right to own property. It also denies 
health care and excludes children from formal education. By the summer of 2018, of 
the 738 individuals stripped of their citizenship, many remained in Bahrain as ‘illegal 
residents’, reduced to bare life: abandoned by the law yet bound to it.32
Beyond physical space, protests also took place online, prompting regime efforts 
to regulate the Internet and arresting a number of individuals such as Nabeel Rajab, 
a Bahraini human rights activist, for criticising the Al Khalifa. While social media is 
often heralded as the means through which the uprisings took place, such a position 
denies local agency33 and the widespread regulation of the Internet meant that some 
narratives were restricted. Supporting this position, Derek Gregory acknowledges that 
Westerners in positions of privilege tend to reduce political action in the Middle East 
to the digital repertoire, ignoring the importance of ‘brave bodies in alliance installing 
new spaces’.34
The uprisings demonstrated once more that space matters, highlighting the 
power of the street, of collective consciousness and the possibility of becoming, as 
the intimately tiny collided with hegemonic regional pressures. Yet the process 
of negotiating the uprisings  – the clash between regimes and societies  – reminded 
many that ownership of space had not been fully transformed from elites to publics. 
Efforts to demonstrate control through architecture continue as violence is embedded 
within urban structures. The erasure of symbolic sites was supplemented with an 
increasingly militarised regulatory force and an increase in symbolic violence. Across 
the Gulf, the presence of ruling families in public spaces, along highways and within 
hotels, increased in the aftermath of the protests; regime power was seemingly all 
encompassing.
Other efforts were undertaken to regulate life and manage images. News channels 
took on political meaning, where Al Jazeera was seen as the mouthpiece not only 
of Qatar but of the uprisings themselves. As the protests spread, regimes worked 
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over music and literature: nationalist songs were played day and night in ministries 
and other public buildings while opposition groups sang modified versions of the 
same songs in the streets.35 On state TV channels across Syria, prominent pro- regime 
religious leaders and intellectuals were interviewed, along with members of the public 
who were vocal in their praise for the President and military, while also baying ‘for the 
blood of the “terrorists” ’.36
The struggle to regulate space also includes intellectual debates. At the 2014 World 
Congress on Middle East Studies Conference in Ankara, those attending a panel on 
the politics of the UAE were met by a row of TV cameras and an armed security 
presence. Breaking with academic convention, the Chair introduced a Sheikha from 
the Emirates who proceeded to give a presentation on the merits of life in – and the 
politics of – the UAE. Again, breaking from the norm, the Chair refused to allow for 
questions and, in spite of a small amount of heckling from the floor, the session passed 
without further event. Although hardly remarkable in the grand scheme of Middle 
Eastern soft- power strategies, regime efforts to shape academic discourse have become 
increasingly prominent. The conference has routinely been a space of contestation. 
Four years earlier, the former Crown Prince of Jordan, Hassan bin Talal, publicly 
condemned a Malaysian journalist who had criticised the Hashemite kingdom, saying, 
in English, ‘Fuck you. People in glass houses shouldn’t throw stones’.
The regulation of physical borders became increasingly important.37 Prominent 
journalists and academics, including a number of my own colleagues, were turned away 
from the states that they worked on and in, while others were also targeted, followed 
and hacked.38 Urban landscapes became contested sites of political representation, a 
battleground within which actors embroiled in conflict express their views and attempt 
to garner support for people who witness such scenes.
News coverage of events beyond regional outlets has also taken on a political agenda. 
In the Syrian context, intellectual exploration has increasingly become populated 
by conspiracy theories and ideological agendas at the cost of rigorous empirically 
driven analysis.39 This has helped to facilitate a position where the narrative that the 
secular Syrian regime is fighting Islamist extremists – as part of the War on Terror – is 
taken with little critical engagement. Ultimately, this creates a position that results in 
international inaction, policy confusion40 and the death of thousands, justified within 
the global nomos.
The sectarianisation of political life
Amid the contestation of sovereign power, regimes have sought to ensure their survival 
by closing off a community against an outside, increasingly done along sect- based lines. 
Parallels can be drawn across the region as regimes sought to solidify their support bases 
by creating existential fears about the other. In such conditions, political life took on a 
sectarian dimension while also becoming imbued with geopolitical meaning. By framing 
opposition groups as an existential threat to the very survival of the polis, regimes not 
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responses as necessary to defend the state, speaking to domestic and international 
audiences in the process.41
The emergence of politically charged sectarian narratives reveals the spatial aspects 
at play in the relationship between politics and Islam, as domestic politics clash with 
the geopolitical aspirations of regional powers. By locating national events within 
(geo)sectarian narratives, regimes derive legitimacy and security from co- religious 
kin within their states and beyond in what has become known as sectarianisation, 
the securitisation of sect- based difference. As we shall see below, sectarianisation was a 
key weapon in the armoury of a number of regimes, opening up questions about the 
ordering of space in the process.
For Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel, sectarianisation is
an active process shaped by political actors operating within specific contexts, 
pursuing political goals that involve the mobilisation of popular sentiments 
around particular identity markers. Class dynamics, fragile states, and 
geopolitical rivalries also shape the sectarianization process.42
The thesis is underpinned by the prevalence of authoritarian rule, creating a crisis 
of legitimacy that requires the manipulation of sect- based identities as a means of 
ensuring regime survival. When placed in the context of geopolitical currents, most 
importantly the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, efforts to ensure survival draw 
upon – and feed into – regional security. Yet beyond this elite process, it also occurs in 
different guises as groups seek to close themselves off against an outside, exacerbating 
sectarian differences in the process.
Processes of sectarianisation seek to ensure survival by mobilising communities 
around a shared identity, framing the predetermined other as an existential threat. 
This framing has been a prominent feature of the state- building process, where loyalty 
is forged from a complex web of identities across the region. Amid the separation of 
regime and society in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, opportunities have emerged 
to ensure survival through the (re)shaping of space and ordering of life, driven by the 
interaction of regional forces with local actors.
Such processes refer to the cultivation and manipulation of seemingly violent 
divisions between  – and within  – groups by individuals with a vested interest in 
communal supremacy in pursuit of political or economic aims. Through these 
approaches, sect- based difference becomes a vehicle through which subjectivity, 
prejudice and politics gain traction. From this, grievances develop, and as 
political structures are put in place to regulate life such sentiments become both 
institutionalised and generational. As we have seen in Lebanon, Iraq, Israel, Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia and Iran (among others), processes of state formation have regularly 
created antagonistic grievances between sectarian groups as a means of maintaining 
control and ultimately, survival.43
In many cases, the survival of the state has been conflated with the survival of the 
regime and, as such, actors seek to frame particular issues as existential threats – those 
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Securitisation seeks to understand how particular issues are moved from the realm 
of ‘normal politics’ and framed in such a way that ‘justifies the use of extraordinary 
measures to handle them’.44 These processes require the linguistic framing of events 
for particular audiences, which take place within domestic, regional and international 
contexts that support the move to extraordinary measures.45
Securitising approaches take place within spaces shaped by the interaction of the 
global with the ‘intimately tiny’. Regional politics provides context within which such 
moves take place, combined with the contingency of local factors, giving meaning to 
particular approaches that may differ in neighbouring states. To justify this suspension 
of rules and order, regimes speak to audiences to legitimise and frame their behaviour, 
yet the complexity of state building and identity construction finds traction among 
intended and unintended audiences.46 Amid a shared normative environment, 
securitising moves have implications across the Middle East, taking place within and 
across spaces that are shaped by the interaction of the global with the local.
The context in which sectarianisation occurs is integral. While sectarianisation takes 
place within political projects, it also derives a great deal of traction from geopolitical 
contexts. In recent years, a key component of sectarianisation and securitisation 
processes is a fear about nefarious Iranian activity among Shi’a communities, perhaps 
most explicitly addressed in remarks about the Shi’a Crescent. Demonstrating the 
success of such framing, a commonly held view across the region is that Iran has 
sought to destabilise states as a means through which they can increase their influence, 
capitalising on moments of crisis to manipulate domestic populations whose loyalty 
has long been questioned.47
To understand the contemporary roots of these processes we must return to Iraq 
after the 2003 invasion. Although most Arab regimes were apathetic to events in Iraq, 
Iranian forces capitalised on the vacuum that emerged after the fall of Saddam.48 In 
the years that followed, Iranian agents began to exert influence across Iraq through 
Qassem Soleimani, the influential head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps.49 
Fearing Iranian gains, Saudi officials urged the United States not to ‘leave Iraq until 
its sovereignty has been restored, otherwise it will be vulnerable to the Iranians’’.50 
The King was a staunch critic of increasing Iranian expansionism, regularly urging 
US military action. One diplomatic cable recounts the King’s exhortations to ‘cut off 
the head of the snake’, with a clear nod to the regime in Tehran.51 Moreover, Abdullah 
stressed that he had ‘no confidence whatsoever in Maliki’, proclaiming that he had 
no credibility. Moreover, Maliki was ‘an Iranian agent’ who had ‘opened the door for 
Iranian influence in Iraq’ since taking power.52 Abdullah’s comments echo those made 
by previous Saudi officials, pre- dating the revolution, yet the increased influence of 
Iranian actors escalated these fears.53 At this time, US diplomatic cables are dominated 
by Saudi and Bahraini efforts to securitise the Iranian threat to US audiences, calling 
on Washington to suspend normal politics and prevent rapprochement with Iran.54
Life in Iraq became increasingly precarious with many fearing for their lives amid 
widespread violence and seemingly routine persecution. Within such a landscape, 
Sunni tribes across Anbar found themselves in bare life, trapped between Shi’a 
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Struggling to meet basic needs and facing threats to their lives from Shi’a militias 
who were seemingly acting with impunity and without recourse to political or legal 
structures, a number of Sunni tribes were left with little option but to find protection 
from groups such as Da’ish.56 Fragmentation of state structures across Iraq resulted in 
narratives of sectarian conflict consuming the political sphere, yet as Fanar Haddad 
has presciently argued, such claims fall wide of the mark.57 Instead, fragmentation 
revealed a complex and fluid set of interactions around communal identities that may 
coalesce around sectarian identities but were far more nuanced, with repercussions 
beyond the borders of Iraq.
Similar strategies of political marginalisation can be seen across Saudi Arabia’s 
response to the Arab Uprisings.58 Fragmentation of political organisation created 
spaces of possibility for increased involvement of a range of actors, prompting 
the kingdom to cultivate and mobilise allies, typically along sectarian lines. The 
sectarianisation of geopolitics served as a means of securing influence across the 
region while simultaneously reducing the influence of their rivals.
For Saudi Arabia, action was necessary to curtail the burgeoning threat posed 
by Iran.59 Supporting this, Prince Saud Al Faisal, the late Foreign Minister of Saudi 
Arabia, was reported as saying, ‘You can’t feast and leave your neighbours hungry’.60 
In contrast, for many in Iran, widespread anti- Iranian sentiment was a consequence 
of Saudi and American actions. According to Javad Zarif, ‘Iranian “aggression” is a 
myth, easily perpetuated by those willing to spend their dollars on American military 
equipment and public- relations firms, and by those promising to protect American 
interest rather than those of their own people’.61
In these geopolitical conditions, regimes sought to circumvent domestic unrest 
through sectarianisation. As protest movements challenged the survival of authoritarian 
rulers, regimes began the process of closing communities off against the sectarian other, 
drawing on history and geopolitical fears as a means of ensuring their survival.
In Bahrain, sectarianisation has been taken alongside emergency laws in an attempt 
to regulate life, which has long been shaped by the exercise of power by the ruling 
Sunni minority over the Shi’a majority amid allegations of divided loyalties and long- 
standing Iranian claims to the island.62 The history of violent opposition in Bahrain 
fueled such suspicions, particularly with regard to the Islamic Front for the Liberation 
of Bahrain (IFLB) and rhetoric from Tehran.
In an attempt to ensure the survival of the regime, the Al Khalifa regime excluded 
Shi’a from the security services63 and prominent ministries, although a number still 
held senior positions in the private sector, much like other states who experience 
‘sectarian violence’.64 A second strategy was to reduce the demographic influence of 
the Shi’a, while the third strategy was to mobilise Sunni identities against their Shi’a 
counterparts to secure the regime’s support base, a domestic move aimed at securing 
regional support.65
Shortly after the protests began, Saudi- led GCC forces of the Peninsular Shield Force 
crossed the King Fahd causeway and entered Bahrain. The force was instrumental in 
crushing the protest movements and in the months to follow, a widespread crackdown 
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Sunnis in Bahrain and beyond, Shi’a groups were framed as fifth columnists, allies of 
Iran and part of a Shi’a crescent. Securitising moves helped cultivate such fears among 
Sunni Bahrains, creating a climate where one Sunni businessman claimed that ‘the 
Persians are everywhere’.66 Such sentiments are also held by a number of state officials, 
revealed after the publication of an article by Fawaz bin Mohammad Al Khalifa that 
articulated the ‘expansionist ambitions of the Persian Shia establishment’, laying blame 
for unrest in Bahrain, Lebanon, Kuwait and Yemen at the door of Iran.67
Such fears had routinely been expressed to US officials. In 2006, Bahraini officials 
argued that ‘as long as Khamenei has the title of Commander- in- Chief, Bahrain must 
worry about the loyalty of Shia who maintain ties and allegiance to Iran’.68 Among the 
island’s Shi’a populations, such views are deeply offensive. One Bahraini Shi’a cleric 
declared that ‘it is an insult to accuse me of following an Iranian agenda or being part 
of an Iranian vision of the region just for being from a Shi’a background’.69 Fears of 
increased Shi’a involvement in political life resulted in widespread gerrymandering, 
the manipulation of electoral borders as a means of ensuring Sunni dominance in 
electoral districts as much as possible.
Fundamental to this adherence of this anti- Iranian sentiment were concerns in 
Manama that ‘the Saudis would turn off the tap’, revealing the collapse of distinctions70 
between (geo)politics and religion, where identities begin to play a dual role, 
demonstrating both nationalist and religious loyalties, leaving Bahrainis caught within 
a regional struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran and their own domestic issues. 
Sectarianisation efforts drew upon both Bahraini history  – notably long- standing 
Iranian claims to the island and the actions of the IFLB – and broader geopolitical 
fears. Amid such fears, sectarianising narratives found traction among many Sunni 
Bahrainis, quickly exacerbating divisions across the island, meaning that the Al Khalifa 
retained power and Shi’a opposition groups were largely marginalised from political, 
social and economic life.71
In Yemen, a similar story unfolded. While typically (inaccurately) reduced to a 
conflict over sectarian difference, Yemen is perhaps the best example of how a conflict 
gains sectarian meaning through taking on geopolitical importance. Prior to 2014, 
there was little talk of sectarian difference in a country whose complex divisions occur 
along tribal or political lines. Yet following the coup d’état against Abd Rabbu Mansour 
Hadi and the rapidly increasing influence of the Houthi movement, this dramatically 
changed to the point that Saudi soldiers fighting in Yemen are told they are fighting 
against Shi’a heretics.
Saudi Arabia responded to the threat of growing Iranian influence in Yemen by 
building an alliance with the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt, which sought to eradicate 
the Houthis, resulting in massive humanitarian consequences and allegations of war 
crimes.72 The complexity of political and security factors within the civil war created 
ample space for external actors to work towards their own geopolitical aspirations. 
The presence of a melange of actors laying claim to political legitimacy and authority 
fed into the fragmentation of the state, amid strong tribal currents, the presence of 
a powerful Al Qa’ida franchise, and burgeoning secessionist movements.73 Amid 
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firing Iranian- made missiles at targets in Saudi Arabia – Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince 
Mohammed bin Salman accused Iran of ‘direct military aggression’, suggesting that 
Tehran’s actions ‘may be considered an act of war against the Kingdom’.74 Yet in later 
incidents in 2019, more restraint was shown.
For Adel Al Jubeir, ‘Iranian interventions in the region are detrimental to the 
security of neighbouring countries and affect international peace and security. We will 
not allow any infringement of our national security’.75 Moreover, ‘Iran’s role and its 
direct command of its Houthi proxy in this matter constitute a clear act of aggression 
that targets neighbouring countries, and threatens peace and security in the region 
and globally’.76 Although Saudi involvement in Yemen can be traced back to 1978 and 
the establishment of networks of patronage in support of its aims, the provision of 
financial support since 2007 to help the Yemeni state to buy wheat on global markets 
has left many in Riyadh with the belief that they have a say in Yemeni politics, which 
is increasingly viewed through a sectarian lens. While many in the kingdom hold the 
view that Yemeni politics ‘should not be in opposition to Riyadh’, the dominance of the 
Houthis have proved detrimental to the success of this strategy.77 Saudi influence was 
traditionally exerted through ‘bags of cash’, although this was also matched by military 
support during the six Saada wars and while many were critical of Saudi involvement 
it is generally accepted that ‘Iran will never pay the food bill for Yemen’.78
In contrast, Iranian involvement in Yemen can be traced back to around 2006 when 
members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) provided Houthis and 
members of the southern Yemen population with weapons, tactics, financial resources 
and PR strategies. This led to collusion with Hizballah and the establishment of a strong 
network of informants, spies, developmental strategists, soldiers and politicians, which 
provided Iran with a strong degree of leverage and influence, albeit at very little expense. 
In spite of this involvement, US diplomatic cables from the years before the uprisings 
acknowledge that Houthi weapons were originally Yemeni army weapons bought on 
the black market.79 There was no evidence of Iranian support at this time, although in 
the years that followed, Tehran offered a great deal more support to the Houthis.
The sectarianisation of regional politics took a different form with Saudi efforts 
to convert members of the Yemeni Zaydi community to Wahhabism. Reflecting the 
construction of space – as regional forces interact with the local factors – tribal leaders 
also saw this as a means through which they could circumvent the historical legacy 
of the sayyid (descendants of the Prophet) facilitating the fracturing of the Shi’a body 
politic.80 Religious groups provided possibilities for achieving political ends in such 
conditions. In Bahrain where the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi groups were used to 
counter the threat posed by Shi’a groups and, although this policy was used after the 
uprisings, by 2014 pressure from Riyadh prevented its continued use.81 The same year, 
demands from Saudi Arabia and the UAE placed pressure on the Bahraini government 
to give key ministerial positions to independent politicians with strong links to the 
military and security sector who were recruited into politics after retiring to serve as 
independents in support of the Al Khalifa.82
In Egypt, the securitisation of the Muslim Brotherhood built upon long- standing 










The regime fights back 193
193
group’s political capacity, violently rejecting and crushing their beliefs in the process. 
As the family of one protester jailed in Egypt claimed, ‘The regime in Egypt is waging 
war against the young who dare to dream of a bright future for themselves and their 
country.’83 In the months that followed the toppling of Morsi, regime forces used force 
to destroy the infrastructure of the Muslim Brotherhood, killing thousands of its 
members in the process.
In Syria, although protests initially began around demands for political reform, the 
Assad regime constructed narratives of sectarian difference, as part of a mechanism of 
control. As protests escalated, a civil war broke out broadly although not exclusively84 
along sectarian lines,85 as the Assad regime supported violent Sunni groups such as 
Al Qa’ida in an attempt to deepen such divisions and exacerbating the conflict. In a 
survey by The Day After, almost three- quarters of people asked responded that they 
had experienced sectarian discrimination.86 This behaviour was not new. As Haider 
Al Khoei argued, the Syrian regime had long manipulated violent extremist agendas 
for their own ends, particularly after the 2003 invasion of Iraq when Sunni jihadists 
were incited to fight in Iraq.87
Elements of the Syrian opposition initially sought to maintain the peaceful 
character of the revolution into the summer of 2011, rejecting the call to arms 
politically, nationally and ethically.88 Yet as the regime became increasingly violent in 
its repression of events, the protestors armed themselves to protect their families and 
neighbourhoods amid huge power disparities with the regime.89
With the emergence of protest movements across the country, Assad quickly sought 
to frame them as jihadists, part of an Al Qa’ida movement determined to topple his 
regime. Although this narrative quickly found traction, it faced a serious problem as 
most of the jihadists present in Syria were imprisoned. In an attempt to strengthen the 
regime narrative, a number of these prisoners were discretely released in the spring 
and summer of 2011, whereupon many joined groups including the forerunner of 
Da’ish. Reflecting on such events, then Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson argued that 
the British position was that it was Assad’s ‘decision to let Daesh out of the jails to 
create this alternative for the West’.90
After this manipulation of divisions within the fabric of Syrian society, fear quickly 
began to take hold and violence became a prominent feature of political life. As Yassin 
Al Haj Saleh suggests, the descent into fear was a prominent strategy of tashbih – a 
sense of collective paranoia – as regimes murder ‘the very concept of truth’.91 In such 
conditions, it was hardly surprising that protestors took up arms in self- defence. The 
conflict quickly gained an international dimension through the construction and 
manipulation of sect- based networks that transcended the Syrian state,92 while the 
presence of Iranian, Russian and Hizballah figures further eroded sovereign power.93 
As societal schisms deepened, the fighting intensified, leading to mass casualties across 
the state and a descent into an intractable conflict.
Beyond the violence, a number of other strategies were used to retain the support 
of people across Syria. Public space took on existential importance and cities became 
battlegrounds. Urban environments underwent rapid transformation as they endured 
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the scale of fighting between rival groups. In places where violence had not escalated 
as far, urban landscapes were transformed in different ways, taking on increasingly 
militarised characteristics. Conflict also took place over contested historiographies 
and culture, as protestors challenged the meaning of poetry, narratives and music 
previously used by the regime in an effort to develop an emancipatory identity and to 
erode support for the Assad regime.94
Similar events unfolded in Yemen, where fighting had a deleterious impact upon 
both the state and also the ability of people to meet their basic needs. Amid serious 
environmental challenges, water reserves rapidly depleted, 18.8 million people need 
some kind of humanitarian assistance while 17 million people are considered to be 
food insecure.95 Politically, the unification of north and south looks increasingly 
precarious, particularly as southern separatists declare a state of emergency and reject 
the legitimacy of the Saudi supported government.96
Political and structural repression of opposition groups across the Middle East was 
supported by people who feared that the escalation of conflict – albeit one that began 
in a quest to secure better democratic rights – would end in a similar situation to that 
found in Syria. Moreover, the sectarianisation of political life fuelled suspicions that 
democratic movements were cover for seditious activity, orchestrated by Iran. And 
with these fears, democratic aspirations were renounced by many in favour of security 
and stability.97
Yet not all efforts to exacerbate sectarian divisions resulted in violence. A  2015 
Da’ish attack on a mosque in Kuwait City was met by widespread condemnation while 
Sunni and Shi’a prayed together in a demonstration of unity. In an attempt to maintain 
this unity, hate speech was criminalised and in a number of speeches, the Emir made 
repeated pleas for unity, condemning those wishing to create discord. Claims to unity 
were echoed by a group of diwaniyahs – the Kuwaiti traditional ‘gathering lounges’ – 
who stressed the Kuwaiti spirit of devotion and togetherness,98 while Shi’a political 
groups occupied a prominent role in the political system as a bulwark against other 
opposition groups.99
Events such as this in Kuwait City and others such as the attack on a Shi’a Mosque 
in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia reveal the collapse of political and theological 
tensions. While many are quick to blame Hizballah- type organisations  – and by 
extension Iran – for such actions, in recent years they have been conducted by groups 
such as Da’ish who wish to capitalise on burgeoning sectarian tensions. Anti- Shi’a 
rhetoric from Saudi leaders creates a climate where such attacks can take place. This 
strategy seeks to trap Sunni Arab regimes:  either to demonstrate nationalist unity 
with Shi’a groups and risk alienating Sunni supporters, or to risk further instability by 
alienating Shi’a groups further.
The increasing sectarianisation of political life has other serious implications. 
Economic dimensions of sectarian difference are clearly seen in Syria, Lebanon and 
Bahrain and although events have been framed as sectarian struggles, a more nuanced 
analysis positions class within socio- political difference. In Lebanon, where society is 
still recovering from the civil war that left a deep scar on the psyche of the country, 
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Line’, political life is organised along sectarian lines.100 Yet within such sectarian blocs, 
economic factors are perhaps the real drivers of division, as wealthy business leaders 
cultivate difference as a mechanism of ensuring support from their constituencies, 
while also benefitting from divisions financially.101 Indeed, in recent years a number 
of cross- sectarian alliances have emerged,102 perhaps as a result of the power- sharing 
agreement. Thus, to reduce political divisions to a theological base wilfully ignores 
how divisions are being manipulated to suit the needs of a wealthy few.
Returning to the concept of nomos, we can see how sectarianisation processes 
seek to create order over space, but also to close off an inside against an outside, 
shaped by historical experience. This process of closing is different to previous 
processes, achieved through the displacement and exclusion of individuals from 
the inside, essentially closing them off from the community. This takes place 
through the framing of Shi’a groups as an existential threat to the survival of the 
community whose loyalties lie with a group that has been closed off against the 
inside. As a consequence, securitisation and sectarianisation moves seek to solidify 
the closing off of the inside against an outside, but also to strengthen the bonds 
of the inside against the outside from within, reordering regional politics in the 
process.
Necropolitics and war machines
Amid conditions of uncertainty and increasing violence, regimes sought to retain 
power through a plethora of strategies. While some reformed political structures, 
others sought to control life by stripping it of political meaning. In some cases, the 
fragmentation of the state meant that these strategies were not viable, leading to the 
emergence of necropolitics and mobilisation of war machines in a final attempt to exert 
sovereign power and ensure regime survival. In a number of states, regimes embarked 
on a dangerous yet calculated gambit designed to secure their rule by mobilising jihadist 
movements to create – and escalate – sectarian violence. Within such environments, 
regimes used excessive violence to regulate life, resulting in catastrophic loss of life 
and devastating humanitarian conditions. One consequence of this is the mobilisation 
of war machines – the manifestation of disruption against sovereign power – as an 
expression of agency.
The case of Da’ish offers a good example of the emergence of war machines out 
of fragmentation and the contestation of sovereign power in the years after the 
2003 war.
An array of mistakes from Iraqi, US, UK and Iranian governments empowered 
Sunni militancy and amid conditions of marginalisation, securitisation and existential 
crises they drew support from people marginalised from political and economic 
structures. Fundamentally, the group was able to emerge as a consequence of the 
failure of Sunnis to find political representation, either formally or informally,103 yet 
it is now generally accepted that the key strategists in the group were ex- Ba’athists, 
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In conditions of uncertainty, around 50 PMUs emerged, with membership estimated 
to be between 60,000 and 140,000 people.104 The identities of the PMUs provided 
opportunities for external actors to become involved in political life, raising questions 
about Iranian involvement and, in the longer term, debates about integration. In the 
struggle against Da’ish, militias played a key role in the liberation of Mosul and as such, 
Baghdad’s efforts to curtail the power and influence of the groups bringing them into 
the institutional machinery of the state – many of whom had ‘given blood’ for Iraq – 
was met with a great deal of resistance.
This move sought to end the existence of the PMUs as war machines, although the 
level of criminality involved with such groups means that Baghdad may not be fully 
able to put an end to them. Yet the move evoked questions about the groups more 
broadly and the role of clerics such as Iraq’s leading Shi’a cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali 
Sistani, who issued a number of fatwas calling on Iraqis to engage in political life in 
a number of often contradictory ways in the fifteen years after the US- led invasion. 
These not only mobilised Iraqis, but imbued lives with meaning, taking them from 
conditions of bare life into a more qualified political existence, revealing the impact of 
religious figures on political life.
In Yemen, the fragmentation of political organisation created space for countless 
groups and factions – often with competing agendas – to operate within the territorial 
shell of the state.105 Underpinning the social fabric of the state was a complex and 
malleable tribal network that was shaped by the concerns of their respective leaders, 
leading to a range of transient alliances that cut across society. Groups possessed a 
range of different political aspirations that were driven by the contexts in which they 
were operating, where poverty, corruption and civil war were rife. Although external 
borders of the state have proved somewhat durable, internally a number of ‘mini- states’ 
each held together by its own internal logic, economy and political ecosystem.106 The 
failure of the 2014 National Dialogue appears to contradict such a view, particularly 
amid the secessionist demands, which remain prevalent.107 In such conditions, war 
machines shape Yemeni politics, in many cases often competing and funded by 
external actors, adding to the complexity and ferocity of the fighting.108
The Houthi movement fought six wars with the Saleh regime between 2004 and 
2010, during which time the group evolved from small cadre of fighters comprised 
of the family and friends of Hussein Badr Al  Din Al  Huthi, the group’s leader, into an 
organisation that would pose an existential challenge to Saleh’s leadership. Although 
routinely referred to an Iranian proxy, the Houthis were formed as an independent 
entity operating with national goals, yet Tehran’s influence has increased in recent 
years.
The Houthi movement – which took on the formal name Ansar Allah, the Partisans 
of God, in 2011 – is one that is comprised of a range of fluid alliances, both overt and 
covert, but predicated on a ‘precise knowledge’ of tribal dynamics, albeit supported by 
Iran and Hizballah.109 The fluidity of their alliances is seen in their willingness to work 
with Saleh, which allowed Ansar Allah to co- opt forces loyal to the former President, to 
capture Sana’a on 21 September 2014. Less than six months later, the group also overran 
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ever conducted by the group, reflecting its ability to draw upon local grievances and 
create alliances in an incredibly complex set of political dynamics. In such conditions 
of fragmentation, war machines took on more formal characteristics of state power, 
losing some of their fluidity in the process, while regimes took on characteristics of war 
machines, leading to increased instability and Saudi- led intervention.
Similar complexity is found in conflict zones across the region. As political life 
fragmented, war machines continued to emerge, capitalising on the elasticity of 
political structures. With the erosion of sovereign power, groups began to offer support 
and protection to communities across the region. Such conditions were exacerbated by 
the sectarianisation of regional politics, which imbued local politics with new meaning, 
often derived from geopolitical struggles. External support for proxies increased the 
contestation of sovereign power, adding to the conflation of regional and domestic 
politics that began to collapse into each other, along with the emergence of war 
machines that challenged political projects in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza and Yemen.
Of course, the emergence of a war machine is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, if we 
look at the history of the region, when sovereignty fragments, war machines emerge, 
further adding to the contestation of power. Within the context of sectarianisation, 
the manifestation of this type of war machine often serves to reproduce sectarian 
difference, particularly when they are sponsored by external actors propagating 
their own agendas. The emergence of increasingly violent war machines documents 
the weakness of sovereign power and the strength of asabiyyah amid political 
fragmentation. In such conditions, the sect emerges as a new form of life as regimes 
practice necropolitics on marginalised masses, along sect- based lines. In pursuit of 
such an aim, war machines from the same asabiyyah are often co- opted, subsumed 
into state structures as a mechanism of control. Although seemingly against the 
deterritorialised nature of the concept, this reveals the fluidity of sovereign power and 
complexity of different logics deployed to regulate life. Such an approach also serves 
as a mechanism to colonise life ‘from below’, defining the inside against an outside, 
restricting and regulating life in the process.
Beyond the manifestation of war machines, other regimes have sought to maintain 
sovereign power through recourse to necropolitics. The brutality of the Assad regime 
was seen in the early days of the uprisings but by this point, it was well versed in 
dealing with challenges to its rule, much like a number of its neighbours. Since Hafez 
Al Assad came to power in 1971, political activity was limited through the violent 
regulation of life and subjugation of it to death in times of crisis, such as in Hama. In 
2011, protestors stressed the peaceful nature of their actions, offering flowers, food and 
water to soldiers that had been sent to crush their expressions of political dissent. In 
response, a number of prominent individuals were arrested, tortured and killed; their 
mutilated bodies were later returned to their families for burial. Tens of thousands 
of protesters were ‘disappeared’ into government prisons, where tales of torture and 
inhumane cruelty continue to be told. This was, as Al Haj Saleh notes, the action of a 
colonial aggressor, internal to the very structure of the state.
In Syria, death became a consequence of torture, not a by- product of it, and as 
a consequence necropolitics became the logic of governmentality through which 
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the Syrian state exerted power and subjected large segments of the population to 
‘political and symbolic extermination’.110 With the escalation of the conflict, the 
Syrian regime used chemical weapons on its own population, seeking to regulate life 
by subjugating it to death. This was not an isolated incident, but as UN war crimes 
investigators suggested, by April 2018, there were thirty- four confirmed cases of the 
use of chemical weapons.111
The Assad regime used all possible mechanisms to regulate life and death, drawing 
on a range of issues including the exclusionary ideas of ‘Absolute Arabism’, sectarian 
difference and the socio- economic climate that had created the Shabiha, a militia 
with close links to the Assad family. The Shabiha operates as an example of the war 
machine, regulating life through repression and restriction and making money 
through appropriation, although in this case war machines were hiding behind the 
mask of the state. In such conditions, repression transforms into business, a new model 
of governance that rewards those who are loyal to the regime, allowing Shabiha to 
make money through appropriating the production of others, while creating  – and 
capitalising upon – conditions of tashbih (typically understood in the Syrian context 
as ‘thuggishnesss’) that found traction amid sectarian biases and divisions within 
communities. As violence increased and the regime faced increasingly existential 
challenges, the Shabiha took on a prominent role in the defence of the regime as 
security was privatised. Unlike other manifestations of the war machine, this is not just 
an armed militia. Instead, and this point should be carefully stressed, it is a powerful 
state actor with responsibilities that is using its regulatory force to subjugate life to 
death in support of the regime’s goal: survival at all costs.
Rent and reform
In contrast to regimes who used political and legal strategies that were underpinned 
by the use of violence, others responded in different ways. Those predicated upon 
the rentier bargain were able to draw upon a variety of methods to placate protest 
movements, essentially buying off protest movements within the context of the current 
social contract. Yet a number of regimes also engaged in reform of political systems 
and those involved in political life.
The largest of all reform packages was in Saudi Arabia – representing the fear felt 
by many in the Al Saud about the consequences of protests breaking out across the 
kingdom – where a welfare package of around $130 billion was announced. Bigger 
than the state’s 2007 budget, it contained a raft of new jobs in the Ministry of Interior – 
adding to the burgeoning public sector employment problem – along with five hundred 
thousand new houses, an increased minimum wage and general infrastructural 
improvements.112 It was supplemented by a number of reforms, including permitting 
women to vote and run in municipal elections.113 In Bahrain, twenty thousand new 
jobs were promised in the Ministry of Interior.114 The UAE offered around $2 billion 
for new housing loans, dwarfed by Qatar’s pledge of $8 billion for salary and benefit 
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and commitments to keep food prices low. In Kuwait, around $3,500 was given to each 
national along with a promise that basic food items would be free for two years.115
In March 2011 a GCC fund was established for Bahrain and Oman that saw 
Manama and Muscat receiving $10 billion each over a ten- year period to facilitate 
infrastructure developments. It was later announced that the GCC fund would also 
provide developmental assistance worth $5 billion to both Jordan and Morocco, 
alongside debate about expanding the GCC.116 It was through the provision of financial 
assistance that Saudi Arabia began to take on an increasingly prominent regional role, 
using its financial might to influence actors amid widespread instability.
While few Gulf states suffered serious damage in the uprisings, the situation 
worsened in 2014, when the price of oil dropped around 70% over the previous year. 
The impact was felt across the region, where spending was dramatically cut and harsh 
austerities measures were imposed in Saudi Arabia after an IMF report suggested 
that the kingdom would run out of money within five years at its current rate.117 
This prompted a raft of new policies aimed at invigorating the kingdom’s economy, 
spearheaded by a new Crown Prince, Mohammad bin Salman. While Saudi Arabia 
was the outlier, other states across the region were also affected, requiring serious 
reconsideration of social contracts and political organisation. Ultimately, the Gulf 
states – Bahrain aside – were largely able to circumvent unrest by updating their social 
contracts but this required ongoing demonstrations of responsibility towards citizens.
Others undertook minor reform as a mechanism of placating protesters. In Jordan, 
forty- two minor constitutional amendments were issued,118 along with changes to 
electoral laws. Electoral laws were also changed in Kuwait119 while religious figures 
were banned from standing in elections in Bahrain.120 In Oman, a number of ministers 
were removed from office following protester demands to eradicate corruption. 
Constitutional reform in the aftermath of the uprisings both acquiesced to protester 
demands as in Egypt and Oman, but also reverted back to characteristics of the ancien 
régime, as in Yemen, where following the removal of Ali Abdullah Salah, the country 
returned to single- candidate elections for the office of president. Constitutional reform 
in moments of disjuncture is a characteristic feature of the Middle East. During the 
1950s and 1960s, amid a period of political turmoil, constitutions became malleable 
documents through which political agendas were expressed. Yet  although agendas 
were expressed in a number of states, the complexity of political situations and deep 
grievances created conditions that could be triggered into mass violence.
The uprising and the coup d’état
The story of the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise – and fall – in the years after the Arab 
Uprisings is perhaps emblematic of the struggle over political life in the Middle East 
and competing visions of the ordering of space.121 After the toppling of Hosni Mubarak, 
the military retained control under the leadership of SCAF, revoking emergency 
legislation122 and holding parliamentary and presidential elections across 2011– 12 that 










Houses built on sand200
20
a number of candidates from the Freedom and Justice Party. While in power, many 
expressed concerns at the extent to which Morsi and the Brotherhood had been able 
to undertake serious change within state institutions and infrastructure. As Nathan 
Brown noted, the power of the deep state in Egypt meant that Morsi was unable to 
exert serious influence over the military and security services, leaving him without 
real power.123
Although in the early stages of the uprisings the official line of the Brotherhood 
was to remain neutral, younger members of the organisation played an integral role 
in driving events.124 In spite of deep schisms within the ikhwan between those who 
advocated neutrality and those who desired more involvement, prior to the ‘Day of 
Rage’, the group announced that it was endorsing the protest movements, calling on its 
members to join protesters in the streets.125 This decision was essential in increasing the 
legitimacy of the ikhwan, where the group’s members were praised for their courage.126
After almost sixty years of political marginalisation, the Muslim Brotherhood was 
invited into the SCAF- supervised interim administration to participate in a nation 
dialogue to shape the future of Egypt.127 In presidential elections, the Ikhwan sought 
to ‘participate, not to dominate’ with the goal of working towards a vision of national 
unity.128 A  spokesperson for the group stressed that they were ‘wiling to form an 
alliance with the political forces that agree to our principles, whether they are socialists, 
liberals, or other Islamist forces and all forces concerned about this homeland’.129
The founding statement of the Freedom and Justice Party, the Brotherhood’s political 
wing, stressed the goal of inclusion, working to rebuild state institutions and aspiring 
to cultivate the Egyptian political community.130 On 24 June 2012, Mohammed Morsi 
was appointed as President of Egypt with 51.7% of the vote, the first time an Islamist 
had been democratically chosen to lead a modern Arab state.
In spite of inclusive aspirations, Morsi’s rule was not without problems. For some 
such as Asef Bayat, this was to be expected as the group experienced the transition 
to ‘post- Islamism’,131 yet it was the creation of a new constitution132 that gave Morsi 
and the Brotherhood increasingly authoritarian powers – and emergency powers that 
went beyond those of Mubarak  – which was ultimately the cause of their downfall 
as they failed to live up to their promise of inclusion and creating an Egypt for all.133 
Ultimately, the constitution sought to strengthen the Brotherhood’s position as a 
means of overcoming the political deadlock that had consumed the country.134
In protest at the new constitution, sit- ins and marches quickly followed the 
constitutional decree and Morsi’s intention to hold a referendum on its application. 
Once again, thousands of people entered Tahrir Square to protest against the regime 
where they were met by ikhwan supporters.135 In early December, clashes took place 
across Cairo between protesters and supporters of the ikhwan while chants reminiscent 
of early 2011 rang out.136 In the months leading up to the coup d’état, Morsi’s government 
lost what little support it had retained after the constitutional crisis and on 3 July 2013, 
Morsi was forced from power.137 In the aftermath of the coup d’état, the military once 
again seized power, demonstrating the power and prevalence of the ‘deep state’.
Reflecting increased insecurity following the coup, Emergency Law No. 162 of 
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to allow for the clearing of two Muslim Brotherhood camps139 leaving six hundred 
dead and four thousand injured in what would become known as the Rabaa Massacre, 
where sovereign power was exerted by controlling death.140
Conclusions: the failure of the uprisings?
On 2 March 2017, an Egyptian court of appeal found former President Hosni Mubarak 
innocent of a number of charges including complicity in the murder of protesters in 
2011 and corruption. Although sentenced to life in prison in 2012 for conspiracy to 
murder 239 demonstrators, the case offers a symbolic ‘closing of the circle’ with the 
continuation of the deep state that once had Mubarak as its figurehead.141 Over a year 
later the Egyptian parliament ratified a draft bill giving immunity and unprecedented 
privileges to key military officials involved in the Rabaa massacre at the discretion of 
the President.142
In contrast, on 27 November 2017, a Kuwaiti court sentenced fifty people to prison 
for storming parliament in 2011, including the prominent opposition figure Musallam 
Al  Barrack. Al Barrack, who had previously spoken about how the Al Sabah’s response 
to the uprisings risked dragging the country into ‘a dark abyss’, was sentenced to 
nine years, while other protesters received sentences ranging from one to five years. 
The defendants were comprised of Salafis, members of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
youth activists and secular figures who had colluded in an anti- corruption protest in 
November 2011.
Political discourse centred around democracy and governance, while political 
reform was deemed central to improving the quality of life, but reform was viewed 
with suspicion by many. As regimes responded to protest movements with violence 
and Syria and Yemen descended into intractable violence, debate quickly moved 
away from democracy to focus upon security and stability.143 As one individual 
recounted, ‘We can’t say we have full democracy, but we are educated and progressing. 
But people don’t necessarily want democracy immediately. We saw what happened 
in Iraq.’144 Similar arguments continue to be made about events in Syria and 
Yemen, where regimes across the region are framing democracy and participatory 
politics as a slippery slope into intractable conflict. Another individual noted that 
regimes propagate narratives of choice: ‘Do you want Syria or us?’145 As one Omani 
stressed, ‘after the escalation of violence in Syria, people now think that stability is 
more important’.146
The aftermath of the uprisings was a struggle to regulate political life and the 
struggle between life and death more broadly. Although previous efforts to exert 
sovereign control were focused on the regulation of life and letting life live, in such 
contested periods, a number of regimes sought to exert control by subjugating life 
to death. The struggle to regulate life and impose order over space, over ordnung 
and ortung, became the central feature of the post- uprisings Middle East. Efforts to 
retain power through regulating and taking life challenged the territorial organisation 
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contested, the localisation of the exception and the order that regulated it were also 
challenged. From this, new spaces of possibility emerged, zones of indistinction that 
could be moulded according to a particular vision, beyond the borders of the state.
A key part of such strategies was the sectarianisation of political life, where a 
number of Arab regimes sought to frame events within the context of burgeoning 
Iranian power. In doing so, they spoke to domestic populations and framed events 
as a consequence of nefarious Iranian influence. Framing events in such a way 
was a prominent part of closing off an inside against an outside, albeit an outside 
that had previously been inside, securing the community and contributing to the 
reorganisation of regional politics. Yet as we shall see, this was not unproblematic 
amid the complex polarity of the region and the influence of Qatar, Turkey and 
Israel.
The evolution of sovereign power reveals a great deal about the nature of 
political organisation within a particular time and space. In Syria and Yemen, 
where political projects had dramatically fragmented, the recourse to necropolitics 
and mobilisation of war machines was hardly surprising. As political projects 
had been embedded within  – and shaped by  – parabolic regional pressures, the 
creation of new political spaces was almost inevitable, as a number of actors sought 
to ensure their own survival and improve their standing by dramatically altering 
the ordering of regional space. In doing this, the struggle to regulate life and define 
spatial boundaries became even more incendiary, with repercussions across the 
Middle East.
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The crisis consists in the fact that the old [order] is dying and the new cannot be 
born; in this interregnum a large variety of morbid symptoms appear.
Antonio Gramsci, Passato e presente
Ana wa akhi ala ibn ammi, ana wa ibn ammi ala algharib.
[My brother and I against our cousin, my cousin and I against a stranger.]
An old Beouin saying
In the fallout from the Arab Uprisings, a number of parallels have been drawn with the 
Thirty Years’ War across Europe in the seventeenth century.1 Take the opening lines of 
an article by Richard Haas, President of the Council on Foreign Relations:
It is a region wracked by religious struggle between competing traditions 
of the faith. But the conflict is also between militants and moderates, fueled 
by neighboring rulers seeking to defend their interests and increase their 
influence. Conflicts take place within and between states; civil wars and proxy 
wars become impossible to distinguish. Governments often forfeit control to 
smaller groups – militias and the like – operating within and across borders. The 
loss of life is devastating, and millions are rendered homeless. That could be a 
description of today’s Middle East. In fact, it describes Europe in the first half of 
the seventeenth century.2
Although the parallels are obvious, this argument reveals a great deal about analysis 
of the region, drawing upon Eurocentric approaches and linear trajectories of 
development. Moreover, as Lorenzo Kamel suggests, this is part of a broader project of 
‘medievalising’ the region, reducing identities to sectarian schisms that have their roots 
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Islam.3 This approach is part of a broader Orientalist strategy to ‘other’ the Middle East 
and neglects the multifarious factors that underpin the emergence of different types of 
involvement and relationships that are shaping the region.
Others have sought to categorise recent events as efforts to bring congruence to 
nation and state amid the alleged imposition of Western conceptions of statehood.4 
Efforts to exert power and regulate life amid the presence of powerful movements 
has had a devastating impact on regional politics. The spread of ideas and ideologies 
across state borders routinely opened up schisms between regimes and societies 
and, in turn, shaped the spatial landscape. Amid the presence of a shared normative 
environment populated by a melange of identities and ideologies within and across 
state borders, what happens in one state has the capacity to impact upon political 
life in another. Thus, regime efforts to maintain domestic power are predicated upon 
regional machinations, which may also impact upon domestic politics.
Central to such fusion is a concern with creating order and regulating space. 
Agamben’s global nomos, the spatialised localisation of the unlocalisable exception 
shapes international politics. Conditioned by neo- liberal modernity, the emergence 
of political projects fall in line with such visions. Yet as we have seen, conditions that 
facilitate ordnung and ortung have become increasingly contested, creating new spaces 
that challenge the organisation and ordering of space. State- building projects created 
zones of indistinction, which are simultaneously spaces of restriction and spaces of 
possibility to be moulded in accordance with local context and contingency. With the 
complex relationship between ordnung and ortung, new possibilities emerge for the 
reorganisation of political life.
Zones of indistinction and possibility emerge in numerous forms, perhaps most 
obviously as a consequence of competing theological and political interpretations 
of sovereign power. In discussions with people across the region about the nature 
of statehood, prominent themes included legitimacy deficits and the erosion of 
the sovereign state.5 Amid the presence of a wide range of groups exerting power 
and influence within and across territorial borders, legitimate claims to sovereign 
control and authority become increasingly complex. In a number of cases, two or 
more groups exert regulatory power over people in particular territorial areas, 
not necessarily spatially bounded, leading to competition domestically and 
regionally.6
With the onset of the uprisings, new arenas of competition emerged which brought 
together local and regional actors, simultaneously serving as zones of possibility 
and restriction as international players sought to manipulate domestic affairs often 
for their own ends.7 Yet the increasingly securitised and politicised role of religion, 
particularly within the context of the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has left 
regimes open to criticism while state security is undermined by the ability of clerics 
in one state to speak to audiences in another. When domestic audiences are framed 
as a security threat, it is hardly surprising that some communities are perceived 
to have sought guidance and support from co- ethnic or sectarian kin.8 Evoking 
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from the Arab Uprisings has consequences for the organisation of the contemporary 
Middle East.
Echo chambers and zones of possibility
Most scholars typically agree that the arrangement of Middle Eastern politics and 
security is fundamentally different to the 2003 landscape, where new ways of ordering 
space have emerged, appearing to take on sectarian characteristics and underpinned 
by anti- Iranian sentiment. Yet it is easy to misrepresent such change. As the late Fred 
Halliday noted, ‘There are two predictable, and nearly always mistaken, responses to 
any great international upheaval: one is to say that everything has changed; the other 
is to say that nothing has changed.’9 The answer, of course, is somewhere in- between, 
albeit contingent on time, place and space.
The toppling of Saddam Hussein created a ‘new’ space of competition between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, which escalated after the uprisings of 2011.10 As we saw 
earlier, Morten Valbjørn and André Bank argue that it is generally accepted that the 
region is ‘qualitatively different from earlier days’, yet in spite of this difference, they 
argue that the Middle East is still shaped by a form of Arab nationalism and shared 
ethnic experiences.11 Jerrold Green’s comments in a 1986 article that ‘Arab politics 
is still Arab’12 remains true, documenting that although nationalist concerns 
remain, they are located within geopolitical machinations and the framing of a 
‘Persian other’ alongside sectarianisation to argue that recent events are still 
shaped by nationalist concerns. This view has clear resonance in ‘high politics’, 
but has also found traction within states, particularly those who are sites of direct 
competition between the Saudis and the Iranians. With this in mind, Paul Noble’s 
comments about the Middle Eastern echo chamber as ‘a set of interconnected 
organisms separated only by porous membranes, or, alternatively a large- scale 
domestic system divided into compartments of varying degrees of permeability’ 
remain relevant.13
Central to the organisation of regional politics is the ability of religion to shape 
the conflation and calibration of space and politics, driven both by local and regional 
contexts.14 While the 2003 war in Iraq facilitated the emergence of violence along 
sect-based lines  – driven by the vociferously anti- Shi’a rhetoric of Abu Musab Al 
Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qa’ida in Iraq – the 2006 Hizballah war with Israel brought 
sectarian politics into regional calculations. Breaking norms in the ‘Arab game of 
politics’, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt publically rebuked Hizballah’s decision to go 
to war, demonstrating concern at the popularity of Hassan Nasrallah and the group 
more broadly.15 In spite of these concerns, in the aftermath of war the kingdom used 
its financial reserves to help rebuild Dahiyeh, in spite of sectarian difference, perhaps 
suggesting that the kingdom was held hostage by the remnants of Arab nationalist 
norms and its enmity towards Israel. Twelve years later, it is hard to envisage such 
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The fallout from the Arab Uprisings once again demonstrated the collapse of the 
distinction between internal and external as actors from across the region became embroiled 
in the domestic affairs of other states. Of course, this is hardly a new phenomenon, as we 
saw with Arab nationalism, but in recent years this has taken on increasing sect-based 
dimensions. As a consequence, when political crises emerge, they are also located within 
broader regional dynamics. Events in Syria offer a good example of this, transforming, 
as Bassell Saloukh suggests, from a Leviathan to a weak state, penetrated by regional 
actors as a consequence of the interplay between domestic and regional forces.16 In spite 
of this weakness, the Assad regime has exercised brutal force over its population, using all 
manner of strategies to regulate life and to subjugate life to death.
As the war escalated, it took on regional and international importance as a zone 
of indistinction, caught in competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and Russia 
and the United States. A  range of networks were mobilised to shape the conflict, 
along sectarian, ethnic, tribal and familial lines, creating a situation that was far more 
complex than the reductive analysis of ‘ancient hatreds’ or ‘proxy wars’ suggest. The 
collapsing distinction of internal and external is not limited to Syria as events in 
Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen and Iraq reveal. Although this distinction is predominantly 
a consequence of security calculations, economic factors remain important both 
independently and as a part of security calculations concerns, amid the provision 
of support for communal groups across state borders.17 Fundamentally, it is about 
regimes wanting to create order and stability.
While sovereignty and respect for the sanctity of territorial borders is routinely 
used as a mechanism to both justify and criticise political action across the region, the 
extent to which the norm of sovereignty is sacrosanct is contingent upon context.18 For 
many, external interference in the domestic affairs was seen as a ‘tool of repression’19 as 
networks were mobilised across state borders. Yet in order to mobilise these networks, 
political and socio- economic conditions must facilitate interactions between local 
and global. Here, we see how contingent factors shape different contexts, even within 
shared normative environments. For instance, although a growing number of young 
people advocate the separation of religion and politics,20 the power of religion within 
informal power structures is undeniable, shaping social, economic and political 
landscapes, with repercussions for spatial ordering.21
As a consequence, the need to contextualise events is paramount, requiring the 
location of events within local and regional environments and the identification of 
contingent factors that shape action. Of course, such contexts are underpinned by 
broader economic trends, as a consequence of globalisation and neoliberal agendas 
that collapse the distinction between internal and external.22 Such neoliberal forces 
also play an important role in shaping the political landscape, both economically 
and socially. Widespread investment in Lebanon has fed into increasingly visible 
economic divides across urban environments, which in turn have political and social 
consequences.23 Such economic divides have political and social dimensions resulting 
in the reproduction of sectarian identities alongside the emergence of powerful mafias 
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Amid the melange of identities across the Middle East, how a regime behaves 
towards one group will have repercussions with regard to how such a group behaves in 
response. The spread of identities creates space for – and the perception of – external 
involvement and manipulation of particular causes; local grievances and agendas 
quickly become imbued with regional meaning. In Syria, Sunni groups are said 
to frame themselves as Salafi in an attempt to secure money from Saudi Arabia, as 
members often changed their names to something more ‘appropriate’ to derive money 
from the kingdom.25
Reform in one state is also seen to have implications for groups in another. In 
Bahrain, a Saudi- imposed red line is alleged to have prevented the emergence of a 
democratically elected second chamber to thwart the proliferation of democratic 
aspirations into the eastern province of Saudi Arabia.26 This same red line also resulted 
in the removal of the Crown Prince from the public eye after an ill- fated effort to 
facilitate dialogue between opposition groups and the ruling family.27
The conflation of internal and external agendas also shaped the character of 
institutional structures, as fragmenting sovereignty left institutions open to the 
influence of regional actors. In Iraq, for instance, the police were perceived by some 
to be ‘controlled not by the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) but by the Islamic Supreme 
Council of Iraq (ISCI)/ Badr, particularly in Karbala, Diwaniyah and Nasiriyah’.28 
Moreover, the evisceration of state infrastructure in post- 2003 Iraq left many Sunnis 
unemployed amid social and political chaos, and increasing the target of Shi’a militias.29 
In early 2017, PMUs such as Badr were integrated into formal state structures with the 
establishment of a parallel military force, much to the chagrin of Sunni communities 
whose experiences of marginalisation and violence at the hands of the PMUs appear 
to have been ignored.30
Sectarianisation as geopolitics by other means
On 2 January 2016, Saudi Arabia executed the Shi’a cleric Nimr Al Nimr for his 
involvement in protests in the eastern province. Sheikh Nimr had long been an 
advocate of political reform in Saudi Arabia, a staunch critic of authoritarian rule and 
a prominent figure in the uprisings in 2011. In response, protests broke out across the 
eastern province, in Kashmir, Pakistan, and protesters stormed the Saudi consulate in 
Tehran as Nimr’s execution was met with global condemnation.31 A few months earlier, 
in a much less covered event, Kuwaiti officials arrested a number of nationals amid 
suggestions that they had been planning an attack against the state;32 it was alleged that 
the group was supported by Iran. Of course, most forms of domestic unrest across the 
region, particularly after the uprisings, have been framed as a consequence of nefarious 
Iranian behaviour.
Following the fragmentation of sovereign structures, power has shifted away from 
a number of regimes, providing scope for the emergence of powerful war machines 
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This transformation has provided opportunities for actors to seek to shape the region 
in accordance with their own image, with repercussions for domestic politics in the 
process. Thus, geopolitical ambitions have seen actors mobilising and harnessing the 
power of religious identities and groups along sectarian lines across the region in what 
has become known as the sectarianisation of politics.34
This type of strategy served to support narratives of Iranian manipulation and 
interference. Narratives supporting sectarianisation have had a serious impact on 
people across the region, not only in terms of their political performances but also 
concerning their own identities within the context of an evolving and increasingly 
precarious environment. There are regional and domestic repercussions of the 
sectarianisation of political life. As political contexts become imbued with sectarian 
tensions, the ordering of space takes on a geopolitically charged meaning, with Saudi 
Arabia at the vanguard of efforts to counter the Iranian threat. Efforts to challenge this 
ordering creates a precarious environment, as we shall see below.
In a changing geopolitical environment, narratives espousing the construction of 
a Shi’a crescent and cultivating fears of the Persian other became more prominent, as 
regimes sought to frame domestic events as a consequence of regional machinations. 
For a large number of Sunni Arabs across the Gulf, Iranian activity is the source of 
instability across the Middle East, resulting in the increasing politicisation and 
securitisation of the region.35 Regime responses to protest movements were framed 
as necessary retorts to perfidious action from fifth columnists supported by Tehran. 
Conflicts emerging from the fragmentation or weakness of state structures took on 
new meaning as they became shaped by geopolitical agendas. Local groups became 
embroiled in regional dynamics and vice versa, albeit the capacity of regional actors to 
affect change locally was determined by both power and perceptions of legitimacy.36 In 
the early stages of protests, events in Bahrain and Yemen were largely free of sectarian 
traits, but as external actors became more prominent, local context was given new 
meaning by incoming actors. In some cases there were suggestions that local groups 
took advantage of such events, moulding their identities according to the perceived 
wishes of external actors in search of funding, although this suggests a rather transient 
and instrumentalised view of identity.37
A wide range of tactics have been used to achieve sectarianisation, shaped by 
context- specific contingent factors. Although the prominence of religion provides 
scope for politicians to use religious and sectarian discourses for their own ends, this 
is seen to offer a means to ‘to mobilise and manipulate their people’, and we must 
locate broader narratives within local contexts.38 Yet as Haid Haid stresses, we must 
distinguish between the motives of local and regional actors, which may coalesce at 
times but may not have the same objectives.39 By doing this, we are better placed to see 
how geopolitical aims have been achieved through recourse to sectarian membership. 
This distinction also helps us consider how sectarian identities have been manipulated 
by sectarian entrepreneurs, those who are able to manipulate sectarian boundaries 
and who ‘profit from these boundaries become the defining markers of a particular 
segment of society’.40 While sectarian entrepreneurs play a prominent role in shaping 
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contingency, and the rhythms of regional forces, facilitating the sectarianisation of 
political life.
The sectarianisation of political life has serious implications for the regulation of life 
more broadly, for both states and their peoples. One journalist suggested that viewing 
events through a sectarian prism is how people have had to define themselves in order to 
survive. Essentially, ‘it is a way of saying I am less likely to be killed by this person than 
if I align with that person’.41 While such analysis may appear reductive, the conflation of 
politics, economics and sect has loaded sect-based identities with existential importance, 
to the extent that the interaction of each facet shapes the other. In places such as Lebanon, 
sectarian dimensions risk becoming all encompassing, providing business elites – both 
legitimate and mafias – with the mechanisms to increase their profit margins and political 
elites with mechanisms of control. Quickly this became an existential issue, not because 
of sectarian difference itself, but because of the political and economic manifestations of 
this difference and the ways in which this plays out across all aspects of life.42
One possible response to such issues is to move to a federal model, such as in 
Lebanon, or to formalise the quasi- federalism in operation across Iraq, yet this too 
is problematic.43 While the current Prime Minister Haider Al Abadi recognises 
decentralisation as a mechanism to empower local communities within the context 
of a nationalist project, his predecessor Nouri Al Maliki viewed decentralisation as a 
‘hidden plot’ and part of an agenda to divide the country. Others suggest that opening 
Iraq – and indeed Syria will ‘open Pandora’s box’, resulting in ‘a race to the bottom 
in each individual canton [over] who is more Sunni, who is more Shia who is more 
Kurdish’.44 Supporting this perception, Haider Al Khoei argued that unlike a century 
ago, if Iraq were to be partitioned, ‘it is not going to be white men in suits meeting in 
London and Paris drawing lines on a piece of paper and imposing them; it is going to 
be young, angry armed men on the ground who will impose, change or redraw those 
lines with their blood’.45 Acknowledging the concern about increasing instability and 
Iranian influence in Iraq, Saudi Arabia has attempted to build alliances with a number 
of Shi’a parties who are seen as ‘nationalist’, including with Moqtada Al Sadr.46
Much like in Iraq, the fragmentation of Syria drew in regional and international 
actors working towards their own geopolitical goals.47 The provision of support to a 
range of different sides in a multi- faceted conflict served to entrench divisions that 
quickly took on sectarian dimensions through a policy of sect-coding by the Assad 
regime, creating an intractability that prevents the swift resolution of the conflict. In 
contrast to events in Bahrain and Yemen, where Saudi efforts sought to preserve the 
status quo, in Syria – much like Iraq – Riyadh attempted to topple the Assad regime to 
reduce Iranian influence across the Levant. As Madawi Al Rasheed notes, Saudi policy 
in Syria can be described as an attempt to ‘win Syria back to the Arab fold’, in doing so, 
dramatically reducing Iranian influence across the region. Yet the internationalisation 
of the conflict geographically and through the spread of Wahhabism helped to secure 
the survival of the Assad regime while also making the conflict increasingly intractable.
In Egypt, the election of Mohammad Morsi as President posed a different kind 
of challenge to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The ikhwan has long challenged Saudi 
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the state apparatus during the 1960s. The Morsi government, the first democratically 
elected Islamist President, offered an alternative vision of the ordering of political 
life to that propagated by the Al Saud, while their social activity was seen as a threat 
in the UAE. At this time, Qatar offered public support to the Morsi government, 
causing a great deal of irritation to their Gulf neighbours. Fuelling the concerns of 
many, Morsi’s government appeared willing to improve relations with Iran, much 
to the chagrin of Saudi Arabia. As a consequence, it was hardly surprising that the 
toppling of the Brotherhood was well received and shortly after the coup, Saud 
Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait pledged $12 billion in aid to Abdul Fatah Al Sisi’s ‘new’, 
ancien régime.
Bahrain has largely managed to control unrest, albeit at a price. In seeking to 
address demographic imbalances, naturalisation processes gave Bahraini passports 
to Sunnis from the Asian subcontinent and Africa, while members of the Shi’a 
community were framed as fifth columnists doing the bidding of Tehran. The 
societal implications of such a reframing may not be seen in the very near future, 
but schisms between different societal groups will emerge. In Lebanon, the influx 
of Syrian refugees has led to increasing xenophobia and the amorphous alignment 
of a number of indigenous Lebanese parties against the refugees.48 Similar forms of 
anti- refugee xenophobia are also found in Turkey as a consequence of the political, 
social and economic pressures placed on the state in order to accommodate those 
displaced from Syria.49
Fundamentally, such moves have positioned Arab and Sunni concerns front and 
centre within regional security calculations. Although a number of rulers have sought 
to cultivate new nationalisms, these are all too often predicated upon an exclusive view 
of national identity based upon shared communal characteristics of ethnicity and sect, 
defined against the other, cultivating racisms, fear and hatred in the process. Within 
this strategy, networks are mobilised and while traditionally along sect- based lines, 
it begins to take the form of regional patronage as richer states distribute financial 
resources in pursuit of their own ends.
Geopolitical realignment
Given the region’s geopolitical importance it was hardly surprising that events took 
on an international dimension, becoming imbued with additional complexity and 
contradiction in the process. The most obvious example of this is in Syria, where 
fighting between regime and opposition figures was complicated by the presence of 
external actors providing support to a range of groups. While the United States, Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar and Turkey provided support to rebel groups, Russia, Iran and Hizballah 
supported the regime,50 yet it would be remiss to suggest that Tehran and Moscow 
agree on longer- term goals.51
Debate about how best to respond to the uprisings was shaped not only by events in 
the region but also by the domestic contexts of international states. The administration 
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marked shift from his predecessor Barack Obama, whose administration had taken a 
more conciliatory position towards Tehran.52 In a wide- ranging interview with Jeffrey 
Goldberg published in The Atlantic, Obama’s views on the Middle East were articulated:
The competition between the Saudis and the Iranians – which has helped to feed 
proxy wars and chaos in Syria and Iraq and Yemen  – requires us to say to our 
friends as well as to the Iranians that they need to find an effective way to share 
the neighborhood and institute some sort of cold peace.53
It was hardly surprising that Obama’s words were not received well in Riyadh:
The Kingdom’s 80  years of constant friendship with America to an Iranian 
leadership that continues to describe America as the biggest enemy, that 
continues to arm, fund and support sectarian militias in the Arab and Muslim 
world, that continues to harbor and host Al- Qaeda leaders, that continues to 
prevent the election of a Lebanese president through Hezbollah, which is 
identified by your government as a terrorist organization, that continues to kill 
the Syrian Arab people in league with Bashar Assad?54
Saudi Arabia’s perception of Iranian foreign policy was made explicit through a 
number of newspaper opinion pieces. In one, Adel Al Jubeir argued that Iran sought 
to ‘obscure its dangerous sectarian and expansionist policies, as well as its support for 
terrorism, by leveling unsubstantiated charges against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’.55 
Al Jubeir also stressed that Iran is ‘the single- most- belligerent- actor in the region, 
and its actions display both a commitment to regional hegemony and a deeply held 
view that conciliatory gestures signal weakness either on Iran’s part or on the part of 
its adversaries’.56
Such comments reveal a great deal about the alliance between Riyadh and 
Washington during the Obama administration. Once a mutually beneficial relationship 
driven by the strength of the personalities involved, cooperation between the two had 
become increasingly frayed. The extent of such fears prompted consecutive Saudi 
figures to frame Iran as an existential threat to Western audiences, including through 
the funding of a number of universities and think tanks across Washington, DC.57 
Although ultimately unsuccessful in persuading the United States to strike against 
Iranian targets, Saudi securitisation moves fed into a regional realignment.
As a consequence of existential fears about the Iranian nuclear crisis and the ensuing 
framing of protest movements along sectarian lines, the balance of power across the 
region shifted. Decades- old suspicion and enmity between Sunni Arab states and Israel 
began to thaw at a state level – although data suggests that this is far less popular with 
domestic populations58 – as anti- Iranian sentiment brought long- time rivals together 
in a classic example of realpolitik.
Post 2011, changes in the organisation of regional security provided scope for a 
number of peripheral regional actors to take a more prominent role in regional 
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establish itself as a regional force. While Israel continued to play a peripheral role in 
the region, happy to maintain the status quo and wary of instability brought by the 
uprisings, changing currents across the Middle East supported growing moves towards 
rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf powers amid shared security 
concerns.59 While such moves gained momentum after 2011, diplomatic cables recall 
observations from King Hamad of Bahrain calling for ‘real peace’ with Israel so that 
‘we can all face Iran’.60
Amid such fears, it was hardly surprising that the Joint Comprehensive Plan 
of Action (JCPOA) agreed by the P5+1 and Iran was viewed with a great deal of 
consternation by many, who saw it as an agreement that would empower Tehran and 
its allies across the region. Fearing that Iran might develop a ‘breakout capacity’ while 
also leading to and an emboldened Hizballah, many in Israel, the Gulf and the United 
States were critical of the deal,61 leading to a range of securitisation efforts designed 
to suspend the ‘normal politics’ of diplomatic efforts and calling for a military strike 
against the Islamic Republic.62 Such calls reflect the growing uncertainty across the 
Middle Eastern security environment while also stressing the extent to which regional 
events possess international importance.
The election of Donald Trump as President of the United States in 2016 had a 
dramatic impact on the Middle East. On Trump’s first official foreign trip as President, 
he visited Saudi Arabia and Israel to set out a bolder foreign policy, where his anti- 
Iranian message was well received in both states. The legacy of anti- Iranian sentiment 
from the Iraq War featured prominently in Trump’s cabinet, with Mike Pompeo and 
John Bolton  – two vehemently anti- Iranian hawks  – holding prominent portfolios 
along with setting the scene for future policy trajectories. The anti- Iranian sentiment 
fed into the Trump administration’s policy decisions, choosing to swiftly withdraw 
from the JCPOA, much to the concern of many across the world.
Although the rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran has come to occupy a central 
role in regional machinations, there are added complexities at play. A by- product of 
the policy of geopolitics by other means is the recent tension between Saudi Arabia – 
and the UAE and Bahrain  – and Qatar. Tensions between the two have historical 
roots but became increasingly fractious amid debates over who was responsible for 
coordinating support to rebel groups in Syria. Tensions rapidly escalated, prompting 
the withdrawal of Saudi, Bahraini and Emirati ambassadors from Doha, along with a 
threat to close Qatar’s only land border and putting out tenders to turn the border into 
a canal. Although these tensions were defused, ambassadors were withdrawn again 
in June 2017 amid continued support for a number of Islamist groups such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas – alongside perceived rapprochement with Iran – 
that underpinned the decision.63 As a consequence, air and sea borders were closed 
and Qatari citizens were given fourteen days to return home.
A thirteen- point list of demands was given to Qatar and met with great scorn in 
Doha, where it was viewed as an attack on Qatari sovereignty. In conversation with a 
US TV show, Emir Tamim stated that, ‘Our sovereignty is a red line. We don’t accept 
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consequence of Doha’s engagement with the Arab Uprisings, where a serious difference 
was exposed wherein Qatar ‘stood by the people. They stood by the regimes’.64
The blockade was a consequence of Doha’s support for actors across the region 
deemed unpalatable to the Saudi bloc, including links with Iran, the Muslim 
Brotherhood and subversive activity in Bahrain. The leader of Bahrain’s Al Wefaq, Ali 
Salman, was framed as a Qatari agent on the basis of a phone call between Salman 
and the Qatari Foreign Minister.65 Qatar has long played host to Islamist groups such 
as Hamas, the Taliban and the Muslim Brotherhood in an attempt to wield political 
influence across the Middle East. It has also provided support to groups across the 
region, both formally through foreign policy channels and informally, through Al 
Jazeera, much to the chagrin of Saudi Arabia. Amid existential concerns about regime 
survival, Islamist groups are seen to be a serious threat to regimes in Riyadh and Abu 
Dhabi.66 Yet in spite of this, a number of GCC states have empowered Salifist groups 
and the Muslim Brotherhood in an attempt to counter the threat from Shi’a groups.67
In response to Saudi actions, images of Emir Tamim drawn by the Qatari artist 
Ahmen bin Majed Amaaheed sprung up across Doha. The image, captioned ‘glorious 
Tamim’, appeared on skyscrapers, cars and T- shirts and the cult of personality was 
almost tangible. Although the blockade was seen to disrupt life across Qatar, preventing 
the development of the state amid the development of national infrastructure of the 
2022 World Cup, the ability to import cows from the United States,68 olive trees from 
Italy, support from allies and the development of a ‘blockade busting port’69 meant 
that the impact of the Saudi- led actions was mitigated. Speaking to a hotel manager 
in September 2017, I asked about the impact of the blockade, to which the manager 
replied, ‘Is that still happening?’ The financial might of Qatar has left it with the 
capacity to circumvent external challenges, along with the repressive technologies to 
quell potential domestic unrest.
Yet as it fragments, the Gulf continues to be a region of international importance, 
not only because of the location of natural resources but also as a consequence of 
widespread diversification and integration into global supply chains.70 Increased 
foreign direct investment followed, while the region’s prestige has been augmented by 
links with global sporting brands such as Arsenal, Barcelona and Manchester City, not 
to mention Qatar hosting the World Cup in 2022. Although demand for Gulf oil from 
the West has decreased following the establishment of fracking programmes in the 
United States, Russian and Chinese demand increases.71
Gulf leaders face a number of important challenges in balancing domestic 
agendas with regional relations, along with international obligations and increasing 
domestic discontent.72 Writing in 2011, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen suggested that Gulf 
states found themselves in the delicate position of navigating both the evolution of 
geoeconomic changes and the diffusion of power in the global economy and increased 
domestic uncertainty from pro- democracy and violent Islamist groups.73 Beyond the 
economic challenges of 2014, little has changed. While GCC states were largely able to 
circumvent dissent, structural conditions remain that leave regimes vulnerable in the 
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legitimacy leaves regimes open to criticism from the religious groups who also seek to 
capitalise on societal differences.
Within the context of such machinations, Bahrain and Oman find themselves 
struggling to exert influence and agency, caught in the shadow of their far more 
powerful neighbours. As a consequence, the two have sought creative responses to 
structural challenges, along with recourse to diplomatic efforts. In Bahrain there have 
been serious moves towards fracking amid concerns about depleting oil reserves and a 
brain drain to the Emirates and Saudi Arabia.74 In contrast, Oman has sought to use its 
strategic location as a means of creating influence by upgrading ports in Sohar, Duqm 
and Salalah, allowing cargo to bypass the Strait of Hormuz.
Omani developments take place amid rising friction with their neighbours and 
domestic economic concerns stemming from questions of succession. Fundamental 
to such decisions are desires to maintain independence and reduce vulnerability to 
political pressure from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, particularly in light of Muscat’s 
relationship with Tehran. Yet Omani developments have broader repercussions for 
the GCC, with Saudi investments in infrastructure building seen by some as a means 
of reducing the Emirati monopoly on Gulf trading roots.75 Such competition takes 
place within an increasingly militarised Gulf and proliferation into the Horn of Africa, 
which adds Chinese and Egyptian aspirations into an already volatile mix.
Moments of indistinction
According to Wahhabi traditions, when Muslims die they are buried in an unmarked 
grave to prevent idolatry. Such protocols are observed by rulers and ruled alike. It was 
no surprise that when King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia was buried on 24 January 2015, 
it was in such a grave at an austere public cemetery named El Ud. Abdullah’s funeral 
was attended by a number of Middle Eastern leaders, yet Oman’s well- respected ruler 
Sultan Qaboos was not present, prompting questions about his health. Omanis are 
not alone in fearing for the health of their much- loved ruler, particularly as he is yet 
to publicly anoint a successor, leading to political and economic uncertainty.76 Across 
the Gulf, questions of succession plague a number of monarchies amid concerns of the 
repercussions of political reform.
Almost two and a half years after the death of Abdullah, Mohammad bin Salman, 
the son of King Salman was named as Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, replacing the 
former incumbent Mohammad bin Nayef. Known across the region as MbS, the young 
Crown Prince rapidly progressed through the kingdom’s upper echelons, leaving his 
mark on political life. One apocryphal story recounts how MbS gained the nickname 
Abu Rasasa – the father of the bullet – after sending a bullet in the post to a man who 
refused to help him appropriate property.77
Although initially installed as Minister of Defence, during which time he launched 
efforts to restrict Houthi military action, MbS was soon positioned as Crown Prince, 
heir apparent to the throne. Seemingly reform minded and seeking to facilitate the 
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fissures within the fabric of the Saudi state amid efforts to curb the power of the clerics 
and prevent the spread of violent Wahhabi thought.78
The Crown Prince quickly embarked on an anti- corruption drive across the 
kingdom, resulting in the arrests of eleven prominent royals and two hundred 
members of the Saudi business elite, in a move referred to by Madawi Al Rasheed as a 
‘theatrical performance’. Although framed as an effort to reduce corruption, it was clear 
that this was also an attempt to secure his position amid the uncertainty and shifting 
sands of political allegiance and ambitions within the Al Saud.79 The anti- corruption 
drive was largely well received by young Saudis, with strict legislation preventing the 
proliferation or acknowledgement of extremist ideologies on social media.80 Yet faith 
in the Saudi economy had dwindled as a consequence of the level of corruption. As one 
official told the New York Times, ‘Corruption is at every level, and there are hundreds 
of billions of riyals that are lost from the national economy every year … The point 
here was mainly to shock the system, to send a message that this will not be tolerated 
anymore and that nobody is immune.’81
MbS was also a vocal supporter of the need to diversify the kingdom’s economy, 
driven by Vision 2030. Central to this vision was a move away from a reliance 
on oil, along with the development of NEOM, a $500 billion megacity, viewed as 
the new commercial capital of the kingdom,82 as part of a privatisation designed 
to create more jobs for Saudis and to facilitate the transition to the post- oil age. 
Although comprised of territory in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, the new city 
will be under Saudi jurisdiction.83 In support of this – and with the aim of attracting 
tourists from the kingdom and beyond  – greater importance has been given to 
the kingdom’s pre- Islamic history, with a number of heritage sites being protected 
with United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
status. Tourism was also mooted as a potential source of income, yet the impact 
of this – and recognition of pre- Islamic sites – upon the kingdom’s social contract 
remains to be seen.84
The Crown Prince also announced a move towards a ‘more tolerant’ form of Islam, 
threatening to crack down on members of the ulema who opposed his programme of 
reforms and professed that he wanted to ‘destroy’ extremist ideologies, evoking memories 
of Faisal in the process.85 It was also supported by the aforementioned anti- terrorism 
coalition, comprised entirely of Sunni states but seemingly dominated by Pakistani 
‘boots on the ground’, before outright rejection from the Pakistani government.
Beyond the kingdom’s borders, the Crown Prince embarked on a more proactive 
foreign policy that sought to reassert Saudi Arabia’s dominance across the Middle 
East, restricting Iranian influence and continuing the burgeoning rapprochement 
with Israel.86 Foreign policy has been driven by an explicitly anti- Iranian agenda, 
leading to military escalation in Yemen – a view used to justify the war particularly 
in the Emirates87  – while in Lebanon, a working relationship between Saad Hariri 
and Hizballah officials resulted in a bizarre series of events in late 2017. Amid Saudi 
concerns about the Lebanese political climate, Hariri was summoned to Riyadh and 
forced to resign before being held under house arrest. After his release Hariri returned 
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Yet the kingdom continued to rely on key allies to help achieve its aims. The close 
friendship between Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed88 – the Crown 
Prince and de facto ruler of the UAE – meant that Saudi military efforts in Yemen were 
also supported by the UAE, along with Egypt, Bahrain and Qatar, although the latter 
was expelled from the Saudi- led coalition amid escalating tensions between the two.89 
Relations with the United States rapidly thawed under Trump and Riyadh was the 
first official trip made by the new President after coming to office, demonstrating the 
importance of not only relations with Saudi Arabia but his personal relationship with 
the Crown Prince. In an unofficial account of time in the Trump White House, it was 
reported in June 2017 that the President said, ‘We’ve put our man on top’, after King 
Salman removed Mohammed bin Nayef as Crown Prince and replaced him with his 
son.90 In the months that followed, Trump was vocal in his support of Salman and his 
son, on one occasion tweeting, ‘I have great confidence in King Salman and the Crown 
Prince of Saudi Arabia, they know exactly what they are doing’.91
The close relationship between Trump and MbS makes criticism of the kingdom 
in the United States more powerful. MbS’ father, King Salman, had previously been 
identified as ‘Fund- Raiser in Chief ’ of Saudi funding for violent extremism across 
the world, where an estimated $90 billion was given to mosques and clerics in 
the twenty years before 9/ 11, many of whom used the money to finance extremist 
motivated violence. While Saudi Arabia does not tolerate extremist thought within 
the kingdom, it is widely accepted that ‘it is openly backing, funding and arming 
radical Islamic jihadists outside the Saudi Kingdom’.92 Tackling this perception was 
a key goal of the new leadership in Riyadh, yet the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, 
a Saudi dissident, provoked a great deal of international condemnation not only 
concerning the death of Khashoggi but over the kingdom’s domestic and foreign 
policy.
Old questions, new answers?
On 6 December 2017, US President Donald Trump broke with decades of US policy 
and stated that it was ‘time to officially recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel’.93 
The move to recognise Jerusalem as Israel’s capital seemingly ended the moribund 
peace process. If a US administration had acted in such a manner in the past, Arab 
leaders would have vehemently rejected the move, and the possibility of widespread 
violence would have been high. Yet in spite of pockets of unrest across the region – 
again stemming from grassroots movements  – there was little in the way of a 
coordinated response. The old question about Palestinian autonomy was populated 
with new apathy.
Although most states across the Arab world have played with the ‘Palestinian 
football’, the cause has long been removed from their strategic priorities. In spite of 
strong domestic anti- Israeli sentiment, Egyptian leaders tacitly accepted the embassy 
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guidelines, choosing to focus their Friday sermons on ‘family values’ rather than 
events in Jerusalem.95 Unsurprisingly, Saudi Arabia was largely quiet on the matter. 
On visiting the Washington Institute, MbS offered ‘mild rebuke’ of the decision and 
presented an optimistic vision of Saudi– Israeli relations, but only when asked.96 Yet 
the Crown Prince was vociferous in his criticism of the Palestinian leadership. At a 
meeting with Jewish leaders in the United States, it was reported that MbS said, ‘It’s 
about time that the Palestinians accept the offers, and agree to come to the negotiating 
table  – or they should shut up and stop complaining’.97
Such a response is hardly unexpected given Saudi manoeuvres in recent years. 
Shortly after publicly rebuking Saad Hariri, Mahmoud Abbas, the leader of the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) was called to Riyadh to hear a Saudi peace plan. Reports 
suggested that the Saudi plan was presented to Abbas along with an ultimatum: accept 
it or resign.98 As the outline was comprised of a number of concessions that no 
Palestinian leader could accept, Abbas was furious. The plan did allow for the 
establishment of a Palestinian ‘entity’, but this would include non- contiguous parts of 
territory in Gaza, parts of the West Bank (Areas A, B and 10% of C), leaving limited 
territorial sovereignty. Moreover, the vast majority of Israeli settlements across the 
West Bank would remain. The most troublesome parts of the plan suggested that there 
would be no right of return for Palestinian refugees and the capital of this entity would 
be in Abu Dis or Ramallah, not Jerusalem.99
In response to both Trump’s decision and the Saudi ultimatum, Abbas was 
steadfast: ‘Now we say “No” to Trump, we won’t accept his plan – we say the “deal of 
the century” is the slap of the century.’100 The PLO Executive Committee was urged 
to ‘suspend recognition of Israel until it recognises the State of Palestine on the 1967 
borders’ while the PLO stated that the Oslo Agreements ‘no longer stand’.101 Two days 
after the Jerusalem announcement, Yoav Galant, the Israeli Construction and Housing 
Minister, announced plans to build fourteen thousand new ‘units’ in settlements across 
the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
Later that year, the Knesset passed a ‘nation state law’ that was framed by Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as ‘a defining moment in the history of the state’,102 which 
offers a legal response to existential questions about Israel, codifying ‘the basic principle 
of our existence’. The law enshrined the right to exercise national self- determination 
in Israel as unique to the Jewish people, establishing settlement as a national value 
and labouring to ‘encourage and promote its establishment and development’, making 
spatial ordering and transformation a key part of the Israeli sovereign project.103
Coming home to roost
In recent years, cartoons have appeared in a number of regional newspapers portraying 
Saudi Arabia as the ideological founder and sponsor of violent Salafist extremism. One 
cartoon depicts King Salman placing money into a jihadi piggy bank, while another 
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towards Syria. By their very nature boomerangs return to where they were thrown 
from, suggesting that such problems will return to Saudi Arabia in the future.
State policy in the face of regional and international challenges has only served 
to support such perceptions. Amid a range of political, economic and ideological 
challenges, regimes have firmly positioned themselves within broader normative and 
security environments in the quest for legitimacy and ultimately survival. Driven by 
sectarianisation, in some cases, this has resulted in alliances that will ensure regime 
survival in the face of particular threats but that are unpalatable to domestic populations. 
The collapse of the distinction between regional and domestic is escalating, with 
potentially dire consequences for people, the ordering of space and territorial borders. 
As sectarianisation narratives find traction, sectarian conflict risks becoming a self- 
perpetuating truth, with devastating repercussions, posing serious challenges to those 
aiming for desectarianisation.
The fragmentation of the region post 2011 has posed a number of existential 
challenges to regime survival. In an effort to ensure survival, state- building projects 
have become increasingly exclusionary, defining themselves against an outside, 
leading to widespread marginalisation, repression and disenfranchisement. Yet amid 
widespread uncertainty and instability, (politically charged) religion offers a semblance 
of certainty for both regimes and individuals amid these struggles.
Recourse to religion and tradition to circumvent opposition created a zone of 
possibility to be shaped by the interaction of various groups. The struggle to exert 
influence, lay claim to legitimacy or implement democracy led to accusations of 
state failure or weakness. Some even predicted the collapse of the Gulf regimes, 
most obviously in Christopher Davidson’s After the Sheikhs.104 Although Davidson’s 
claims were ultimately premature, his initial premise has some merit. Although 
traditionally secure states such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE have 
largely escaped from the problems of the Arab Uprisings, this position is not tenable 
in the medium to long term, feeding into the crisis of legitimacy and instability that 
drives sectarianisation processes.
In such conditions, the struggle to shape political life becomes increasingly 
important, while groups and individuals face precarious futures. In an article in the 
Financial Times, the former Jordanian Finance Minister Marwan Muasher suggested 
that the problems facing the Arab world were increasing, with societal fissures 
deepening and economic challenges escalating. For Muasher, fractures in society are 
‘the biggest problem, and unfortunately very few leaders are paying attention to it’. One 
potential outcome is ‘another Arab Spring … the status quo is not sustainable’.105 One 
additional consequence, for Shadi Hamid, is that amid such conditions and increasing 
repression, Islamist groups move towards violent escalation as they are pushed to the 
periphery of political projects.106
The complexity of contemporary political life underpinned by often competing 
geopolitical agendas means that regimes across the Middle East operate with a profound 
sense of insecurity. Such conditions are hardly new, yet the perceived severity of the 
threats facing the region’s rulers have multiplied, challenging stability from a range of 
different vantage points. As scholars of International Relations are aware, existential 
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instability. Regimes across the Middle East now face a number of often competing 
security dilemmas, including the traditional dilemma between states but also 
occurring within states. A number of these internal security dilemmas have regional 
repercussions, particularly when embedded within shared normative environments.107 
In such precarious conditions, maintaining security or reassuring those whose security 
is to be guaranteed is increasingly difficult. As fear permeates the region, along with 
sectarianisation processes, it facilitates the descent into violent conflict and makes the 
possibility of de- escalation increasingly unlikely.
Conclusions
In one of the more powerful analyses of the Arab Uprisings, Hamid Dabashi argues 
that the post- uprisings landscape has been defined by the struggle between domestic 
tyranny and globalised disempowerment.108 In this moment, a new geography emerges 
as states seek to reimagine the ‘moral map’ of the Middle East away from the colonial 
legacy of ‘the West’, essentially ‘altering the very geography of how we think and 
fathom the world’.109 Moreover, the spread of identities and ideologies across state 
borders resulted in the collapse of the distinction between internal and external. This 
conflation of national and regional dynamics obfuscates the counter- revolutionary 
factions at play, while also establishing a new cosmopolitan geography.
Within this new geography, spatial borders have been eroded as a new means of ordering 
life, while schisms within and across states have deepened. Debate about the resolution 
of domestic unrest involved discussions of a move towards federalism, underpinned by 
power- sharing agreements such as those seen in Lebanon. An increasingly popular view 
suggested that an ethno- sectarian redistribution across the region would bring stability to 
the region.110 Indeed, for many, the centrifugal forces shaping the region were interpreted 
as the rearrangement of populations in an attempt to ‘better fit the nation states’.111 After 
the uprisings, these centrifugal forces challenged the spatial organisation of politics 
through the emergence of a new system of ordering life, increasingly along sectarianised 
lines, eroding the sovereign power of the state in the process.
The geography of ideas and ideologies also transcend the construction of national 
borders. Ideas of liberation and empowerment served as a source of possibility and 
inspiration, providing a compelling means through which to reject ‘being thus’. As 
Dabashi argued, the uprisings also served as a means of creating a new geography of 
hope, challenging the colonial legacy of external actors and the counter- revolutionary 
forces that had regulated spatial dynamics across the Middle East. In spite of this 
optimism, following the initial successes of the revolutionary groups, a more restrictive 
and counter- revolutionary set of forces began to shape the region.
Political life is shaped in accordance with the context and contingency of space yet 
underpinning a great deal of recent events is the increasingly toxic rivalry between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran that capitalises on – and drives – the fragmentation of political 
projects. Although a number of organisations have sought to embark on track II 
diplomatic processes, there appears little scope for rapprochement at present given 
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Islamic legitimacy. As a consequence, while the two states have sought to capitalise 
on opportunities that present themselves, this feeds into the fragmentation of political 
organisation and supports sectarianisation processes.
Where authority and legitimacy have been seriously challenged, the move to more 
community grounded identities that often share some form of identity or ideology 
with external actors has supported such claims. Such counter- revolutionary forces 
were supported by external actors, whose own interests did not align with those who 
took to the streets across the region to express political goals. Although his optimism 
appears misguided, we should not ignore Dabashi’s words, which urge us to look 
beyond the clash of imperialism, Orientalism and lazy journalism. Doing so results 
in the construction of ‘truth’ posited upon ‘the grid of prosaic normativity, a reading 
of reality by way of sustaining the power and the benefits of imperial domination’.112
Yet as counter- revolutionary forces prevail, the dreams and hopes of those who took 
to the streets have been crushed by the bureaucratic systems of biopolitical machinery 
designed to regulate life and, where necessary, to subjugate it to death. Ultimately, 
amid widespread devastation and humanitarian crises, the people of the region have 
paid the heaviest price.
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Conclusion: The end of the dream
The story of our struggle has finally become known. We lost our home, which 
means the familiarity of daily life. We lost our occupation, which means the 
confidence that we are of some use in this world. We lost our language, which 
means the naturalness of reactions, the simplicity of gestures, the unaffected 
expression of feelings … Once we were somebodies about whom people cared.
Hannah Arendt, We Refugees (emphasis added)
On 2 October 2018, Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist, walked into the kingdom’s 
consulate in Istanbul where he was murdered by senior intelligence officers, allegedly 
with the approval of Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman. In the days that followed, 
questions about what happened to Khashoggi dominated news cycles around the world, 
while diplomats from the kingdom’s allies pulled out of an investment conference due 
to take place in Saudi Arabia. Following in the footsteps of Raif Badawi and many 
others, the incident reveals a great deal about the extent to which authoritarian leaders 
will go in order to silence critics and maintain power, much like in the aftermath of 
the Arab Uprisings where violence was used to crush protest movements, seemingly 
whatever the cost.
The fragmentation of sovereign borders and retreat into communal identities 
collapsed domestic and regional politics into new spaces of the political that placed 
regime survival above human security, albeit not curtailed by territorial borders. 
Following regime responses to the uprisings, intractable conflicts have emerged, 
becoming all- encompassing, dividing societies and communities along political lines. 
Socio- economic contexts add additional characteristics to these divisions, creating 
conditions that give rise to mafia groups who are able to capitalise on marginalisation 
and instability. The allocation of resources and jobs becomes a mechanism through 
which control is exerted and as such, performing identity becomes essential to 
ensuring survival.
With the fragmentation of the state and emergence of competing claims to 
sovereignty, the biopolitical regulation of life provided the mechanisms of control 
to regulate life through stripping it of its political meaning. Across the region, the 
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creation of bare life was a mechanism of sovereign power, designed to ensure order 
and compliance. Yet in a number of cases, the creation of bare life was an insufficient 
expression of sovereign power. Instead, we see regimes choosing to exert sovereign 
power through necropolitics, with war machines emerging as a consequence of 
widespread fragmentation.
In such conditions, localised manifestations of the global nomos, defined by a 
spatialised exception and underpinned by conditions of modernity have become 
increasingly contested by the contingency of daily life. Amid such contestation, 
definitions of the outside against an inside become increasingly complex, while 
regime efforts to maintain sovereign power shifted from the regulation of life to the 
subjugation of life to death. In conditions of necropolitics, replete with death zones and 
war machines, human life operates in a Hobbesian state of nature, a war of all against 
all.1 There is little doubt that the crises in Syria and Yemen have become humanitarian 
tragedies on a devastating scale, driven by the mobilisation of war machines seeking to 
exert power in the face of – and hiding behind the mask of – state power. Regulating 
life through controlling death, regimes seek to maintain power regardless of the 
human cost.
The evolution of sovereign projects meant that wars were waged for societies not the 
sovereign, to devastating effect. With that in mind, such a view alludes to the emergence 
of a battle between races, resulting in the emergence of state racism. As Foucault argues 
in Society Must Be Defended, ‘a racism that society will direct against itself, against its 
own elements and its own products … the internal racism of permanent purification, 
and it will become one of the basic dimensions of social normalization’.2 While the 
Israeli– Palestinian conflict particularly in the aftermath of the nation- state law, is a 
prime example of such a racial struggle, as documented by the likes of Eyal Weizman 
and Achille Mbembe, events in Iraq, Bahrain, Syria and Yemen possess a number of 
similar characteristics. Yet with the collapse of the distinction between internal and 
external, along with the framing of sect as a main point of difference within political 
life, we see similar processes emerging along sectarian lines, where such difference 
becomes all consuming.
In states such as Lebanon that have attempted to rectify societal divisions through 
democratic means, schisms within society have become embedded within political 
structures that have prevented the descent into all- out violence. A survey conducted 
by the Arab Barometer found that 52% of Lebanese participants reported that 
no party is close to representing their political, social and economic aspirations.3 
Additionally, only the army is seen as a trustworthy public institution, while only 8% 
of respondents trusted the government, 10% trusted parliament and 17% trusted the 
courts and legal system. In Beirut, these figures are dramatically lower, with only 1% 
trusting the government, 2% parliament and 6% trusting the courts and legal system.4 
Unsurprisingly the economic situation is identified as one of the two major challenges 
facing Lebanon according to 64% of respondents, while 43% of respondents viewed the 
presence of Syrian refugees in the country as one of the two major challenges.5
Education plays a powerful role in such matters. One interviewee recalled a lack 









recently have Gulf states started to teach on ideas of nationalism.7 The focus upon 
community rights places greater emphasis upon the power of particular groups within 
society at the expense of individual rights, regardless of the text and indeed sentiment of 
constitutions or Basic Laws. Instead, groups derive power and legitimacy from history 
and culture that provide a reservoir of norms to facilitate the ordering of life, albeit 
with implications for spatial borders. Yet stressing the dominance of communities 
only serves to reify divisions, whereas a move towards greater acceptance of individual 
rights can facilitate a move beyond community divisions. Of course, such an approach 
is easy to discuss in theory but in practice, far harder to implement, particularly amid 
civil war or serious political, theological and socio- economic tensions.
Strategies to retain control amid myriad competing pressures has ultimately 
contributed to the evisceration of state sovereignty and the fragmentation of the 
regional order. The rejection of national identities, securitisation of sectarian identities 
and decision to view events through the lens of communitarian – or indeed sectarian – 
interests has created a political environment that contributes to the entrenchment and 
replication of division at the cost of human safety and well- being. Although sectarian 
narratives have been applied and writ large across the region, the manifestation of 
sectarian difference is contingent upon context. We must remember the importance of 
context- specific contingent factors when conducting this analysis, which can lead to 
different regional manifestations of sectarian difference as a consequence of different 
political contexts.
Just as the construction of space is a consequence of the interaction of the intimately 
small with the global – and all in- between – political life in the Middle East is shaped 
by the interaction of local, regional and international forces. Domestic affairs occur 
within the context of broader events, while regional and international actors capitalise 
on internal affairs in pursuit of their own agendas. Amid a climate of fear and the 
descent into asabiyyah, ensuring support from more powerful actors is of paramount 
importance, yet in doing so, events become imbued with new meaning, adding to the 
challenge of working towards reconciliation.
In failing to respond to the deep structural grievances that drove the protests in 
2011, regimes remain in a precarious situation. At the time of writing, protests are 
breaking out across Algeria – following Sudan and Iraq – amid frustration at similar 
socio- economic conditions that resulted in the events of 2011. Those closely watching 
the Middle East were not surprised, as economic instability and uncertainty continue 
to plague the region. A piece in the Financial Times titled ‘How the Middle East Is 
Sowing the Seeds of a Second Arab Spring’ suggested that conditions that gave rise 
to the protest movements of 2011 had not been addressed. Instead, rising youth 
unemployment, huge public sector wage bills, heavy subsidies on food and fuel and 
declining foreign direct investment underpinned by continued repression left the 
region ripe for further revolution.8
These fundamental challenges were supported by the findings of the 2018 Arab 
Barometer, which revealed that 30% of people in the Arab region continue to live ‘in 
need’, meaning that household incomes fail to cover necessary expenditures. Economic 
pressures mean that 55% of those living in need require financial support, with 17% 
 
 
Houses built on sand238
238
requiring handouts and charitable assistance from family and friends and a further 
15% on charitable organisations. Of those asked, 55% had negative views of their home 
country’s political situations, with 33% of people suggesting that economic issues were 
the most pressing challenges. Some 22% suggested that political issues and governance 
were the most pressing, while only 10% suggested that safety and security were the 
biggest threat. The rule of law was widely criticised. Only 28% of Arab publics felt 
the rule of law was applied universally, while 52% of respondents believed that some 
groups were shown preferential treatment.9
Underpinning such factors is latent structural discrimination against women. In 
a survey conducted by Pew Research, five of the bottom six countries with the lowest 
percentage share of females in the workforce were from the Middle East. While the 
global median female share of the workforce is 45.4%, in Qatar, the lowest ranked 
state, it is 13.4%.10 In economic performance, it is hardly surprising to see Israel ranked 
highest out of all Middle Eastern states, followed by states from the Gulf.
The Arab region has the highest youth unemployment rate in the world, along with 
increasing birth rates. It also has one of the largest public sector wage bills, deepening 
dependence on foreign debt and bond markets. One consequence is the redrawing of 
social contracts. The 2018 Arab Youth Survey documented a widespread frustration 
at recent events. When asked if things in the Arab world as a region have moved in 
the right direction or in the wrong direction over the past ten years, 55% answered in 
the negative. Within those respondents were 89% of people from Lebanon, 88% from 
Jordan and 83% from Palestine. In contrast, across the Gulf, 57% of people answered 
that things had moved in the right direction.11
Western (in)action
In spite of routinely espousing the values and merits of freedom, justice and democracy, 
Western responses to the uprisings were characterised by indecision, first over whether 
to support the protest movements, second over intervention and third with regard to 
maintaining links with regimes that are routinely considered to be abusers of human 
rights. Although the Arab Uprisings were driven by demands for greater democratic 
accountability, world leaders were largely uncertain on how to respond, caught 
between providing support to autocratic allies or endorsing demands for greater 
political equality. Comments from Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton and former British 
Prime Minister David Cameron were replete with uncertainty and, over time, rife with 
contradiction, perhaps best seen in the White House’s responses to events in Egypt 
and Bahrain.
As regimes fought back against protesters, Western governments continued to 
support their allies in a triumph of realpolitik over normative concerns. Supplementing 
this were arms sales to Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, in spite of concerns that these 
weapons were being used in Yemen against civilians and allegations of war crimes. 
Underpinning Western policy towards the uprisings were long- standing fears about 







official suggesting that the ideologies of the Brotherhood and Al Qa’ida were ‘all the 
same’.12 Such views meant that violence was often reduced to ‘ancient hatreds’. From 
Obama and other world leaders, to respected analysts such as Richard Haas, this 
Orientalist thesis is deeply problematic and has facilitated the deaths of hundreds of 
thousands through inaction. We should not view inaction solely as the lack of military 
intervention, but rather as the failure to do anything at all.13
Similar views were echoed by Carla Del Ponte, a UN War Crimes Prosecutor, 
who resigned following the inaction of her employer, arguing that ‘everyone in Syria 
is now bad’.14 This is, of course, a seismic oversimplification. There is no doubt that 
violence in Syria has escalated to a devastating level yet providing support to groups 
who were working to overthrow authoritarian leaders was deemed to run contrary 
to the realpolitik of national interest. Engagement with the conflict is replete with 
generalisations,15 alongside what have been alleged as racist views of the Syrian 
opposition, most devastatingly seen in the case of the White Helmets and their 
association with various Al Qa’ida organisations, which resulted in serious funding 
cuts.16 Of course, a great deal of this is predicated on the predominance of the state as 
the vanguard of sovereign power amid a broader struggle between the homogenising 
powers of globalisation and the nation state itself, between global and local nomoi.
Theoretical reflections
Although predominantly driven by empirical questions, the project has raised a 
number of theoretical points. Sovereign power has been at the centre of our inquiry, 
which allows us to understand the regulation of life and space, along with the way in 
which contestation emerges. As we have seen, the ideas of Agamben, Mbembe and 
Arendt offer strong theoretical support to understand the process through which 
human life is regulated by the sovereign. The struggle to regulate life has taken place 
in a number of different forms, shaped by local context, from stripping life of political 
meaning to controlling life by subjugating it to death. Running alongside all of this is 
the continued presence of war machines that contest state power.
The regulation of life has implications for the ordering of time and space, with the 
concept of nomos central in helping us understand the manifestation of sovereign 
power on human agency. Questions about spatial ordering and normative visions 
of organisation – ordnung and ortung – are central to discussions of nomos. Myriad 
factors shape the interaction of ordnung and ortung, from competing visions of how 
to live as set out by Peter Berger and Robert Cover, to the geopolitical pressures that 
feature prominently in space across the Middle East. Fundamental to both dimensions 
are questions about sovereign power and the interaction between ordnung and ortung 
that creates the localised nomos. Tensions between these competing visions and spatial 
borders have had clear implications for the ordering of space and for political life in 
the hundred years since the end of the Ottoman Empire, from the Arab nationalist 
movement to the construction of a Shi’a crescent and will continue to do so as 
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In the global nomos of the spatialised exception, the struggle to order such localised 
spaces is a prominent feature of political life. From the creation of a state of exception 
and as the normalisation of this exception becomes permanent, zones of indistinction 
are created. Distinction between zoe and bios blurred with the emergence of a nation 
state and as a consequence, ‘human life is politicised only through an abandonment to 
an unconditional power of death’.18 Amid such conditions of competing and contested 
sovereignty, the spatially defined and ordered nomos locates the exception within context 
and contingency, but in ordering life challenges the very relationship between ordnung 
and ortung, along with the broader spatial aspects of political organisation that become 
contested amid competing visions of the organisation of life. In engaging with these 
questions, Geneive Abdo’s comments about the primacy of the state and role of religion 
opens up a zone of indistinction between competing visions of sovereign power, creating 
space for dissent to emerge. In such conditions, the sovereign makes decisions not just 
about the life and death of human beings but over who is a human being at all. As such, 
to paraphrase Agamben, within bare life the homo sacer stands outside of the law while 
simultaneously being abandoned by it, relating to the law through their exclusion from it.
Whither the dream
In the aftermath of the uprisings, the relationship between rulers and ruled has been 
shaken amid contrasting conditions across the region. From an evolving rentier bargain 
in the Gulf to the ongoing war in Syria and Yemen, the nature of political organisation 
appears dramatically different. We should not be surprised at regime responses to 
the Arab Uprisings. Consideration of state- building processes reveals a history of 
regimes acting in pursuit of their survival, deploying governance structures of (neo)
patrimonialism and, when conditions call for it, regulating life through subjugating it 
to death. Amid seemingly existential fragmentation that has consumed societies, the 
implications of such conflicts will be felt long after battles are over, spilling out beyond 
the borders of sovereign states and subsuming others in broader regional struggles.
While the fallout from the uprisings and conflict is perhaps the most pressing 
challenge to peace and stability across the Middle East, there are a number of other 
issues confronting regimes. With a population increase of 53% between 1991 and 
2010,19 the pressure on regimes across the region to provide job opportunities increased 
dramatically, yet the inability to provide employment either in the public sector or to 
create a vibrant private sector, fed into a lack of trust in politics. Projected growth rates 
suggest that by 2020 it is estimated that there will be over three hundred and fifty million 
people living in countries ‘vulnerable to conflict’, which is expected to double by 2050. 
Such deep structural conditions are exacerbated by the growth of an increasingly vocal 
middle class making serious demands on the state,20 where the capacity of Gulf states 
to act was reduced by a fall in oil prices. Changes in the demographic construction of 
states and the fluidity of peoples across the region resulted in serious challenges for the 
management of space, particularly in urban environments. The struggle to regulate 







society after a moment of disjuncture threatened to – and in many cases did – rupture 
relations between rulers and ruled.
The speed of environmental change poses additional challenges that require 
structural responses to ensure access to water and to maintain stability in times of 
chaos. Ensuring the governance of such rapid urban expansions poses a serious 
challenge to local and national elites, whose legitimacy is bound up in the provision 
of security. Underpinning all of this is a burgeoning sense of frustration at the other. 
With the increasingly fractious relationship between ordnung and ortung, new sites 
of contestation emerge. Amid an influx of people from different backgrounds, latent 
racism increases, often resulting in acts of violence against incoming residents. The 
emergence of an increasingly tech- savvy generation poses a new set of challenges for 
ruling elites, particularly across urban environments.
There are also longer- term implications for those displaced from their homes 
within the context of the collapse of internal and external politics. Those forced to flee 
from Syria, Yemen or Iraq typically find themselves in states that are not signatories of 
UN conventions on refugees and, as a consequence, lack the necessary infrastructure 
to protect people. A generation of Syrians will grow up without proper schooling and 
health care, at home and abroad, struggling to assimilate into increasingly xenophobic 
environments made more so by continued violence and sectarian narratives and latent 
trauma.21 Beyond Syria, those stripped of nationality face similar challenges, abandoned 
by the law yet bound by it, while the intergenerational nature of statelessness poses a 
challenge to future generations.
The process of post- war reconstruction – albeit before the war has officially ended – 
provided the Asad regime with a further opportunity to ensure his survival. Recognising 
the need to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), Urban Law Renewal 10 allows for 
the mass confiscation of refugee property, offering areas for potential redevelopment 
and valuable urban real estate.22 Although some frame it as ‘reconstruction legislation’, 
the political dimensions are easily seen. Legislation prevents people from returning to 
their homes while unrealistic demands for paperwork in the midst of a conflict zone 
makes it difficult to prove ownership. All of which serves as a means of expropriating 
land for political, religious and economic reasons. The first areas to be redeveloped 
under Law 10 are Barzeh, Jobar, Qaboun and Yarmouk, all of which had previously 
been besieged rebel areas of Damascas. Estimates suggest that one in three homes 
across Syria have been destroyed, posing serious challenges to lasting – and peaceful 
– redevelopment.
Similar issues plague Yemen, where almost eighteen million are in dire need of 
humanitarian assistance. As fighting continues to devastate the state, getting aid into 
Yemen is increasingly difficult. The port city of Hudaydah, where 80% of the country’s 
aid is received, continues to be the scene of fierce conflict. Beyond Syria and Yemen, 
fragmentation of political organisation continues to have a devastating impact in Iraq 
and Gaza. Those displaced from their homes within and beyond state borders face 
countless challenges amid reconciliation efforts and survival efforts that are jeopardised 
by the cultivation of normative environments that breed racism. On the Greek island 
of Lesbos, Kurdish refugees are persecuted by groups pledging allegiance to Da’ish on 
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ethnic grounds.23 Post- conflict reconstruction is traditionally a precarious process, but 
increasingly poisonous regional dynamics add an extra challenge.
Of course, all (in)action has consequences and within the consequences of the 
securitisation of sectarian identities, people are left to pay the price. Across the region 
the repercussions of dealing with politics through communal identities creates a volatile 
environment where individual rights are sacrificed for the benefit of regime survival. 
With anti- Shi’a rhetoric becoming commonplace in the region and beyond, there are 
serious implications for Shi’a minorities and, conversely, for Sunni communities when 
Shi’a groups respond. Yet there are a number of instances where such binary politics 
is challenged. In Kuwait, Da’ish attacks on Shi’a mosques prompted displays of intra- 
sectarian unity and although the sectarianisation of political life has created exclusionary 
politics and the establishment of communitarian networks that transcend state borders, 
others have responded to questions of sectarian allegiance by stressing national identity.24
While uncertainty is viewed by many with trepidation, it also remains a source 
of possibility. The existence of biopolitical modes of governance restrict the capacity 
for political expression and action, yet the regulation of life also creates zones of 
indistinction that can also be seen as zones of possibility. Although political, social 
and economic situations are bleak, residue of protest and resistance remains in the 
nomos and thus, the dreams of the Arab Uprisings remain. Demonstrations of political 
agency in the face of oppressive structural factors have been a common feature of the 
past decade as regimes attempt to retain sovereignty and the right to take life or let it 
live. As long as there is scope to express agency there is hope; and where there is hope, 
there is uncertainty and an imaginative geography of liberation, justice and dignity, 
effervescent in the minds of revolutionaries and documented in art, poetry and song.
Yet like the unity of nomos, such optimism is but a fleeting glance, eradicated 
in the minds of people as they are abandoned by the outside world. Dreams occur 
within the context of rampant authoritarianism – supported by Western powers – and 
seemingly unchecked efforts to restrict human agency, either through the regulation 
of life or through the subjugation of life to death. As we have seen, maintaining 
sovereign power is the ultimate goal of regimes, apparently regardless of the economic 
or human cost. Political contestation is a consequence of long- standing repression and 
marginalisation, a struggle to exert and control political agency that has transcended 
the borders of the sovereign state. Amid precarious conditions, political futures look 
bleak. As contestation escapes territorial borders, the fight for survival occurs within a 
broader struggle for regional supremacy where people are sacrificed in in the name of 
political projects and, ultimately, regime survival.
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